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FOREWORD  
David Puttnam 
 
To instruct democracy, if possible to reanimate its beliefs…such is the first duty 
imposed on those who would guide society. 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1863) 
 
If the past few years have taught me anything, it is that our need for trusted sources of 
information, comprised of tolerant balanced opinion, based on the very best available 
evidence, has never been greater. In an era of fake news, alternative facts and online trolls our 
Public Service Broadcasters stand as guarantors of accurate, informed and impartial 
information. 
If only the same could be said of much of our national popular press.  
Our democracy is increasingly distorted by mendacious axe-grinding on the part of 
the tabloid press.  
In his brilliant book, Enough Said, the former director general of the BBC Mark 
Thompson writes that: 
 
Intolerance and illiberalism are on the rise almost everywhere. Lies go unchecked. At 
home, boundaries – of political responsibility, mutual respect, basic civility – which 
seemed secure a mere decade ago, are broken by the week.1 
 
Our Inquiry set out to discover if the concept of public service broadcasting could 
survive in the hyper-commercial, market dominated media environment of the 21st century. 
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In the pages that follow I believe that we have made that case that, not only do the 
public believe it should survive, but that our evolved PSB ecology functions as the most 
reliable bulwark available to truly plural and informed democracy in its battle against ill-
informed populism and market totalitarianism. 
The successful democracies of the 21st century are likely to be those in which the 
provision of news and information is rapid, accurate and trusted. ‘Rapidity’ is now a given, 
‘accuracy’ remains a challenge, but ‘trust’ is proving increasingly elusive. 
It is a commonplace to believe that trust lies at the heart of a sustainable democracy, 
yet as Mark Thompson suggests, it is evaporating on a daily basis and, once shredded, could 
prove all but impossible to regain.  
Clearly this is a battle we are losing as the public has made it clear that they no longer 
have any faith in the press and are developing increasing reservations about television. 
I think most people accept that knowledge and understanding play a vital role in our 
ability to navigate the complexities and opportunities of our times. So where do we look for 
guidance, what defines an informed and active citizen? 
This book argues that a well-resourced and fully independent public service television 
system that is free of political coercion offers our most reliable means of rebuilding public 
trust and accountability. 
From time to time we glimpse the possibility of renewal, all too frequently evolving 
out of tragedy; we have to get better at grasping and building upon the lessons of 
Hillsborough, Bloody Sunday, the deaths of Milly Dowler, Dr David Kelly and, the murder 
of Jo Cox MP. 
I started out by suggesting that public service broadcasting was a noble idea. The 
issue surely facing us is whether we can we find sufficient nobility in ourselves to nurture and 
protect it. 
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In his introduction to the white paper on charter renewal the former secretary of state 
for culture, media and sport, John Whittingdale, said of the BBC: 
 
 It is a revered national institution, and a familiar treasured companion. It is a cultural, 
economic and diplomatic force that touches the lives of almost all of those who live in 
the UK and hundreds of millions beyond these shores.2 
 
Of what else in British life could a similar claim be made? 
This book attempts to analyse the current strengths as well as the threats to our PSB 
ecology, and to offer an evidence-based argument for the conditions under which it can not 
just survive, but thrive. 
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Part One: Introduction 
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THE LONG REVOLUTION 
Des Freedman 
 
TV Won’t Go Away 
 
Television is leading a charmed existence. After all, it is no longer supposed to exist. With 
the rise of the internet and the widespread availability of digital platforms, what is the point 
in the 21st century of a 20th century technology that broadcasts from a central point out to 
millions of viewers who are increasingly preoccupied with making, circulating and 
consuming non-broadcast content on their smartphones and iPads? How can television with 
its baggage of ‘mass audiences’ and one-way transmissions compete with a digital universe 
that embodies the more fragmented and decentred nature of the way we live today? The 
American writer George Gilder noticed this development back in 1994, just after the 
emergence of the web. He predicted that ‘TV will die because it affronts human nature: the 
drive to self-improvement and autonomy that lifted the race from the muck and offers the 
only promise for triumph in our current adversities.’3 
But TV hasn’t died. In fact it has stubbornly refused to disappear in the face of the 
white heat of the digital revolution. Contrary to what people like Gilder predicted, the internet 
hasn’t killed television but actually extended its appeal – liberating it from the confines of the 
living room where it sat unchallenged for half a century and propelling it, via new screens, 
into our bedrooms, kitchens, offices, buses, trains and streets. Television has both grown and 
shrunk: its giant screens now adorn the walls of our shared spaces but it is simultaneously 
mobile and portable. Meanwhile, we are facing an epidemic of TV content described by one 
US executive as ‘Peak TV’. Back in 2015, when FX boss John Landgraf first warned about 
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the viability of the explosion in scripted programmes on American television, there were 
‘only’ 400 such shows; now there are likely to be over 500.4 
Even more puzzling than the resilience of the television experience is the fact that in 
the UK, the heartland of creative innovation and deregulated markets, the vast majority of the 
content consumed is provided by a group of people who are described as ‘public service 
broadcasters’ (PSBs)5 and whose remit is not simply to secure profits alone but instead to 
pursue a range of political, social and cultural objectives aimed at maximising the public 
interest. This too has been dismissed as a project without a future. ‘Public service 
broadcasting will soon be dead,’ argued the former ITV chief executive Richard Eyre in 
1999. ‘It will soon be dead because it relies on an active broadcaster and a passive viewer.’6 
Yet millions of ‘passive viewers’ continue to consume, on average, just under four hours a 
day of material that combines, in Eyre’s language, ‘the wholesome, healthy and carefully 
crafted’ with the ‘easily digestible, pre-packaged, and the undemanding.’ 
One of the reasons for these apocalyptic visions of TV’s imminent demise is the 
confusion between television as a specific technology and its status as a cultural form. The 
media commentator Michael Wolff highlights the frequent conflation between TV ‘as a 
business model’, which he argues is incredibly healthy, and TV as a ‘distribution channel’ 
whose future is far less certain. He concludes that there is little reason to believe that ‘people 
will stop watching TV, even if they stop watching the TV.’7 So while we may not all watch 
Games of Thrones at the same time and on the set in the living room, millions of us will 
nevertheless still watch it – perhaps days later, perhaps as part of an all-night binge and 
perhaps on our tablets on the train home from work. Our routines and access points may not 
be the same but there is little evidence that we have lost our appetite for television-like 
content. 
  
11 
On the other hand, there is ample evidence that television is changing – and changing 
fast. Back in 1982, the UK had three channels, a powerful duopoly and audiences for 
individual programmes that were regularly in the tens of millions; now we have a 
multichannel landscape, fragmented audiences, more complex consumption patterns, new 
sources of production and a constant innovation in distribution platforms. In particular, there 
is the prospect of a mass exodus of young people from linear television to online video 
consumption that is not controlled by traditional channels and voices. Viewing of live TV by 
16-24 year olds dropped by 14% between 2014 and 2016 and now makes up only a third of 
their total consumption of video content.8 These are the digital natives who are less 
committed to watching television, given that they are now likely to consume content across a 
range of platforms and devices, and we cannot be sure whether they will ever return to a quiet 
night in front of the TV. On the other hand, even the most ‘disruptive’ voices are launching 
television channels with Vice Media, a relatively new entrant to newsgathering that has 
millions of subscribers to its videos, launching ‘Viceland’ on the Sky platform in 2016. The 
fact remains that even the young remain voracious consumers of television content. 
Television is, therefore, characterised by its durability as well as an underlying 
volatility and uncertainty. Just as the landscape is undergoing enormous change, it is also 
characterised by important continuities. The public service broadcasters (PSBs)—BBC, 
Channel 3, Channel 4 and Channel 5—continue to command our attention; their share of 
viewing (if you include their portfolio channels) has fallen but only from 76% in 2006 to 70% 
in 2016. The PSBs also dominate investment in original programming and the vast majority 
of our viewing—some 80% according to Ofcom—still takes place live.9 It is important to 
acknowledge these continuities if we are to appreciate the significance of the change that is 
taking place and then to consider how best to inspire and sustain high quality television in the 
UK.  
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Sometimes, this means going beyond the headlines. For example, a 2016 report 
examining the crisis affecting TV news notes the ‘significant declines in traditional television 
in technologically developed markets’ and argues that television is now facing the same 
collapse as the print press with audiences in the UK declining by some 3-4% per year since 
2012.10 That is true but highly selective. Viewing to the TV set has indeed fallen by 26 
minutes a day in the last five years but this has simply brought it back to virtually the same 
level that it was in 2006: 3 hours and 32 minutes every day.11 Meanwhile, Enders Analysis 
predict that the broadcast sector is likely ‘to account for the greatest share of viewing for 
many years to come’ with a scenario that sees over four hours a day of viewing in 2025 of 
which three-quarters continues to take place via a television set.12  
So while it is easy (and necessary) to be absorbed by the challenge of the new, it 
would be foolish to ignore the grip of the old. For example, there is understandably a huge 
amount of interest in (and concern in the ranks of traditional broadcasters about) the vast 
subscriber base of video bloggers on YouTube given that they constitute the digital 
generation that is not guaranteed to return en masse to linear TV. However, there is a big 
difference between the potential audience of these vloggers and the numbers who actually 
watch an individual video. So while the British rapper KSI has, at the time of writing, some 
16 million subscribers, just over 2 million watch the average programme; while the fashion 
vlogger Zoella managed to garner 4.1 million hours of viewing in the first 3 months of 
2016—itself an incredibly impressive feat—this hardly compares to the 76 million hours that 
UK audiences spent in front of ITV’s Downton Abbey.13 ‘Buzzy, short form content fill gaps 
that have always existed’ conclude Enders; ‘yet, despite the hype, it will remain 
supplementary to long-form programming.’14 
Similarly, while digital intermediaries like Facebook and Twitter have changed the 
dynamics of the news landscape, terrestrial news outlets remain extremely influential in 
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shaping agendas and legitimising specific perspectives on major issues of public concern 
including Brexit, immigration, race, austerity and terrorism. The bulletins provided by the 
public service broadcasters remain by far the most popular sources of news for adults in the 
UK with BBC One bulletins alone dominating more than two-thirds of TV news viewing.15 
The BBC’s overall reach is vastly greater than that of any other source; even for those people 
who rely on the internet for news, some 56% of them use BBC sites, far more than the 27% 
who use Facebook which, of course, continues itself to rely heavily on other legacy news 
outlets to generate the bulk of original news content.16  
 
The Puttnam Inquiry into the Future of Public Service Television (and its antecedents) 
 
This relationship between continuity and change, and indeed the role and relevance of public 
service itself were issues that were key to the launch of the Inquiry into the Future of Public 
Service Television and the report that followed and that is the focus of this book.17 The 
Inquiry was very much a product of its time: the BBC’s decennial Charter Review was in full 
swing while government ministers were speaking about the possibility of diminishing the 
scope of the Corporation and of privatising the publicly-owned Channel 4. With the rise of 
new sources of content from pay-TV broadcasters and on-demand services like Amazon and 
Netflix—some of whose output, it could be argued, have clear public service qualities—and 
changing modes of consumption to which I have already referred, the UK’s television 
landscape was going through a particularly volatile period. 
The Inquiry was initiated by researchers at Goldsmiths, University of London and 
chaired by the Labour peer and film producer David Puttnam. It invited submissions from 
broadcasters, academics, civil society groups and regulators and organised events—from a 
conversation between Lord Puttnam and the BBC director general at BAFTA in London to a 
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debate about representation involving filmmaker Ken Loach and TV producer Phil Redmond 
at a community festival in Liverpool—in all the nations of the UK. It sought to reflect on the 
place and performance of public service in an age of platforms and populism; it did not 
attempt to second-guess which platforms will dominate in the future nor to speculate, for 
example, on precisely when we will switch off terrestrial television and move to a wholly 
online system. Instead it was more preoccupied with the purposes of television in an era that 
is characterised not simply by technological transformations but also by changing cultural 
and political attitudes: high levels of disengagement from traditional political parties, the 
collapse of the centre ground, falling levels of trust in major public institutions and a 
willingness to identify with social groups beyond the level of the nation state. It aimed not to 
reproduce old debates about the shape of public service broadcasting but to inform what a 
future public service media system might look like.  
Above all, the Inquiry and report considered the extent to which the UK’s most 
popular television channels were successful in addressing the concerns, representing the 
interests and telling the stories of all the citizens of the UK. It sought to highlight the 
conditions that best facilitate the production and circulation of high quality, creative and 
relevant public service content in these complex circumstances rather than to dwell only on 
the specific apparatuses through which this content is likely to be consumed. 
In doing this, the Inquiry drew inspiration from a previous investigation into the 
future of broadcasting that also set out to examine the purposes of television at a time of 
major social change. In 1962, the report of the Pilkington Committee recommended the 
adoption of colour television licences and the creation of a further television channel to be 
run by the BBC. That report, however, was far more than a mere list of policy prescriptions 
and technological missives, but a searing indictment of the direction of travel of British 
television under the influence of a growing commercial mindset and an increasing number of 
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programmes imported from the USA. It advocated measures designed to revitalise the idea of 
public service broadcasting and to foster a more creative and robust public culture. 
The Pilkington report was perhaps best known for its hard-hitting critique of the 
‘emotional tawdriness and mental timidity’ of a new ‘candy-floss world’18 that was 
epitomised by commercial television. Television’s power to influence and persuade, it 
argued, was being abused in the search for cheap thrills and high ratings, a situation from 
which the BBC too was not immune. This ‘lack of variety and originality, an adherence to 
what was ‘safe’ was directly related to TV’s ‘unwillingness to try challenging, demanding 
and, still less, uncomfortable subject matter.’19 Critics, however, attacked the report as elitist 
and moralising when, in fact, it made a very strong case for an expansion, and not a 
narrowing, of content. In words that resonate today given contemporary debates about 
whether public service broadcasters should restrict themselves to areas left vacant by their 
competitors, Pilkington argued that: 
 
No one can say he is giving the public what it wants, unless the public knows the 
whole range of possibilities which television can offer and, from this range, chooses 
what it wants to see. For a choice is only free if the field of choice is not unnecessarily 
restricted. The subject matter of television is to be found in the whole scope and 
variety of human awareness and experience.20 
 
Public service television, if it is to show the full diversity of its audience base, needs to make 
available the broadest range of content while, at the same time, it cannot afford to turn away 
from the responsibility to engage minority audiences.21  
Pilkington contributed to a hugely important debate about the contribution that 
television could make to public life and private interests. It attempted to create an 
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infrastructure that would allow both the ITV network and the BBC to act as a public service 
engaged in a ‘constant and living relationship with the moral condition of society.’22 Today, 
the status and definition of public service is far more fluid and we have lost the ‘moral’ 
certainties that underpinned the Pilkington Committee’s investigation. For some, the whole 
notion of public service television suggests the paternalistic imposition of ‘desirable’ (for 
which read ‘establishment’) values at a time when citizens are increasingly unwilling to be 
the passive recipients of established belief systems. For others, public service suggests a 
regulated form of speech that inhibits accumulation and restricts growth. For example, in a 
famous speech at the 1989 Edinburgh International Television Festival, a year in which walls 
were coming down across the world, Rupert Murdoch tore into what he described as the 
‘British broadcasting elite’ and demolished the ‘special privileges and favours’ that were 
associated with the ‘public interest’. ‘My own view’, insisted the founder of the UK’s new 
satellite service, ‘is that anybody who, within the law of the land, provides a service which 
the public wants at a price it can afford is providing a public service. So if in the years ahead 
we can make a success of Sky Television, that will be as much a public service as ITV.’23 
This neoliberal conception of broadcasting’s role runs counter to the normative 
position that public service should not simply be measured by ratings nor should it exist 
simply to correct any tendency for markets to under-serve minority audiences. Public service 
television—and public service media as it will emerge— 
are not merely the medicine that it is sometimes necessary to take to counter the lack of 
nutrition of a purely commercial system. In many ways, public service television is—at least, 
it is supposed to be—about a specific conception of culture that is irreducible to economic 
measures of ‘profit and loss’; it refers to the ‘establishment of a communicative relationship’ 
rather than to ‘the delivery of a set of distinct commodities to consumers.’24 Its main goal is 
not to sell audiences to advertisers or subscription broadcasters or to conduct private 
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transactions but to facilitate public knowledge and connections. According to Liz Forgan, a 
former director of programmes at Channel 4: ‘Television channels are not pork barrel futures 
or redundant government buildings. They are creators, patrons and purveyors of a highly 
popular (in both senses) variety of entertainment, information and culture to millions.’25 
But if public service television is to be a ‘public good’ that has multiple objectives26, 
then it must, for example, provide content that is popular and challenging; it must be 
universally available; it must enhance trust in and diversity of news and opinion; it must 
increase the plurality of voices in the UK media landscape; and it must provide a means 
through which UK citizens can enter into dialogue. The problem is that, for increasing 
numbers of people, public service television is falling short of these lofty ideals whether it is 
in relation to news coverage that reproduces neoliberal agendas on a wide range of political 
issues or the inadequate representation of minority groups in their everyday lives.27 Indeed, 
this is not a new phenomenon: various studies have drawn attention to the long and intimate 
association between the ‘high priests’ of PSB—notably inside the BBC—and elite interests.28 
Given that public service broadcasting is, at its root, simply an intervention into the 
media market, it will therefore need constant renewal if it is boldly to serve publics and not 
be captured by establishment interests. So when—under political and commercial pressure—
broadcasters fail to protect their own independence, to challenge falsehoods, to provide a 
meaningful range of opinions and to relate to the full diversity of their audiences, then it isn’t 
enough to fall back on the status quo. While right-wing populist voices are very effective at 
attacking the failures of what they describe as the ‘liberal media’, it is interesting that those 
voices on the liberal left—including many who feature in this book— who seek to champion 
public service are often are so often wedded to an uncritical defence of a media system even 
when there is evident need for reinvigoration. There is, after all, a big difference between the 
concept of public service and its actual institutional forms. As Raymond Williams once 
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pointed out: ‘it is very important that the idea of public service should not be used as a cover 
for paternal or even authoritarian system…The only way of achieving this is to create new 
kinds of institution.’29  
For too long, most broadcasters have gravitated towards a perceived ‘centre ground’ 
when this ‘centre ground’ was coming unstuck; instead of promoting a multitude of voices 
and taking risks, they have too often clung to the familiar and acceptable. Yet precisely 
because of the political polarisation and fragmentation we see today, there is an urgent role 
for public service television to act both as a counterweight to a commercial system that is 
more likely to chase ratings and pursue formulae and as a champion of all those whose needs 
have not been adequately met by mainstream media organizations. The challenge, therefore, 
is to design both a regulatory and professional culture to support—indeed to build—a 
creative, spirited and independent public service media. The truth is that the status quo isn’t 
really an option: technology won’t allow it, markets won’t stand still and, perhaps most 
significantly, there is a growing appetite on the part of the public for change and a desire to 
refresh even some of the most ‘cherished’ institutions in the UK. What should replace the 
status quo is precisely the subject of this collection. 
 
Structure of the Book 
 
This book aims to contribute to the discussion about what kind of public service media we 
want and to provide some blueprints for future policy action. The editors have commissioned 
leading practitioners and academics to write brand new chapters that both provide context for 
the debate and reflect on some of the issues raised in the Puttnam report itself. Mark 
Thompson, the former chief executive of Channel 4 and former director general of the BBC, 
argues that we are ‘living through an exhilarating and bloody revolution’ in which public 
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service media will be increasingly important as a corrective to the enormous uncertainties 
facing commercial media. The award-winning independent producer Jon Thoday provides a 
robust defence of public service broadcasting as a ‘public good’ and calls for imaginative 
measures to increase its visibility in the TV landscape while Tess Alps, founder of industry 
body Thinkbox, reminds us why watching television remains such a powerful and necessary 
cultural activity and highlights the role of advertising in sustaining at least a part of the public 
service environment. 
 Leading academics from the US, UK and Europe then map out some of the central 
dynamics of public service television as a specific intervention into the broadcast sphere. 
Amanda Lotz notes that the Puttnam report remains stuck in a ‘broadcast paradigm’ and 
urges us to consider how internet protocols can inspire a whole new conception of public 
service media; the eminent media economist, Paddy Barwise, on the other hand, insists that 
public service broadcasting as it exists today continues to provide both better value for money 
than its commercial rivals and important citizenship benefits. Jennifer Holt, Matthew Powers 
and Trine Syvertrsen and Gunn Enli provide a crucial comparative dimension by focusing on 
a range of different television systems. Holt examines how changing technologies, metrics 
and policies are affecting what is left of ‘public service’ in the US while Powers reports back 
on a survey of 12 countries that shows that, despite all the challenges, public media ‘remain 
vital components of contemporary democratic media systems’. Syvertsen and Enli address 
the main dimensions of what they see as a ‘crisis discourse’ in relation to European public 
service broadcasting and highlight some of the strategies and responses that have been 
pursued across the continent. 
The final three freshly commissioned chapters confront some specific issues that are 
at the heart of the Puttnam report. Sarita Malik addresses the vexed (and very topical) debate 
about diversity and concludes that PSB, while having a responsibility to address multicultural 
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audiences and to provide multicultural content, also has to recognise its own complicity in 
denying marginalised groups full and representative access to the airwaves. The historian 
David Hendy considers some of the key challenges—both external and organisational—that 
face the BBC in the run-up to its centenary celebrations in 2022 while James Bennett makes a 
persuasive case for a policy focus on public service algorithms: for new ‘logics of 
recommendations’ to leverage public service principles of exploration and serendipity into 
the digital age. 
These new chapters are followed by extracts from the Puttnam report that are then 
supplemented by evidence that was provided to and generated by the Inquiry in the shape of 
formal submissions and transcripts of events. We have ordered these thematically into 
separate parts that consider first the underlying principles that animate public service 
television and, next, the role of public service in a digital and on-demand environment. The 
book then focuses on debates on representation, both in relation to the UK as a multicultural 
society and also as an entity composed of different nations, regions and social groups. The 
penultimate part looks at the specific challenges facing genres that are traditionally associated 
with public service broadcasting—such as arts, news, and children’s programming—before 
concluding with the report’s recommendations and an Afterword written by two members of 
the Inquiry team. 
 Every edited collection should come with a health warning. First, while the book is 
designed to inform general debates on the future of public service television, it is also a 
product of a rather specific environment: the UK’s very mixed broadcast ecology. As such, 
some of the discussion might seem to be rather ‘local’ (and even dated) even though we 
believe that these debates have far more widespread ramifications. Second, we are not trying 
to legitimise a particular narrative that will magically unify the very different contributions 
that populate the book but to reflect the hugely different assessments of both the problems 
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and solutions facing PSB. After all, one thing became very clear during the course of the 
Inquiry: that there is very little agreement on key issues including the speed and impact of 
change, the performance of our major broadcasters, the measures needed to protect public 
service institutions, future funding solutions and, indeed, the very definition of public service 
content in an on-demand age. Perhaps this is a valuable lesson: that dissensus, not consensus, 
is the ‘new normal’ and that we had better get used to difference and not attempt to impose a 
consensus on unwilling and rebellious audiences. Indeed many of the report’s final 
recommendations (for examples its proposals on devolution and for a new digital innovation 
fund) are designed specifically to allow some of these differences—demographic, cultural 
and political—to be expressed in a revamped public service media environment. 
In that spirit, this book—like the Puttnam report itself—will not satisfy everyone. It 
will probably be accused of both underplaying the pace of change and exaggerating the need 
for change, of being too soft or too harsh on the BBC and public service broadcasting as a 
whole, of being too timid or too unreasonable in some its prescriptions. We welcome this 
difference of opinion as, after all, the Pilkington Report was also heavily criticised in 
parliament and in the main newspapers of the time. Richard Hoggart, one of the report’s main 
authors, recalls that one ITV executive ‘gave a party in his garden at which copies of the 
report were put to the flames…Other [newspaper]s threw every dirty word in their box of 
cliché abuse at us: “nannying…elitist…patronising…grundyish…do-gooding”.’30 The 
language is likely to have changed in the last 50 years but the passionate debate still 
continues: how best to imagine, improve and democratise what remains one of our central 
preoccupations: television. 
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Part Two: Contexts and Reflections 
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REFLECTION ON A FUTURE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION 
Mark Thompson 
 
Public service broadcasting will become more, not less, important to British audiences over 
the next decade. Political support for public service broadcasting is weaker today than at any 
time in its history. This growing mismatch between need and support is the central problem 
in current broadcasting policy. 
For some decades, ministers and their advisers have developed policy in the belief 
that public service broadcasting (PSB) would become steadily less justified as technology and 
deregulation opened up the range of commercial content available to British audiences.  
If PSB had any continued relevance, it would be in market failure ‘gaps’, ensuring the 
continued provision of genres which were not attractive to audiences (and thus not 
commercially viable), but which were deemed to be of continuing civic or cultural value. Arts 
programmes and religious output are sometimes cited as examples of these market failure 
genres. 
A Future for Public Service Television is right to argue that this is an impoverished 
account of the role and value of PSB.31 But I want to go further: the underlying assumption is 
false. Digital technology has certainly increased the range of content available to consumers, 
but it is also undermining the economics of many commercial content providers. Market 
failure in the provision of high quality British content is more likely to increase than decrease 
over the next ten years.  
Consider the central PSB genre of news. Most people would accept that broad public 
access to high quality news about the UK and the world is vital if we want informed citizens 
and a healthy democracy. 
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But no British newspaper has yet found a viable business model for a post-print 
world, and none has demonstrated sufficient willingness-to-pay on the part of its readers, or 
leverage and pricing-power in the digital ad market, to be likely to do so. The major global 
digital platforms—all of which are American, and none of which place a priority on British 
civic and social needs—will win most of the advertising revenue which once paid for quality 
newspaper journalism, as that revenue switches from print to digital. 
At first glance, news on advertising- and subscription-funded TV and radio seems 
more secure. This is a timing issue, however. We should expect these markets to also be 
fundamentally disrupted by digital over the next decade; for margins to be squeezed; and the 
investment and airtime devoted to news progressively to shrink. 
Perhaps new digital news providers will take up the slack? Alas, no such provider has 
yet demonstrated an ability to create a sustainable, profitable business from high quality 
news, given the considerable cost of a professional newsroom. 
A handful of players will survive and thrive. I believe the New York Times is one of 
them, but it has advantages—a vast home market and significant global subscription 
potential—enjoyed by almost no British commercial news publisher. A few British national 
titles and magazines may also make it, and we shouldn’t write off the most innovative of the 
new digital news companies. But—particularly when it comes to international coverage and 
investigative journalism—the range of British high quality sources of news available to 
households is likely to narrow. News from the BBC and Channel 4 will become more not less 
important. 
The same story will play out with many other genres. Tighter business models, a 
focus on the most commercially attractive audiences and most popular genres, less financial 
room for cross-subsidy and creative experimentation. More choice in absolute terms, but less 
choice when it comes to high quality homegrown content. 
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British broadcasting policy has been largely blind to all of this, and is still broadly 
following the naïve free market play-book set out by Alan Peacock and others in the 1980s.32 
Indeed, commercial lobbying has led, as A Future for Public Service Television notes, to an 
obsession with ‘market impact’, as if the only problem commercial players faced was the 
PSBs, and in particular the BBC. This is manifestly not the case: look at the similar 
downward trajectories of commercial players in countries with weaker or no PSB provision. 
The story of most newspapers in the US is exactly the same as that of their British peers, 
despite the absence of the BBC.  
I welcome the robust way in which the Puttnam report challenges the lazy doctrine of 
market impact, and its suggestions for new rationales for targeted PSB intervention and 
partnership. The ‘public service algorithm’33, a serendipity engine to encourage viewers to 
encounter content they didn’t know they would enjoy and value, points to an interesting 
dilemma—how do you encourage diversity of consumption in a personalised digital 
world?—without being remotely practical. 
The UK has enviable natural advantages when it comes to creative talent, but it is 
desperately weak in the means of distributing the fruits of that talent to the world – and 
enjoying its economic benefits. That was always true in the feature film industry. Given that 
all of the major digital platforms are American, there is a real danger that the same will also 
become increasingly true of our television and video output as well. 
The risk is not that British content will disappear. Our writers, actors directors and 
craft talent are simply too good for that. It is that they will work for companies owned by US 
or other foreign interests, on projects chosen by non-British commissioners and aimed at 
global audiences, and that the lion’s share of the economic benefits of their work will accrue 
to major international players. 
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The result would be a thriving British production sector, but a TV/video industry that 
was a net importer rather than a net exporter of finished content; programmes on British TV 
screens which increasingly serve the needs of international partners and generic global 
audiences, and a loss of national economic opportunity in what could be a significant growth 
sector for the economy. Historically, a small feature film industry that was essentially 
tethered to Hollywood was balanced by a powerful tradition of TV production whose primary 
mission was to produce outstanding and culturally relevant output for British audiences. 
Without intervention, our TV production industry will increasingly resemble our film one.  
Successive British governments have rightly focused on the need for a national 
strategy to build a world-class digital technology industry. We need a national industrial 
strategy for TV production, one which is far less bashful about the central role which the 
PSBs can and should play, both on focusing on the needs of our own audiences, and in 
bringing British talent to the world. 
The PSBs have a particular role to play in ensuring that this industry thrives not just in 
London, but in the UK’s other great cities, and that it fully reflects the diversity of talent and 
experiences in this country. Often—as in the BBC’s investments in BBC North, BBC 
Scotland and the BBC Wales Drama Village—the presence of a PSB operation will 
encourage purely commercial production in non-metropolitan centres as well, creating more 
jobs and more opportunities for talent and local cultural expression. 
Finally, the PSBs—and again especially the BBC—have the opportunity to deliver 
innovation at scale and with world-class creative and engineering talent. At the time of the 
launch of the BBC iPlayer, James Murdoch, who was then (as now) Chairman of BskyB, 
argued vociferously against the launch and the BBC’s right to take part in innovation in 
media technology. In the event, the iPlayer played the key role in introducing the British 
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public to a new way of consuming TV and radio – and in process helped the entire industry, 
including Sky. 
It is not that policy-makers do not hear these arguments, but rather that they attach too 
little weight to them compared to other considerations, and in particular to their outdated and 
misguided belief that, in some unspecified way, a perfect digital market-place will solve all 
the problems which public service broadcasting was invented to address. 
Not just in the UK but across Europe and in other western countries, the same story is 
playing out: fierce and significantly successful lobbying against the PSBs by struggling 
newspaper groups and other commercial interests; politicians who care more about their 
standing with key editors and proprietors than they do about national culture or the needs of 
the public; a slow but inexorable reduction of the PSBs’ room for manouevre, through budget 
cuts, regulatory limitation and ever more complex and onerous governance.  
In Britain in 2016, far more civil service brain-power and column inches of coverage 
was devoted to a debate about the best methodology for appointing members of the new 
combined BBC board than to the astonishing disruptive impact of the major global search and 
social media platforms. We are living through an exhilarating and bloody revolution; our 
policy-makers have their heads down trimming their fingernails.  
Fourteen years ago, when I was chief executive of Channel 4, I turned in a speech to 
Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy to try to capture the cultural ambition of public 
service broadcasting at its best: 
 
The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making 
prevail, for carrying out from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the 
best ideas of their time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, 
uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient 
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outside the clique of the cultivated and the learned, yet still remaining the best 
knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore of sweetness and light.34 
 
We might add ‘the great men and women of culture’ but, other than that, this passage— – 
written many decades before the invention of broadcasting and mass media—faithfully sets 
out the political, cultural and social ideals of PSB. 
All is not lost. The BBC’s new charter is a reasonable one, though the BBC’s funding 
is unnecessarily and damagingly tight. Channel 4 remains a public service broadcaster, 
though its long-term future is still unclear. But broadcasting policy is still significantly in the 
grip of the people whom Arnold called the Philistines, people for whom the public are 
consumers and customers first and citizens second, who regard culture as ‘elitist’ and the 
social and educational claims of public service broadcasting as so much special pleading. 
We need to fight for public service media, through patient, evidence-based argument 
and with thoughtful contributions like the Puttnam report. When it comes to broadcasting 
policy, we need a change in the wind – but such a change is not out of the question. The 
public love what the British public service broadcasters do, and the public is in a rebellious 
mood. Woe betide the technocrat who puts market theory ahead of digital reality. Woe betide 
the politician who puts their relationship with the media magnate above their duty to the 
public. Sweetness and light may make better electoral sense than they know. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION AND THE CRISIS OF CONTENT  
Jon Thoday 
 
Public service broadcasting (PSB) has a long and noble tradition in the UK. We invented it 
and the BBC has been its finest exponent, admired and respected throughout the world. This 
is the case whether in the breadth and integrity of its news reporting or, at the other end of the 
spectrum, the brilliance of its entertainment offering. This highly successful model is now 
under existential threat as never before. The threats come externally from market forces, from 
commercial adversaries chipping away to advance their own agendas and from the political 
class with their concerns about bias. The BBC also faces the challenges common to all 
mature organisations: that of calcification and inertia consequent upon size and success.  
These attacks have not only had a real effect at the BBC, but also the wider industry with UK 
PSB content spend reduced by almost £1billion in the space of a decade.35 Both management 
and government need to recognise that content must be re-prioritised. If this can’t be done the 
industry must act to found a new organisation whose sole priority is the support of content. 
It is widely agreed that British public service broadcasting (a term which principally 
encompasses the BBC and Channel 4) is and has been both culturally and commercially good 
for UK plc. Despite this consensus there is regular debate and criticism, not only of the BBC, 
but also recently a serious suggestion that Channel 4 is a national asset that should be sold off 
to the highest bidder. The main focus of attack is generally value for money or of regulatory 
issues borne out of perceived concerns of political bias or, in Channel 4‘s case, a simple 
desire by the government to realise value. Issues around regulation, which is a costly 
necessity of PSB, seem to attract more debate than the more important and fundamental 
question of the actual purpose of PSB. 
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  PSB is a vital resource for nurturing talent. If you look at where creative talent both 
on and off screen cut their teeth, it is almost always at the BBC or Channel 4. These 
organisations have been almost the sole investors in future talent. They have given a start to, 
and allowed for creative experiment and risk-taking for, countless artists, writers and behind-
the-screen talent. The rest of the commercial industry has time and time again benefitted from 
this investment. There has been cross-fertilisation within the industry as repeatedly key 
artists, producers and executives have made the move from PSB to the commercial sector. 
There is no sign of this kind of investment being made by commercial organisations. The 
most commercial TV environment in the world, the USA, regularly looks to the UK for new 
ideas and talent. The old US resistance to UK product on the basis of impenetrability of 
accent and desire to ‘Americanise’ UK formats has gone. Whereas ten years ago independent 
producers like All3 Media, Freemantle, Endemol/Shine, Tinopolis and Avalon were at best 
bit part players in Hollywood, today they are prominent participants. With the right support 
this growth is just beginning. The change in terms of trade which happened less than 15 years 
ago allowed independent production companies to retain the rights to their shows and was 
transformational in the UK TV industry, incentivising production companies to market their 
content leading to massive growth in international sales. PACT/Oliver & Ohlbaum analysis 
reveals growth from £200 million per annum in 2005 to over £1 billion per annum in 2015.36 
UKTV has gone from being admired creatively to being a sought-after asset. 
British talent and British TV is also a form of soft power.  Shows about the UK 
(witness the likes of Downton Abbey’ and The Crown) are great adverts for the country. One 
of the go-to people in the USA for a worldview on politics is a British comedian, John Oliver. 
The success of the industry, as well as increased exports, is also demonstrated by the amount 
of inward investment from foreign media groups. The Europeans (RTL Group, StudioCanal, 
and ProSeiben), the Chinese (Hejing Culture) and the Americans (Fox, Discovery, Liberty 
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Global, NBC Universal, Warner Bros., Viacom and Sony) are all now heavily invested in the 
market. This inward investment is almost all because of a hunger for the new ideas and the 
commercial growth which flowed from the change in terms of trade. 
In light of the overwhelming evidence that PSB is a significant net contributor to a 
UK TV plc, it is puzzling that the attacks seem more frequent and the BBC more defensive. 
This is symptomatic of the fact that the original purpose of PSB has become blurred over the 
years and the public has become complacent, believing that PSB is a social good that 
government will not interfere with. There is no recognition that the continued good health of 
this resource is not a foregone conclusion, or that what is a success story might turn into a 
massive own goal if support continues to be withdrawn. Inward investment is not a sign that 
PSB funding can be reduced or has effectively done its job. This commercial interest is a by-
product of previous investment and to maintain the success creative renewal has to continue 
otherwise we will see decline rather than growth. 
Clearly the BBC is the main torch bearer for PSB, but it faces significant challenges 
which  contribute to difficulties in delivering on its core purpose. This is one faced by all 
mature institutions, namely that with success and power the organisational imperative 
becomes one of survival of the organism itself as opposed to the execution of its purpose. 
When founded, a public institution is largely peopled with altruistic employees who are very 
clear what they are there for, whether it be a health service, a national theatre or a 
broadcaster, and their energies go into providing something which didn’t previously exist. 
Over time, for a number of reasons, more and more resources and intellectual time get put 
into survival strategies and less and less into promoting its original function. In the case of a 
non-commercial organisation this is compounded by the ambitions of its employees. A 
publically funded organisation does not have immediately obvious markers of success. In the 
business world it is profit or market share, both of which are quite clear indicators. In the 
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publicly funded world, a manager’s success is judged by two things: the number of people he 
or she manages and the level on the management tier they achieve. This gives perverse 
incentives for a manager to employ ever more people to do ever-smaller jobs. It also 
contributes to an inability for anyone to be held to account for any one decision. Both these 
phenomena are very evident at the BBC. 
The BBC management faces three external threats. First, under pressure from 
successive governments, the BBC has been forced to take on functions (and their consequent 
costs) which arguably do not form part of its core purpose. The costs of this mission creep are 
such that the money must be taken from somewhere else within the BBC. The result is that 
any area which is not ring-fenced by government diktat is vulnerable to having money taken 
from it. Second, the BBC is constantly under attack from its commercial rivals who see its 
successes as encroaching on their profits. Last, the BBC faces regular attacks from politicians 
feeling misrepresented by news reportage. These feelings are then translated into allegations 
of bias.  
There is little realisation amongst the public that successive governments have placed 
increasingly onerous requirements on the BBC which are affecting its ability to carry out its 
core purpose: ‘serving all audiences through the provision of impartial, high-quality and 
distinctive output and services which inform, educate and entertain.’37 An example of this can 
be found during licence fee negotiations in 2015 whereby an agreement was extracted from 
the BBC to fund the television licences of pensioners. A cynic might say the government 
originally gave pensioners this perk as a sweetener for electoral advantage and then years 
later foisted the £650 million per annum cost of this onto the BBC.38 Past incursions on the 
licence fee have included the decision in 2010 to withdraw funding of £253 million for the 
benefit of the World Service (this was subsequently ameliorated somewhat by George 
Osborne), funding the Welsh-language broadcaster S4C which costs £74.5million, supporting 
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the government rollout of fast broadband throughout the nation (£80 million), and the 
provision of local television services (£40 million). There is also the long-term funding of 
nine orchestras and choirs, which could be said to sit more appropriately within the aegis of 
the Arts Council. The Nations and Regions policy, whereby the BBC is required to produce a 
certain amount of content outside of London, has caused massive increases in production 
costs which are not seen on screen. Whilst these things are all on the face of it born of good 
intentions they have been done at the expense of funding content. 
 The government requirement that the BBC be at the forefront of technology is 
particularly outdated. This has in the past been a benefit but more recently has led to 
misspending of substantial sums of money. Exhibit A here is the cost of the disastrously 
misconceived spend on digitisation which current BBC Chairman, Tony Hall, cancelled with 
a loss of £100 million with practically nothing to show for it.39 We live in a world where 
technology is so advanced and so readily available that there really is no need for the BBC to 
speculate on future developments when the commercial world is doing exactly that very 
successfully. We can all broadcast from our phones and many people have become stars 
online without the need for technological support from public funding. At the dawn of 
broadcasting it was easy to see why this was not only in the remit but an absolute necessity. 
Today, it is access to funding of quality content that is the main issue and if new talent is to 
be nurtured and new shows created to replace the ageing shows then much more focus needs 
to be given to it. 
 The second attack comes at the behest of commercial rivals of the BBC and Channel 
4. There is a constant drumbeat from both the Murdoch press (in print and broadcast) and the 
Daily Mail seeking to denigrate public service broadcasting. Consider, for example, Paul 
Dacre’s attacks on Michael Grade while chairman of Channel 4 as ‘pornographer in chief’ or 
James Murdoch’s attacks on the BBC during his MacTaggart lecture at the Edinburgh TV 
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festival in which he notably compared government intervention in broadcasting with failed 
attempts to manipulate the international banana market in the 1950’s, described the BBC’s 
size and ambitions as ‘chilling’, and indicated that its news operation was ‘throttling’ the 
market.40 
 The third area of attack concerns bias. Successive governments, whether Tory or 
Labour, have complained of BBC bias. It has been argued that the fact that fellow travellers 
from both sides of the political divide feel misrepresented by the BBC is evidence in itself 
that in fact the BBC has been largely successful in walking the independent line. However, 
new regulatory arrangements are set to increase the potential for day-to-day interference of 
the BBC through government-nominated board members and can be argued to be an 
incursion upon the BBC’s independence.41 Before this development previous governments 
had used the threat of more control over the BBC as a bargaining chip in licence fee 
negotiations.  
 It can be seen that the BBC is being squeezed by myriad forces. These forces have 
tied the hands of BBC management requiring them to spend decreasing time worrying about 
content and more time worrying about cost control and threats to its role. The solution to 
budgetary problems has not been to reduce management costs but rather to take it out of the 
cost of programming. For example the BBC invested some £500 million less in original 
content in 2013 than it did in 200442 and it is predictable that if you spend less money on 
content, quality suffers. It’s a simple calculation: if you make the same number of 
programmes for less money, the quality will suffer and you will have fewer successful shows. 
Furthermore, for every new show that succeeds there are many that fail. If cuts lead to fewer 
shows being made then it is going to take longer to find the needle in the haystack - new 
successful shows. Creative experimentation leads to innovation but fear of failure makes this 
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experiment too risky. Creative risk should remain at the very heart of PSB, however current 
circumstances make it less and less acceptable for executives to take such necessary risks.  
 The reduction in spend has also led to the BBC making cuts to platforms. Most 
notable in recent history was its decision to move BBC3 from its terrestrial platform to an 
online only platform.  This was significant because BBC3 was unique as a place for diversity. 
It gave an outlet for innovative content often by new creative talent and producers. The 
reason given for closing was simple: money.  
 The closure of BBC3 was a symptom of a wider problem, a general move away from 
focusing on innovation and the younger audience and a refocusing on ‘tent pole’ dramas with 
high-end established talent. This failure to engage a younger audience and develop new talent 
will have adverse effects for which the rest of the industry, and the UK viewer, will pay in the 
future. Now what is left in the free, non-commercial UK broadcast television landscape is 
two ageing channels with similarly ageing audiences.43 This is not because the young do not 
want to watch television, or because they are only prepared to watch it on their tablets or 
phones. It is because the BBC’s two main channels are largely filled with old programmes for 
old people. They have very long-running, successful shows that appeal (unsurprisingly) to 
ageing audiences. The past success of these channels militates against creative renewal as 
they are full of shows which effectively cannot be cancelled. In some ways they have become 
hostage to their own success, meaning that younger viewers’ interests are not being 
addressed.  
 Today, faced with the reduction in the content spend discussed above, it is unlikely 
that any channel controller would clear primetime schedules by, say, cancelling an episode of 
a soap. There would be a viewer outcry. Even if they did then most likely the replacement 
show would fail because, as discussed above, most new shows do. Potential failure is not a 
problem any executive wants. It is much easier to pick the next signature, high-budget, 
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international co-production drama than it is to find new programmes to entertain the mass 
audience in primetime. One can always point at a few programmes which skew young but 
there has been a withdrawal from youth-centered platforms and there is no sign of any 
attempt to skew these remaining channels younger overall.  
 Weekday primetime pre-watershed, which is the time where traditionally the very 
large audiences can be found, is full of ancient soaps. A study of BBC1 schedules before nine 
o’clock during the week reveal either on the one hand a soap or, on the other, a show that is 
low priority because ITV is broadcasting a soap at the same time so the competition is too 
great. There is virtually no thought or investment in programming for the primetime mass 
audience in that time slot during the week and there hasn’t been for decades. Controllers of 
BBC1 are left with relatively few slots to play with and almost none of those having a decent 
budget allocation are pre-watershed. This is a dereliction of both the youth audience and of 
creative talent at the beginning of their careers.  
 These cuts do not only affect the BBC. They have knock-on effects on the other 
broadcasters because it allows them to feel able to make their own cuts as this maximises 
value for their shareholders. What is good for shareholders is not necessarily good for the 
viewing public. Whatever the new BBC Charter44 and BBC management say about the BBC 
working in partnership with the rest of the industry, it is in competition with other 
broadcasters and if it fails to do the things that only it can do, then commercial broadcasters 
no longer feel that they have to step up to the plate either.  
 Senior executives are able to point to many successes as a way to convince the 
government and the viewer that all is well, but they are in denial not only are things not well 
but they are in significant decline and worryingly endangered. The lack of investment in new 
talent and the lack of new investment in prime time programming is at the heart of potential 
problems for the future and mirror the problems of the ageing institution as a whole. BBC1 is 
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secure in its soaps and makes waves with some prestige dramas. Having signature pieces like 
David Attenborough programming or The Night Manager are get-out-of-jail-free cards, 
whilst the vast number of soap hours maintain the big audience. Successive industry heads 
have blamed the decline of broadcast television viewing on changes in viewer habits as 
opposed to simply a reaction to the shows that they choose to broadcast. TV watching is not 
in decline in general. More people than ever are watching screens and the rise of the likes of 
Netflix shows what happens if you launch a new service predominantly focusing on content. 
 Decline is not inevitable. It could be reversed with enough will both politically and 
from the industry. Government needs to require the BBC not just to entertain the public but 
also to do what commercial organisations find hard, namely to innovate, to support new 
talent, and to take far more risks. There needs to be a requirement that investment on content 
must be increased, not reduced. This should be fundamental to the BBC charter. Currently 
BBC management faces a dilemma. It is easy to cut content budgets, hard to cut overheads, 
and impossible to cut ring-fenced obligatory spends.  Therefore the lead must come from 
government which, if it was less concerned about perceived political bias and more 
concerned about what best served the audience, would ring-fence the content spend of the 
BBC. 
 Realistically in the light of the difficulties facing the current guardians of public 
service broadcasting set out above there needs to be another way forward. If the UK is to 
maintain its position as a leader in the creative world both culturally and creatively, with its 
ensuing consequent financial advantages, then investment must be found. There must then be 
a way of focusing that investment on the green shoots of creativity that lead to huge popular 
hits.  
 So while doing everything possible to persuade the government to require the BBC to 
maintain, and even grow, its content spend and doing everything possible to persuade the 
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government not to privatise Channel 4, there needs to be a third way to rebuild and support 
PSB. One possibility would be to have a publicly funded third body whose sole purpose is to 
fund content.45 Companies, producers, and broadcasters could apply to fund projects which 
are either unfunded or in need of top-up funding. This could be for start-up companies or for 
project development, as well as for production funding. Revenue generated from these 
projects would be part-owned by the new organisation as a return on investment which could 
then in turn be reinvested. 
 This could be a new body with funding of say £500 million per annum (being the gap 
left by the BBC) or it could be an existing body like Creative England which, despite being 
very poorly funded, has already done amazing work in funding start-ups. If its remit and 
funding were expanded it could be empowered to concentrate solely on UK-produced content 
be it radio, TV or gaming. 
 To be clear, this is not a proposal to top-slice the license fee but a suggestion to 
replace the lost BBC content funding with a new organisation which will stand or fall by its 
focused decisions. Initial funding for the new PSB or public service funder (as it might be 
called) could come from the commercial sector and government and, once established, be 
partially self-funded from revenue which would flow from the projects and companies that 
benefit. There is precedent for this. When Channel 4 was founded it was part-funded by ITV 
for many years until it became self-sufficient. This new long-term investment in content and 
new talent would help plug the gap left by the BBC. The commercial broadcasters woujld 
benefit because they need the content and the public would benefit it because it is what makes 
our television the envy of the rest of the world. This body will, by necessity and remit, be 
forced to focus on new and diverse talent. A fiscally minded government should be part 
funders because the evidence of increases in exports is overwhelming. In the light of Brexit, 
the future economy needs all the help it can get. Receipts of £1 billion per annum should be 
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just the beginning if we do not turn away from the success that the industry has achieved 
thanks largely to PSB. 
 Public service broadcasting is a social good, both economically and culturally. The 
BBC as the primary guardian of PSB is facing too many challenges to be able to protect and 
advance it. In the absence of political will to force the BBC to concentrate on its core 
function, a new organisation has to be empowered to plug the content gap and intellectual gap 
left by the BBC. It is imperative to find a way to generate the talent of the future and ensure 
that the focus remains on the production of great new British content for the benefit of the 
UK as a whole. 
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TV ADVERTISING FOR ALL SEASONS 
Tess Alps 
 
When I arrived to set up Thinkbox46 from scratch in 2006, the name had already been chosen.  
There have been many times since when I have wished for a more ‘Ronseal’ name—the TV 
Advertising Association maybe—but, back then, the broadcasters weren’t sure whether ‘TV’ 
would remain the word to describe best what they do.  In fact, ‘television’ has proved itself to 
be the most elastic, comprehensive, comprehensible and appropriate word that exists to 
describe the business we are in. 
The word ‘television’ means something very real to viewers: the word they reach for 
when they are watching any professionally-made long-form entertainment in-home or on a 
personal device. Sometimes we professionals agonise over whether the BBC iPlayer, All4 
and Netflix are truly TV or just video, but the average viewer is in no doubt – of course they 
are ‘telly’. 
Television is also a word that many other companies have ambitions to appropriate: 
for example, Google TV, Apple TV and Telegraph TV.  It’s an aspirational word; they 
choose it because it conveys a certain quality.  
Thinkbox’s stakeholders comprise both public service broadcasting (PSB) and non-
PSB channels. It would therefore be inappropriate for us to engage in public debate about the 
desirability of any particular outcome regarding PSB or public service content (PSC). Hence, 
when we were asked to contribute to David Puttnam’s report on the future of public service 
television47 we had to consider how best to be involved and, indeed, whether it was 
appropriate to be involved at all. After consultation with our board, we decided that the 
Inquiry’s Report was an important and responsible undertaking and that it would be remiss 
not to help it by sharing our research. Thinkbox’s specific expertise in TV advertising was an 
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important consideration. Advertising income is, after all, a major part of the whole TV 
economy and a totally vital one for the commercial PSBs. 
The report references some of our research, in particular the work we do to 
contextualise the changes that are happening to how TV is being viewed. As you will read in 
other parts of this book, people are watching as much TV as ever but less of it is live or 
captured within the industry’s ‘standard’ definition of viewing in-home on TV sets, live plus 
7 day playback and on-demand. We need to stop being surprised that ‘standard’ TV is 
declining given how much effort and investment broadcasters are making to entice people to 
watch differently. 
At some point—hopefully sooner rather than later—BARB will be able to quantify 
reliably all these new avenues for TV viewing. In the meantime, our work suggests that 
almost all of any apparent ‘loss’—yes, even for younger viewers—will become reclaimable. 
In addition to the various forms of TV, there are many other new sources of video 
from the sublime to the ridiculous. We should not assume that one form of video is 
necessarily a substitute for another. For example, watching Zoella’s make-up tips on 
YouTube is more a replacement for reading a teenage magazine than watching Hollyoaks; 
watching (or listening to) music videos on Vevo is more a replacement for radio than 
watching Dave; chilling to Netflix is at least as much replacing the rental and purchase of 
DVDs as it is the viewing of The Halcyon or Game of Thrones.  
The graph below gives an overview of the time spent watching all the various forms 
of video for which reliable research exists. Detailed data is only available for the more recent 
forms of video and viewing to DVD/Blu Ray for the last four years. However, we have 
estimated viewing using broadband penetration and DVD/VHS sales as a proxy to determine 
historic viewing levels. What is clear is we are watching more and more video – this is not a 
zero sum game. 
  
42 
 
Figure 1: Total TV viewing is resilient as all video grows 
 
I would like, in this chapter, to do just three things: to give my highly personal 
interpretation of PSB, to dissect the relationship between advertising and public service 
broadcasters, and finally to use some of Thinkbox’s qualitative insight to imagine the future 
of advertising within PSB. 
 
Public Service Broadcasting and ‘Sacrifice’ 
 
I was clearly waiting for my parents to buy their first television set for the televised 
Coronation before I deigned to be born in the autumn of 1953. I have never lived in a home 
without at least one TV set and I would definitely feel rather queasy if it ever happened. 
Growing up in a small village in the wasteland of north Nottinghamshire where it took 40 
minutes to get by bus to the nearest town which boasted one cinema, television was—in 
Homer Simpson’s words—my ‘Teacher! Mother! Secret Lover!’ 
Our playground games were influenced heavily by the TV we had all been watching: 
The Adventures of Robin Hood and Dr Who were great favourites. I saw my first Shakespeare 
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play, my first opera, my first political debate thanks to TV. My first crush was on Dr Kildare 
– and frankly I still haven’t quite recovered. 
The value of PSB is rightly defined by all the noble words you will have read many 
times already in this book: quality, range, diversity, accuracy, ambition, innovation, 
impartiality, and so on. But one of those words—universality—is at least as important as the 
others in my opinion. The universality—the availability and accessibility—of PSB is what 
makes it such a unique cultural asset. It’s not particularly high-minded to be able to share 
jokes about, say, Simon Cowell’s trousers or Claudia Winkleman’s eye-liner, but it provides 
crucial social glue. 
PSB is a slippery beast when it comes to nailing a definition. It certainly is not to be 
found solely in a limited number of supposedly uncommercial genres, though that is part of 
it. My personal approach to deciding whether something is public service in character or not 
is bound up in the notion of ‘sacrifice’. Sacrifice means more than just risk-taking. All 
broadcasters take risks; it’s vital for any organisation in any sphere with a desire to remain 
successful and relevant. Sacrifice is different; it is about making a deliberate decision in the 
pursuit of public good which will almost certainly disadvantage the broadcaster 
commercially, politically or reputationally. 
A very obvious example of this is Channel 4 News, an hour long news programme 
scheduled at 7pm each weekday. The conscious ‘sacrifice’ is three-fold: quality news 
programmes are relatively expensive to produce; news programmes have no shelf-life and 
minimal residual rights value; and an entertainment programme broadcast at 7pm would 
almost certainly gain a higher audience and hence generate more advertising revenue. 
The ‘sacrifice’ test holds good for almost all news and current affairs programmes and 
most children’s output. How does quality drama fit in? Well it is certainly a hugely expensive 
risk. There was absolutely no guarantee that ITV’s historical drama series, Victoria, shown in 
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autumn 2016 would be a success. The vast cost was mitigated by a co-production deal but the 
international appeal of a story about a dead British queen was, on the face of it, limited. One 
could argue that investing in quality drama is an important element in the brand of ITV which 
raises its overall status. Purely from an advertising angle, one could also argue it attracts 
viewers from the demographic groups that command a price premium. But, without doubt, 
Victoria was a ‘sacrifice’ decision in advance; whether a recommission, made after the 
successful first series, could also be counted a sacrifice is a point for debate. 
The ‘sacrifice’ aspect of PSB does not relate only to the nature of the content, its 
genre and cost. Decisions about scheduling frequently demonstrate sacrifice, Channel 5’s 
Milkshake segment for young children being a prime example. And it affects marketing too.  
When Channel 4 uses limited marketing budgets to promote Dispatches instead of its latest 
comedy, the return on investment in terms of ad revenue will be lower, notwithstanding the 
high cultural return on investment. 
When a commissioning, scheduling or marketing decision consciously embraces a 
‘sacrifice’ but ends up delivering unexpected success, this is a cause for rejoicing. Many 
stalwarts of PSB schedules were discovered through a ‘sacrifice’ decision and they pave the 
way for others to follow. This is one of the enormous gifts PSB gives to the entire television 
ecology. 
There are many obvious examples, as the Puttnam Report acknowledges, of public 
service purposes being met by non-PSB broadcasters; Sky News, Discovery, Nickelodeon, 
Dave, Amazon and many others can point to various programmes that tick PSC boxes.  But 
understanding why those companies commission such shows—when there is no regulatory 
obligation to do so—is a complex undertaking, involving issues such as unique reach, 
audience profile and the value of niche demographics for advertising, marketing, bundling, 
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and political lobbying. None of that should stop us valuing the resultant quality output 
however. 
 
The Relationship between Advertising and Public Service Content 
 
If universality is a key tenet then any form of subscription or payment at the point of use 
immediately precludes pay TV providers, platforms and channels, from sitting within the 
PSB camp. In light of this, I conclude that PSB can be paid for in only one of three ways: a 
universal licence fee, direct treasury funding or advertising.  I shall leave discussion of the 
BBC licence fee to others though it is worth saying that, were the BBC to stop receiving it 
and look to advertising income instead, overall TV ad revenues would be unlikely to increase 
sufficiently to replace it and all other broadcasters would suffer, not to mention many other 
media. 
Total TV advertising income (including sponsorship and VOD) has almost kept pace 
with the overall growth in the advertising market, which is somewhat remarkable given the 
extraordinary dynamism of online formats such as search and social media. In 2016, TV ad 
revenue48 totalled £5.27bn gross (which is how the ad industry talks about ad income) or 
£4.48bn net of agency commission (which is how Ofcom and public companies express it).  
There is sometimes confusion between these two ways of talking about TV ad revenue.  TV’s 
share of total advertising is estimated at 25.3% in 2016 whereas in 2000 it was 27.5%.49 
Despite TV advertising’s relative health, the percentage contribution advertising makes to the 
TV industry’s total revenue has declined, as income from subscriptions has increased. 
According to Ofcom, in 2000 advertising contributed 44.5% to TV industry total income; in 
2015 it was just 30%.50  In recent years, this percentage has stabilised because the percentage 
gathered from the licence fee has declined. Without advertising providing the third ‘leg’ of 
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TV’s income stool, commercial PSBs would collapse and the profitability of subscription 
broadcasters would be severely dented. 
Those of us who work in advertising are humble enough to know that it is not 
universally popular but, presented with the choice of paying or seeing ads, most consumers 
opt for the ad route when questioned. Our challenge is to make TV advertising acceptable and 
ideally enjoyable. The existence of the ad-free BBC has a marked effect on British viewers’ 
relationship with TV ads. It makes them more sceptical and more impatient. You might think 
that these that these sentiments are wholly negative but in fact they have acted as a brake on 
excessive advertising on the commercial PSBs in the UK. This is in marked contrast to the 
USA where the growth of cable and SVOD appears to be, at some small level, attributable to 
ad-avoidance. 
In a world where a reported 22% of UK online users—and growing—have installed 
an ad-blocker51, the public remains generally accepting of TV spot advertising and even more 
positive about TV sponsorship in the UK. While the majority of ads are skipped in the 14% 
of standard TV that is recorded and played back, 86% of standard TV is watched live. We do 
not see levels of militant ad avoidance in British commercial TV. One way to assess this is to 
look at comparative levels of recording and playback between the BBC and commercial 
channels. As the chart below shows, there is no evidence of people recording more 
programmes on commercial channels in order to allow them to skip ads.   
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Figure 2: Time-shifting is driven by genre, not ad avoidance 
 
As you can see, the levels of recording are chiefly determined by genres, with news and sport 
being the least recorded and drama the most. TV ads must be watched at normal speed to be 
counted by BARB; hence fast-forwarded ads are free to advertisers even though they do have 
a residual effect. One unfortunate consequence is that some programmes that are amongst the 
most expensive to make—and the most highly valued and hence recorded—lose the highest 
percentage of the potential value of ads within them, drama being the biggest victim here. 
One of the benefits of commercial broadcasters’ VOD services, versus playback, is 
that the ads can be made unskippable, and access denied to viewers with ad-blockers 
installed. This is a delicate balance however which I will address in my final section. But as 
all forms of video grow it is interesting to see that broadcasters deliver the vast majority of 
minutes actually watching video advertising, with live TV performing very strongly. 
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Figure 3: TV accounts for 94% of all video advertising time 
 
The Future of TV Advertising 
 
Thinkbox’s work is focused on presenting hard and impartial facts in the face of a decade of 
‘post-truth’ and ‘alternative’ facts about what is happening to TV. We deal in empirical 
evidence; we have learned that asking people how much TV they watch is about as reliable as 
asking them how much they sex or food they have. We rely on proper measurement, 
observation and, when looking at the subject of advertising effectiveness, business outcomes 
through the discipline of econometrics.  One of the joys of using ethnography—filming 
people watching TV in their own homes—is being able to present the footage back to 
participants. They are amused, bewildered and occasionally horrified to see themselves doing 
what they swore they never did.  
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If it’s unreliable to ask people what they do currently, how much more useless is it to 
ask them how they will watch TV in the future? Hence, Thinkbox makes few predictions.  
Technology is one half of the equation; while some developments are predictable, 
occasionally a technology pops out of nowhere to change the game. But the other half of the 
equation is human psychology and this is an area we have found it worthwhile investigating 
in various ways including neuroscience, in-depth interviews and implicit attitude testing.  
One significant study uncovered the psychology that leads us to watch TV, film and 
video in certain ways. Sometimes our needs are highly personal; at other times they are more 
socially driven. Often the context of viewing—such as being with loved ones on a comfy 
sofa—is more important than the content itself; more often though, certain programmes are 
so important to us that we are prepared to make compromises with the context, such as 
watching a live football match on a smartphone on the way home from work. The researchers 
identified the six core need-states that watching TV and video fulfill. 
 
 
Figure 4: The six need-states of TV & video 
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• Unwind: defer life’s chores or de-stress from the pressures of the day, for example 
Countdown or This Morning. 
• Comfort: shared family time; togetherness, rituals, familiarity and routine, for example 
Coronation Street, Hollyoaks, Antiques Roadshow and The Simpsons. 
• Connect: a sense of ‘plugging in’ – to feel a sense of connection to society, to time or to 
place, for example through all forms of news, current affairs, live reality and factual 
entertainment such as Big Brother, I’m a Celebrity, Gogglebox, Have I Got News For You. 
• Experience: a need for fun and a sense of occasion to be shared  eg major entertainment such 
as The Voice, Strictly Come Dancing and major live sport.   
• Escape: the desire to be taken on an enjoyable journey to another time and place, for example 
Game of Thrones, Victoria, Peaky Blinders. 
• Indulge: satisfying your (often guilty) pleasures with personal favourites, usually alone, with 
programmes such as Celebrity Juice, Great British Sewing Bee and America’s Next Top 
Model.  This is also the need-state that online pornography satisfies. 
The study found that live TV offers a range of programming to meet all the six need-
states. But some of the newer forms of TV and video perform particularly well against certain 
of these need-states. Being able to watch TV content of your choice, at a time and place to 
suit, whether through VOD or playback, serves the Escape and Indulge need-states strongly, 
while social video, such as sharing clips of TV with friends, enhances the Connect need-state.  
However, four of the six need-states—Unwind, Comfort, Connect and Experience—are 
highly dependent on scheduled TV. This leads us to anticipate that, although the various 
forms of on-demand TV will grow, the need for live TV will always remain, whether 
broadcast or live-streamed. Technology changes, but human psychology doesn’t. 
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Given advertising’s crucial role in funding the commercial PSBs, we moved on to 
address how the six need-states affect social acceptance of advertising. We found that where 
people are watching live TV in a very relaxed, context-driven state, advertising is accepted as 
just a normal part of commercial TV. There is even evidence that some people look forward 
to the advertising in, say, a big sporting event, because they anticipate it will be of high 
quality, much as in the US Superbowl. 
When people are watching playback or on-demand, however, their tolerance of 
advertising is lower. They want the programme to start with minimum delay. When they are 
in Escape mode, they also expect the advertising to be congruent with their emotional state; 
holidays and perfume sit well here for example whereas toilet cleaners and car insurance do 
not. 
Notwithstanding the need for greater sensitivity in placing advertising in on-demand 
programming, there is no evidence that it is rejected. Indeed, the ITV Hub and All4 require 
viewers to register and to disable ad-blockers and this has generated minimal resistance.  
Where viewers believe advertising is a fair exchange for watching quality PSB content for 
free it is understood and accepted. This is very good news. It gives us confidence that 
advertising will be able to keep making a vital contribution to public service television as it 
continues its fascinating evolution.  
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INVENTING PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA 
Amanda D. Lotz 
 
The Future of Public Service Television Inquiry recognizes the scale of its task. This is not 
another periodic moment of assessment and recommendation. Rather, what is required is 
nothing short of the invention of public service media. Although broadcasting remains, will 
persist, and perhaps continue to play a role in the public service media project, it is clear that 
continuing to think only in terms of public service broadcasting is to ignore a situation of 
great opportunity. 
 Though a century of public service broadcasting experience exists, there have never 
been public service media—in the United Kingdom—or elsewhere. Public service 
broadcasting had key affordances and limitations, not only because of its public service 
directive, but also because of the affordances and limitations of broadcasting.  
Radio and television industries—public service and commercial alike—have been 
defined for their entire existence by their broadcast distribution technology. The 
technological abilities of broadcasting—sending a single message across a vast geography—
revolutionized human communication previously confined to person-to-person 
communication or to those connected by wire.  
The abilities of broadcasting in this context were so extraordinary that little thought 
has been given to broadcasting’s limitations, in particular, its profound scarcity. 
Technologically, broadcasting allows the transmission of just one message, from one to 
many. Assumed as ‘normal’ and consequently rarely considered, broadcasting technology 
strangled radio and television as media, creating an exceptional bottleneck with its capacity 
constraint of transmitting a single signal. This led to the importance of scheduling and 
afforded profound power to the intermediaries that selected the schedule. Without technology 
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capable of countering this limitation, such constraint was not worth deep interrogation. Over 
the decades, British public service television responded by launching additional channels 
precisely because this technological bottleneck limited its ability to service its broad 
citizenry. 
But internet distribution of video has revealed that nearly all the features presumed 
constitutive of television are not, in fact, characteristic of television, but of broadcast 
technology. Rather, the necessity of intermediaries to order a schedule of programming and 
the experience of programs being ‘on’ at particular times are ‘protocols’ developed for and 
specific to broadcast technology.52 The technological development of a new mechanism of 
audio and video distribution requires reconsideration of the practices and metrics of 
evaluation of broadcast public service television to account for the opportunities of other 
forms of distribution. 
The arrival of a new distribution technology—internet distribution—with different 
affordances and limitations, has left those in both public service and commercial television 
feeling unmoored and uncertain of the present and future. The implications and 
transformation introduced by internet distribution have been slowly revealed. Terminology 
used in initial phases of its arrival, such as ‘new media’ and widely shared expectations of the 
‘death’ of television, created presumptions of a medium in transition. True internet 
distribution of television is barely a decade old, but it is now clear that the profound change 
has less to do with the medium than with its distribution technology.53 
Although the scale and nature of the implications of a new mechanism for distribution 
of video is just now being fully understood, the early years of internet-distributed television 
illustrate well the differences between commercial and public service television. While US 
content owners (studios) and networks/channels did all they could to hinder the development 
of internet-distributed video by tightly controlling intellectual property and allowing minimal 
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authorized circulation of professional quality video in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the BBC launched the iPlayer. A truly revolutionary offering, the iPlayer was the 
first indication of public service media and clearly illustrates the difference between 
commercial and public service practices. U.S. commercial broadcasters lacked reason to 
make desired content easier to access and sought to maintain the scarcity to access 
characteristic of broadcasting that supported windowed licensing revenue. By embracing a 
technology that made its content more accessible, the BBC acted in accord with its mandate 
of public service. 
Commercial and public service television operators around the world are now 
struggling to understand a competitive environment that includes internet-distributed 
television. They face the challenge of adapting practices developed for the abilities and 
limitations of broadcasting to a distribution technology with different capabilities and hence 
different strategic potential. Many of the old practices have become ineffective. For example, 
the business of television series creation has relied on strategies of price discrimination in 
which rights to exhibit a series are sold again and again through a variety of distribution 
‘windows’. Scarce access to content supported delayed windows, but television viewers now 
demand access when they desire and turn to unauthorized sources if distributors attempt to 
make them wait. Moreover, measurements of performance, such as the number of viewers in 
a live airing, are of diminishing utility. U.S. commercial broadcasters now compete with a 
growing number of internet-distributed services supported entirely by subscriber fees. These 
services curate libraries of programmes cultivated through previously unimagined data about 
viewer behavior. The challenges for public service television differ but are every bit as 
extraordinary. 
Although the final report of the inquiry on A Future for Public Service Television 
attends to this new environment that includes internet-distributed television, the report in 
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many ways maintains a ‘broadcast paradigm’ in its focus and perspective. The report rightly 
identifies the necessary shift to thinking in terms of public service media, although many of 
its ultimate recommendations belie the logics of public service broadcasting. For example, 
the continued attention to the electronic programme guide (EPG) fails to acknowledge the 
irrelevance of EPGs in an era of algorithmically-based recommendation engines. A paradigm 
of traditional ‘newscasts’ pervades that assumes the perpetuation of this broadcast protocol 
largely abandoned by younger viewers. The report asserts programming produced outside of 
public service broadcasting to have a ‘public service character,’ though it is not derived from 
a motivation of service, but embraces a strategy of distinction for commercial ends. 
Rather than a regular reappraisal of public service broadcasting, the context of the 
development of a new mechanism of video distribution requires a more exhaustive task of 
identifying the ways in which the affordances of internet-distributed video require the 
abandonment of the broadcast paradigm and creation of a paradigm of public service that 
embraces the opportunities and characteristics of internet distribution. 
 
Challenges and Opportunities of Public Service Media  
 
Arguably, the greatest challenge for public service broadcasting has been its mandate to serve 
the full citizenry of a diverse nation while simultaneously creating common culture. As Owen 
and Wildman identified, ‘the production of mass media messages involves a trade-off 
between the savings from shared consumption of a common commodity and the loss of 
consumer satisfaction that occurs when messages are not tailored to individual or local 
tastes.’54 Creating content for a ‘nation’ offers economically valuable scope, but rarely yields 
programming compelling to a citizenry with varying identities, daily realities, and interests.  
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In addition to the paradoxical directives of serving diverse populations and building 
common culture, these competing tasks were made even more difficult by the scarcity 
characteristic of broadcasting. Public service broadcasters have thus been challenged in the 
commissioning of programmes by the incompatible pressures to create content meaningful to 
and preferred by diverse populations, at the same time as fitting it into the narrow confines of 
schedule availability. The time-specificity of broadcasting necessitated that PSBs not only 
provide programming aimed to service a particular group or perspective, but to gather that 
intended population at a specific time. 
The affordances of internet distribution offer opportunities to create and circulate 
media without the challenges imposed by a schedule and its associated scarcity. A public 
service media system utilizing the affordances of internet distribution bears several 
commonalities to the existing broadcast system but crucially differs by cultivating a library 
rather than schedule of content. Internet-distributed services, what I have elsewhere identified 
as ‘portals,’ must be theorized and understood as possessing both similarities to and 
differences from previous mechanisms of video distribution that significantly affect their 
capabilities.55 As can be seen in commercial portals such as Netflix, the strategies of portal 
curation differ from broadcast scheduling and provide significant opportunity to both 
commercial and public service media.  
Exploring the case and strategies of Netflix is a valuable exercise for imagining public 
service media. Netflix’ subscriber-funded business model leads it to different strategies than 
advertiser-supported television—whether broadcast, cable, or internet distributed—and make 
it more comparable to a public service mandate. Subscriber-funded media must provide 
content of such value that subscribers are willing to pay for it, rather than the aim of 
advertiser-funding to attract as many eyeballs as possible to increase the audience that can be 
sold to advertisers. The commercial success of subscriber-funded services is not derived from 
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attracting the most viewers at every moment of the day, but from creating programming of 
value to the viewer. The need to create content of value parallels the mission of public service 
media. Technologically, internet distribution allows the creation of a library—or rather 
several sub-libraries of content in the case of Netflix—which provides viewers with a broader 
range of viewing options than the schedule of a handful of channels could supply. 
Different strategies are possible with internet-distributed libraries of content. For a 
service such as Netflix, a recommendation algorithm built from vast data about usage and 
preferences enables the service to know considerably more about what programmes are 
valued and by whom than traditional measures. This allows the service to offer a better value 
proposition to viewers and more strategic programme development. Such capabilities also 
have public service applications. For example, Netflix’ recommendation algorithm aims to 
provide personalized recommendations—which more effectively services a public service 
mandate aim of helping diverse populations find content of interest. As the report notes, 
algorithms might also be designed to offer programming most watched so as to 
simultaneously provide viewers with access to programming that facilitates the public service 
mandate of creating common culture.56 
Of course the affordances of internet distribution come with limitations. The 
asynchronicity characteristic of offering viewers a library rather than a schedule works 
contrary to public service goals of common culture. Outside of public service systems, the 
exceptional convenience facilitated by on demand, internet distribution has proven very 
compelling. Freeing viewers from time-specific viewing may decrease the possibility of 
simultaneous cultural conversation, but it is arguably impossible to enforce time-specific 
viewing in a technological context in which it is no longer required. Trying to enforce such 
viewing behavior risks being ignored. 
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The affordances of internet distribution also offer tools to balance asynchronous 
engagement. A key advantage of creating a public service portal such as the iPlayer is 
archival capability. The value of content accessible in a library is derived over a much longer 
period of time than has been characteristic of broadcasting. There has been considerable 
consternation among US linear television services about Netflix’s refusal to share data about 
how many view its series. But the number of viewers, as I have already argued, is not a 
measure of success for a subscriber-funded service in the same way it is the currency for 
advertiser-supported services. Assessing the number of viewers in the first week, month, or 
even year that content is available is only a limited indication of the value of that content. 
Content owned by the portal is contracted in near perpetuity and thus provides value to the 
library long after its first arrival. This can be beneficial to public service media because it 
better enables viewers to derive value from content. 
Although internet-distributed public service media do not face the constraints of 
broadcasting’s distribution capacity, they are not without constraint. Rather, programming 
budget becomes the primary limitation of the system. Put another way, the broadcast 
schedule provided the most stringent limitation on public service broadcasters’ aspirations to 
serve their constituencies due to the technological constraints of broadcasting. The cost of 
programme development becomes that limitation in an era of on demand, internet-distributed 
television.  
The affordances of internet distribution allow for and encourage the evolution from 
public service broadcasting to public service media. It must be understood that much of the 
paradigm of thinking that has developed for public service broadcasting—about where value 
derives, about how viewers are served—must be significantly adapted in a transition to an 
environment of public service media. Many of the strategies that have developed from norms 
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of the linear environment are ineffective in the cultivation of libraries of content, while 
libraries likewise allow for strategies previously unavailable.  
 
Facing the Contemporary Technological Landscape 
 
Shifting from deeply ingrained practices, approaches, and expectations derived from a 
century of broadcasting is a significant task. Among the necessary paradigm shifts are 
understanding the changed competitive environment in which PSBs operate, reconsidering 
the norms that derive from a schedule of programming, and reflecting on whether the remit of 
public service media includes convenience or simply access. 
PSBs compete in an environment in which they are not alone in seeking distinction. 
The development of distinctive and valued content is core to the business strategy of 
subscriber-funded services such as Netflix and HBO, and even some advertiser-supported 
services now use distinction to stand out in what has become a video programming 
marketplace that has shifted from abundance to outright surplus. In such an environment, 
brand identity and awareness is crucial. The BBC possesses a brand with considerable 
domestic and international awareness as a provider of distinctive programming. Maintaining 
that brand is crucial, and as internet distribution allows the creation of truly international 
distribution services—seen clearly in Netflix recent global moves—it provides opportunities 
as well.  
Existing international awareness of the BBC is valuable and enables British public 
service media to develop a multifaceted strategy that allows it to leverage itself 
internationally for commercial gain to generate revenue from outside of Britain that can 
augment further innovation for the domestic audience. Such a strategy only adds to the 
complexity of the demands on programme development, as it is crucial to maintain a focus on 
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serving the core domestic market while also developing enough content capable of travelling 
abroad to maintain an international audience that delivers revenue that supplements the 
revenue generated by the funding mechanisms of the future (including those suggested in the 
Inquiry report).  
A second paradigm shift must come from rethinking programme practices tied to 
scheduling programming. A good example of this is the persistence of ‘newscasts’ as a 
category of focus. Video news need not be constrained to particular times of day, nor to an 
aggregation of stories into a thirty or sixty minute block. Public service media needs to create 
rigorous journalism that is made accessible to viewers in the ways they want to access it. 
Continuing to focus on time-specific newscasts risks losing audience to the several 
developing services that may offer an inferior product but embrace changing media use 
behaviors. In an era of internet and social media, journalists remain crucial for insight into 
how and why the events of the day matter even if countless sources now immediately 
proclaim what has happened.  
There are many other ways that the paradigm of scheduling and time specificity 
continues to dominate the imagination of what is possible for public service media. Indeed, 
this time of multiple, coexisting distribution technologies is most complicated. It remains 
unclear whether internet distribution will completely overtake broadcasting or two separate 
distribution norms will persist for some time, but it is clear that practices designed for 
distribution outside of a schedule should be the focus moving forward.  
Finally, PSB’s have been driven by a mandate to provide accessible services. Given 
broadcasting’s limitations, these services were not the most convenient: they required that 
viewers accept time specificity to access programmes. Greater consideration of whether 
internet-distributed public service media is a matter of access or convenience should be 
pursued. The opportunities of internet distribution are significant—but so long as 
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broadcasting persists, it is reasonable to consider whether a stronger public service media 
system can be achieved by requiring additional payment for the convenience it provides as 
convenience is not clearly part of the public service remit. Research on why viewers 
subscribe to Netflix found that 82 percent do so because of the ‘convenience of on-demand 
streaming programming,’ 67 percent because it is ‘cost-effective’, and 54 percent because of 
its ‘broad streaming content library.’ In other words, content is only the third most 
compelling reason for subscription.57 Such information is telling of viewers’ deeply held 
frustration with the limitations of broadcast and multichannel technology and an important 
consideration for those assessing programming and distribution strategies in this new 
environment.   
Public service broadcasters are not alone in this experience of transformative change. 
The US commercial television industries have been slowly pivoting toward strategies that 
account for multiple distribution technologies. A key adjustment has been diversifying 
revenue models. Even services still characterized as advertiser-supported (broadcast networks 
and basic cable) are now significantly reliant on subscriber funding paid by multichannel 
providers and by licensing revenue derived from owning their own intellectual property. 
Increasingly, they distribute this self-owned intellectual property through multiple self-owned 
outlets, changing a business that historically utilized licensing rather than extensive vertical 
integration of content and distribution.  
Such strategic revenue diversification might also help fund public service media to an 
extent that viewers identify greater value from the service without substantially increasing the 
costs of providing the service. Internet-distributed media pose several challenges to media 
operations developed based on previous technologies, but offer considerable opportunities as 
well. Such opportunities are most clear when imagining these media anew—as a call for 
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public service media suggests—instead of limiting possibility to the practices and norms 
constituted by broadcasting.  
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DOES PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION REALLY GIVE CONSUMERS LESS 
GOOD VALUE FOR MONEY THAN THE REST OF THE MARKET? 
Patrick Barwise 
 
 
Why do we still have public service television (PST) when commercial broadcasters and 
online TV companies now offer consumers so much choice? The obvious answer is that 
people are citizens as well as consumers: for policy reasons, we want to ensure the 
availability of public service programmes that offer social, cultural and political benefits and 
economic externalities but are not commercially viable. Despite disagreements about scope, 
scale and funding, the idea that there should be some PST for ‘citizenship’ reasons is not 
seriously disputed in most countries, the USA being perhaps the main exception. 
Among some commentators, however, this ‘market failure’ argument - the market’s 
under-provision of some kinds of programme - is now the only continuing justification for 
PST. In the words of British economist Helen Weeds, ‘[t]he rationale for public intervention 
in broadcasting must now rest on citizen concerns’.58 Many others would broadly agree.59  
The Conservative government’s position also seems to reflect this view. A 2016 white 
paper argues that ‘[t]he BBC has faced questions in recent years, including about…its 
distinctiveness, the market impact of its more mainstream services…and its efficiency and 
value for money…[It should] focus its creative energy on high quality distinctive content that 
differentiates it from the rest of the market’.60 The white paper frames broadcasting policy as 
a kind of balancing act between citizen and consumer interests: for citizenship reasons, we 
need some PST to address gaps in provision; but for consumer reasons, we should minimise 
its cost and market impact.  
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One practical problem with this view is that it assumes a clear-cut distinction between 
popular/commercial and minority/non-commercial programmes. The reality is much fuzzier 
and less predictable: what could be more ‘minority interest’ than a baking competition? Yet 
The Great British Bake Off turned out to be a huge hit. 
At a deeper level, the key assumption underpinning the ‘market failure’ argument is 
that, whatever its citizenship value, PST offers less good consumer value for money (VFM) 
than the rest of the market. This chapter explores this assumption in the UK context. The 
main analysis completely ignores the citizenship benefits of PST, treating it as if it were just a 
consumer product like baked beans. At the end of the chapter, I briefly return to the 
citizenship issues and discuss the policy implications. 
 
The UK Market Context  
I here define a public service broadcaster (PSB) as a broadcaster governed, managed and 
regulated to achieve a different or broader set of goals than maximising shareholder value. 
This is not a black-and-white concept. For instance, all UK broadcasters, apart from online-
only TV services such as Netflix, operate under—and almost always comply with—the 
Ofcom Broadcasting Code, designed to protect children, avoid undue harm and offence, 
ensure accurate, impartial news, and so on. 61 As well as the BBC—publicly owned and 
largely funded by compulsory licence fees—the UK’s diverse and highly competitive TV 
system includes two other sets of broadcasters:62  
• Commercial PSBs: the publicly owned Channel 4 (C4) and privately owned ITV and 
Channel 5 (C5), all mainly funded by advertising63   
• Non-PSBs: a combination of platforms, channels, and online-only services, mainly 
funded by subscriptions and advertising.  
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The BBC and C4 are ‘pure’ PSBs with detailed public service remits; ITV and C5 are 
also defined as PSBs because they have agreed to deliver some public service objectives (in 
addition to those in the Ofcom Broadcasting Code) in exchange for privileges such as access 
to spectrum at a lower price than they would have to pay in a competitive auction.     
 
Method 
 
This chapter is about the relative consumer value for money of PST (BBC TV and the 
commercial PSBs) and the non-PSBs. Consumer VFM is a familiar concept in marketing and 
consumer policy, usually measured by simply asking consumers, who typically have no 
difficulty interpreting the question and relating their responses to their own buying behaviour, 
perhaps with some post-rationalisation. In thinking about the different brands, they know that 
they are broadly comparing like with like or, at most, trading off price and quality within a 
category, for example when comparing a premium brand with an economy brand. 
Evaluating the consumer VFM of television is less straightforward because it is rarely 
bought one programme, or even one channel, at a time; much of its funding comes from 
advertising; and different broadcasters have quite different revenue models: 
 
1. BBC TV is mainly funded by a compulsory licence fee which also funds BBC Radio, 
BBC Online, the BBC World Service, and much of the cost of broadband rollout, the 
Welsh public service channel S4C and local TV. Also, all households with one or 
more members aged over 75 get a free TV licence (regardless of household size and 
income).  
2. The commercial PSBs are mainly funded by advertising.   
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3. Pay TV is mainly funded by monthly subscriptions, supplemented by advertising, for 
a package of channels, increasingly bundled with apps, DVRs, catch-up services, 
telephony, broadband, etc. 
4. Online-only TV services are funded by a mixture of subscriptions, advertising, and 
one-off payments (pay-per-view, rentals, download-to-own). 
 
We can, however, infer a lot from a combination of consumer behaviour (‘revealed 
preference’), consumer costs, and selected attitudinal data. To illustrate, consider the overall 
consumer VFM of UK television. 
 
The Overall Consumer VFM of UK Television 
 
Consumers’ revealed preference suggests that most see television as excellent VFM – so 
much so that almost every household chooses to have a TV set (95.4% of all households in 
late 201564) and/or access to an online TV service (including an unknown proportion of the 
other 4.6%). At a minimum, the direct cost per household is the £12.25/month BBC licence 
fee65 and the cost of a TV set and electricity. 
Watching TV is extremely cheap by any standards. Robert Picard and I estimated that, 
in 2012, the direct consumer cost per viewer-hour (CPVH)—subscriptions, the TV proportion 
of the BBC licence fee, and one-off payments—was 9.2p. Including the indirect cost of TV 
advertising (discussed later), it was still only 13.5p/hour. On a comparable basis, the cost per 
consumer-hour was roughly 50p for fixed and mobile telephony, tabloid newspapers, 
paperback books and ‘free’ advertising-funded online services (including the cost of 
broadband). For magazines, quality newspapers and DVDs it was significantly higher than 
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that; for most out-of-home leisure activities (restaurants, pubs, cinemas, etc) much more 
again.66  
Of course, these figures do not mean that these other activities represent poor VFM – 
the experiences are not closely comparable with everyday TV viewing. But the low cost of 
television clearly helps explain its huge and continuing popularity. Only radio listening 
worked out even cheaper, at only 1.9p per listener-hour. 
 
Testing the ‘Market Failure’ Assumption  
 
Using the same broad approach, we can start to test the ‘market failure’ assumption that UK 
PST—certainly the BBC and perhaps the commercial PSBs—offers less good consumer 
VFM than the rest of the market. We can observe consumers’ revealed preference at two 
stages:  
• Adoption: households deciding whether to pay for access to any TV; and, if so, 
whether also to subscribe to (basic or premium) pay TV 
• Usage: individuals then deciding which programmes to watch. 
 
These are very different. The first is an occasional household choice involving money. 
The second is a constant series of individual choices (albeit often negotiated with other 
household members) and rarely involves money. Both throw light on the ‘market failure’ 
assumption about the relative consumer value for money of PST and the non-PSBs. 
On the first point, adoption, as already noted, almost all households choose to have access 
to TV content, including the small but growing minority who watch only online. The 
proportion of households with access to TV content who, over any extended period, watch no 
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PST is unknown but certainly very small, skewed towards light-viewing, young, upscale 
online-only households without children.  
Among the over 95% of UK households with TV sets able to receive broadcast TV, in 
late 2016: 67 
1. 45.1% had no pay TV (including a majority of low-income households, who rely 
disproportionately on PST) 
2. 33.6% had basic pay TV costing £20-30/month on top of the £12/month BBC licence 
fee 
3. 21.3% had premium pay TV, ie sport and/or movie packages costing £20-40/month 
on top of the cost of basic pay TV and the BBC.  
Because consumers legally have to have a TV licence in order to have pay TV, and a 
basic pay TV package if they want premium pay TV, these figures do not show their 
willingness to pay for each option separately. But they do show that, although over 95% of 
households regard TV as good VFM, a large minority of these (45% of TV households) do 
not regard even basic pay TV as cost-justified as an addition to PST; and only about 21% 
think premium pay TV offers good enough VFM to justify a subscription. 
Turning to the second type of revealed preference, usage, viewers switch between their 
favourite channels at no additional cost and seamlessly—although nudged by their EPG68— 
with little or no distinction between PSB and non-PSB channels. 
In 2015, BBC TV had a total viewing share of 33% among all UK individuals aged 4+ 
while the commercial PSBs (including their portfolio channels) had a combined share of 38% 
and the non-PSBs the remaining 29%. PST was therefore still extremely popular, accounting 
for over 70% of viewing.69 To assess its relative VFM, however, we also need to take account 
of, first, costs, ie the direct and indirect consumer cost per viewer-hour (CPVH) and, second, 
perceived quality.  
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The Cost per Viewer-Hour (CPVH) 
 
We can estimate the CPVH of a specific (type of) broadcaster by dividing its direct and 
indirect cost to consumers by its viewing hours. We have good data on viewing hours but 
estimating the consumer cost involves two assumptions: 
 
1. The consumer cost of BBC TV is the proportion of licence fee revenue allocated to it, 
including proportionate overheads 
2. The indirect consumer cost (or opportunity cost) of TV advertising is equal to 
commercial broadcasters’ net advertising revenue (NAR), that is, the revenue they 
receive from media agencies.70 
Using these assumptions, Robert Picard and I estimated the following CPVH figures in 
2012: BBC TV 9.2p, commercial PSBs 8.0p, non-PSBs (excluding online-only services) 
24.9p.71 We can now update these estimates to 2015 – see Table 1. The first two columns 
show weekly revenue (£m/week) in 2012 and 2015. Column 3 then shows the ratio between 
these: 0.96 for BBC TV (a 4% reduction in nominal revenue resulting from the 2010 funding 
settlement), 1.11 for the commercial PSBs (an 11% increase, mainly reflecting the recovery 
in NAR) and 1.13 for the non-PSBs (mainly from higher revenue per subscriber).72 Columns 
4-6 show the equivalent figures for viewing. Total viewing (scheduled programmes watched 
on TV sets, live or up to seven days after broadcast) decreased by 10%, from 28.1 to 25.2 
hours/week. 73 Most of this reflected reduced PST viewing, leading to ratios of 0.88, 0.85 and 
0.97, respectively, for BBC TV, the commercial PSBs and the non-PSBs. 
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Table 1: Nominal Revenue and Viewing Hours per Week 
2012 vs 201574 
 
 Revenue 
(£m/week) 
  Viewing 
(Hours/week, 
all inds 4+) 
  
 2012 2015 2015/2012 2012 2015 2015/2012 
BBC TV 52 50 0.96 9.3 8.2 0.88 
Commercial 
PSBs 
56 62 1.11 11.1 9.4 0.85 
Non-PSBs 133 150 1.13 7.7 7.5 0.97 
Total 240 262 1.09 28.1 25.2 0.90 
 
 
Assuming changes in total consumer costs are proportional to those for broadcaster 
revenue, we can use these ratios to update the 2012 CPVH figures to 2015: 
 
BBC TV   9.2p x (0.96/0.88) = 10.0p 
Commercial PSBs  8.0p x (1.11/0.85) = 10.4p 
Non-PSBs            24.9p x (1.13/0.97) = 29.0p 
 
These estimates are approximate (+/- 10%) because they are based on rounded revenue 
figures, but the qualitative picture is clear: as in 2012, the 2015 CPVH for the non-PSBs was 
almost three times as high as for the PSBs. The reasons are: 
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1. The high cost of sport (and, to a lesser extent, movie) rights for premium pay TV 
channels. The £1,712m annual cost of live TV rights for Premier League football (ie 
excluding production costs) is now marginally more than the total programme budget 
of BBC TV (£1,702m in 2015/16).75 
2. The much higher non-programming costs of pay TV versus PST (marketing, 
distribution, consumer equipment, installation, customer service). 
3. The non-PSBs’ significantly lower availability. As already discussed, TV household 
penetration is only about 55% for pay TV and, within that, 21% for premium pay TV, 
versus 100% for PST.76 
4. Finally, the market is highly competitive, forcing the PSBs to be much more efficient 
than they are sometimes portrayed.  
 
The difference in CPVH is probably somewhat less than this analysis suggests because it 
excludes the unknown opportunity cost of the PSBs’ DTT spectrum. However, even if we 
incorporated this, the general pattern—with the non-PSBs’ CPVH being much higher than for 
the PSBs—would be unaffected, because of the above points. 
 
Basic Multichannel, Premium Multichannel and Online-Only TV 
 
Ideally, we would split the non-PSBs in Table 1 into two groups: (a) basic satellite, cable and 
DTT platforms and free-to-air non-PSB channels (accounting for over 95% of non-PSB 
viewing); and (b) the additional cost and viewing of premium sport and movie channels, 
since these are not sold separately.   
Because of the high cost of the premium channels’ content—point 1 above—and their 
relatively low availability and viewing levels, their CPVH is much higher than that of basic 
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multichannel pay TV. But basic pay TV still has much higher non-programming costs and 
lower availability than PST—points 2 and 3—so its CPVH is almost certainly still 
significantly higher than PST’s.   
Unfortunately, Robert Picard and I were unable to find any published data to enable us to 
separate the CPVH of the basic and premium non-PSBs and I am still unable to do so.  
Similarly, I have been unable to find reliable published data on the consumer cost and 
viewing of the online-only TV services. But, to illustrate, a household paying Netflix’s or 
Amazon’s entry-level £5.99/month, with two adults each watching the service, on average, 
five hours/week, would equate to a direct CPVH of 13.8p.77 The total CPVH would be 
significantly higher if we include the indirect consumer cost of advertising and perhaps 
additional equipment and broadband costs as these video-on-demand services are extremely 
bandwidth-hungry.   
Download-to-own box sets are slightly more expensive. For example the complete Mad 
Men costs £39.99 from Sky for 68 hours of content, which works out at 58.8p/hour. The 
CPVH depends on how many people watch it how many times but if, say, two people 
watched every episode once, on average, the CPVH would be 29.4p.78 For pay-per-view sport 
and movies, the CPVH is likely to be significantly higher again. 
In summary, although we lack the data to make precise estimates, the evidence is that, far 
from PST being more expensive than the rest of TV, it is almost certainly significantly 
cheaper per viewer-hour than basic non-PSB multichannel TV, entry-level online-only TV or 
online box sets, and much cheaper than premium services such as sport and movie pay TV 
channels and online pay-per-view.  
 
Perceived Quality: Audience Appreciation 
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The cost per viewer-hour is only part of VFM, however. The other is perceived quality, 
typically measured as audience appreciation. Until the mid-1980s, with only four public 
service UK channels, audience appreciation was routinely measured using self-completion 
diaries that asked respondents to say how ‘interesting and/or enjoyable’ they found each 
programme they watched. The results were reported as a 0-to-100 Appreciation Index (AI) 
for each programme. Most AIs were between 60 and 80. Among the general run of 
entertainment programmes, there was no evidence of ‘niche’ programmes attracting small but 
especially loyal and appreciative audiences. Instead, there was a ‘double jeopardy’ pattern 
under which, for a given channel and time of day, lower-rating programmes tended to have 
lower repeat-viewing rates and audience appreciation than more popular ones. A secondary 
pattern was that, other things being equal, more demanding programmes tended to have 
smaller audiences but higher AIs because only viewers who liked them a lot were willing to 
invest the extra effort needed to watch them.79  
As far as I know, there has been no published research comparing the average 
audience appreciation of PSB and non-PSB programmes. But, based on the earlier studies, I 
would be surprised if AIs were significantly higher, on average, for programmes on the basic 
multichannels than on the PSB channels. There are two reasons why they might be slightly 
higher, however. First, their viewers are people who have invested in pay TV, presumably 
because, other things being equal, they like television more, on average, than do those who 
do not subscribe to pay TV. Secondly, as with demanding programmes on the PSBs, viewers 
will typically make the extra effort of switching to a small multichannel only if they expect to 
like the programme more than those showing on the main channels. Typically, this will 
happen when the multichannel is showing a predictably enjoyable favourite programme.  
The appreciation of premium sport and movie channels and online pay-per-view 
(among those who choose to pay for them) may well be much higher than for either the PSBs 
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or the basic non-PSB channels in order to justify their much higher CPVH. For entry-level 
online-only TV, I have no solid basis on which to hypothesise.  
 
The Relative Consumer VFM of PST 
 
Based on the above analysis of adoption, usage, CPVH and audience appreciation, both BBC 
TV and the commercial PSBs most likely offer most consumers better VFM than the basic 
non-PSB channels (including platform costs) that account for the great majority of non-PSB 
viewing - the exact opposite of the assumption underlying the ‘market failure’ view. This 
provisional conclusion is based on the likelihood that, relative to the PSBs, the basic non-PSB 
channels’ significantly higher CPVH (even after allowing for the opportunity cost of the 
PSBs’ access to spectrum) is not compensated for by commensurately higher audience 
appreciation. This tentative conclusion is researchable. The relative consumer VFM of 
premium sport and movie channels, online pay-per-view and entry-level online-only TV is 
unclear: their much higher CPVH may be fully compensated for by higher audience 
appreciation among those who subscribe to them. However, this too is researchable. 
What about the significant minority of consumers who have always said, in response 
to surveys, that the compulsory BBC licence fee represents poor VFM?80 A 2015 study81 
focused on this minority: the sample included 24 households saying they would prefer to pay 
nothing and receive no BBC services (representing 12% of UK households) and a further 24 
households saying they would prefer to pay less for a reduced BBC service (representing 
16% of UK households). The total sample of 48 therefore represented the 28% of households 
who, at least to some extent, saw the licence fee as poor VFM. These households then lived 
with no BBC services for nine days, after which they were re-interviewed and given £3.60 
(nine times the 40p/day cost of the licence fee). Over two-thirds (33 out of the 48) changed 
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their minds, deciding that the licence fee did, after all, represent good VFM. In contrast, only 
one out of a control sample of 22 households who, in the initial interview, had said the BBC 
represented good VFM went the other way, saying in the second interview that they now felt 
it represented poor VFM.  
This study was based on limited samples but, if it generalises, the proportion saying 
the licence fee is good VFM increases from 72% in the initial survey to 88%82 once 
respondents experience life without the BBC for just over a week. There has been no 
equivalent study for other broadcasters but the results are certainly consistent with the above 
evidence that PST represents good VFM for UK consumers. 
 
‘Citizenship’ Benefits 
 
Of course, PST also offers citizenship benefits beyond those provided by the rest of the 
market. This chapter is about consumer VFM so I will discuss these only briefly. Ofcom’s 
PSB Annual Research Report 2016 found that, in 2015, most of the UK public valued the ten 
defined PSB purposes and five PSB characteristics highly - and increasingly over the four 
years 2011-15. The highest importance ratings were for providing ‘high-quality UK-made 
programmes for children’ (88% among those with children) and ‘trustworthy news’ (86%). 
The lowest, at 63%, was for distinctiveness (‘The style of programme is different to what I’d 
expect to see on other channels’), representing a five-point drop from 2014, the first year in 
which it was measured. A majority also said the PSBs were delivering on all these purposes 
and characteristics, ranging from 85% for high-quality UK children’s programmes down to 
51% for ‘distinctiveness’.83 
In summary, the UK public values the ‘citizenship’ purposes and characteristics of 
PST; does so increasingly; and believes that the PSBs are doing a good job delivering them. 
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The characteristic on which they are least convinced on both importance and delivery is 
‘distinctiveness’. As I have written elsewhere in a more general context, consumers see no 
value in a product being distinctive as an end in itself. Instead, they value products that are 
distinctive because they are ‘simply better’.84 In line with this, a recent study for the BBC, 
unpublished at the time of writing but pending publication, confirms that audiences mainly 
interpret ‘distinctive’ as ‘distinctively good’.85 Unfortunately, the government’s white paper 
appears to use ‘distinctive’ mainly in the quite different sense of ‘distinctively different’.  
 
Policy Implications 
 
The above analysis shows that the key assumption underpinning the ‘market failure’ view— 
that PST offers consumers less good value for money than the rest of the market, so that its 
only continuing rationale rests on citizen concerns—appears to be simply wrong, at least in 
the UK. PST does, of course, give citizens public service benefits over and above those 
provided by the non-PSBs and online-only TV players, and these ‘citizenship’ benefits are 
highly valued by the public. But the numbers suggest that PST also offers consumers better 
value for money because the non-PSBs’ significantly higher cost per viewer-hour seems 
unlikely to be compensated for by commensurately higher audience appreciation. 86 
The main policy implication is simple: there is no necessary trade-off between citizen and 
consumer benefits: pound for pound, PST appears to deliver both sets of benefits better than 
the rest of the market. This does not mean we should return to a world with only PST: the 
addition of non-PSB platforms and channels (now including the online-only services) to what 
has so far been a strong, well-funded PST system has hugely increased viewer choice and 
competition. The analysis here does, however, mean that the relentless current reduction in 
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the BBC’s real income, in particular, is now unambiguously against the public interest from 
both a citizenship and a consumer perspective.  
In 2014, Robert Picard and I showed what would happen if this reduction were continued 
until the BBC were reduced to nothing or a minor sideshow like PBS in America – the logical 
conclusion of the ‘market failure’ view. Even, optimistically, assuming commercial 
broadcasters significantly increased their investment in content, including first-run UK 
content, in response to the BBC’s removal from the market, we showed that the net impact 
would still be to reduce the range, quality and VFM of television for most households, as well 
as the income of UK producers and, of course, the citizenship benefits of PST.87 Since then, 
the cuts in BBC income have, if anything, accelerated. 
The assumption that PST offers consumers less good VFM than the rest of the market is 
central to the ‘market failure’ view. From a rational policy perspective, the onus should 
therefore be on those advocating this view to provide evidence that—contrary to the analysis 
here—this key assumption is correct, ie that PST does offer less good VFM than the rest of 
the market.  
  
  
78 
THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION IN THE US 
Jennifer Holt 
 
Among the comprehensive recommendations in A Future for Public Service Television, the 
2016 study of television culture, economics, and politics in the UK, is the overarching vision 
statement that public television in an emerging digital media landscape should be governed 
not by market forces or funded in relation to their financial impact, but instead by 
‘[p]rinciples of independence, universality, citizenship, quality and diversity…’88 These 
values for media culture have long been hallmarks of a public service mission but are much 
more elusive in the US system, existing only in part and often merely in name. While 
diversity has been a long arc principle underlying broadcast regulation and licensing 
requirements in the US since the Radio Act of 1927, it is a value that is largely unquantifiable 
and unenforceable as written; thus, it functions more conceptually as an ideal or a goal to 
strive for than as a practical or operational standard. The concept of universality/universal 
access is a tenet traditionally applied to the dissemination of public utilities, but the internet 
and its various delivery pipelines that also distribute digital television have yet to be 
classified as such. In fact, the pressures bearing on television’s future in the US context are a 
far cry from those related to concerns of programming quality, affordability and accessibility, 
or the impact of television on a citizenry or culture. They are instead circulating around issues 
of monetization, the evolving viewing practices of the digital audience, and the politicized 
regulation of distribution infrastructures. As such, the major debates about the future of 
television in the US context have focused primarily on digital technologies and their impact 
on business models, policies for broadband pipelines and Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
and the need for new metrics that correspond to contemporary modalities of viewing and 
engagement.   
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 Accordingly, this chapter will examine those issues that are most significant to the 
developing digital landscape of television in the US, particularly as they relate to the 
transition from an industry deeply rooted in the legacy structures of analogue delivery born in 
the radio era to one navigating the new rules and protocols of digital distribution and 
‘connected viewing’. In an environment of ubiquitous mobile screens, third party providers, 
the fragmentation of the mass audience, increased demands on creative workers as shows 
proliferate across multiple media platforms, and the enhanced surveillance of the digital 
audience, the television industry is experiencing a host of pressures previously unimagined, 
even in the multi-channel universe of cable in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, debates about 
the future of television in the US are proliferating, as are the complications involved as 
content providers are forced to look in multiple directions at once to deliver their 
programming; they must cultivate the traditional televisual space as well as on-demand 
viewing practices, tend to their linear schedules, home audiences, and armies of affiliates 
while concurrently developing online distribution strategies and rolling out their content on 
myriad new set top boxes, platforms, services, and screens. In the end, as Los Angeles Times 
entertainment reporter Joe Flint has noted, this is an industry that will ‘innovate at gunpoint’89 
and it is clear that whatever innovation takes place is going to be focused on marketplace 
priorities rather than cultural or civic ones.  
 
Digital Distribution 
 
One of the largest areas of consequence for the future of television in the US lies in the shifts 
to digital distribution and the imposition of new business models. Chief among the industry’s 
problems—particularly the cable industry—is the threat posed by ‘cord cutting’ which is 
accelerating rapidly of late: as of July 2016, one quarter of US homes no longer subscribe to a 
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pay-TV service.90 This is due to the expanding range of digital platforms for accessing 
television programs (e.g., Hulu, iTunes, Amazon Prime Video, Netflix, HBO Go) and also to 
the skyrocketing price of a cable subscription, which is currently averaging over $100 a 
month in the US and perpetually climbing. Furthermore, the ability for viewers to leave the 
cable box behind and go ‘over the top’ has become much easier in the past decade. 
Broadband has achieved 80% penetration in US households, and the popularity of smart TVs 
and new delivery technologies for streaming television—including Roku, Apple TV, Amazon 
Fire, Google Chromecast, and gaming consoles such as the Xbox and Sony Playstation—is 
on the rise. Presently, almost a quarter of US homes own a digital streaming device, 42% 
own gaming consoles, and 29% own Smart TVs.91 Additionally, half of US homes now use 
subscription-based video on demand (SVOD) services such as Netflix, equaling DVR 
penetration for the first time.92  
As a reaction to the threats from new services and platforms, the cable industry began 
to offer different versions of ‘TV Everywhere,’ which gave audiences the ability to stream or 
download content via multiple platforms and mobile devices for authenticated subscribers. 
Introduced by Time Warner Cable in 2009 and quickly imitated by other major cable 
providers and networks, this has become the primary form of paywall for most television 
content including the broadcast networks, which—in stark contrast to the UK and other 
territories with public service traditions—require a cable subscription for online access. The 
lack of a uniform log-in system between providers and channels, the restriction of broadcast 
content online (including news and sports and special events like the Olympics) to only those 
who pay for cable, and the frustration of geo-blocking content that was supposed to be 
available ‘everywhere’ but is often only able to be viewed on devices inside the subscriber’s 
own home has led to consumer disenchantment with the promises of ‘TV Everywhere’. It has 
also given fuel to activists challenging the strategy as ‘TV Nowhere’ that has further 
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entrenched oligopolistic control in the cable industry while limiting competition and crushing 
online content diversity.93 In addition to authenticated access, the cable and satellite industries 
have been forced to further reevaluate ways to entice subscribers, and they have begun to 
create lower-priced options of ‘skinny bundles’ of programming that are being rolled out in a 
limited way thus far.94  
These changes in distribution have also focused attention on the evolving spectrum of 
what are now considered content providers and television ‘channels’, and the shifting 
relationships between studios, networks, and online platforms. For example, the National 
Football League—now television’s most valuable product95, which has been shown on 
broadcast networks since the 1940s, on ESPN since 1987 and on TNT since 1990—sold 
Twitter the rights to livestream ten games in 2015, and then sold Amazon Prime Video the 
rights to stream ten games in 2016. The Amazon deal was worth $50 million – five times the 
price of the Twitter deal sealed just one year earlier.96 The broadcast networks CBS and NBC 
will also be broadcasting those games that Amazon is streaming, and Amazon will have some 
rights to advertising slots. Sharing rights costs with digital platforms does take some of the 
pressure off of the networks, but it also shrinks everyone’s slice of the revenue pie. Disney’s 
exclusive deal with Netflix for first streaming rights to all of their content, including their 
production subsidiaries Marvel, Lucasfilm, and Pixar, is another case in point. This deal 
represents a change in long-established ‘windowing’ practices—release strategies prioritising 
particular markets and platforms for specific lengths of time—and marks the first time that a 
major studio chose a streaming platform before a cable service as the designated ‘Pay TV’ 
window in post-theatrical distribution.97 As relationships between streaming venues and 
heavyweight content providers evolve, unique release strategies, and revenue-/cost-sharing 
arrangements are likely to continue in this era of transition and transformation affecting 
television.  
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‘Liveness’ is one of the last remaining draws of linear television. It mostly endures in 
the form of breaking news, sports, and major events like Presidential inaugurations, awards 
shows, or highly anticipated series finales. This has kept many connected to their cable cords, 
but with ESPN now part of YouTube TV (the new streaming service offering live television 
from broadcast and major cable networks for $35/month) and most news and sports channels 
offering apps for mobile devices, there is new life for live television beyond traditional 
viewing practices. Further, as platforms like Facebook Live and Twitter’s collective raw 
feeds increasingly stream live news events (often to the chagrin of journalists and critics98), 
‘liveness’ is being commuted into the digital space via social media platforms as well.  
What all of this means for viewers is a host of ever-expanding sites to access 
television programming outside of being tethered to a cable subscription. And there are more 
shows being produced than ever before in history – in 2016, there were 362 scripted shows 
on television, 455 if you include online services like Amazon, Hulu, and Netflix.99 Netflix has 
announced plans to spend $6 billion on original content in 2017 alone. In an era when 
audiences want to select content using an a la carte model—acting as their own programmers, 
unbundling and disaggregating network schedules to create their own evening’s 
entertainment—what role will networks play in the future of television, particularly that of 
the broadcast networks? Will the network-affiliate structure soon be merely debris of the 
analogue age? How will those relationships survive negotiations over the creation of the 
online brand experience and digital rights/streaming deals?100 These questions lead to yet 
another pressure facing the future of television: the challenge of getting noticed and 
connecting with audiences in such a content-rich environment. Creating—and monetizing—a 
hit in this supremely cluttered media landscape where a #1 show commands an audience of 
just over two million people gets harder with every passing year. 
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Metrics 
 
For a show to survive, getting noticed by audiences is not enough; it also requires that those 
viewers are counted and valued by the television industry. This issue of metrics is another 
fundamental element of the television business model under siege, as a splintering audience, 
shifting viewing habits and changing measurement standards have had serious implications 
for the advertising market and, in turn, the business model for television. In 2016, the US 
television industry took in roughly $72 billion from advertising – a little more than the total 
for online advertising. However, the market for ad spending on linear television is currently 
stagnant while internet advertising has been steadily increasing following the popularity of 
online video, social media, and mobile viewing. It is predicted that the internet will edge 
ahead of television to be the dominant advertising medium in 2017.101  
As audiences and advertisers begin favoring digital spaces, metrics are failing to keep 
up with viewing practices and ratings (along with revenues) continue to fall for the networks. 
Nielsen includes C3 and C7 ratings (for programmes viewed three and seven days after their 
initial live airing) to account for the role of DVR and catch-up viewing, but the growing 
number of audience members watching programmes outside of those windows are not 
recognized by the ratings industry as significant. In other words, audiences viewing on 
computer and mobile screens are simply not valued equally to those watching on linear 
television. At the same time, new algorithms and analytics are emerging that demonstrate the 
value of ‘engagement’ to advertisers and challenge traditional metrics that support the 
premiums paid for rates on linear TV. Understandably, content providers, traditional 
networks, and even digital platforms are losing patience.  
Consequently, it has been suggested that US television is entering a ‘post-Nielsen era’ 
as the main ratings provider has failed to meet industry demands, and networks and their 
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parent companies have begun designing their own methods to measure the new millennium 
audience and second-screen usage. Many of the big media conglomerates such as Viacom, 
Time Warner, and Comcast NBC have started to develop new proprietary techniques and 
tools for measurement that incorporate set-top boxes, browsing behavior, and online 
shopping data.102 Additionally, Nielsen has faced considerable competition from ComScore in 
the digital space and both companies are battling it out to set the new standard in both linear 
TV and digital video measurement. The 2016 merger of ComScore and Rentrak, two of the 
biggest data analytics and audience measurement companies in the digital space, will further 
consolidate (and complicate) measurement for behavior across computer screens, mobile 
phones, tablets, and television sets. Just like the viewing landscape, the metrics industry is 
becoming quite fractured, and the unified ratings system that has endured for over 90 years is 
rapidly approaching its expiration date. 
Ultimately, the US television industry, particularly as it focuses on the multiscreen, 
app-driven, digital market, is becoming progressively folded further into the core of what 
Mark Andrejevic and Hye-Jin Lee have called the ‘commercial surround’ in which one’s 
activities online are ‘recorded, stored, and mined for marketing purposes.’103 In this spirit, and 
following the lucrative strategies of streaming services like Netflix and Amazon Prime 
Video, the television industry has started to see some salvation for its struggling business 
model in the form of ‘big data’ related to their digital audience. Scholars have argued that the 
television industry has ‘become enamored’ with big data, and that this data has now become 
‘an integral part of the televisual culture; an essential tool for survival in the increasingly 
fragmented, crowded and competitive marketplace of digital TV.’104 Indeed, the personal 
information and viewing habits of the online viewer that can easily be exploited and sold to 
hungry advertisers in search of their specifically targeted ‘ideal’ audience have proven to be 
extremely valuable commodities. Accordingly, the art of surveillance is being integrated into 
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the realm of digital delivery and advertising, and simply repackaged as ‘personalization’ for 
viewers. This snowballing invasion of digital privacy has multiple entry-points, and 
streaming platforms are but one. 
 
Policy  
 
The policy landscape is presenting its own considerable pressures for the television industry 
and its audience, many of which are centered around the issue of access – access to content, 
to internet services, to viewers, and ultimately to their personal information. What is at stake 
is everything from preserving diversity and localism in television to securing digital rights 
and maintaining a free and open internet that delivers streaming media, information, and 
communication to all citizens equally. The importance of digital media policy extends 
beyond media culture into the fabric of democracy and the policy issues for television 
actually illuminate the much larger picture of digital rights presently at risk. The privacy 
concerns related to advertising and social media platforms mentioned above, for example, are 
even more troubling when one stops to consider how they also extend to the pipelines for 
internet access. In the US, Congress recently passed a bill allowing all ISPs to track, share, 
and sell data on their subscribers’ personal data and online behaviour—including people’s 
viewing habits, Internet browsing activities, and app use—without permission. This 
dismantles previous privacy protections in the digital space and further deregulates 
telecommunications policy that affects streaming media. Indeed, thanks to policymakers, 
engaging in online viewing has viewers sinking even deeper into ‘the commercial surround’, 
and our television experience has become even more ‘big data’ for sale to advertisers by 
companies providing Internet access. Our online television viewing has become fully 
imbricated in surveillance culture. 
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Net neutrality is another major policy issue bearing down on the future of television, 
particularly in the US where there is not a strong tradition of public service affordances or 
values to sustain alternative visions of the medium beyond the most brutally commercial. As 
policies for the treatment of broadband are debated, the unrestricted provision of digital 
media services also hang in the balance. Will broadband pipelines be treated as a 
‘telecommunications service’ and therefore be protected as a ‘common carrier’ which must 
prioritize public accessibility and equal treatment for all data? Or will they be categorized as 
an ‘information service’ which would strip those protections and allow for discriminatory 
practices by internet service providers that want to slow down (‘throttle’) certain content and 
charge for tiered levels of service?105 While the Federal Communications Commission’s 2015 
Open Internet Rules106 determined that all ISPs—including cable companies and mobile 
phone providers—were ‘telecommunications services’ ensuring that all data must be sent at 
the same speed regardless of its origin, these public interest safeguards are far from secure. 
Several ISPs have already demonstrated their willingness to flout the spirit and the letter of 
the net neutrality rules as they currently exist. For example, Verizon, AT&T, and Comcast 
have exempted their own video services from mobile data caps (i.e., assigned them a ‘zero 
rating’) on their distribution pipelines while charging their competitors for data usage.107 Such 
anti-competitive behaviour in a different political climate would be cause for an FCC 
investigation at the very least, but the Trump administration has instead signaled that Obama-
era regulations protecting the ‘Open Internet’ and equal access to all data will not stand. The 
result for television in the digital space will be a marked decrease in competition and 
diversity as conglomerate-owned distributors will be allowed to privilege their own content 
services and stifle others. Sadly, the public and the ‘public interest’ are the ultimate losers in 
this particular policy fight over what values will prevail in digital media pipelines.  
Policies related to protecting digital rights, intellectual property, and privacy are also 
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at the forefront of the US television industry’s concerns. Piracy and rights infringements are 
multiplying as are the problems they pose for the industry, all the while becoming more 
complex to define, track, and deter as television streams globally.108 The vulnerabilities for 
media companies are indeed quite extensive, and have been dramatically illustrated in events 
such as the 2014 hack on Sony Pictures, and the 2017 ransomware attack on Netflix that 
targeted then-unreleased episodes from Season 5 of Orange is the New Black. These issues of 
digital privacy also present growing problems for viewers, even extending to the hardware 
designed to bring television into their homes: Samsung TVs, for example, have recently been 
revealed to be vulnerable to CIA hacking and capable of fooling the owner into thinking the 
device is off, when it is actually on and recording conversations in the room, acting as a 
remote surveillance device.109  
The trend of consolidation and media concentration also continues in the US context 
and is no longer just limited to horizontal mergers in the content industry. Since the Comcast-
NBC merger in 2011110, there have been takeovers emanating from the distribution sector as 
they either merge with one another and take control of even more media infrastructure, or buy 
production companies to add to their expanding empires. AT&T is leading the pack on both 
fronts. Their deal for $49 billion to buy satellite provider DirecTV in 2015 and their pending 
$85 billion takeover of Time Warner will put them in new territory for media conglomerates. 
The attitude in the regulatory sector that has allowed for these developments is reminiscent of 
‘the whorehouse era’ in the FCC of the 1950s, when ‘federal regulators and industry leaders 
develop[ed] a relationship too friendly to be of honorable service to the public.’111 This does 
not bode well for citizens and consumers of digital media, nor for the future of television, 
should the industry hope to hold onto any trace of the public service values that represent the 
medium’s greatest potential.  
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PRESSURES ON PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA: INSIGHTS FROM A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF TWELVE DEMOCRACIES 
Matthew Powers 
 
This chapter identifies three key pressures experienced by contemporary public service 
media. The first—funding—pertains to debates about whether public service media should 
continue receiving public funds, and if so, how much and through what means they should 
receive it. The second—oversight—details legal and administrative measures that threaten 
the independence of public service media or make it difficult for them to fulfill their civic 
obligations. The third—audiences—highlights competitive pressures on public service media 
to pander to audiences, especially socio-demographically elite ones, rather than serve the 
needs of a broad, diverse population.  
In each domain, I suggest that the public service media best equipped to deal with 
these pressures—and therefore to fulfil their civic obligations—are those that deepen, rather 
than depart from, long-standing public service principles. Public service media that receive 
generous funding through a universally paid fee tend to provide robust news coverage, as 
well as innovative programming in arts and culture. Those with strong legal charters and 
arms-length oversight enjoy also relatively strong protections from undue government 
influence. And public service media that thoughtfully integrate public input are relatively 
well-positioned to serve as a broad forum for diverse voices and viewpoints. By contrast, 
public service media that rely on government appropriations struggle to assert their 
independence from partisan influence and engage in long-term planning. Those with weak 
charters are vulnerable to changes in government policy. And public service media that chase 
after niche audiences tend to skew their programming to reflect the demands of culturally and 
economically advantaged populations.   
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The data for this chapter come from research conducted with Rodney Benson and Tim 
Neff on public service media in 12 democracies.112 While hardly representative of public 
service media in their entirety, the countries studied vary in their funding, oversight and 
audience size in ways that make it possible to identify distinct responses to the key pressures 
identified above. For each country, government source documents were used identify the 
pressures experienced by public service media, both online and off. This data was then 
complemented by comprehensive literature reviews of public service media in each country, 
as well as e-mail correspondence with scholars and government regulators whose expertise 
on public media helped to confirm analyses of the pressures public media face in each 
country.  
In what follows, I briefly outline the key pressures experienced by public service 
media in the three domains highlighted above: funding, oversight, audiences. For each, I 
describe the key pressures, and draw on the experiences of different public service media to 
identify potential solutions. I conclude with a brief discussion of how this research can 
inform debates about the role of public service media in shaping contemporary public 
communication systems. 
 
Funding 
 
One set of pressures concern funding. In general, funding for public media has not kept pace 
with increasing costs, thus leading some to explore advertising, philanthropy and others 
forms of revenue to support their operations. While such funds boost revenue, they also tend 
to dilute public service missions. In France, there are only minor differences between the 
evening news of the private TF1 and public (but advertising reliant) France 2 evening 
news.113 In the United States, paltry government funding leads public media to seek corporate 
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and philanthropic support, thus creating pressure to align content with donor demands. In 
2012, for example, a multi-part series on the American economy sponsored by Dow 
Chemical tracked closely with the company’s major business interests.114 By contrast, public 
service television in Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom—which rely primarily on 
public funding—gives more attention to public affairs news than commercial competitors.115 
Several content analyses also suggest these more publicly-funded channels tend to be offer 
more in-depth, diverse and critical reporting than their commercial counterparts.116 
  While most public media see declining or stagnant revenues, the most admired and 
most popular (in terms of audience share) public media outlets remain some of the best 
funded. At the United Kingdom’s BBC, Sweden’s SVT, Findland’s YLE, Demark’s DR, 
Germany’s ARD/ZDF, and Norway’s NRK, per capita public spending ranges from $100 to 
$177 US dollars annually. By contrast, the worst funded—Canada ($31), New Zealand ($25) 
and the United States ($3)—also tend to have difficulty attracting broad, diverse audiences 
and providing independent, civically oriented programming.117 Greater funding, which often 
comes in multiyear increments, boosts the capacity for long-term planning and the delivery of 
online services. One scholar argues the BBC’s ‘huge resources’ have enabled it to ‘offer 
wide-ranging outputs, from educational and cultural programmes for the web, to new, public 
affairs and interactive forums.’118 Along with Finland’s YLE, the BBC leads on many 
platforms as the most popular provider of news and information.119 
Historically, the license fee has been the primary mechanism for funding public media 
in much of Western Europe. Despite longstanding issues with viewers avoiding payment, 
such fees have a ‘social dimension’ in that ‘by contributing to their national public 
broadcaster, citizens felt it was more accountable to them than to the politicians.’120 These 
fees are also set aside solely for public media, and thus do not compete for direct government 
appropriations with other programs. In Canada, by contrast, the annual appropriations process 
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keeps the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) ‘on a short leash,’ which makes ‘long-
term planning difficult.’121 In 2000, the Netherlands replaced the license fee with government 
appropriations, and one result has been a gradual decline of funding in recent years.  
Many countries are now adjusting license fees, which previously were determined 
simply by the presence of a television in the home, to include digital devices that provide 
multiple access points for content. Denmark has changed its definition to include any device 
that can display television content.122 Finland has replaced the license fee with a general 
media tax that citizens pay regardless of the device used.123 Germany has moved to a flat-rate, 
per-household license fee. This ‘one residence, one fee’ system is promoted as enabling 
access to content across multiple devices without paying multiple fees.124 These and related 
efforts deepen, rather than depart from, the ‘public good’ concept of public service media and 
can thus be seen as ‘an extension of the traditional license fee.’125 
 
Oversight  
 
Oversight, both administrative and legal, is a perpetual issue for public service media which 
seek to maintain their independence from partisan interference while fulfilling their civic 
missions. The public service media most subject to undue influence tend to be those with 
weak or vague charters, poor safeguards for mitigating political interference, and overly 
constraining regulations that limit the ability of public media to develop online offerings. 
Here, too, public service media best positioned to deal with these pressures seem to be those 
that deepen extant public service principles by implementing arms-length oversight that 
simultaneously ensures independence while maintaining accountability.  
Strong legal charters provide the basis for non-interference from government, while 
mandating that public service media provide high-quality, diverse programming. They do this 
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by explicitly restricting government interference, and in some cases—Germany, for 
example—setting forth technical criteria by which funding decisions are made. To ensure 
public media fulfill their civic obligations, some charters also set forth mandates around 
educational content, cultural programming, and the inclusion of diverse voices. In Norway, 
for example, the NRK must submit an annual report to the Norwegian media authority 
detailing how it fulfilled these mandates. By contrast, weak charters contain overly generic 
language that leave public media vulnerable to changes in government policy. In New 
Zealand, the centre right party replaced the existing charter—which included language to 
ensure public media provide content neglected by commercial providers—with vague 
language about the need for a range of quality content. The resulting ‘strategic ambiguity’ 
means that the public service media provider can be more easily directed by ‘the 
government’s transitory policy priorities.’126  
While all public service media have oversight agencies, those best able to function 
independently of political influence have staggered term limits and dispersed appointment 
power. In Sweden, the foundation’s board consists of 13 members whose terms are staggered: 
half the board leaves every four years.127 The German KEF is comprised of 16 members, each 
Land (German state) appoints one expert from a given field.128 Protections against partisan 
political meddling are less robust in France, Japan and the United States. In 2008, the French 
administration of Nicolas Sarkozy asserted presidential authority to directly appoint the 
public broadcaster’s director129 which, although reversed in 2013, shows the fragility of 
public media’s independence. Similarly, in Japan politicians have been accused of attempting 
to influence NHK news.130 Finally, in the United States the president has sole appointment 
authority for the CPB’s board of directors. Historically, these appointments are based on 
political patronage rather than expertise.131  
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Questions abound as to how the remit of public service media ought to evolve in a 
digital era. In even the best-funded systems, like Germany, public media have sometimes 
been slow to embrace a pro-digital organizational culture.132 Where public media have not 
expanded online, it has largely been due to legal constraints stemming from commercial 
media opposition claiming unfair-state sponsored competition against market actors. In 
Denmark, associations representing commercial media have gained political support for 
banning or restricting DR’s online services. In the most recent policy agreement, which runs 
from 2015-18, the public broadcaster’s online services remain intact, though a panel of 
experts is being asked to clarify the future role of public service media.133  
More broadly, throughout Europe oversight agencies have introduced ‘public value 
tests’ as a way to evaluate the impact of digital services prior to their implementation. Since 
2008, the BBC has regularly submitted to such tests, and it has received negative decisions as 
a result of them, most notably a 2008 proposal to provide additional local video news, sports 
and weather services in sixty areas of the United Kingdom on local BBC news sites. The 
BBC Trust rejected the proposal on the grounds that the service would not be the best use of 
license fee funds and might negatively impact commercial media at the local level. The 
Puttnam Report suggests revisiting this proposal as a way to ‘help to address the immense 
local democratic deficit in English regions.’134 This suggestion accords with the idea that 
extending—rather than abolishing—pre-existing public service values not adequately 
captured in extant value tests.  
 
Audiences 
 
Public service media around the world face stiff competition from commercial channels for 
audiences. Those that maintain and build audiences seem to be those that integrate public 
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input so as to ensure that public media remain a forum for diverse and broad voices and 
viewpoints. In the United Kingdom, audience councils publish an annual report assessing 
how well the BBC meets license payers’ needs. In Denmark, an eight-person regulatory 
authority by law must include one person nominated by the Cooperative Forum for Danish 
Listeners and Viewers Association. In some cases, opinion surveys also help provide public 
service media with an additional buffer against government intervention, as public 
broadcasters typically fare better in opinion polls than does the incumbent government.135 
Which audiences count most is sometimes an issue for public service media, and this 
problem is growing in the digital environment. In the United States, audience members who 
donate effectively have more input over programming than those that do not. Only a small 
portion of the citizenry contributes, and they tend to be more educated and wealthier than the 
general population, thus creating pressures to orient programming toward more affluent 
groups.136 The Puttnam report expresses a similar concern that the BBC will sacrifice 
‘underserved audiences’ (both regional and socioeconomic) while ‘superserving the literate, 
articulate and wealthy.’137 Here as elsewhere, the pressure to depart from long-standing public 
media principles is strong, yet doing so risks undermining the historical mission of public 
service providers to serve as a forum for broad, diverse audiences.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Public service media face challenges on a number of fronts. These challenges include long-
existing concerns about how to protect public media from partisan meddling, as well as more 
recent problems posed by increasing commercial pressures and the difficulty of balancing the 
need to appeal to a broad audience while upholding public service values. This review 
suggests that the public service media best equipped to deal with these pressures are those 
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that deepen, rather than depart from, long-standing efforts to provide high-quality 
programming, and in-depth news and information that serves to promote an inclusive version 
of democratic citizenship across diverse populations.  
 This research highlights the relative strengths of public service media in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the Nordic countries, all of which have media policies aimed at 
ensuring public media excellence. By contrast, public media have been weakened in recent 
years in the Netherlands and New Zealand due to the erosion of procedures for ensuring 
arm’s-length autonomy from direct government control. Canada’s public service media, 
already weak, remains vulnerable to political pressures because of its reliance on government 
appropriations. Likewise, the American public media system continues to struggle with both 
partisan and philanthropic pressures due to its weak institutional autonomy, government 
underfunding, and reliance on donors to make up the shortfall.  
 It is important to stress, though, that even in countries where public service media 
operate under less-than-ideal conditions, they retain a certain distance from commercial 
pressures and are thus able to provide content not found on commercial networks. 
Conversely, even the best funded public media do not go as far as small-scale alternative 
media in challenging entrenched power relations. Public service media may thus provide 
important content but they are unlikely to replace long-term influences that stem from the 
shared class interests and social networks of many politicians, regulators and public media 
professionals.138  
Opponents often argue that public service offerings are obsolete in the age of cable 
television and the Internet. They also oppose public funding on the grounds that it amounts to 
unfair state-sponsored competition against market actors. Yet in many countries public 
service media are the only media providing locally produced, innovative and experimental 
content online.139 And while there are pressures to compete with commercial outlets and 
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monetize online offerings, it is also important to emphasize that they continue to find ways to 
fulfil their core missions. This includes helping audiences navigate digital networks in which 
content is abundant but civic affairs content can get lost in the noise. In short, even as public 
media face challenges, they remain vital components of contemporary democratic media 
systems.  
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PUBLIC SERVICE IN EUROPE: FIVE KEY POINTS 
Trine Syvertsen and Gunn Enli 
 
Introduction: The State of Public Service Broadcasting in Europe 
 
Europe is the heartland of public service broadcasting (PSB), not least because of the leading 
role of the BBC, but there is of course more to European public broadcasting than the BBC. 
In this chapter, we will contextualise the 2016 report A Future for Public Service Television: 
Content and Platforms in a Digital World through a review of relevant research on public 
broadcasting in Europe as well as our own studies of PSB in the Nordic region. 
We have structured our observations around five key points that condense research as 
well as challenges, debates and prospects: 1) the crisis discourse; 2) innovation and public 
service media (PSM); 3) distinctiveness; 4) editorial independence; 5) national differences 
and politics. In line with the report that is the centre of this volume, studies from other 
European countries observe that an overall narrative of decline dominates the debate on 
public service. However, they also note that public broadcasters, and particularly publicly 
funded institutions with long traditions, are managing better than the overall narrative 
describes.140 As we enter a more politicised and polarized social climate, there are new 
opportunities as well as risks for European public service broadcasters. 
 
Challenges and Crisis 
 
The starting point for many contemporary studies, as it has been since the mid-1980s, is the 
ongoing challenges to PSB; literature inevitably refers to various forms of ‘crisis’. In a sense, 
the entire research tradition on public service broadcasting is defined by the mapping of 
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challenges and problems and, to some degree, on normative suggestions for remedies and 
improvements. The challenges described have shifted over the last three decades, but 
continues to be discussed under broadly similar headings: technological, political, economic, 
and changes in the social and cultural climate.141 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the emphasis was on commercialisation, cable and satellite 
competition and a political and cultural shift to the right. In the early 2000s, it was the 
introduction of new digital platforms, participatory formats and the concern that public 
broadcasters could be left out by new portals and gatekeepers. Nowadays, the challenges of 
audience fragmentation stem from new competitors reluctant to be regulated as media 
businesses, ongoing challenges related to TV's position as content provider, problems for 
established business models, and problems related to the very definition of television. The 
traditional understanding of television—as an advertisement or licence fee funded system 
distributing mixed schedule programming simultaneously to a mass audience watching in 
their homes—is in flux.  
Specific challenges come from so-called digital intermediaries: a group of services that have 
in common that they function as algorithm-based gatekeepers. The most disruptive digital 
intermediaries for linear television are content aggregators such as Netflix, HBO, Amazon 
and YouTube, in addition to AppleTV, which together represent a significant gatekeeper to, 
and third party provider of, TV content. The impact of digital intermediaries vary, but they 
have in common that they liberate consumers from schedules, produce and distribute content 
based on more specific user data than traditional TV companies, and encourage so-called 
‘cord-cutting’ where viewers can watch individual programmes online and avoid TV-
advertising and paying the licence fee.142 
The economic and technological challenges to public service television are similar 
across borders but the impact is mediated by cultural and political forces and, in particular, 
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the degree of trust and support for public institutions. The studies from different European 
countries are perhaps most varied on this point. While some describe a polarised political 
climate, others describe political cultures where there are still some form of consensual 
politics surrounding PSB. 
A point where studies across Europe largely overlap is on their emphasis on the 
increasing complexity of the political context of public broadcasting. While there has always 
been a multitude of social, political and cultural interests in broadcasting, the term ‘multi-
stakeholderism’ describes the erosion of sector boundaries that has brought new stakeholders 
into the debate, such as technology platforms, online services, and distributors. A multi-
stakeholder environment implies that not just public broadcasters and the government are 
partners in negotiations over PSB, but that a variety of private operators can influence the 
debate.143 Criticism of PSB now comes from all sides and pertains to all aspects and concerns 
that are external to PSB operations and increasingly affects both how it is understood and 
regulated. 
 
From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media 
 
Paralleling the attention to crisis and challenges, research on public service emphasises the 
potential for renewal and change for the original public broadcasters. Many contributions 
passionately urge broadcasters to change their ways, and much attention has been given to the 
role of PSBs in digital environments.144 Central to this research is a conceptual transition 
from ‘public service broadcasting’ to ‘public service media’ to reflect the fact that the 
institutions do more than just radio and television.145  
The reconceptualization demonstrates that public service broadcasters share 
characteristics with other types of media, online experiments and cultural institutions. While 
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such a change in focus is understandable and necessary, there is also a risk that research on 
public service broadcasting may neglect the large-scale and mainstream broadcasting 
activities that continue to distinguish these types of institutions. As the research interest shifts 
from PSB to PSM, the most marginal of experiments may get more attention than steady and 
stable programme formats that may run for years and attract millions of viewers. It is still 
vital to investigate the mechanisms that PSB institutions use to build relationships with mass 
audiences and a broad public sphere. 
Cross-platform formats, which combine tradition and innovation, are among the most 
expansive strategies of public broadcasters. Case studies from across Europe demonstrate that 
the cross-platform operations of PSB institutions have reached a certain maturity. First, the 
classic PSB genre news production has changed significantly to include online platforms.146 
A second example are innovative services for young audiences, such as the Norwegian online 
drama series Skam [Shame], which updates randomly according to the narrative rather than 
following a predetermined schedule, and includes text-messages between the characters. 
Third, public broadcasters have invented formats with mass appeal and a focus on national 
identity such as Test the Nation and Great Britons, offering interactive services such as 
online voting. Despite the idea central to PSM research that PSB could be a node, linking 
together amateur and professional activities, it may appear that cross-platform experiments 
are more successful where the traditional broadcaster is in control and has designed the whole 
process.147 
 
Broad Remits are Challenged Everywhere 
 
The move to online platforms has intensified ongoing debate about the broad remit enjoyed 
by public broadcasters. Although there are variations, the criticism of the PSB remit rests on 
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three interlinked premises across borders: that a broad remit is no longer needed as provisions 
have proliferated in the multi-platform universe, that public broadcasters use their broad 
remit as an excuse for transmitting crowd-pleasing programming indistinguishable from 
commercial broadcasters, and that the expansion of services on new platforms threaten the 
revenue of private media businesses.148  
Commenting on this debate, public broadcasting scholars have nuanced the argument 
that PSB is becoming indistinguishable and argue that it constitutes a central quality-
enhancing mechanism in a cross-media ecosystem. First, scheduling studies show that genre 
pluralism is more extensive on public service channels, particularly in prime time, and that 
their distinctiveness from commercial channels is increasing.149 Furthermore, studies have 
demonstrated that even if public and commercial channels buy similar formats, the PSB 
productions remain distinct.150 Third, studies of PSB activities, such as online news and 
weather services, dispute that these constitute an economic threat to competitors’ online 
activities.151  
Instead of exerting a negative influence on the rest of the market, scholars argue that 
PSB has a positive influence, sometimes described as an ecosystem effect, meaning that by 
influencing their commercial competitors, PSBs can, in practice, ‘act as regulators of the 
television industry as a whole.’152 Indeed, public broadcasters are constantly expected to take 
on new tasks to improve the overall sector, whether it is to act as a ‘digital locomotive’ or to 
support creative industries and private competitors.153  
 
The Twin Challenges of Commercialisation and Politicisation 
 
The operations of the public broadcasters reflect their relationship with other domains of 
power, particularly the market and state. Historically, there has been great emphasis on the 
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autonomy of broadcasters and on securing governance and funding models that may 
guarantee a high degree of political and financial independence. The intention has been to 
impose mechanisms guaranteeing that broadcasters are more accountable to the general 
public than to commercial interests or the government. The licence fee has been an important 
source of funding for many public broadcasters, and people’s willingness to pay it has been 
seen as an indication of the general legitimacy for public service broadcasting.  
However with funding models in flux, a changing political climate, and TV audiences 
migrating online, the licence fee is increasingly being debated and challenged across Europe. 
In the Nordic region, several countries have abolished the license fee system (Iceland in 
2007, Finland in 2013), and replaced it with a direct unconditional income tax, while others 
have so far continued the system (Norway, Sweden), or extended it to a media licence, 
including also the internet and mobile phones (Denmark). In spite of changing funding 
mechanisms, the Nordic countries’ public service fees and taxes remain some of the highest 
in the world.154 The Nordic public broadcasters, and in particular the NRK, have been 
provided with a ‘generous leeway for launching commercial initiatives’155 and a high level of 
autonomy based on the ‘arm’s length principle’.    
Across Europe, the level of funding, how that funding can be spent, and what else it is 
obliged to cover vary significantly. A less stable financial situation leaves broadcasters more 
open to both commercial and political pressures. Studies reveal correlating patterns between 
the level of funding and the level of politicisation of public broadcasting funding; the 
countries with high and stable public service funding, such as Sweden and Germany, are also 
the countries with the lowest influence of politics; in less stable funding systems, such as 
France, Italy and Spain, there are higher levels of political influence over PSB; in Poland, the 
only European Broadcasting Union member state where advertising is the main revenue 
source, there exist levels of politicisation and commercialisation to a degree not found 
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elsewhere in Europe.156 Generally, PSB institutions have less autonomy in countries where 
public service broadcasting was established later and in different historical conditions. For 
example, in Poland, public broadcasting was established only after the revolutionary changes 
of 1989, and in Greece, where the public broadcaster was shut down by the Government in 
2013, both radio and television were introduced under political dictatorships.157 
In spite of differences, political and financial pressures are also found in stable PSB 
countries, not least because multi-stakeholderism leads to vigorous debate and new 
challenges. In addition to the factors already discussed, the degree of compromise or conflict 
over PSB may also relate to differences between consensus-oriented and more polarised 
political cultures more generally. In smaller, more consensus-oriented cultures, it may be 
easier to reach a compromise to support and sustain PSB. 
The Significance of National Differences 
 
In this chapter, we have pinpointed similarities and differences, general challenges as well as 
diverging paths. The fifth and final observation addresses the overall perspective on public 
broadcasting and its relationship to political culture. Despite a common discussion and 
familiarity of issues across borders, studies increasingly point to significant differences 
between public broadcasters across different countries that are systematically related to the 
domain of national policies.158 Despite all the talk about globalisation and the role of the 
European Union, the primary context for public service broadcasting remains at the level of 
the national.159  
The emphasis on path-dependency points to factors that lie outside of public service 
broadcasting and, to some degree, outside the context of media policy. The fate of public 
broadcasters is only partially determined by how well each broadcaster succeeds in attaining 
its goals, and largely determined by developments at a more general political level where 
  
104 
basic policy solutions fall in and out of favour. Few politicians are media policy specialists; 
rather, they are usually generalists preferring particular types of policy solutions over others. 
Stable political compromises in overall policy continue to be important – such as the Nordic 
welfare state contexts where there is broad consensus for state intervention and support for 
universal solutions to reduce inequalities in society.160 As political debates over public 
broadcasting across Europe demonstrate, public broadcasting may be seen as both cause and   
indication of, as well as a solution to, problems in the social and political sphere, whether 
these refer to issues of diversity or pluralism or a more profound loss of trust in media and 
public institutions. 
 
DIVERSITY: REFLECTION AND REVIEW 
Sarita Malik 
 
Introduction 
 
This is a particularly fertile moment to discuss the relationship between diversity and Public 
Service Television (PST). In late 2016, the issue of boardroom diversity was raised when the 
UK government took an unprecedented intervention to block a BME female candidate’s 
application for a position on Channel 4’s board. The BBC’s coverage of Brexit in 2016 
demonstrated its struggle to diversify the debates around immigration that framed the 
campaign. Meanwhile, Channel 4 with its mainstreaming of populist politics through 
documentaries such as Things That We Won’t Say About Race That Are True (Channel 4, 
2015) (it probed the value of multiculturalism) and The Trouble With Political Correctness 
(2017)161 (it linked a fear of offence with the conditions for extremist politics), mark a 
departure from its confidently multicultural origins. Each of these examples is symptomatic 
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of a media sector that is still contending with how to manage cultural difference in the public 
space. My focus in this contribution is to reflect on what the ‘A Future For Public Service 
Television’ report162 says about ‘diversity’ and consider more broadly, the utility of PST 
diversity policy in direct relation to its role in mediating lived multiculture.  
The timeliness of the report in relation to questions of diversity is striking. Minority 
communities in the UK are currently experiencing new forms of hostility as an intense 
backlash against immigration and multiculturalism presides, alongside a resurgence of right-
wing populisms and xenophobia.163 Within an intensified climate of ethnic separatism and 
border anxieties, it would be easy to assume that spaces seeking to foster multiplicity would 
be shut down and that public service modes of governmentality around diversity, would be on 
fragile ground. And yet ‘diversity’ is gaining traction within PST like never before.  
In 2016, the government announced that, for the first time, diversity would be 
enshrined in the BBC Royal Charter, asserting a commitment in its Diversity and Inclusion 
Action Plan and Strategy 2016-20 to embed diversity more deeply into the organisation’s 
identity and to better include underrepresented groups (such as women, disabled, LGBT and 
black, Asian and minority ethnics (BAME)) in the workforce and content, both on-air and on-
screen. Meanwhile, Channel 4’s 360° Diversity Charter, established in 2015 is, according to 
its Creative Diversity Manager, ‘a game changer’ because ’every production has to go 
through a diversity tick-box process for on-and off-screen’.164 In late 2016, the British 
Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) announced new initiatives to boost the 
numbers of ethnic minority and socially disadvantaged filmmakers, which includes plans for 
more diverse membership and reworked eligibility criteria for some of its award categories. 
Ofcom, now the BBC's first external regulator, is launching an annual scheme to monitor 
diversity. For its CEO, Sharon White, the priority for the regulator is transparency.165 These 
are just a few of the many diversity interventions that seek to boost more diverse 
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participation, representation and engagement – whether through target-setting, monitoring, 
mentorship or training. 
For Channel 4’s CEO, David Abraham, quoted in a special section of the Royal 
Television Society’s magazine, Television, in January 2017, diversity ‘is going to be a 
lifetime’s effort but we can begin to look back now on the first steps to progress.’166 So what 
is it about this current moment, after several decades of shifting modalities of PST diversity 
policy167 and parallel sector inequalities that offers grounds for such optimism? And how is it 
that this ostensible proclivity towards diversity is being assembled and normalised alongside 
broader exclusionary nationalisms related not just to issues of race and ethnicity but also to 
other aspects of social identity including class, religion, sexuality, age, and nationality? 
The report states that issues of diversity ‘based on the recognition that the population 
consists of multiple and overlapping sets of minorities’168 are central to the relevance and 
legitimacy of any public service media system. Problematically, PST has also proven to be 
implicated in the social processes of exclusion that are enacted more widely across the 
creative sector, revealing a deep correlation between social and cultural inequality.169 As I 
reflect on the report, I also want to briefly examine how ‘diversity’ is operationalised within 
these contexts and consider its potential efficacy in producing a less unequal, more diverse 
public service media culture as part of a functioning public sphere. 
 
The Report on Diversity 
 
Diversity—beyond questions of diversity of ownership or content (for example genre)—is 
normally tagged on to wider debates about public service and its remit in scholarly and 
industry debates. Significantly, the report positions diversity as a core concern (as did the 
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Pilkington Report in 1962 and the Annan committee in 1977) alongside other issues such as 
representation, accountability and independence. Chapter 8 focuses specifically on 
television’s environment in relation to diversity, asserting that struggles over visibility and 
representation will continue ‘as long as different social groups are not adequately 
addressed’.170 At the same time, the apparent tension that PST is tasked to deal with, 
involving the negotiation of common, universal approaches (that underpin the ethos of public 
service) alongside meeting the particular needs of ethnic minority and other under-
represented groups (in an already complex scenario of a multi-platform digital age) is also 
acknowledged. 
Public Service Broadcasting’s (PSB) ostensibly unifying project based around a 
national public culture and identification is tasked therefore with being entirely inclusive and 
representative, whilst grappling with the nuances of living with difference—cultural, racial or 
otherwise—in a multicultural, if not multiculturalist, society. Developments such as 
devolution, inequality, immigration and the various protected characteristics addressed by the 
UK’s 2010 Single Equality Act171 further complicate the picture. One specific 
recommendation within the report is that an amendment be made in the Equality Act to 
include PST commissioning and editorial policy, as part of its public service equality duties. 
Equality under law seems a reasonable proposal because it asserts the link between PST and 
wider social contexts of equality. The trickier issue, and one which I will now go on to 
discuss, is of how such equality might be achieved within a sector that has repeatedly been 
identified as deeply unequal in terms of minority access, opportunity, representation and 
engagement. 
Following Napoli’s work on broadcast diversity,172 the report contends that PST 
requires a multi-pronged approach to address not just content diversity (that is, the range of 
representations that end up on screen and how these are perceived) and source diversity (the 
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diversity of those who produce and supply content), but also what Napoli calls ‘exposure 
diversity’. This, Napoli explains, is, ‘the degree to which audiences are actually exposing 
themselves to a diversity of information products and sources.’173 Napoli’s work on diversity 
and PSB overlaps with some of the other ways in which we can think about diversity, for 
example in relation to issues of ownership and control, media plurality and democratic 
participation. The report further explicates how diversity might be understood, for example in 
relation to ‘voice, representation and opportunity’.174 These are useful routes to analysis 
because they open up the meanings of ‘diversity’, and insist on recognising the overlapping 
orders of mediation that include representation, production and reception. An implicit 
suggestion is that the realisation of ‘diversity’ might depend on an integrated approach 
factoring in such interdependencies, rather than building distinct solutions that do not take 
into account other orders of mediation. 
Taking each of Napoli’s elements of broadcast diversity—content, source and 
exposure—the report outlines some of the outstanding problems that have led to a deep 
unevenness in terms of, for example, satisfaction levels based on visibility and portrayal 
across different social and geographical groups. It uses as an example, the representation of 
working class lives, particularly in the reality television genre and the strong responses to 
Channel 4’s 2014 series, Benefits Street. Exposure diversity is importantly tied to the values 
placed on PST, a point that has also been backed up by industry data. For example, Ofcom’s 
PSB 2015 Audience Opinion report demonstrates that where there is an increase in 
satisfaction with PSB provision, it has clearly mapped onto the ways in which PSB purposes 
are valued, for example an increasing satisfaction in PSB in 2014 for ‘showing different 
cultures within the UK.’175 All of this underscores the report’s emphasis on how diversity is 
interwoven with the relevance and legitimacy of PST. 
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Ring-fenced Funding  
 
The report notes the lack of research that has been conducted around content or on-screen 
diversity compared to research on audience reception. One of the key recommendations is for 
the BBC and other public service broadcasters to ringfence funding specifically aimed at 
BAME productions to both evidence commitment and more successfully build real change. A 
potential funding model for this might be how the BBC has funded nations and regions, 
which resulted from a crisis in representation and funding allocations that it first identified in 
2003. Marcus Ryder, BBC Scotland’s former editor of current affairs, reminds us that, under 
the nations and regions template, if money is not spent on particular kinds of regional 
productions (for example, a Scottish production), then the money gets lost, so in the case of 
diversity, funding could be earmarked as ‘BAME’ (as one example of a social group that has 
hitherto been marginalised within PST and as a demographic that will make up one-third of 
the total audience by 2050). The upshot is that ‘the actual accountability is within the 
structure’,176 making it difficult to ignore.  
The report’s two main recommendations (the first to link PSB with public service 
equality duties and the second, to ring-fence funding) urge a more robust commitment to 
reducing inequalities and providing more tangible support. Ring-fenced funding is a 
recommendation that has a historical context, both within the structures of PST, and as a 
source of critique, with claims that it risks building separateness into organisational structures 
(or ghettoes), whilst allowing more pervasive racialised inequalities and regimes of 
representation to remain intact.177 For example, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a broader 
conception of public service representation that was built into the very structure of early 
Channel 4 (in the form of the Multicultural Programmes Unit) and the BBC and LWT had 
their own Black and Asian ‘specialist’ minority programming strands. For all the potential 
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gains of dedicated funding, such as increasing visibility, any lasting impact on wider 
institutional culture or on subsequently making PST less ‘hideously White’178 has been put in 
doubt. The question arises of whether ring-fending money really is the solution or, indeed, 
enough in itself. Would separate funds, even if they were conceded to by the broadcasters, 
further fuel a politics of resentment (both institutionally and publicly) because of the 
accentuated difference that such funding would help produce at a time of anti-
multiculturalism in public discourse? What kinds of representations might BAME audiences 
want or expect from this investment and how and where would these programmes be 
screened, scheduled and valued?  
 
Inequalities in the Workforce 
 
These concerns around representation also connect to a more prevalent method within past 
and current diversity strategy making, which proposes boosting minority workers in line with 
proportion to the population or what Herman Gray has called ‘representational parity’.179 
Diversifying the workforce is an area that is potentially more straightforward to regulate 
through policy intervention, partly because it is easier to monitor personnel (rather than, for 
example, the more contested terrain of content and representation). The 2015 Creative 
Skillset Employment Survey found that only 4% of executive positions were held by BAME 
staff.180 Creative Skillset’s 2012 Census had shown a decrease in BAME employment in 
television, with figures falling from 9% in 2009 to 7.5% in 2012.181 Although BAME is only 
one dimension of a broader understanding of cultural diversity alongside other modes of 
demographic diversity, these figures indicate that, even in spite of (hypothetically ‘easier’) 
employment-targeted diversity strategies, marginalised and privileged access persists.  A 
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more recent study commissioned by BAFTA and Creative Skillset with the BFI in 2016182 
also emphasised the ‘class ceiling’ as a further barrier to opportunity for underrepresented 
groups working in the film, television and the gaming industries who have to contend with a 
culture of ‘fitting in’ together with homogenised recruitment practices and mindsets. Whilst 
such findings are depressing, they also function as an important ‘reality check’, apparently 
influencing the recent intensification of institutional diversity initiatives. The 2012 Creative 
Skillset survey in particular, by evidencing the extent of the problem, has elicited a range of 
high profile discussions, including those led by the actor and writer, Lenny Henry.  
We can say quite confidently that the culture of PST is partly reflected in the 
composition of the workforce and that the low representation of minority demographics 
serves as evidence of social exclusion. However, is it a logical consequence that a more 
diverse workforce will lead to more diverse content and exposure for audiences? An 
emerging body of literature within media industry studies research contests the simple idea 
that diversifying those who produce and supply content (source diversity) will, in turn, 
diversify the range of representations that end up on screen or, indeed, how these might be 
perceived by audiences (when determining content diversity). For Anamik Saha, the cultures 
of production that minority workers have to negotiate, also need to be taken in to account, as 
well as representational politics because ‘the reproduction of neo-colonial discourses around 
race, ethnicity and religion does not merely spring from the values of individual gatekeepers 
but is embedded within the production process itself through what appears as a common-
sense economic/commercial rationale.’183  
If we agree that these additional facets unavoidably shape broadcasting culture, the 
inevitability of ‘social parity’ as a result of ‘representational parity’ is rightly queried. This is 
not to suggest that labour inequalities are harmless or that more diversity at the point of 
production can never diversify editorial power or influence, but it is also not tantamount to 
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chalking up the numbers in the hope that all representational problems will be solved at once. 
Besides, assuming that certain cultural ‘types’ will inevitably produce certain kinds of 
cultural work and from only certain perspectives, reifies essentialist tropes of cultural 
identity.  
Gray’s analysis also encourages us to consider ‘the assumption, micropractices, social 
relations, sense about the nature of social difference and the practices of inequality’ that 
exist.184 This matters, not just because diversity policy often fails to mediate lived 
multiculture in meaningful ways, but more ominously because diversity is implicated 
precisely as a ‘technology of power, a means of managing the very difference it expresses.’185 
Thus, it is suggested that ‘diversity’ not only co-exists with inequality (as is repeatedly 
proven to be the case), but that ‘diversity’ helps produce a racialised social system, in order 
for racialised— 
and other social—hierarchies to be, more or less, held in place. The enactment of diversity in 
institutional life—of which current PST presents us with a brilliant example because it is 
what Gray detects as ‘a key location where diversity is practiced materially and 
symbolically’186—is therefore coming under scrutiny, rendered an ideological and discursive 
mechanism designed to manage rather than address cultural difference.187 These 
interpretations help us to make sense of the ongoing relationship between social and cultural 
inequality, as well as the potential disconnect between institutionalised diversity-isms and the 
effects they promise to deliver. 
 
Diversity Strategy as Ideological Counterpoint 
 
The report welcomes the various diversity strategies within PST, but also critiques them for 
not meeting their desired aims.188 It observes that, whilst the current diversity impetus 
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relocates diversity as a universal point of reference rather than positioning itself in relation to 
specific minority communities, it is precisely the prevalence of marked social inequalities 
that have led to such strategy building. The symbiotic raison d'être for the latest diversity 
imperative is that growing social diversity and demands for fairer representation from those 
who are routinely marginalised are occurring alongside acute social inequalities.  
David Abraham’s comment that diversity for Channel 4 is ‘a lifetime’s effort’ is an 
expectation that resonates with Sara Ahmed’s argument that diversity discourse is an ongoing 
phenomenon that rarely actually implements change and thus depends on what Ahmed calls 
‘non-performativity’.189 For Abraham, ‘the first steps of progress’ that he discerns, signify the 
great promise of diversity, a tangential hope, and one that sees disadvantage and 
discrimination as transitory rather than systemic190 or, perhaps more cynically, requiring 
systematic maintenance. It is in such ways that ‘diversity’ within public service media 
functions as what Collins has identified in the context of liberal higher education, as an  
‘ideological counterpoint to the race-based policy and practice of affirmative action’191 (in the 
US) or anti-racism (in the UK) that came before. Returning to the wider political and popular 
contestations around the value of multiculturalism, one concern is whether, rather than being 
antithetical to the wider retreat from multiculturalism that we are experiencing, current 
industry-led diversity mediations are actually constitutive of it and its enactment. The 
supposition is raised precisely because of the underlying language and logic of 
institutionalised diversity that suit the valorisation of post-multiculturalism (if not an outright 
denunciation of multiculturalism), by evading a direct engagement with the institutional 
discrimination that exists within the very structures and systems of PSB.  
Such evasion—that ‘diversity’ work facilitates—works on multiple levels. For 
example, the specific ways in which different minority communities are marginalised is not 
constructively engaged with (as an example of the predominant rejection of ‘identity 
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politics’). Resource is spent on renewing diversity policy goals rather than on holding to 
account those earlier misdirected diversity campaigns, meaning that organisational 
responsibility is lost. The risk is that the idea of tolerance underpinning ‘diversity’ goes 
untested against practice and that recurring, imitative policies are expected to yield different 
results. Meanwhile, diversity reproduces positive articulations—vis-à-vis, for example, 
updated scripts around creativity, talent and innovation—that are actually dependent on the 
social inequalities that it fundamentally helps produce.   
One example of the uncritical renewal of diversity is the phenomenal rise of ‘creative 
diversity’ policy making; now the dominant way in which diversity is presented in PST 
contexts. ‘Creative diversity’ shifts the paradigm of the multicultural problem (in PSB), 
enables the ‘marketisation’ of television and multiculture and ultimately continues to 
safeguard PSB interests.192 ‘Diversity’ simply becomes therefore a self-narrative requiring 
visibility (as a public discourse of validation), and promotion (as a discourse of liberal 
tolerance). One further characteristic is its economic utility because ‘diversity’ is also 
financially driven, securing the universal assurance requirements of public funding and also 
bringing a potential boost to profitability through, for example, a diverse workforce, 
leadership or customer orientation. This financial characteristic is especially prevalent in the 
‘creative diversity’ paradigm. It is in these ways that ‘diversity’ is underpinned by market, 
regulatory and social motivations. Market-oriented diversity arguments, whilst they may 
obscure the social regulatory basis of public service television, can provide obvious 
incentives for broadcasters. Commercial broadcasters such as Sky, for example, have 
responded to declining BAME audiences by recently pledging to take 20% of the stars and 
writers of its UK-originated television shows from a BAME background. For Stuart Murphy, 
director of Sky's portfolio of entertainment channels (to which the pledge applies), this is ‘a 
way of kickstarting the process’.193  
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Concluding Reflections 
 
Even within this critique, there is a strong defence of diversity in practice as the basis of PST, 
coupled with a call for greater equality and a valuing of diversity in the public sphere. How 
PST positions itself in relation to rising populisms and new social tensions, and the steps it 
takes to shift the axis of debate towards a more democratic, diverse and sometimes discordant 
space, seems especially pressing. For broadcasters, this means constructing different ways of 
talking about these issues in a move that potentially challenges public service media 
tendencies to invite consensus rather than disagreement. For media and communications 
studies, but also one hopes for the broadcasters themselves, it means engaging with ‘the 
operations of power/knowledge and the role of media in the making of racial inequality (and 
its potential for the making of racial justice).’194 All of this might seem like an abstraction 
from the nitty gritty of ‘doing diversity’, but without interrogating the meanings, functions 
and utility of ‘diversity’ itself, it becomes impossible to curate a future that not just 
accommodates, but also actively defends, multiculture. How we understand PST’s approach 
to diversity has to go beyond calling for renewed sets of remits and targets, to instead 
understand it as a process that, through its very existence, sustains deep inequalities that avert 
mutual recognition in public space.  
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THE BBC: A BRIEF FUTURE HISTORY, 2017-2022 
David Hendy 
 
The report into the ‘Future for Public Service Television’ is out. So, what next for the biggest 
and most influential player in the public service firmament, the BBC? The document’s 
diagnosis—and its prescriptions—are clear and persuasive. Will it be transformative in the 
ways we hope? 
 I’m reluctant, as all historians should be, to engage in too much futurology. In any 
case, the Puttnam report is admirably wide-ranging and thorough. Its authors have ensured 
that almost all the runes have already been read. It’s a shame, perhaps, that radio wasn’t in 
their original remit. When Radio 4’s breakfast programme still does so much to shape the 
daily news agenda and its drama-serial brings to greater public attention the issue of gas-
lighting in domestic abuse, when Radio 3 offers such significant patronage to the music 
industry and 1Extra recruits a younger and more diverse audience than many commercial 
stations, I’d say the medium easily justifies at least a walk-on part in this topical drama. But 
that single caveat aside, the key issues—content, universality, variety, benchmark-setting in 
quality, the nurturing of talent, above all perhaps the facilitating of ‘public knowledge and 
connections’—have all been identified and analysed with precision and fairness.195  Deeper 
currents of history have been addressed, too, not just more immediate matters of policy and 
structure. The report makes clear, for instance, that the most profound threats to public 
service television have not only come from the ‘hyper-commercial, market dominated media 
environment’ unleashed in the 1980s,196 or from the prospect of a ‘mass exodus’ of younger 
viewers from old-fashioned TV boxes in the family living room to various forms of 
individualised online, on-demand, mobile video services such as YouTube and Netflix. They 
have also come in response to longer-term changes of behaviour and attitude in British 
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society – a healthy decline in deference, for instance, and a gathering reluctance to allow only 
a narrow elite to pronounce on matters of newsworthiness or artistic value. Quite rightly, the 
report has made clear that despite everything, reports of the death of public service 
broadcasting have been premature: not only does it persist in having a firm emotional grip on 
audiences, it is still needed—perhaps more than ever in the age of the internet ‘filter 
bubble’—as a bulwark to a ‘plural and informed democracy’.197 And in their closing 
recommendations the authors show decisively that ensuring an old institution such as the 
BBC remains fit for purpose will nevertheless involve more than a few tweaks: it will have to 
show even more determination to support productions that don’t just feature Black and 
Minority Ethnic people, but are actually conceived and made by them; it will have to devolve 
even more production to Wales and Scotland; it will have to contemplate replacing the 
licence fee with a household levy; appointments to its unitary board will need to be 
independent from government; and so on.   
As I say, all the detailed policy analysis and the prescriptions that follow are self-
evidently sensible. The unresolved issue, though, is this: the ability of such a vision to take 
hold – to actually influence government policy or the BBC’s own sense of what it needs to do 
to reform itself. In this respect, public service television in Britain faces two enormous 
challenges: one political, the other cultural; one external, the other internal.  
 First, then, the political challenge: the inconvenient fact that we currently reside in a 
kakistocracy: rule not by the best people, but by the worst. As with Brexit, as with Trump, as 
with all the ‘fake news’, as with the whole damned political ferment we find ourselves 
mesmerised and horrified by as we lurch dazed and confused towards the BBC’s Centenary 
year of 2022. We are confronted by one apparently immovable obstacle: the repeated failure 
of sound empirical data and rational argument to gain purchase in government policy-making 
circles. It’s hard to know whether this is a matter of ignorance or design – both, perhaps. But 
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the pattern is clear enough. Scientists warned very clearly that a cull of badgers would do 
little to control the spread of bovine TB – but the government went ahead anyway. An 
avalanche of sociological data has been produced to prove that reintroducing selective 
secondary schooling will depress both educational achievement and social mobility – but the 
government is still allowing new Grammar schools to open. Convincing, well-researched 
case-studies, whether uttered calmly or screamed out loud, have been met with a studied 
indifference from a government less flashily confrontational than that of Thatcher but almost 
certainly more ideologically extreme. So, one is forced to ask, what hope is there that even 
the best arguments in favour of public service television will gain traction in the corridors of 
power? Why, indeed, should we expect the kakistocrats—most likely in power for several 
more years—to act in the public’s interests at all?   
 There’s worse. The survival of public service broadcasting, and of the BBC in 
particular, in a form we would recognise—universal, diverse, large enough to have cultural 
force—now has to deal with a very malevolent Catch-22 which the political class has 
constructed for it. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the BBC could be attacked for being weak – 
for its falling share of the national TV audience, for perceived lapses in editorial judgement 
and the like. Now, even more perversely, it’s being attacked for being strong: the range and 
quality of its online presence is said to be blocking new players from entering the field, the 
size and popularity of its news service is said to be killing off local newspapers, and so on. 
It’s public usefulness in providing a service—and in doing something well—is discounted in 
favour of its impact on the ability of private companies to make a profit. In other words, so 
the reasoning goes, the better the BBC is at doing television, the more it’s a danger to 
competitors, real or imagined. It’s the kind of reasoning that translates into a pervasive 
government belief that the BBC is going beyond its ‘true’ remit in broadcasting pop music on 
Radio 1 or the hugely successful prime-time show Strictly Come Dancing on BBC One. 
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 It’s difficult to know if this complaint is simply the language of a government acting 
as proxy for the commercial companies who stand to benefit from a smaller BBC, or if it 
comes from a genuine though misplaced belief in some mythical past when the Corporation 
really was dedicated solely to minority programming, with not a whisper of popular dance 
music or comedy on air – a belief that its broad appeal and the broad range of programming it 
offers is merely a result of that steady imperialistic, bloated ambition perceived by the Right 
as typical of ‘statist’ bureaucracies. Either way, one feels despondent. One can doggedly 
point out to our politicians that back in 1924—that is, when the BBC was less than two years 
old—it was John Reith himself who declared that ‘it is most important that light and 
“entertaining” items’ be broadcast. Or one can show that a couple of years later popular or 
dance music occupied a whopping 35 per cent of the BBC schedule. Or one can simply 
remind politicians that even in Reith’s vision, ‘pleasing relaxation after a hard day’s work’ 
was as vital a building block of the rounded, balanced citizen as any programme of 
‘edification and wider knowledge’.198 But the only response we’re likely to get is a by now 
deeply-rehearsed demand: that the BBC becomes more ‘distinctive’ – a benign-sounding 
phrase in which terrible danger lurks. The comedian David Mitchell put it most succinctly. 
What the Right mean by ‘distinctiveness’, he pointed out, is programmes that are simply not 
popular. This idea hasn’t been arrived at in order to improve the BBC, but ‘specifically to 
make it do less well’. In effect, Mitchell suggested, the government attitude is that, like 
telling a boxer to throw a fight, the BBC will ‘be expected deliberately to perform less well 
than it’s capable of’.199 Charter review might have been completed and a licence-fee 
settlement reached. But a highly resistant strain of ideological malevolence and historical 
illiteracy shows no sign of abating among those currently in power. 
 And then there is that second challenge – this time, internal. It concerns the culture 
that seems to have taken root within the BBC—or, more specifically, inside BBC News—
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over the past few years. Perhaps we should say, not ‘culture’ but ideology – a term I 
assiduously used to avoid deploying when discussing the BBC because it always felt too 
strong a word to describe the rather ad hoc, accidental way that policy has seemed to evolve 
inside the Corporation for most of its life. Any length of time spent in the BBC’s written 
archives poring over the minutes of endless editorial meetings shows that what’s ended up on 
air for most of the past 95 years or so has usually been the result of a complex negotiation 
between individual personnel with hugely varied—never entirely coherent, always debated, 
sometimes fiercely contested—opinions and prejudices. Naturally, some voices will have 
been more powerful than others: the BBC is not without its hierarchies and chains of 
command. But the cut and thrust of disagreement has palpably been there. I think back to the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, for instance: the supposed high tide mark of Reithian orthodoxy 
and timidity. In the offices and studios we would find individuals like the documentary-
pioneer Geoffrey Bridson, a Manchester poet who loved jazz and folk and the voices and 
opinions of ‘the Common Man’ and who proudly declared himself to be a ‘Bolshevik’; or 
Lionel Fielden, aristocratic and conservative in background, though also pacifist and 
instinctively anti-establishment; or his immediate boss, Hilda Matheson, well-connected to 
the Westminster political elite but also to the socially liberal Bloomsbury set and fiercely 
committed to filling the airwaves with what she called ‘all the most important currents of 
thought’ while preserving a ‘balanced diversity’.200 Fast-forward to the 1970s, and we can 
sense in the written records a similarly agreeable discordance of character and viewpoint 
around the editorial tables – amplified, perhaps, by the cosmopolitan background of many of 
those gathered there: the Columbian-British journalist George Camacho, the Viennese émigré 
Stephen Hearst, the Hungarian George Fischer, the Anglo-French radio executive Gerard 
Mansell. Mansell was born and educated in Paris and at the Chelsea School of Art. He would 
regularly arrive at Broadcasting House after a morning listening to France-Inter and with the 
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French newspapers tucked under his arm. Back in the 1970s, the Controller of Radio 4 said 
that editorial meetings represented the notion of a ‘Republic of Ideas’ in action. It was at this 
time, too, that the BBC’s director general Charles Curran, wrote to the Bishop of St Albans 
(and future Archbishop of Canterbury), Robert Runcie, to explain that although the 
Corporation claimed to be neutral between the different sections of British society it was also 
committed to what Curran called a ‘Miltonic freedom of opinion and its expression’.201 
If freedom of opinion did indeed make its way to the airwaves, it was surely only 
possible in the first place because the BBC had, at the heart of its programme-making 
machinery, a body of staff with an array of cultural hinterlands and a predisposition towards 
challenging received opinion. This meant that their eyes were open and their ears alert to all 
the ideas floating around out there in the world, including those that might be unexpected and 
novel and sometimes perhaps even unsettling – a body of men and women ever curious and 
formidably well-read. If, as Stuart Hall once argued, broadcasting has had a major role in ‘re-
imagining the nation’,202 it is only because those who have worked its levers have shown 
imagination themselves. 
 The approved BBC line now is that nothing has changed. In April 2017, for instance, 
the Today programme presenter and former political editor Nick Robinson, used a column in 
the Radio Times to dismiss all talk of favouritism in the Corporation’s reporting of Brexit, 
arguing essentially that it was a case of confirmation bias—listeners and viewers finding it 
‘hard to accept that on the BBC they will often hear people they disagree with saying things 
they don’t like’—that inside Broadcasting House the tradition of weighing arguments, 
assessing evidence, asking difficult questions in the spirit of ‘due impartiality’ remained as 
strong as ever.203 The director general, Tony Hall, has also asserted confidently that the BBC 
remains ‘independent… impartial… brave’.204 To which, I say: up to a point, Lord Copper. 
It’s hard to dispute the data showing that overall the BBC remains a highly-trusted news 
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provider as far as the public are concerned. And I think the BBC’s senior managers and 
journalists both believe in and attempt to serve the principles of ‘due impartiality’. But on the 
shop-floor there are discomfiting signs that even if impartiality remains a governing value it 
is being applied to a more restricted range of viewpoints than we have a right to expect. 
Why? Not because of government interference as such, I think. Or even, I would argue, an 
innate corporate bias – though, as Tom Mills has recently demonstrated very persuasively, 
the BBC, if only as a matter of survival, has always been uncomfortably close to the 
establishment.205 Rather, it’s more a question of working culture and mental habits. It’s 
because among the Corporation’s journalists, some cultural horizons have diminished and a 
certain ‘group think’ taken hold. 
In 2014, the Guardian’s Charlotte Higgins wrote a series of lengthy, well-researched 
articles about the state of the Corporation as it faced the prospect of Charter Review, and all 
the government scrutiny that would come with it. In her analysis of the BBC’s news output, 
she spoke to several of the Corporation’s most experienced journalists – both named and 
unnamed. One, asked about whether BBC coverage had moved to the right, laughed out loud. 
‘Undoubtedly. You’re not supposed to read the Guardian at the BBC, because it confirms 
everyone’s prejudices. For years it has been more important at the BBC to be seen reading 
the Telegraph or the Times’. Higgins also spoke to Robert Peston, who was at the time the 
BBC’s economics editor. ‘What actually sends BBC news editors into a tizz’, he told 
Higgins, ‘is a splash in the Telegraph or the Mail.’ ‘Over time the criticism of the Mail and 
the Telegraph that we are too leftwing has got to us. So BBC editors feel under more pressure 
to follow up stories in the Telegraph and Mail than those in the Guardian… There is no 
institutional bias to the left – if anything, it is a bit the other way’.206  
 So: fewer papers are being read; the same papers are being read time and again. In a 
very real sense, the BBC newsroom’s ‘intake’—the range of perspectives and ideas to which 
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its journalists are exposing themselves—is diminishing. Higgins’ report implicitly laid the 
blame for this at the door of insistent political pressure of some vague but omnipresent kind. 
But another cause—for me, just as significant—is a deeper cultural shift: an 
overcompensating swing of the pendulum that’s been gathering momentum since the 1960s, 
as those inside the BBC anxiously counter their inherited guilt at what they’ve been told for 
decades, namely that they are too elite and liberal and cosmopolitan. John Reith’s old 
assertion, that ‘only those who have a claim to be heard above their fellows on any particular 
subject’ should reach the microphone, has long been unsustainable – and was seen as such by 
many of Reith’s employees at the time.207 But the perfectly proper desire to be more inclusive 
has now mutated, it would seem, into rather too partisan a commitment to the demotic, the 
voice of ‘common sense’, the ‘man on the street’: a distorted version of democracy that 
dispenses with its more deliberative dimension, leaving something more, well, reactionary - 
in the literal sense and, consequently, also in the political sense. It’s not that there’s anything 
wrong with hearing the voice of Everyman (or better still, Everywoman). It’s just that the 
journalist’s sense of what such a voice is likely to say—what its role in any debate is 
constructed to be—is already shaped by that journalist’s habitual reading of a set of 
newspapers that demonstrably has a highly selective view of what public opinion is in the 
first place. Media theorists have mapped this process of framing and filtering and agenda-
setting for years, so I claim no original insight here. Nonetheless, witnessing it unfolding 
before your eyes and ears—and to something you care about and generally think well of—is 
salutary. 
 Let me give two examples of how this manifests itself on air. First, Today – a radio 
programme, so not strictly-speaking part of the report on the ‘Future for Public Service 
Television’, but, as I say, undoubtedly an agenda-setter for the British news media at large. 
Its apparent commitment to keeping a chair warm for climate-change sceptics such as the 
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former chancellor Nigel Lawson—a man whose biography reveals no scientific training 
whatsoever—seems inexplicable. Inexplicable, that is, until one reads an interview with the 
programme’s editor in 2014, Jamie Angus—a former researcher and press-officer for the 
government’s junior coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats—who suggested that Lawson 
earned his place because ‘if you go into a pub on Oxford Street… you will probably find a 
couple of people who are unconvinced by the science on climate change’. Now it’s true that 
not everyone believes in climate change. But the consensus among the scientifically literate 
that this is happening and is largely human-made is extraordinary, unprecedented, almost, 
one is tempted to say, unarguable – much more than what Angus describes as ‘a relatively 
settled view’. His aim, ensuring that ‘alternative points of view’ are not squeezed out, is 
admirable. But in defending the demotic he seems to have chosen a singularly unconvincing 
test-case.208 
 A second example: BBC TV’s Ten O’Clock News. As it happens, I’m a bit of a fan of 
this programme. It usually embraces a good range of stories and makes excellent use of the 
Corporation’s pool of foreign correspondents. It’s provided some insightful reports, in 
particular, on the refugee crisis engulfing southern, eastern and central Europe. But even on 
the Ten O’Clock News one finds certain internalised attitudes leaking out. In early-April 
2017, it featured the BBC’s economics editor, Kamal Ahmed, discussing the fall-out from 
Britain’s referendum in favour of Brexit. In his report, he claimed that over 25% of the 
workforce in parts of Britain’s hospitality industry was ‘from the EU’ – a figure that 
immediately struck me as strange because we in Britain are also in the EU, a simple but 
evidently overlooked fact that meant the correct figure should surely have been nearer 100 
per cent. I didn’t think this choice of words was a deliberate attempt to skew the debate. Nor 
did I see it as a sign of direct government interference. Rather, and just as dangerous, it was 
unconscious – a cultural assumption, perhaps, from reading too many editions of the 
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Telegraph and the Mail, and one that went uncorrected by anyone else on shift that night. The 
effect, in this case, was surely to reinforce subtly the notion that we are already separate from 
the EU, not part of it – that there is a ‘them’ and an ‘us’. It was, in a very real sense, a report 
biased in favour of Brexit. I haven’t attempted to measure how often such subtle inflections 
of meaning sneak under the radar, but it’s reasonable to assume it wasn’t an entirely isolated 
incident. And perhaps the proof of this comes in a recent article by the conservative 
commentator Simon Jenkins, in which he declares that the BBC’s ‘past bias’ in favour of the 
European Union has at last been corrected to his satisfaction.209 
 This, I know, is all a bit anecdotal. But sometimes anecdote piled upon anecdote starts 
to build a picture that is highly suggestive. So, here’s just one more. Among my own 
acquaintances—admittedly, and perhaps predictably, a fairly leftish, cosmopolitan bunch, 
though not in any uniform way, for we certainly argue a lot—I find the vast majority no 
longer tuning in to the BBC for their daily news. This cannot be a good sign. 
 Even more worrying, many of these critics are failing to distinguish BBC News from 
the BBC as a whole. They complain of bias – and perhaps rightly so. But their diagnosis only 
really applies one part of the machine. They overlook, perhaps even start to forget, that there 
have been some brilliant and enlightening programmes on the BBC which throw new light on 
current problems and genuinely challenge prevailing political orthodoxies –programmes 
found not in the category of news or even current affairs, but rather in documentary, features, 
drama, even comedy. Take, for example, Exodus, a three-part TV series broadcast in 2016, 
which gave cameras to refugees fleeing to Europe. One episode of this BBC-Open University 
co-production dropped us in the most visceral way right into the midst of the packed human 
cargo of a dilapidated boat as it drifted somewhere between Greece and Turkey. The 
abstraction of so many news reports was immediately replaced on screen by the tangible 
reality of what it’s like to be on a sinking boat facing the prospect of losing your child at any 
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moment. In other episodes, we gradually got to see the workings of people smuggling, the 
vital importance of mobile phones in helping to hold families together, the hurt and distress 
of rejection on arrival in host countries. More recently, there’s been Welcome to Zaatari, a 
Radio 4 drama series made in collaboration with the UNHCR, which portrayed life in a 
sprawling refugee camp. 
 Both Exile and Welcome to Zaatari, then, were as informative as anything I’ve seen or 
heard on the news; neither of them deserve to be discounted by too sweeping an accusation of 
BBC bias. And they go to show that for the best insights into current affairs, it’s now often 
best to look beyond the area of journalism. 
 Yet wouldn’t it be better if we didn’t need to? I’d like to think that Simon Jenkins 
could agree with this point. Like me, he worries about a ‘narrow monoculture’ having taken 
hold inside the Corporation. Unlike me, however, he believes it is ‘left liberal’.210 So, I fear 
we won’t be able to agree on the way forward – except, perhaps, to say this: that whatever 
happens in the way of licence fees or regulation or policy and planning or content and 
platforms, one of the key features of the BBC’s near future will be a vigorous, perhaps 
vituperative, but always necessary debate about something deeper, namely the values and 
mind-sets of those thoughtful though fallible men and women who make it all possible to 
begin with. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE ALGORITHMS 
James Bennett 
 
Like many households, live television is becoming a rarity in our house. Most programmes 
are consumed on-demand at times that suit the rhythms of our life. We have become 
accustomed to this system from a broadcast heritage, but it is the norm for our five year old 
son. His viewing is no longer dictated by the times at which he can watch, like the very old 
Watch with Mother time slot or the CBeebies Bedtime Stories programme before switch-off 
at 7pm, but rather the algorithms that serve him up content he’ll like. Increasingly this is 
more of the same, based on the recommendation algorithm that works within the marketing 
logic of ‘if you liked this, you might also like …’.  As William Uricchio argues, such 
algorithms posit the past as ‘prologue, as the data generated through our earlier interactions 
shapes the textual world selected for us. No “surprises”, or “unwanted” encounters, just 
uncannily familiar themes and variations.’211 The results of this are evident in my son’s 
Netflix profile which appears currently to be very keen on a particular form of ‘girly’ 
programming. Once logged in he is greeted with a wall of pink idents and other brightly or 
pastel branded shows featuring prototypically feminine characters. With a choice between 
different on-demand services in our house, Netflix has quickly established itself as his 
favourite, ‘go to’ app for its ability to respond to his current viewing preferences: offering 
him hundreds of shows and films to choose from, all of which will provide him reassuringly 
familiar pleasures within the pastel universe of princesses, pre-teen beauty queens and Glitter 
Force.  
 The choice of programming itself is not an issue: I’d be equally concerned if all he 
watched was ‘boy-ish’ programmes of robot battles, knight quests and the like. But what is 
striking about the way the Netflix algorithm works is this wall of pink and purple that greets 
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him: ingraining his viewing preferences as if these were the entire televisual world on offer to 
him. Equally, my own Netflix profile offers up a database of black and muted colour palettes, 
often punctuated with visceral red titles that reveal my penchant for dark dramas and horror. 
My concern here, as viewer, parent and academic, is how to broaden our viewing horizons so 
that he and I might have the opportunity to discover other equally pleasurable viewing 
experiences in other genres, modes and moods. Whilst I must take responsibility for my own 
choices, I’m aware that this is not always done in my best interests: ’choice fatigue’ and  
‘time famine’, as John Ellis described these emergent problems over a decade ago,212 from 
the thousands of options on offer can easily return me to familiar and comfortable pleasures 
rather than exploring something new. As a parent, however, I’m able to employ a range of 
tactics to broaden my son’s viewing horizons, including using different Netflix accounts to 
browse children’s content that is not so algorithmically determined, researching what friends 
are watching (often the same thing!), drawing on the archive of my own children’s television 
experiences, and even very occasionally insisting he watches the ‘flow’ of a live broadcast 
channel airing children’s content, such as CBeebies. After some strongly articulated 
resistance to the notion of watching something he has so little choice over, he succumbs and 
finds himself swept up in the mad-capped world of Justin’s House or the educational 
adventures of Go Jetters or the simple slapstick humour of Dip Dap, which he finds utterly 
hilarious. None of these programmes are better per se, certainly not to his critical judgement, 
than what is available in Netflix’s huge catalogue – but they are more varied than what is 
offered by Netflix’s algorithm. Without this variety, we descend into our own echo chamber 
and develop an only partial perspective, ‘in which our already existing views of the world are 
reinforced but rarely challenged.’213 The outcomes of recent elections around the world might 
alert us to the dangers of such an approach developing, especially as future generations may 
take the world presented to them through an algorithmic lens for granted.   
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 This would be not only bad for democracy, but also counter to the role that television 
has played in society throughout its history. A prevailing metaphor for television throughout 
its history has been as a ‘window on the world’, which enables us to explore a variety of 
different content, viewpoints, debates and landscapes. This was a function largely fulfilled in 
the broadcast era by scheduling: providing viewers with a mixed diet of programming, albeit 
at the scheduler’s behest. Crucially, within a PSB remit, this window on the world offered 
viewers the chance to broaden their horizons – taking them from comedy, to news, to drama, 
to a music documentary to a current affairs programme and not to just another moody drama 
or pink cartoon. In what follows I argue that this variety of offering is a crucial part of what 
public service algorithms should aspire to offer us, a proposition supported by the Puttnam 
Inquiry report.214 This requires thinking differently about the data that is collected and 
measured for public service broadcasting (PSB) within our ‘algorithmic culture’ and using it 
to set different objectives that escape some of the bounded thinking of a commercially-
driven, on-demand digital television market. 
 
The TV Market: Algorithms, Choice and Paternalism. 
 
The current era of television is one largely defined by an abundance of choice – from the 
services one can access, the channels that are available through to the individual programme 
titles one can consume. The proliferation of choice has been brought about by a range of 
socio-political and technological factors that are well documented elsewhere.215 For the 
purposes of this essay, I want to focus on the rise of choice in the context of PSB and 
algorithms.  
 Choice is a lynchpin of the marketisation of television, which has been underpinned 
by the regulatory approach to the digital TV landscape in not only the UK but in most 
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countries around the world. At the outset of the digital television era, the then ‘digital tsar’ of 
the UK’s switchover programme, Barry Cox, underlined this market and consumer choice 
model for the future by recasting the television landscape in the image of a high street retail 
store: ‘our homes [would] become an electronic retail outlet, the equivalent of a video version 
of WH Smith. …we would have the ability to choose – and pay for – what we wanted from 
that wide range.’216  
 As Cox’s position makes clear, the idea of choice is attached to the idea of 
‘empowering’ the audience to choose which services and programmes suit their own needs 
and desires. Indeed, the idea of ‘choice’ has a long regulatory history having been continually 
invoked since the 1988 white paper , ‘Broadcasting in the 1990s: Competition, Choice and 
Quality’.217 This period marked the arrival of new competitors in the form of cable and 
satellite and the beginning of a challenge to European models of PSB that were formerly 
based on the audience as citizen, with one based upon consumer choice. But with 
digitalisation, and the technological capacity to expand the TV marketplace that accompanied 
it, this emphasis on choice redoubled, also having a profound impact on how the BBC 
positioned its own services and policy. Thus the blueprints laid for the BBC’s digital future in 
the mid- to late- 1990s emphasised choice as a key public value to be offered by the 
Corporation; documents like Extending Choice in the Digital Age (1996) and The Future 
Funding of the BBC (1999) promoted the BBC as an institution capable of supporting ‘the 
public policy aims of quality, diversity, choice and accessibility.’218 In the 2000s choice 
became a watchword for the BBC’s own strategic vision, Building Public Value (2005)219 and 
even marked the Corporation’s move into digital broadcasting, with the launch of BBC 
Choice in 1998 (to become BBC4 in late 2003). It is within such a milieu that the BBC 
iPlayer emerged in 2006, immediately positioned by then director general Mark Thompson as 
an explicit alignment of choice with PSB: ‘MyBBCPlayer … marks a watershed – a major 
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expansion of choice and functionality and a recognition that on-demand is going to become 
an important – perhaps ultimately the most important – way in which we will put great 
content in front of the public.220 As Mike Flood Page argues of the iPlayer, ‘on-demand could 
justifiably be framed as a natural and legitimate extension of the BBC’s mission, as public 
service broadcasting by another means,’221 legitimating both the BBC’s expansion into digital 
spaces as well as its adoption of the public value test, to demonstrate its value in the digital 
television marketplace.  
 If choice had become a prevailing discourse within the BBC by the start of the new 
millennia, it had also significantly influenced the wider policy sphere. Sonia Livingstone and 
Peter Lunt trace the nadir of this emphasis on choice in the regulatory shifts during this 
period that resulted in the hybrid consumer-citizen who replaced the citizen as the body on 
whose behalf new regulatory body Ofcom policed the television landscape.222 Whilst we 
should be careful not to over-emphasise the neoliberal drift in the regulatory shaping of 
digital television, the UK media policy that shaped the emergence of the digital television 
landscape clearly emphasised choice and competition in its approach, in turn coinciding with 
technological developments that have paved the way for a marketplace ripe for new entrants, 
including from international players such as Netflix, Amazon and more. 
 In this context, algorithms stand as a logical industrial response to both uncertainty 
over the ability to maintain audience attention in an era of increased consumer choice and its 
exacerbation by government policy’s focus on deregulation, competition and the market. To 
return to the anecdote of my own family’s viewing patterns, choice can create as many 
problems as it can solutions. But in an era of neoliberalism, the paternalism inherent in our 
response is not in vogue as a wider strategy for the management of consumer viewing 
options. In turn, paternalism has been a key charge leveled at the role of PSB, with the BBC 
positioned pejoratively as ‘Auntie’, especially in a digital era in which consumers are better 
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placed to determine their own best interests. But, as Amanda Lotz’s theorisation of ‘Internet-
Distributed Television’ as ‘portals’ implicitly suggests, there remains an underlying sense 
that such players adopt vast libraries of content to enable choice in lieu of paternalism.  
 
A particularly challenging aspect of theorizing value for cultural goods is that viewers 
have ‘bounded rationality’, which means they do not know their own preference for 
cultural goods. The degree to which viewers often do not know what they want to 
watch explains the value of libraries that bundle multiple series.223 
 
The provision of choice in such a market is, therefore, not simply a case of letting 
consumers determine their own best viewing interests. Rather, as Hallinan and Striphas 
argue, the rise of algorithmic culture has profound and fundamental implications for how we 
understand culture and the factors and forces that shape it. Their study of Netflix leads them 
to describe the present moment as one increasingly defined by algorithmic culture, in which 
‘use of computational processes to sort, classify, and hierarchize people, places, objects, and 
ideas, and also the habits of thought, conduct, and expression that arise in relationship to 
those processes’ is commonplace.224 As they argue, the ever-increasing sophistication of the 
recommendation of the Netflix algorithm is equated with customer satisfaction, theoretically 
creating a ‘closed commercial loop in which culture confirms to, more than confronts, its 
users.’225 Consumer choice is, therefore, managed not necessarily in the best interests of 
consumers but rather to accelerate and amplify the value of that virtuous commercial circle. 
As Uricchio concludes, ‘algorithms used as filters, shap[e] our access to the cultural 
repertoire,’ but as gatekeepers they help ‘determine what will and will not be produced.226 
Choice, in other words, becomes a proxy for letting platform operators determine what is on 
offer, with the only measure of success the viewing figures that provide for ‘recursive data 
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flows’ in which data generated from consumer choices constructs recommendations that 
shape future use of the site.227 Thus rather than the ‘WH Smith’ model posited by Cox, or the 
portal metaphor proposed by Lotz, consumer choice becomes increasingly to look like a 
goldfish bowl. 
 Whomever the provider, the goal of algorithms has remained largely the same: to 
retain, grow and monetise audiences by managing consumer choice and attention. But this 
focus does surely make them appropriate for a public service landscape if we recall its role in 
providing us with a ‘window on the world’. Far from an outmoded notion about television, 
this ‘window on the world’ function was given renewed emphasis in the development of the 
BBC’s digital priorities in contradistinction to that placed on choice. Thus in The Future 
Funding of the BBC (1999) in which choice is espoused as a watchword, the BBC is also 
charged with providing ‘universal access’ to the ‘information age’, whilst in Building Public 
Value (2004) the Corporation had explicitly articulated a policy of acting as a ‘trusted guide’ 
to the digital age. These promises are reframed in subsequent policy documents, but guiding 
viewers remains something that we can take as needing to run in tandem with the abundance 
of choice offered. The question, then, is what kind of guidance might we expect from a public 
service algorithm?  
 
iPlayer: Curating and Connecting Choice 
 
Paul Grainge and Cathy Johnson’s excellent analysis of the emergence of BBC iPlayer posits 
the service as increasingly likely to act as a ‘“front door” to the BBC … where people might 
start their viewing journey rather than a site to catch up on missed broadcast content.’228 As 
such, they term the iPlayer a ‘hybrid space’, representative of what it ‘means to be a digital 
broadcaster.’ The challenge for the BBC and the iPlayer is not just to be a ‘digital 
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broadcaster’, but a public service one, requiring it to move beyond the discourses of choice 
that informed its inception, and the singular emphasis on viewing figures in a market-led 
approach to algorithms discussed above.  
 In particular, the last five years have been marked by the growing ‘datafication’ of the 
industry, increasingly measuring viewing habits and tailoring and personalising content to 
allow audiences to become self-schedulers. Thus current director general Tony Hall’s 
‘myBBC revolution’, places increased emphasis on the power of data to catch up with 
commercial VOD providers like Netflix and Amazon.229 At the same time, however, in a 
world of big data and the ability to measure everything, it is a peculiarity that television, and 
PSBs in particular, remain obsessed simply with ratings. Whilst these are increasingly sliced 
according to demography and geography, it is viewing figures that remain king: determining 
success and failures, careers and work lives in the industry. But in an era of the datafication 
of audiences, we must think outside the commercial box and posit some new, and some 
enduring, principles for how PSBs operate algorithms in a PS context. Otherwise 
personalisation risks the BBC replicating the echo chambers of familiar pleasures and views 
described at the outset of this chapter.  
 As Tony Hall suggests, the BBC should not be ‘telling you what customers like you 
bought, but what citizens like you would love to watch and need to know’.230 In this vein we 
might think of different measurements for the success of PS algorithms that can inform the 
development of iPlayer:  
 
• Connecting audiences with new content: measuring not total views, but instead how often 
an offering outside of the ‘norm’ of a viewing profile is accessed. For example, if a viewer 
has Top Gear as part of ‘my shows’, success might be gauged by how often they explore 
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unrelated content, such as a programme on environmentalism and fossil fuel, or Woman’s 
Hour.  
• Connecting diverse audiences to shared content: An enduring principle of PSB has been 
shared ‘national’ moments. In an algorithmic culture, PSB should attempt to break citizens 
out of their echo chambers and measure, and report on, the diversity of audiences watching 
particular forms of content: such as  
• Connecting audiences to new experiences and forms: The world on to which the PSB 
window can open is more diverse now than simply television programmes. As public service 
broadcasting becomes public service media (PSM), the duty becomes to connect audiences 
not to simply more content but a variety of PSM forms – for example, VR, gaming, social 
media, interactive and participatory forms.  
• Connecting audiences with external services and content: Similarly, we cannot expect to 
corral viewers into walled gardens of one PSM institution: audiences are always only one-
click away from a world of entertainment, education and information offered by other 
providers. There is public value in connecting audiences with shared national treasures and 
public resources, from the local library to the science museum to the NHS to ‘.gov.uk’ sites. 
The BBC should use iPlayer as a launchpad for its role as a trusted guide to help licence-fee 
payers navigate the digital age beyond its own borders.  
 
These principles all reframe the notion of digital television as a window on the world, 
positioning iPlayer as a ‘front door’ that can broaden viewers’ vistas.  
But the vision here relies on the BBC not only resisting, at least partially, industry 
norms and regulatory drives, but also in adapting to the digital age by promoting another ‘c’ 
word: curation. As Amanda Lotz argues, it has become the ‘primary task’ of on-demand 
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players to curate ‘a library of content based on the identity, vision, and strategy that drive its 
business model.’ As Lotz continues, ‘curation—although largely untheorized—differs 
considerably from scheduling, and parallels to the rich insight available about scheduling 
strategies must now be created for commercial library curation.’231 There is some evidence of 
a changing understanding of the role of curation at the BBC as demonstrated by Grainge and 
Johnson’s recent work, with one senior executive quoted as developing curation tactics that 
tried ‘to recreate serendipitous discovery’, much like scheduling had done in the broadcast 
era.232 In particular, their work posits a hybrid approach to algorithmic and editorial 
recommendations. Wider work on algorithms already suggests the importance such thinking 
has for competitors like Netflix, where ‘human intuition for knowing how to talk about and 
appreciate media content’ is combined ‘with sophisticated systems for organising categories 
as uniquely customised for a given subscriber.’233 Rather than playing ‘catch up’ again with 
such commercial competitors, however, the BBC should deploy principles like those 
articulated here to develop a PS-led approach to algorithms. Fundamentally, deploying such 
‘human intuition’ in the service of PSB rather than commercial logics requires a production 
culture within the BBC where algorithmic and editorial logic share an understanding of the 
role and purpose of the Corporation that is measured beyond viewing figures. In short, this 
demands a strong and imaginative BBC.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In an algorithmic culture, the challenge for the BBC is to find the public service structuring 
logics of recommendations in order to guide viewer choice. In a digital world, ‘information, 
education and entertainment’ should be appended by ‘explore’ such that the BBC should 
once again open up a window on the world. A PSB algorithm would mark the BBC’s services 
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out as distinct from the market and connect viewers to a greater breadth not only of the 
Corporation’s amazing output and a diversity of voices and viewpoints, but beyond its walls 
to other PSM providers. That is what a public service orientation should always be about.  
One small step that might be taken to iterate and explore this approach is developing a 
‘serendipity window’ on the iPlayer’s recommendation panel. At present the iPlayer’s screen 
real estate is crowded with options of more of the same or most popular. Developing a space 
that pulls in content that might surprise, challenge, confound or even comfort viewers via a 
serendipity window might place the BBC ahead of the curve in the next battleground of 
social media as providers realise that people do, after all, want to step out of their echo-
chambers.  
 I hope the ideas offered here go some way towards developing the logics of public 
service algorithms and broadening the vistas of not only my son’s, but also my own, 
preferences, in order to challenge us and to provide the serendipitous experience that ought to 
be at the heart of public service television.  Digital television’s window should not become a 
narrow portal, but instead should continue to broaden our horizons: recent political history 
tells us how dangerous inhabiting our own echo chambers can be.  
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Part Three: Principles and Purposes of Public Service Television 
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TELEVISION AND PUBLIC SERVICE: A BRIEF HISTORY234 
  
Television is in its death throes but has also been reborn; it is a relic of the mass audiences of 
the 20th century but it is has never been more popular or more creative; we are watching more 
television but television viewing is also declining. Such are the profound contradictions of 
television in the 21st century. 
The television screen remains at the heart of many a British home, and the output of 
the UK’s numerous television companies remains central to British life. Even in the 
information age of tablets and smartphones, when the idea of broadcasting can seem almost 
quaint, television remains a powerful—indeed, is arguably still the most powerful—medium 
for information, education and entertainment. 
Television has, in its relatively short history, been connected to major waves of social 
change. It was one of the main symbols (and accessories) of the consumer boom in the 1950s; 
it provided a crucial backdrop for many of the struggles that took place in the 1960s; satellite 
television helped to facilitate the globalisation that occurred from the 1980s while digital 
television in this century epitomises the abundance of an ‘information age’. It has given us 
new vocabularies and new ways of behaving: we no longer just binge on alcohol or chocolate 
but on episodes of our favourite TV dramas.    
Television also shapes our lives in many different ways. It has a crucial democratic 
purpose, for example through informing the public about the political process and 
encouraging us to engage with it, hosting political debate and discussion, investigating and 
analysing public affairs, and dramatising the most important moments in the UK’s political 
life. Unlike the print and online news media, UK broadcasters are formally required to do all 
of this impartially. In recent years, television has helped—not without significant 
controversy—to frame the issues behind the referenda on Scottish independence and EU 
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membership as well as the 2015 general election. Many of the key moments in those 
campaigns happened on television and much of the reporting that informed the public’s 
decision making was by television journalists. 
Television’s highly regulated status has long distinguished it from the UK’s 
notoriously partisan print media, and it is all the more distinctive today amid the cacophony 
of the internet. Within the existing regulatory framework, television ought to allow for the 
expression of differences and a respect for opposing views that allows us to work through our 
conflicts. In a world where increasingly popular social media platforms can act as an echo 
chamber, it is an important barometer of national and local cultures, forcing us to consider a 
full range of perspectives and voices. 
Television also provides a means of collective experience. It is still largely through television 
that people can watch major sporting event such as the European football championships and 
the Olympic Games. This sharing happens on a daily basis too. Television facilitates 
conversation, both while it is being watched and afterwards. A few shows—Strictly Come 
Dancing, X Factor, EastEnders, Coronation Street—have survived the fragmentation of the 
multichannel era to remain talking points across the UK. Sherlock, Downton Abbey, and The 
Great British Bake-Off have all caught the popular imagination in their different ways. 
Football fans discuss the matches they have seen live on Sky or BT Sport, or on Match of the 
Day. Much of the discussion in newspapers and magazines, or on Facebook and Twitter, 
springs from television programmes. At the same time, new voices and platforms have 
emerged to add to this conversation –from Vice News to YouTube’s danisnotonfire and 
Venus vs Mars. 
Television is a cultural form in its own right, capable of reaching artistic heights, and 
it is intimately connected with many other cultural forms as part of the wider creative 
industries and the creative ecology. It also provides major economic benefits. The UK 
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television industry earned revenues of over £13 billion in 2014235 and is the biggest player in 
an audiovisual creative sector that employs over 250,000 people, generates more than £10 
billion of Gross Value Added and exports over £4 billion of services and products to the rest 
of the world.236 Yet none of these possibilities are inevitable nor are they guaranteed to last 
unless we secure an independent, competitive and creative television landscape here in the 
UK through appropriate regulatory, technological and creative infrastructure dedicated to this 
purpose.  
 
The Evolution of Public Service Television 
 
The idea of public service has been integral to the history of broadcasting in the UK, from the 
foundation of the BBC in the 1920s onwards. The BBC started out as a monopoly provider 
and a public body acting in the national interest, forged out of the mood of the times, from the 
specific recommendations of the 1926 Crawford committee, and through the domineering 
character and singular vision of its first director-general, Lord Reith. In those early days, no 
broadcasting market was allowed to develop, as it had in the US, and overt political 
interference was generally kept at bay. First incorporated under royal charter in 1927, the 
BBC was from its earliest days characterised by aspirations towards impartiality and 
independence, even if in practice these aspirations were not always perfectly fulfilled.237 
Reith wanted the BBC to be available to everyone across the UK, and he achieved his 
aim. Monopoly status gave the corporation an almost oracular power as the voice of a nation, 
a power that to this day it partially retains. As the UK’s only broadcaster for more than 30 
years, it was synonymous with broadcasting itself and its example influenced everything that 
followed. Reith may have felt little enthusiasm for television—and he left the BBC not long 
after the launch of the full television service in 1936—but his notion that broadcasting should 
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‘inform, educate and entertain’ remains the cornerstone of the public service ideal even if this 
‘holy trinity’ has been interpreted in wildly different ways. 
When commercial television was launched in the 1950s, the BBC lost its monopoly, 
but the principle that broadcasting should be public service in character continued into the 
new era. The ITV network of regional licences set up in 1955 was highly regulated, and 
required to provide public service programming that was balanced, impartial and high quality 
in return for the advertising monopoly that made owning a franchise a ‘licence to print 
money’. The regulator held sanctions over scheduling and programmes and could even 
revoke a licence if necessary. Minority interest programmes were expected to be spread 
across the schedule, including in peak time, and there were limits on US imports. The 
regional character of the ITV network was drawn up very deliberately as a way of 
decentralising the television industry, even if the map was drawn more for the benefit of 
marketers than with any specific feel for regional identity or local politics. 
In the face of this new competition, the BBC had to sharpen up its act: the launch of 
ITN as a rival news provider to the BBC is credited with many innovations and 
improvements in broadcast news, for example. It was the BBC too that would be the 
beneficiary when the development of television was reviewed by the Pilkington report of 
1962. Pilkington’s scathing criticisms of the output of commercial television led to the BBC 
being granted the third channel—BBC Two—two years later, and to stronger regulation of 
the ITV network. Against the backdrop of social liberalisation and under Hugh Carleton 
Greene’s leadership, the BBC came into its own as a public service television broadcaster in 
the 1960s. 
By the 1970s, the BBC-ITV duopoly was showing its age – its one-size-fits-all 
approach frustrating for programme makers and failing to reflect the fraying of cultural 
homogeneity. The time was ripe for a fourth channel, which was the recommendation of the 
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Annan report in 1977. Annan felt that television should serve the various groups and interests 
in British society and not just aspire to cater for everyone at once. Channel 4 was launched in 
1982 along these lines; its addition to the broadcasting landscape expanded the idea of public 
service to embrace diversity rather than just universality, and allowed for balance across the 
schedule rather than within programmes. In Wales, the fourth channel was devoted to the 
Welsh language service S4C. 
The Conservative government that had presided over Channel 4’s launch was also 
responsible for the 1990 Broadcasting Act, which significantly changed the nature of 
commercial TV. ITV licences were to be auctioned off to a highest bidder rather than 
awarded on merit by the regulator. Elsewhere, a technological revolution was making cable 
and satellite channels available to anyone who wanted to pay for them. No impediment was 
placed in the way of this rapidly emerging market, and no requirements were made of these 
new channels to offer original public service programming (although they were obliged to 
carry the existing PSB channels). Public service television became the preserve of the four 
legacy channels, Channel 5 (launched in 1997) and the BBC’s new digital services. The 
Labour government of Tony Blair committed itself to switching off the analogue signal by 
2012, bringing the digital, multichannel future into focus. By the end of the 20th century, the 
old public service formula was holding firm but the great technological disruption that so 
characterises today’s marketplace was already under way. 
In summary, we can see the history of British public service broadcasting policy in 
the 20th century as being characterised by a series of very deliberate public interventions into 
what might otherwise have developed as a straightforward commercial marketplace. The 
creation of the BBC, the launch of an ITV network required to produce public service 
programming, and the addition of the highly idiosyncratic Channel 4 gave the UK a 
television ecology animated by quality, breadth of programming and an orientation towards 
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serving the public interest. At each of these three moments, the possibilities of public service 
television were expanded and British culture enriched as a result.  
The 1990 Broadcasting Act and the fair wind given to multichannel services may 
have ended the supremacy of the public service television ideal. Public service television may 
now seem like an aberration in an era of apparently limitless consumer choice whose 
discourse is increasingly dominated by economic arguments. Nevertheless, it has survived, 
through the design of the institutions responsible for it, because of legislative protection, and 
as a result of its continuing popularity amongst the public. But the goodwill of programme 
makers and the appreciation of audiences will not by themselves keep it alive in the 21st 
century. Television does not develop ‘naturally’ following either a technological or 
commercial logic. It is worth remembering that at all stages, for good or ill, governments of 
the day have played an instrumental role in shaping the television industry.  
 
Public Service Television Today 
 
Before the multichannel era, all the TV channels were public services in different ways; there 
were no purely commercial operations. So the trick of providing a mix of programmes that 
were popular, public service or both was not so hard to pull off and nailing down a definition 
of what was public service was not an urgent task. Anyone seeking definitions today can find 
plenty of guidance, if not total enlightenment.  
The 2003 Communications Act laid out some of the key features. First, it listed the 
public service television services as all the BBC’s TV services, S4C, every Channel 3 service 
(which now means ITV in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and STV in Scotland), 
Channel 4, and Channel 5.238 It made it obligatory for these services to be ‘broadcast or 
distributed by means of every appropriate network’.239 It defined the purposes of public 
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service television broadcasting in terms of programmes that deal with a wide range of subject 
matters; cater for as many different audiences as practicable; are properly balanced; and 
maintain high general standards of content, quality, and professional skill and editorial 
integrity.240 It also outlined various genre-based aims for public service television to fulfil, 
covering cultural activity (drama, comedy, music, films, and other visual and performing 
arts), news and current affairs, sporting and leisure interests, educational programming, 
science and religion, as well as programmes for children and young people. It also specified 
the need for ‘programmes that reflect the lives and concerns of different communities and 
cultural interests and traditions within the United Kingdom, and locally in different parts of 
the United Kingdom’. Importantly, it did not say which broadcasters should do what, just that 
the public service channels ‘taken together’ should produce these outcomes.241 
The Act required the UK’s three commercially funded public service broadcasters—
the Channel 3 licencees, Channel 4 and Channel 5—to provide a range of ‘high quality and 
diverse’ programming. Channel 4’s output must additionally demonstrate innovation, 
experiment and creativity; appeal to a culturally diverse society; contribute to education; and 
exhibit a distinctive character.242 Further detailed requirements in accordance with the act are 
set out in ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5’s main channel licences (which were agreed in 2004 
and renewed in 2015, but have been subject to frequent variations). They are required to 
broadcast a set number of hours of news and current affairs programming and to fulfil various 
quotas on production in return for their prominent positions on the electronic programme 
guide. 
Crucially, public service television has been defined more by broadcaster or channel, 
by (often rather vaguely expressed) principle, and by genre than in terms of individual 
programmes. This is a distinction that is becoming increasingly important in current debates 
that may seek to restrict the definition of public service to discrete programmes rather than 
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outlets or remits. So while the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 are public service 
broadcasters by virtue of the regulatory obligations imposed on them to produce a range of 
output, a company like Sky, which is responsible for significant news and arts provision, is 
not described as a public service broadcaster. All of the BBC’s output is deemed public 
service, whereas for the three commercially funded public service broadcasters operators only 
the main ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 channels fall into this category.  
Ofcom is required under the Communications Act to review the state of public service 
broadcasting. Its third and most recent review, published in 2015, said that the system was 
‘broadly working’ but drew attention to changes in the wider marketplace and in consumer 
behaviour and raised a number of other concerns. For example, it found falling levels of 
investment in new UK-originated content by the ‘PSB channels’, with a 44% decline in 
drama spending.243 Investment in some genres such as arts and classical music, religion and 
ethics had ‘significantly reduced’, while the provision of non-animated children’s content 
outside the BBC was very limited. […]  
Thinking about the television industry as a highly developed and sophisticated 
ecology—as well as part of a larger creative ecology—allows us to view the challenge of 
maintaining public service television holistically. But improving and reforming public service 
television is not a matter of choosing from a menu. There is no point trying to change just one 
element and hoping that everything else will be fine. It is crucial that we examine today’s 
various challenges alongside each other and come up with solutions that value co-ordination 
and interaction and secure democratic exchange, diverse representation and meaningful 
dialogue – in conditions of considerable technological, political and cultural volatility. The 
challenges that lie ahead are significant but there are also, in our view, some important 
opportunities. 
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PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY244 
Georgina Born 
 
Basic Principles  
 
At the core of previous normative frameworks for public service broadcasting are four 
interrelated concepts: independence, universality, citizenship and quality. We believe that 
these norms have not yet evolved to meet the challenges posed by digital platforms, 
increasing cultural diversity as well as the stubborn inequalities of modern Britain. We 
propose that the principles of what we might, for the purposes of this chapter, call public 
service media (PSM), as opposed to public service broadcasting (PSB), have not diminished 
but expanded in the digital era. We explore these principles in relation to PSM as a whole, 
but we are particularly mindful of the crucial role in delivering public service played by the 
BBC and Channel 4 both now and in the future. 
 
Independence 
 
Independence is, of course, enshrined in the BBC’s current royal charter which says that the 
BBC ‘must be independent in all matters concerning the fulfilment of its Mission and the 
promotion of the Public Purposes, particularly as regards editorial and creative decisions, the 
times and manner in which its output and services are supplied, and in the management of its 
affairs.’245 Strikingly, the charter does not concern itself with the structural conditions that 
create or impede this independence and we believe that, from this point on, any governing 
document must also concern itself with these conditions. The Broadcasting Research Unit 
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(BRU), reflecting on these issues some 30 years ago, insisted on the need for ‘distance from 
all vested interests, and in particular from those of the government of the day.’246 We wish to 
argue that, particularly in relation to the BBC, this independence has been undermined and 
urgently needs new structural foundations. 
 
Universality 
 
Universality has three important and distinctive meanings:  
 
a) The first is technical and geographical universality: in other words universal access 
to services, ideally free at the point of use. As the BRU put it, public service broadcasting 
‘should be available to the whole population.’ 247 
 
b) The second meaning concerns social and cultural universality: as Born and Prosser 
argue, the provision of services and programming that enhance ‘social unity through the 
creation of a “common culture”’, as well as those ‘that cater for and reflect the interests of the 
full social and cultural diversity of Britain and its minorities.’248 Similarly, for the BRU: 
‘Broadcasters should recognise their special relationship to the sense of national identity’, 
while ‘[m]inorities, especially disadvantaged minorities, should receive particular 
provision’.249 
Crucial to this sense of universality, and at the heart of PSB since its inception, is the 
relationship between commonality and plurality: between the creation of a national culture 
through mass modes of address, and the need to recognise and reflect minorities – from the 
four nations and all the regions of the UK to the full range of Britain’s significant minorities. 
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This relationship remains central to PSM in the digital era; importantly, digital platforms 
provide opportunities for its expansion. 
 
c) The third meaning refers to universality of genre: as Born and Prosser argue, this is 
about the importance of ‘the provision of mixed programming, … the entire range of 
broadcast genres, thereby meeting a wide range of needs and purposes through the trinity of 
information, education and entertainment. The aim here is that [PSM] should be truly 
popular, both as a value in itself… [and] in order to draw audiences, serendipitously, across 
different and unforeseen kinds of programming.’250 Again, we wish to argue that this sense 
remains central to PSM today, but that it needs reinvention in digital conditions. 
 
Citizenship 
 
PSM’s citizenship purposes have been closely associated with cultivating national identity, 
social and political community via the public sphere or spheres that provide the grounds for a 
democratic political culture. This is often linked to PSM’s informational role and the 
cultivation of rational debate and is contrasted with the more individual, consumer mode of 
address of commercial media. Recent revisions in scholarly literature have stressed:  
 
a) The need for citizenship, particularly in multicultural societies, to focus on plurality 
as much as commonality, on the expression of different identities and the fostering of 
dialogue between them. 
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b) The obligation to foster what the philosopher Onora O’Neill calls ‘practices of 
toleration’ towards those ‘positions and voices that are in danger of being silenced or 
marginalised’,251 allied to the need to combat political, social and cultural exclusion by 
ensuring the presence of disadvantaged and excluded groups within mainstream 
communicative processes.252  
 
c) The emergence of the principle of cultural citizenship, such that the space produced 
by the media is conceived not just as an informational space but also as a cultural space 
where media are ‘involved in the construction of [both] common identities and… multiple 
publics’.253 According to the influential sociologist Stuart Hall, broadcasting has a major role 
in ‘re-imagining the nation’, not by reimposing an imagined unity but by becoming the 
‘the “theatre” in which [Britain’s] cultural diversity is produced, displayed and represented, 
and the “forum” in which the terms of its associative life together are negotiated’.254 Cultural 
citizenship recognises the key role played by expressive, imaginative and affective media 
content (entertainment, drama, comedy, arts) in providing frameworks for collective 
reflection and enjoyment, in addition to the functions fulfilled by news and current affairs in 
facilitating public knowledge and action. Given the role of media cultures in influencing 
audience tastes and conditioning the wider public culture, then, by analogy with the concern 
in democratic political theory with the formation of an educated and informed citizenry, 
cultural citizenship emphasises the importance of the formation of a culturally mature and 
aware, culturally pluralistic citizenry.255  
 
Quality 
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Accounts of this principle emphasise the conditions that promote or impede high quality 
programming and services. The Broadcasting Research Unit made two points in relation to 
quality: first that structural conditions ‘should be designed to liberate rather than restrict 
programme makers’ so as to enhance creativity; and, second, that PSM ‘should be structured 
so as to encourage competition in good programming [and services] rather than competition 
for numbers [ie ratings].’256  
Channel 4’s remit has always stressed additional factors enhancing quality: thus the 
channel must provide ‘a broad range of high quality and diverse programming… which, in 
particular, demonstrates innovation, experiment and creativity in the form and content of 
programmes; appeals to the tastes and interests of a culturally diverse society’ and ‘exhibits a 
distinctive character’257 Notable here is the prominence in Channel 4’s remit of both the 
commitment to universality of genre and the diversity principle central to social and cultural 
universality and cultural citizenship.  
 
An Additional Principle: Diversity  
 
Public service media therefore have a remit both to promote the national commons and to 
serve minorities, especially disadvantaged and underserved minorities. Given the current 
insecurities concerning both national and European identity, as well as the rise in divisive 
racisms, the challenges posed by reflecting and enhancing cultural diversity and pluralism 
seem more central to PSM than at any time since the mid-twentieth century. We propose that 
a core task for PSM today is to revitalise their offering to multiple social groups, including 
ethnic and religious minorities, and to address more adequately the distinctive as well as the 
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shared needs of the UK population wherever they live. Increased pressures for devolution 
make this an especially urgent task. 
We suggest that rather than the earlier two-way public sphere (commons/minorities), 
PSM should now employ digital media to shape a three-way, multi-platform public sphere. In 
addition to ‘universal’ mass or national channels or events, this should take the form of 
content and services that can create a counterpoint between mass and minority audiences, 
including services aimed at supporting both intercultural and intracultural modes of 
address:258 
 
a) Intercultural is when a minority speaks both to the majority and to other 
minorities, a core function of pluralist PSM. Here, universal channels and events become the 
means of exposure to and connection with others’ imaginative and expressive worlds via the 
self-representation of minorities in their own ‘voice’. It encompasses ‘minority’ 
programming on mainstream channels, including such forms as black and Asian sitcoms, 
drama and current affairs, community access programming, as well as internet-based content 
and cross-platform events. 
  
 b) Intracultural is when a minority speaks to ‘itself’ via services and programming 
that act as arenas for shared experience and deliberation by minorities about their own 
cultures, needs and strategies, enhancing self-expression and self-understanding. Crucially, 
on PSM this output—whether available on the internet, radio or television—is also always 
accessible to the majority and to other minorities, who thereby gain understanding of the core 
minority culture as well as potential pleasure from such encounters. 
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All three modes of address—universal, intercultural and intracultural—are necessary 
components of PSM’s orchestration, via both mass and niche services and programming, of a 
democratic communicative pluralism. Clearly, digital platforms have greatly enhanced and 
will continue to enhance the realisation of this three-way, multi-platform public sphere.  
 
The achievement of pluralism and diversity points towards additional challenges: 
issues of employment and training, of representation, and of the conditions for production. 
Guiding principles for addressing these matters are suggested by the philosopher Anne 
Phillips when addressing the challenges posed to democratic political practice by 
marginalised groups. Phillips highlights the importance of the linkage between self-
representation and ‘presence’: rather than conceive of diversity in the terms of diversity 
merely of belief and opinion, or the ‘politics of ideas’, Phillips advocates the ‘politics of 
presence’––the necessity of ensuring the presence within the political process of those most 
dispossessed from it. As she puts it, ‘[p]olitical exclusion is increasingly viewed… in terms 
that can be met only by political presence’.259 By analogy, the absence of sufficient diversity 
in PSM and the wider media culture can be redressed only through a combination of policies 
aimed at fostering a ‘politics of presence’ and greater self-representation among and by 
minority groups. 
 
Regarding employment and training: several linked steps are necessary: 
i) Pluralism and diversity would be enhanced through recruitment drives to encourage 
more people from minorities to enter the media industries, as well as through training 
schemes and professional placements; such entry and employment policies must be 
accompanied by measures to support the promotion of minorities to the higher echelons. 
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ii) These employment and promotion drives should be matched by greater support for 
minorities to build independent media and production businesses, bringing the linked benefits 
of increased economic activity and the provision of as yet undersupplied content representing 
the full spectrum of minority experiences. 
iii) Encouraging increasing minority presence and activities in the media industries 
suggests, in turn, the need for policies aimed at providing greater support by the BBC, 
Channel 4 and other commissioning bodies and distribution channels for SMEs as new 
entrants to the creative economy: that is, diversification of both scale and source in the 
production community––issues that have hitherto been attended to mainly by Channel 4. 
iv) In light of the weakness of the existing PSM institutions in addressing these issues, 
we suggest that a new body might be created to advance and coordinate these developments: 
one model would be the Channel 4 workshops,260 which had the effect of training and 
bringing on such world-recognised talents as Isaac Julien and John Akomfrah, themselves 
influential on filmmaker Steve McQueen. 
 
Regarding representation: such employment, training and industry initiatives are not 
sufficient, however, unless they are matched by effective support for diverse, innovative and 
imaginative representations of minority experience.261 A key lesson of recent decades is that 
the entry of greater numbers of minority producers and commissioners into the media 
industries does not in itself lead to stronger representations of the varieties of black, Asian, 
Muslim, queer or disabled experience on screen.  
This returns to the quality principle: for high quality minority representations of this 
kind require conditions for production that support innovation, experimentation, risk-taking 
and the right to fail––conditions that are still undersupplied in the PSM ecology, and that we 
address further in Chapter 4.1 of this book.262  
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It is striking how core elements of these revitalised diversity and pluralism norms, as 
they link to quality, are already found in Channel 4’s remit. One discussion point, then, is 
whether Channel 4’s remit now contains core principles that, given their universal importance 
and undersupply elsewhere, might now be applied more generally: notably, those concerning 
diversity, and the principle that both diversity and quality are intrinsically linked to risk-
taking, innovation and experiment in the form and content of programmes. Should these 
principles be extended to become general foundations for the PSM ecology?  
 
Public Service Principles in the Digital Age: From Institutions to Ecology 
 
Buoyed by the enormous increase in content, platforms and services that has emerged from a 
less regulated landscape, there has been a concomitant rise in the use of a discourse focused 
overwhelmingly on the ‘market impact’ of PSM. But such an approach risks elevating 
commercial media interests over the public interests served by PSM. Recent economic 
thinking reverses this thinking, arguing that publicly-funded interventions can enhance 
innovation and lead to the creation of new markets, with the potential to fuel wider economic 
growth.263 We contend that the following two foundations of PSB in the 20th century, 
consequent on the above principles, must be reinstated and renewed for the 21st century in 
the light of digital conditions: 
 
Public service media are not synonymous with market failure:  
 
This principle follows clearly from the underlying relationship between public service media 
and universality: both universality of genre (mixed programming), and social and cultural 
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universality (i.e. content, events and channels that draw national audiences). Recent 
governments have overlooked this principle and have attempted to disrupt this relationship by 
suggesting that public service broadcasters should focus on the provision of content in which 
commercial providers are likely to under-invest. While it is highly likely that broadcasting, if 
unregulated, would primarily target the most lucrative and wealthy demographics, PSM 
should not be seen as vehicles to plug these gaps but, instead, as institutions that challenge 
this tendency to fragmentation precisely by providing common and overlapping spaces and 
channels. If PSM are reduced to operating as cultural ‘ghettoes’ and ‘market failure’ 
institutions in a situation of digital abundance, then they are not adequately serving the public 
and they are likely to decline. Popular and mainstream programming and entertainment must 
remain core elements of PSM as they continue to diversify taking advantage of new platforms 
and new suppliers. 
 
Public service media refers to an evolving digital media ecology: 
 
PSM is an ecology shaped, as we discussed in the previous chapter, by institutional design 
and regulation: it should not be equated with a single institution or channel. From the birth of 
ITV onwards, this ecology has encompassed the commercial public service broadcasters as 
well as the BBC and, in the future, potentially additional organisations. We want to reinstate 
this definition for the digital age. The PSM ecology entails complementarity between the 
different bodies delivering PSM’s public purposes, as well as benign competition to raise 
standards and stimulate innovation, both central to quality. It optimises the public interest 
both by creating new markets and by intervening in wider markets. 
We therefore question the current nostrum that PSM’s ‘market impact’ should limit 
their entry into new and existing markets.264 In contrast, new economic thinking stresses the 
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essential contributions of publicly funded research and development, in technology and 
culture, to innovation, the creation of new markets and economic growth. We could speak of 
distributed innovation as a property of the PSM ecology through partnerships with start-ups, 
universities, cultural organisations and so on: public-public as well as public-private 
partnerships. This paradigm in the economics of innovation is now gaining new life. As the 
economist Mariana Mazzucato argues, ‘the public sector not only “de-risks” the private 
sector by sharing its risk, it often “leads the way”, courageously taking on risk that the private 
sector fears.’265 
Of course, this reframing should not be read as a complete licence for PSM to do 
everything, everywhere – especially where public resources are limited and commercial 
provision is highly regarded. As we noted in the Puttnam report, a holistic approach to PSM 
must consider how changes to one part of the ecology (whether between PSM providers, or 
between them and commercial providers) are affecting other parts. A more sophisticated 
approach to market impact would place greater emphasis on the positive and longer term 
benefits of PSM in new markets, while also attending to any possible detrimental effects. 
 
Applying Normative Principles to the Funding of Public Service Media 
 
It seems to us unarguable that funding mechanisms for PSM must follow on from 
institutional purposes, values and objectives. It is therefore imperative that the normative 
principles of PSM, as well as wider good governance principles, should also inform funding. 
 
Universality and citizenship 
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As the Broadcasting Research Unit argued back in 1986, it is vital that ‘one main instrument 
of broadcasting [and now of PSM] should be directly funded by the corpus of users.’ The 
BRU insisted on the need for ‘a contract between the citizen and the broadcasters that an 
equally good service… shall be made available to all for the fee paid.’266 Ideally, access to 
PSM services—including those delivered via the internet—should also be free at the point of 
use in order to maximize this commitment and their universality for citizens. 
 
Independence 
 
Independence is vital in the process of decision-making about setting and distributing the 
licence fee and other sources of PSM funding so as to retain a significant measure of 
autonomy from vested interests. According to the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), 
funding must not be ‘reliant on political favour, thereby promoting public trust in PSM and 
its role as a truly indispensable service.’267 
 
Transparency 
 
Public services, including PSM, should be fully accountable to the public, as enshrined in 
appropriate good governance models. The funding of PSM, equally, ought to have a 
commitment, as the EBU puts it, to an ‘open and clear funding mechanism holding PSM 
accountable to its audience.’268 
 
Redistribution 
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We propose that, in accord with the principles of universality and citizenship, new 
redistributive funding mechanisms should exist to address structural inequalities and 
economic disparities both between providers in media markets (as, for example in the original 
funding relationship between ITV and Channel 4) and crucially, as we suggest below, 
between the citizens that compose the audiences for PSM. 
 
Plurality 
 
We believe that a healthy public service ecology is best served by multiple funding sources 
(and public service providers) in order to minimize, wherever possible, competition for 
revenue, while maximizing competition for innovation and quality. Britain is fortunate to 
have a television landscape financed by the licence fee, advertising, subscription and even 
some elements of general taxation (as in the government’s small contribution to S4C).  
However, we would also wish to note specific problems with the existing mechanisms 
in the light of the normative principles: 
 
Subscription favours the better off, discourages universality of genre (mixed 
programming), and, by fragmenting audiences, damages the attainment of social and cultural 
universality. 
 
Advertising and sponsorship carry risks of commercial influence and of the skewing 
of provision towards more desirable demographics thus providing a disincentive to invest in 
particular kinds of content to represent particular social groups. 
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A flat licence fee is a regressive payment mechanism in that it is a ‘poll tax’ that, at 
least in relation to the BBC, currently criminalises some of the poorest sections of the 
population. 
 
We therefore propose several possible improvements for PSM funding going forward 
in relation to the BBC. Rather than a flat licence fee, in order to mitigate criminalization and 
improve distributive justice, wealth-related payments should be implemented, whether 
through a revamped and platform-neutral BBC licence fee, general taxation, or a household 
fee following the German model but based on different tiers, and with substantial exemptions 
for the low-waged and the unemployed.  
In addition, pursuing the principle of (re)distributive justice at the institutional level of 
funding mechanisms that address the media landscape as an ecology, we suggest the need to 
explore the use of levies on the profits of the largest digital intermediaries, including ISPs and 
phone/tablet manufacturers, in order to fund new sources of public service content, as well as 
to stimulate key genres that are currently under-funded, including children’s television and 
education. 
Whatever the merits of these recommendations, we urge government in future to 
address the need to base legislation and policies in relation to funding on the foundational 
normative principles set out in this chapter. The beneficial effects will be that greater 
attention is given to curbing inequality of access to the means of citizenship, and that 
pluralism of funding and provision remains at the heart of the PSM ecology in the digital age. 
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THE PURPOSES OF BROADCASTING - REVISITED 
Julian Petley269 
 
 
In 1960 the then Conservative government commissioned a report on the future of 
broadcasting in the UK. This it did for four reasons. The first was that, because of 
considerable hostility to ‘commercial’ television from across the political spectrum, ITV had 
been introduced in 1954 for only a ten-year ‘experimental’ period, and this was now drawing 
to an end. Second, there was mounting criticism that ITV companies were making very 
considerable profits by lowering programme standards. Third, a second TV channel was to be 
allotted, and there was a great deal of debate about whether this should go to the BBC or ITV. 
And finally, the BBC Charter was due to expire in 1962. 
The committee which wrote the report was chaired by the industrialist Sir Harry 
Pilkington, and a particularly notable member was Richard Hoggart – who had recently 
published The Uses of Literacy (1957) and appeared for the defence in the Lady Chatterley 
trial.  Its secretary was Dennis Lawrence, a career civil servant in the Post Office. 
Much to the fury of the numerous newspapers who had shares in ITV companies, the 
Committee was highly critical of ITV and decided to award the second channel to the BBC. 
The Committee in general, and Hoggart in particular, were accused of being, among other 
things, do-gooders, roundheads, puritans, socialists, authoritarians, paternal, prim, 
patronising, moralistic, censorious, and out of touch with public opinion. Later, Hoggart 
himself, in his book An Imagined Life, described this reaction as ‘the usual dreary, 
underdeveloped litany of fear’, and as manifesting an ‘Islamic-fundamentalist-like fury’270. 
The anti-BBC, anti-intellectual and stridently populist tone of the aggrieved reaction 
against Pilkington carries many a pre-echo of subsequent attacks on the public service 
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broadcasting system and the BBC in particular. The fact that they all come from exactly the 
same quarter—‘free market’ politicians and economists, and a press which is very far indeed 
from being a disinterested observer of the broadcasting scene—shows just how deep run the 
roots of the current campaign against not just the BBC but against public service broadcasting 
in all its forms. And, by the same token, much of the report’s defence of public service 
broadcasting is as directly relevant to today’s battles as to those of fifty years ago. 
From this perspective, the most important part of the report is Chapter Three, entitled 
‘The Purposes of Broadcasting’.271 It was actually written by Dennis Lawrence, but is highly 
Hoggartian in spirit. 
It is of course important to understand that when the report talks of broadcasting it 
means public service broadcasting, as embodied in the BBC and ITV, since there was no 
other form in those days. Now, of course, there is absolutely no shortage of weighty books 
and articles about public service broadcasting, the public sphere and so on, but in 1960 such 
serious analyses of broadcasting were rare – and particularly so in official reports. And the 
report was nothing if not serious about the public purposes and responsibilities of 
broadcasting.   
In its consideration of those purposes and responsibilities, the report argues that 
‘television is and will be a main factor in influencing the values and moral standards of our 
society’272 […] Inevitably this immediately led to the report being caricatured by its populist 
critics as calling for broadcasting to play a moralising role in society, whereas what it was in 
fact doing was simply pointing out that social attitudes, assumptions and values will 
inevitably be reflected in and to some extent influenced by broadcasting, as well as other 
forms of modern communication. Consequently, it was important that broadcasters respected 
the medium and assumed a responsibility for its output, its audience and indeed the wider 
public and society. An observation that is as valid now as when the report was published.   
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However, the most significant part of ‘The Purposes of Broadcasting’ for current 
debates about the future of the BBC in particular and of public service broadcasting in 
general is its robust and combative dismissal of the populist approach to television – an 
approach which thoroughly infused many of the attacks on the report and which has become 
a hallmark of the many onslaughts on public service broadcasting in the intervening years.   
  The report notes the argument, familiar even then, that certain programmes are 
popular with large audiences because they are ‘what the public wants’, and that ‘to provide 
anything else is to impose on people what someone thinks they ought to like’.  But as the 
report points out:  
 
The public is not an amorphous, uniform mass; however much it is counted and 
classified under this or that heading, it is composed of individual people; and ‘what 
the public wants’ is what individual people want. They share some of their wants and 
interests with all or most of their fellows; and it is necessary that a service of 
broadcasting should cater for those wants and interests. There is in short a 
considerable place for items which all or most enjoy. To say, however, that the only 
way of giving people what they want is to give them these items is to imply that all 
individuals are alike. But no two are […] a service which caters only for majorities 
can never satisfy all, or even most, of the needs of any individual. It cannot, therefore, 
satisfy all the needs of the public.273 
 
Thus, far from advocating narrowing of the range of television programmes so as to 
include only those which were ‘good’ for people, as the report’s populist critics suggested 
that it did, it actually argued, conversely, for a wide range of programmes aimed at a wide 
range of audiences. […]  
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Back in 1989, Rupert Murdoch opened his infamous MacTaggart Lecture at the 
Edinburgh Television Festival by stating that: ‘For fifty years British television has operated 
on the assumption that the people could not be trusted to watch what they wanted to watch, so 
that it had to be controlled by like-minded people who knew what was good for us.’274 But 
nearly thirty years earlier, the Pilkington report had detonated the rank hypocrisy lurking 
behind this kind of populist rhetoric, arguing that ‘giving the public what it wants’ has 
 
the appearance of an appeal to democratic principle but the appearance is deceptive. It 
is in fact patronising and arrogant, in that it claims to know what the public is, but 
defines it as no more than the mass audience; and in that it claims to know what it 
wants but limits its choice to the average of experience. In this sense, we reject it 
utterly. If there is a sense in which it should be used, it is this: what the public wants 
and what it has the right to get is freedom to choose from the widest range of 
programme matter. Anything less than that is deprivation.275 
 
Furthermore, far from desiring moral conformism on the part of the broadcasters, the 
report openly encouraged the expression of dissenting and minority viewpoints, arguing that  
‘television must pay particular attention to those parts of the range of worthwhile experience 
which lie beyond the most common; to those parts which some have explored here and there 
but few everywhere’. Indeed, it stated that television should focus a particular spotlight on 
what it called society’s ‘growing pains’, because   
 
it is at these points that the challenges to existing assumptions and beliefs are made, 
where the claims to new knowledge and new awareness are stated. If our society is to 
respond to the challenges and judge the claims, they must be put before it. All 
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broadcasting, and television especially, must be ready and anxious to experiment, to 
show the new and unusual, to give a hearing to dissent. Here, broadcasting must be 
most willing to make mistakes; for if it does not, it will make no discoveries. […]   
 
The Pilkington report played a key role in paving the way for the many invigorating 
changes that television underwent in the 1960s. In particular, it required the Independent 
Television Authority to ensure that the ITV companies took their public service obligations 
far more seriously than they had done hitherto, and the greatly improved programming that 
resulted caused the BBC to sharpen up its own act considerably.  Far from being the near-
relation of Mrs Grundy, as painted by the populist press, the report was actually a harbinger 
of The Wednesday Play, Z Cars, World in Action, Coronation Street, Seven Up! (and its 
successors), and  many other ground-breaking programmes which had their birth in the 
decade at the start of which the report was published.  However, the caricature of the report 
as an elitist, moralistic, killjoy charter has been far too useful to the enemies of public service 
broadcasting – most of whom almost certainly haven’t read it – to have been allowed to fade 
into the obscurity which it deserves.       
According to Hoggart, in Speaking to Each Other, the Pilkington report was best 
understood as an argument  
 
about freedom and responsibility within commercialised democracies. It touched on 
the interrelations between cash, power and the organs for intellectual debate; it had to 
do with a society which is changing rapidly and doesn’t understand its own changes; 
it had to do with the adequacy of our assumptions and vocabulary to many current 
social issues.276  
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Today British society, and indeed the world with which it is increasingly deeply and 
intimately connected, is changing even more rapidly than in the1960s, and public 
understanding of those changes is at a woefully low ebb – a situation for which the media, 
including the public service broadcasters, must take their fair share of blame. Thus we 
desperately need an analysis of both the strengths and weaknesses of public service 
broadcasting as it currently exists, as well as a blueprint for its future, which is as profound, 
challenging, well-informed and intellectually self-confident as was the Pilkington report 
when it was published in 1962. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE USES OF TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Michael Bailey277 
 
Any inquiry into the present-day ecology and future possibilities of British television must 
necessarily reflect on the historical development of public service broadcasting. Not so as to 
invoke a nostalgic golden age or a whiggish history of scientific progress; rather, to highlight 
the democratic purposes that have shaped television as a social technology over the past nine 
decades. And to also consider how best to reevaluate that tradition in view of the medium’s 
changing production, distribution and consumption practices in the digital age.  
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  Such an analysis also reveals how and why debates about television are part of a 
longer inquiry concerning the more extensive relation of culture to society: viz. the 
articulation between the creative and intellectual capacities of human beings (as expressed in 
the popular arts, recreation, education, everyday customs and habits of thought), on the one 
hand, and wider social changes and political forces (industrialisation, urbanisation, 
enfranchisement, secularisation, welfarism, migration, multiculturalism, neoliberalism), on 
the other. 
It is especially fitting that the Inquiry into the future of public service television, 
chaired by Lord Puttnam, and based in the Department of Media and Communications at 
Goldsmiths, University of London, should take its cue from the Pilkington report on 
broadcasting published in 1962. Apart from being the first (not to mention highly influential) 
committee of inquiry into television, Pilkington was one of the defining moments in the 
distinguished career of the late Richard Hoggart, former Warden of Goldsmiths. […] 
 Hoggart noted that one of the reasons the inquiry decided not to commission a related 
audience study was because it did not want the report to ‘restrict itself to collecting and 
ordering objective evidence’ or ‘to laying out the social alternatives neutrally’: interesting 
though quantitative research may be, it tends to confine itself to ‘outlining a great many 
useful is’s’; rarely does such work ‘give a single ought’.278 
The inference of Hoggart’s matter-of-fact remarks is that, whilst recognising that ex 
cathedra opinions can be misleading, the committee wanted evidence from people who were 
not afraid to offer shrewd opinion: ‘We were engaged to the best of our ability in a study in 
social philosophy. We were asking about the nature of good broadcasting in a democracy. We 
could not enforce our judgements scientifically; we could only say at the end … “This is so, 
is it not?”’279 And of the various metaphysical considerations expressed during the course of 
the inquiry, foremost was the concern to realise the purposes of broadcasting. 
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Hence Pilkington’s recommendation that broadcasters ought to recognise that they 
‘were in a constant and sensitive relationship with the moral condition of society’, which 
many critics took to epitomise the report’s patrician tone of voice.280 However, the committee 
defended this particular clause on the grounds that it was intended to give broadcasters a 
‘responsibility difficult to define but not easy to shrug off’, which necessarily involved them 
having to steer a course somewhere between the populist Scylla of ‘giving the public what it 
wants’ and the autocratic Charybdis of ‘giving the public what they ought to have’.281 
That is to say, Pilkington was not asserting ‘a crudely moralistic relationship’ in the 
sense that ‘broadcasters had a responsibility for the direct propagation of the Ten 
Commandments’.282 Rather, the report was advocating a vocational sense of professionalism 
that went beyond either a purely commercial or aesthetic definition of broadcasting: a duty to 
commission programmes that ‘bring before us all the widest range of subject matter, the 
whole scope and variety of human awareness and experience, the best and the worst, the new 
and the challenging, the old and familiar, the serious and the light [thus] enriching the lives of 
every one of us’.283 
Naturally, mediating between these different positions presents all kinds of dilemmas 
in terms of what broadcasters should prioritise. But Hoggart reminds us that one of the 
enduring principles established by Pilkington was that ‘good broadcasting in a free society … 
should not hesitate to reflect “the quarrel of society with itself”, even though politicians may 
not like the result’. What is more, if they shoulder this responsibility, broadcasters will end up 
becoming ‘a sort of yeast in society’ in the sense that they ‘will be active agents of change’, 
sensitive to new possibilities and unforeseen contingencies.284 
Hoggart’s fondness for positive regulation is well known. But contrary to accusations 
of him promoting censorship, Hoggart was always clear about the difference between 
enabling forms of broadcasting policy that say ‘Thou shalt’ as opposed to prohibitive forms 
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of broadcasting legislation that say ‘Thou shalt not’: ‘Good regulations increase freedom, 
make for good growth, expand and protect the arena, the living space, for good 
programming’; ‘to windows being opened, not knuckles censoriously rapped’.285 In other 
words, unfettered consumerism and uncritical populism are the problem, not sex, bad 
language, and violence. 
Commenting on broadcasting policy developments in the early 1990s Hoggart was 
even more specific. Though never published, A Broadcasting Charter for Britain (with 
Stephen Hearst) remains one of the boldest statements on the duties and rights of listeners, 
viewers, programme makers, and regulators. With typical candour, the manuscript is prefaced 
with the following statement: ‘It would be more fashionable and more generally acceptable to 
list first – and perhaps only – Rights. But in a democratic society Rights are inextricably 
bound up with Duties; Duties are the foundation of Rights and so prior to them. No Rights 
without Duties.’286 
The public have a duty ‘to respect other people’s tastes’ and ‘to look at what is 
available overall before complaining that there’s nothing worth watching’. It is the duty of 
the programme maker ‘to his or her self’ (that is to say, to their ‘conscience’), ‘to do justice to 
his or her subject’ and ‘to be creative’. Duties of legislators include the duty ‘to create 
structures and methods of financing for broadcasting’ which encourage the production of 
‘good programmes’, ‘to enable disparate voices to be heard’ and, finally, in Jane Austen’s 
words, ‘not to assume it is their duty to “screw people into virtue”’. 287 
Of the many rights listed, the one that best summarises Hoggart’s thinking was the 
declaration that listeners and viewers had a right ‘not to be got at, politically, commercially, 
piously’.288 That is to say, the public has a right to access the fullest means of information and 
creative expression in the belief that we can learn to value both our common humanity and 
our best selves. Only then might we fully comprehend how broadcasting might become truly 
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democratic, comprehensive, and socially organic; indeed, the much wider relationship 
between culture and society generally and, if found wanting, to be in a position to do 
something about it.  
 In spite of being sympathetic to the needs of minority communities, Hoggart’s claims 
to represent the broader public interest nevertheless risk excluding those social groups whose 
cultural tastes and interests are not so easily articulated, much less accommodated, in such 
prescriptive and general terms. Though he always insisted that ‘we should feel members one 
of another, but also retain all we have of sparky, spikey individuality’,289 there is still a danger 
that a straightforward Hoggartian analysis could ignore communities of people who have 
nothing in common with its vision for a common culture.   
For example, Hoggart never supported community media initiatives in quite the same 
way that he supported PSBs such as the BBC or Channel 4. In fact, he actually dismissed the 
‘small-holding dreams of communications’ as at best ‘an engaging dream’, at worst ‘a 
reversion to parochialism’ which will permit ‘the ideological toughs and the commercial 
sharp-shooters’ to ‘divide and rule’.290 The subtext of Hoggart’s reasoning is that locally 
oriented media may result in the fragmenting of society into a mass of atomised communities 
of interest or regional identity, which could put an end to any sense of shared culture and 
sociality. 
Though one can appreciate the cultural and political logic of Hoggart’s argument, it is 
nevertheless his Achilles heel. This is a pity because, whilst broadcasting policy in the United 
Kingdom has begun to acknowledge the differing needs and wants of a variety of publics, it 
has been a long time in the making and is still in need of more widespread support. This is 
partly because of the government’s refusal to lift restricted access to the airwaves on the 
grounds of spectrum scarcity, but also because of broadcasting’s tendency towards 
concentration of ownership, economies of scale, formulaic programming, inward-looking 
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professionalism, and managerial bureaucracy. […] 
 There are many other debates concerning public service television and the future of 
mass communications more generally. The focus of this submission captures only a small 
fraction of past and current developments. Suffice to say that the above proposals and 
comments take inspiration from the resurgent positive interest in the Pilkington Inquiry and 
the related ideas of its best-known committee member, Richard Hoggart. Their criticisms of 
free-market liberalism and light-touch regulation are as relevant today as they were fifty-odd 
years ago insofar as they still represent a cogent engagement with the idea of PSB as a 
primary facilitator of an educated and deliberative democracy. 
To quote Hoggart again (writing shortly before his death), ‘the arrival of broadcasting 
in the last century offered the greatest opportunity to create a clear democratic means of 
communication, one harnessed neither to the profit-making wagon nor to political power’.291 
Furthermore, ‘broadcasting can be the biggest and best arena for exposing false democracy 
and welcoming its opposite’, that is a socio-political system which both encourages and is 
supported by the endless play of free will and a more civil society. And it is for these primary 
reasons that broadcasting should keep ‘going on going on’ with ‘public service at its heart’292 
– for its sake and ours. […] 
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TELEVISION, QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE VALUE OF CULTURE 
David Hesmondhalgh293 
 
This submission forefronts two concepts that need to be central in discussions about the 
future of television in the UK: quality of life, and the value of culture. It makes four main 
claims, as follows. 
 
1. Television can contribute to quality of life in important ways, but we should not 
understand that contribution in terms of ‘consumer preferences’ 
In the last twenty years, much debate about television has been a slanging match 
between advocates of markets (i.e., of much greater marketization of the television system) 
and advocates of public service. Too many contributions on either side treat markets and 
public service as ends in themselves, sidelining discussion of what the ultimate purposes of 
the television system ought to be.  
One useful and potentially productive way to conceptualise the ultimate goal of any 
media or cultural system such as television is in terms of its contributions to people’s quality 
of life in the areas reached by that system.  
The problem of course is that there are many different ways of understanding quality 
of life. Mainstream economics, which has exerted considerable influence over television 
policy (and public policy in general) in recent decades, often conceives of quality of life in 
terms of ‘welfare’, understood in terms of consumers’ subjective preferences.  
There are major problems in thinking of quality of life in this way. For people are 
often mistaken in their appraisals of their own preferences and desired goals, not because 
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they are stupid, but because often they lack information about what kinds of rewards products 
will provide, and the social consequences of their choices.  
In the case of cultural goods,294 such as television, it is hard to know much at all in 
advance about what kinds of rewards and pleasures that an individual cultural product might 
offer. We very often only really know whether we value the experience produced by a 
cultural product once we have fully tried it. Even trailers, or familiarity with a star name, or 
source material, can be deceptive. Cultural goods often give greatest reward and pleasure 
precisely because they surprise, enlighten or delight us by offering a new perspective on the 
world. The benefits of particular television programmes for individuals, communities and 
society only become apparent in retrospect. One factor that contributes to this feature of 
television (shared by many other cultural forms) is that each television programme or series is 
in a sense a new product, different from all other television programmes and series – 
sometimes only marginally, but sometimes considerably.  
This difficulty for consumers in accurately knowing their cultural preferences is one 
of the reasons that assertions that media markets necessarily ‘give people what they want’ are 
either naïve or made in bad faith.295 This feature of cultural goods also means that even the 
more sophisticated expression of that viewpoint, that media markets contribute to people’s 
welfare by efficiently meeting consumers’ subjective preferences, is dubious. And it means 
that to define the kinds of well-being or quality of life that might be enhanced by television in 
terms of consumers’ subjective preferences is mistaken. We need a different conception of 
quality of life. 
 
2. Television’s contribution to quality of life should be thought of in terms of what it 
enables people to do and be 
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The ‘Capabilities Approach’ offers a superior conception of quality of life and its 
relation to policy. Developed by (among others) two leading neo-Aristotelian thinkers, the 
US philosopher Martha Nussbaum and the Indian economist Amartya Sen, the Capabilities 
Approach has served as an important basis for debates about international ‘development’.296 
The approach emphasises that ‘it is not only what people have that is important for their well-
being but what they can do or be’.297 Capabilities are simply the abilities of people to achieve 
‘functionings’ such as being able to have good health, or move freely from place to place. 
The focus of the capabilities approach therefore is on which functionings should be enabled 
by public policy, why, and how. It can and should be applied to television (but hasn’t been, 
much).  
What kinds of cultural functionings might a good television system enable in the 
population who receive it? Different genres might enable different functionings. In news and 
current affairs, there is a social need for serious, rigorous and yet accessible information that 
would allow people to participate meaningfully in democratic life; such a view is of course 
widely accepted. In ‘entertainment’ genres (drama, factual entertainment, comedy, talk 
shows, children’s programming) there is a need for a wide range of skilful representations of 
experiences, so that people can better understand their own emotions, motivations and 
development. Culture matters for quality of life across a wide range of genres, and there is a 
danger of elitism in leaving this importance to the market. 
Capabilities and functionings can be construed as needs, but unlike some other 
treatments of needs, there is a strong emphasis on freedom. For the capabilities approach does 
not decree or imply that everyone must achieve functionings whether they want to or not: ‘the 
ability to choose is itself crucial for well-being.’298 So the approach avoids the paternalism 
that both left and conservative-libertarian critics would rightly question in television policy, 
emphasising the very great variability in people’s inclinations and practices. But equally it 
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moves beyond the idea that services should be provided on the basis of subjective consumer 
preferences, by forefronting the need for public deliberation over which cultural functionings 
a society should enable, and how.  
 
3. Television markets, if not well constructed and regulated, are unlikely to enhance 
cultural quality of life adequately, because high-quality television is a particular form of 
‘merit good’ and is therefore likely to be under-produced. 
 
The difficulty of knowing in advance what kinds of rewards and pleasures good 
television might offer (discussed in 1 above) means that good television can be understood as 
a ‘merit good’: a product or service of significant social benefit in which individual 
consumers are likely to underinvest299 and which therefore markets are likely to under-
produce. Other examples would be preventive healthcare or education, in which many 
individuals and families might underinvest because of a lack of information about the 
benefits of exercise, diet, or learning, or because of fears that their investments will be 
worthless. This is why even nearly all governments invest in health information and in 
universal public education, to correct this particular form of market failure.  
Even if it is accepted that quality of life (understood in terms of capabilities and 
functionings) is a good way to think about the goals of cultural systems, and that television 
can be thought of as a merit good because of certain fundamental features of how it is 
consumed, some people might object to the preceding paragraph on the basis that there is a 
false analogy. They might claim that culture should not be treated like health and education, 
because health and education are simply more important than culture, more a matter of life 
and death.  
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Health and education are indeed important but culture matters too, and contributes to 
quality of life in particular and distinctive ways, as we have seen briefly above. It is only 
relatively recently that citizens and governments have come to recognise the need for 
comprehensive social provision of health and education; even neo-liberals would recognise 
the need for such provision but they just think that the market is best placed to offer it. With 
the industrialisation of culture since the 1920s, and with generally expanding leisure time and 
income, culture has become more and more central to people’s lives. This process has only 
been intensified by digitalisation, which allows access to culture to become more mobile, 
flexible and frequent. Culture matters more than ever.  
The increasing importance of culture means that it should be considered alongside 
merit goods in the health and education sectors, as requiring public, democratic provision to 
prevent under-supply of goods that have a significant effect on people’s quality of life. In the 
realm of culture, consumers will generally over-value in advance the familiar, and 
underestimate the benefits of the fresh, the innovative and the challenging, because of the 
difficulties of knowing and understanding unfamiliar experiences. This means that, in 
marketised systems, while some people will have their cultural needs met, and will expand 
the range of cultural functionings they can pursue, many will not –especially the poor and 
less educated, who tend to have less opportunity to take cultural risks on products with which 
they are unfamiliar. Because culture remains a key marker of social distinction in modern 
societies, as sociologists from Pierre Bourdieu onwards have amply demonstrated, that will 
only increase problems of inequality. 
 
4. Digitalisation does not remove the fundamental problems surrounding cultural 
markets and quality of life – it makes a public service ‘common provider’ more 
important. 
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The above mentioned digitalisation does not significantly alter the problem of under-
production of television as a merit good that enables quality of life. Where digital markets 
have enabled a number of competing services to offer high quality provision, along the lines 
of HBO, this is often consumed mainly by white middle-class educated people, even if such 
services offer products that working-class people might well value once they are exposed to 
it. So content that crosses class, ethnic and other social divides is likely still to be under-
produced; the ‘merit good’ problem remains. Furthermore, digitalisation, especially the likely 
proliferation of subscription services (whether consumed via PC, tablet or ‘traditional’ TV 
screens) intensifies the problem of cultural fragmentation. A version of the current ecology of 
a public-service oriented BBC, alongside public service oriented commercial providers, must 
surely remain the prime means by which such cultural fragmentation is countered, by 
providing trusted sources of varied representations, good explanations, innovative humour, 
and so on. Only if this public service ecology is generously funded, and positioned as a 
universal provider, across all major genres, can it serve this purpose, by enabling a wide 
range of cultural functionings, and providing a real alternative to control of distribution by 
the big tech oligopolies that now dominate in the realm of digital media, as other sector’s 
oligopolies did in the analogue era (again, because of the nature of cultural markets. To 
undermine or reduce this public service ecology would be to throw away that the potential 
quality-of-life benefits that investment over 75 years and more has built up.  
The BBC and the commercial public service providers have accrued and adapted huge 
skill and experience in providing programmes that have enhanced life in Britain. The success 
of the iPlayer and its equivalents in providing a new means of accessing television in the 
digital age puts the current public service players, especially the BBC, in a strong position to 
provide widely-shared knowledge and aesthetic experiences, which might redress the massive 
fragmentation that marketization and digitalisation have already brought about and are likely 
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to intensify further. The iPlayer needs to be made universally available, and BBC 
programming—aimed at all citizens irrespective of background and geography—needs 
sufficient support to ensure that a sufficient number of people continue to watch content via it 
to justify a universal licence fee.  
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SHOUTING TOWARD EACH OTHER: ECONOMICS, IDEOLOGY, AND PUBLIC 
SERVICE TELEVISION POLICY 
Robert G. Picard300 
 
The biggest challenge in determining the future of public service television and the BBC is 
that there is little debate and informed discussion, but rather a surfeit of partisan viewpoints 
shouted toward opponents. 
We need more objective and reasoned thought as the UK considers what to do about 
public service television. Proponents of more and less public service television make 
impassioned, ideologically based arguments that are often deficient in substance and 
misconstrue the purposes, functions, and operations of public service television – thus 
obscuring the underlying issues and choices that the UK faces.  
A sensible debate can only start by recognising that there is nothing sacrosanct about 
public service television. It is merely a policy tool for achieving desirable social outcomes 
given the economic characteristics of broadcasting. The fundamental question in the debate is 
thus whether changes produced by the growth of commercial content provision and 
contemporary distribution technologies have reduced the necessity and ability of the public 
service television tool to provide those outcomes. 
The fundamental purposes of public service broadcasting are uncomplicated. Its 
objectives are to provide quality programming that 1) serves the information and 
entertainment needs of the public, 2) supports national identity and culture, 3) provides 
service to underserved groups such as children and minorities, and 4) meets the specific local 
needs of communities and regions.  
Public service broadcasting was developed in an age when technical, economic, and 
business conditions made it difficult for other types of operations to effectively serve those 
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social purposes.301 The UK is now in a national debate about the roles of public service 
broadcasting in meeting those purposes in the digital age in which other types of operations 
exist.   
In recent decades, critics have vociferously challenged public service television at 
every opportunity and much of the UK press has been less than forthright about the reasons 
for their criticisms. Some have criticised it out of self-interests in profits of commercial 
broadcasting firms.  A few critics have opposed the very existence of public service 
broadcasting on ideological grounds. Most critics, however, perceive value in public service, 
but argue that its scale and scope reduce effective governance or harm development of the 
commercial broadcasting sector.302 
I do not believe that ideology should be absent from the debates over broadcasting. 
Such discussions are necessarily ideological because they are about choices between reliance 
on the state or the market. The arguments, however, should be backed by persuasive evidence 
and made with recognition that the real choice in the current discussion is not one between 
the state and the market, but rather what is the appropriate balance between them. 
To begin with, one must accept the undeniable facts that public service broadcasting 
has been singularly successful in meeting UK broadcast needs during the past nine decades 
and since full-scale provision of UK television began following World War II. The UK 
television market today is lauded by television system observers worldwide for the quality, 
choice, and social service it provides UK citizens. The UK market is recognized for providing 
the best public service television and creating a highly successful commercial market with the 
largest revenues in Europe. 
We must also recognize that public service television experienced unparalleled 
growth until 2010, when its resources began to be reduced and constrained by policy 
decisions.303 Nevertheless, the cuts that have already taken place have addressed and are 
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ameliorating many of the criticisms levelled against public service television and it has lower 
market impact than public broadcasting in many European nations. 
Public service television—especially the BBC— has become institutionalised, 
however, and changes are difficult. It is determinedly supported by those who benefit from 
the employment it offers and supporters of public service broadcasting who see any criticism 
as a threat or do not wish to consider other possible tools for achieving the desired social 
outcomes.  
The focus of attention on public service television is appropriate because it is a 
creation of public policy, funded by policy choices, and because policymakers will have 
significant influence on its future. As the contemporary debate develops, however, it is 
important that public service broadcasting not be considered in isolation from developments 
in commercial broadcasting and the content that is provided by broadcast and digital 
audiovisual services as a whole. It also needs to be recognised that all broadcasting, cable, 
and other services have been made possible because of public policy and public investments 
and that the BBC has played important roles in technological and product developments that 
benefit commercial providers.  
The continued usefulness of public service television as a policy tool must be assessed 
within the broader perspective of the contributions of the broader broadcasting and digital 
sectors to national life and should not consider public service television in isolation. For the 
debate about public service television to contribute to an effective policy solution, bigger 
questions will need to be addressed: 
• What functions should television serve in social and public life? What does UK 
society need from it? 
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• What roles will broadcasting—public service and commercial—play in the growing 
environment of streamed linear and non-linear programming? What will broadcasting 
contribute to the content environment that non-broadcast providers do and will not? 
• What functions and needs does public service television fulfil that are not adequately 
performed or met by commercial broadcasting and digital streaming? Must public service 
television only fulfil those functions and needs or should it be allowed to have a broader 
impact on society? 
• To what extent, if any, does public service broadcasting keep the commercial sector 
from having adequate resources to grow, prosper and contribute to the economic well-being 
of the UK? 
• If the scope and service of public service television are diminished further, what 
requirements can be placed on commercial broadcasters to meet the social outcomes desired 
from broadcasting generally or the functions lost by reducing the scale and scope of public 
service television? 
 
[…] As contemplation of current and future roles of public service television continues, it is 
useful to consider five salient points: 
 
1. Public service television provides universal access and values all viewers equally, 
including those who are less valued by commercial firms. 
2. Public service television provides social and cultural benefits beyond merely 
providing content that commercial broadcasters are unwilling to provide. It does more than 
address market failure to provide some genres of programming and services to minorities. 
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3. Public service television is distinctly UK-oriented, providing content that serves UK 
social, cultural, and political interests beyond those provided by commercial broadcasters as a 
whole. 
4. Public service television has the potential to interfere with business development of 
some commercial content providers, constraining the UK economy and denying some 
additional tax revenue. 
5. Funding for public service television has already been significantly diminished, 
leading to reduced services and impact on the market. The effects of the reduced funding 
need to be considered during the deliberations taking place about the proper scale and scope 
of public service television.  
Economic issues and policy evidence require that a balance be sought between those 
who argue for unfettered public service television and those who argue that the market alone 
can meet the UK’s audio-visual content needs. Neither option alone will produce an optimal 
social outcome. The placement of unwarranted constraints on either public service or 
commercial provision, however, will reduce the benefits that citizens receive from the UK 
television market. 
Getting the policy choice correct will require thoughtful deliberation and cautious 
choices, lest the UK risk destroying what is probably the best television system in the world 
today.  
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EVERYTHING FOR SOMEONE: FOR AN INCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE BROADCASTING 
Brett Mills304 
 
Everything for Someone 
 
It is pointless to discuss how PSB can best be delivered unless there is consensus on what 
constitutes it. Given the need for PSB providers to repeatedly evidence both that their output 
represents PSB and that PSB represents some kind of social good, there is a necessity for 
clarity about what it is. In debates about PSB there is rarely little dissent from the view that it 
can function as a social good; debates instead rest on what kind of social good is appropriate, 
and the extent to which the ‘intervention’ of funding is made to ‘the market by that social 
good. This submission rejects the notion that PSB should function solely, or even primarily, 
to fill the gaps left by ‘market failure’. The provision of social goods is typically seen to be of 
importance irrespective of whether the market can supply them, and public funding ensures 
their provision. Just as the existence of bookshops doesn’t mean that libraries should only 
supply the volumes that can’t be found in those stores, so PSB providers should not be forced 
to evidence that they only do what the market can’t. 
Definitions of PSB throughout the world—typically drawing on the UK, Reithian 
model—insist that PSB can only function if services are universal. This is conventionally 
understood as being in terms of access; that all citizens have a right to the material and 
services offered by PSB, partly because they have paid for it, but primarily because all 
citizens should have equal access to public services. Debates about PSB, then, often focus on 
modes of delivery to ensure that access, and, as such, changes in technology such as multi-
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channel platforms and online services have represented challenges and opportunities to that 
universal access. While these debates are important, concerns over changes in technology risk 
crowding out discussion of content. 
Universality should not be understood solely in terms of access. Universality must 
also be considered in terms of content. A universal PSB enables all citizens to see their lives 
reflected and valued within content, and this is only possible if PSB encompasses as wide a 
range of genres and programming as possible. It is easy to forget how radical and inclusive 
the decision that the BBC should ‘inform, educate and entertain’ was when the Corporation 
was instituted, with the inclusion of ‘entertain’ representing a commitment to popular culture 
that might not have automatically been seen as necessary for PSB. Yet that triad persists and 
has been implemented in many countries across the world. UNESCO, for example, states that 
it is ‘[t]hrough PSB [that] citizens are informed, educated, and also entertained.’305 In the UK, 
the notion of entertainment has persisted in PSB definitions, and it has been part of Channel 
4’s remit since its inception. As such, PSB has been understood as constituting mixed 
programming whose aim ‘was not simply to provide “something for everyone” but, at 
whatever level, “everything for someone”’.306 Too often, debates about PSB focus on 
‘something for everyone’; that is, that PSB services reach as large a percentage of the 
population as it can. However, PSB must also represent ‘everything for someone’; that is, that 
a public service offers all forms of culture desired by citizens. A library that only offers 
books on certain kinds of topics isn’t a public service; and a PSB provider that fails to deliver 
all components of ‘inform, educate and entertain’ similarly isn’t a public service. 
 
The Problematic Hierarchies within PSB 
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Despite claims to universality, discourses within which debates about PSB function often 
hierarchise different kinds of PSB provision. This is evident in both academic and policy 
material. For example, the Government’s 2016 White Paper proposes instituting a ‘public 
service content fund’ which would enable broadcasters other than the BBC to deliver ‘quality 
and pluralistic public service content’.307 While the fund would aim to encourage innovation 
in content coupled with programming intended to reach a more diverse audience, the White 
Paper also highlights what it calls ‘underserved genres’; these are children’s programming, 
religion and ethics, formal education, and arts and classical music.308 The White Paper cites 
Ofcom research as evidencing the ‘underserved’ nature of these genres. While Ofcom 
research does indeed demonstrate this, the genres the White Paper lists are not the only ones 
Ofcom finds to be underserved, as it states that ‘There has also been a recent decline in spend 
on new UK comedy, with spend falling by 30% in real terms since 2008’.309 The 
marginalisation of an entertainment genre such as comedy is repeatedly formalised within 
policy. For example, the Digital Economy Act (2015) requires Channel 4 to produce news, 
current affairs and film, ignoring other genres.310 There is a worrying trend of some aspects of 
PSB being seen as more public service than others, with news and current affairs typically 
hierarchized over entertainment. The BBC’s move in 2016 of BBC3 to an online service 
demonstrates this, given that BBC3 was the largest commissioner of television comedy in the 
UK by far311  yet its budget has been significantly reduced. Such hierarchisations are highly 
problematic yet seem to be becoming normal. Indeed, the Review this document contributes 
to itself refers to ‘specific public service genres, including current affairs, drama, news and 
sport’312 as if there are some kinds of services that aren’t specifically PSB. 
These hierarchisations run counter to the public’s views of what PSB is and should 
be. After all, 
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even today the public, both in the BBC’s research and in a recent largescale survey 
conducted by Ofcom, continue to define public service broadcasting (PSB) not as a 
narrow set of particular programme categories which the market may fail to provide, 
but as a broad and integrated system of programmes and services. To them, PSB 
includes soaps, drama, sport, comedy and natural history just as much as (and in some 
cases, even more than) the traditional ‘public service’ categories of current affairs, 
arts and religion.313  
 
The BBC’s most recent survey of its audiences found that they ‘felt strongly that the 
BBC’s mission to inform, educate and entertain was still highly relevant’.314 Ofcom’s annual 
survey of audience opinions on the importance of different kinds of programming to PSB 
only started asking about comedy in 2014. Yet those results show that audiences see comedy 
as more important to PSB than high-quality drama.315 That the public might have a quite 
different view of PSB to policy-makers and academics was evidenced in 2016 by the public’s 
angry response to the BBC’s decision to close its recipes website, a decision it quickly 
changed following an outcry. While content such as recipes has been categorised as ‘soft’, 
not in keeping with the ‘core’ notions of PSB policy-makers insist on, this categorisation 
clearly does not match the value audiences place upon such material.316 
Throughout its history the BBC—and the concept of PSB as a whole—has often been 
criticised as ‘elitist and paternalistic’.317 Yet the inclusion of entertainment in PSB has instead 
often evidenced a much more inclusive, universal approach to public service which actively 
responds to how the public defines such services. While this submission has referred to 
comedy and cookery, it also acknowledges the broader conceptions of PSB and 
entertainment, and argues for the value of them, including programming such as quiz shows, 
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chat shows, popular factual, panel shows, reality television and so on. To exclude genres or 
particular kinds of programming from conceptions of PSB is to reinstate elitist, paternalistic 
notions of culture counter to the ideals of a public service. Similarly, to hierarchise some 
kinds of programming as more PSB than others is to engage in similarly elitist and 
paternalistic activity, and to impost a rarefied conception of PSB upon the public whom it is 
intended to serve. It therefore remains vital that while PSB continues to deliver ‘something 
for everyone, it also offers ‘everything for someone’. 
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DEBATING ‘DISTINCTIVENESS’: HOW USEFUL A CONCEPT IS IT IN 
MEASURING THE VALUE AND IMPACT OF THE BBC? 
Peter Goddard318 
 
Defining ‘Distinctiveness’ 
 
In the 2015 Green Paper produced for BBC Charter Review, the comparison between Strictly 
Come Dancing and The Voice represents the most obvious depiction of what ‘distinctiveness’ 
seems to mean.  In arguing that the BBC should be ‘providing distinctive programming 
across all genre types’ including entertainment, the Green Paper contrasts The Voice, as a 
bought-in format similar to ITV’s X-Factor, with Strictly ‘which was developed by the BBC 
in-house and then sold abroad’.319 Here then, ‘distinctiveness’ seems to support originality 
rather than imitativeness, with the added bonus that developing distinctive formats might 
attract international sales revenues for the BBC.  The Green Paper also reports the BBC’s 
own research into whether audiences find its programmes to be ‘fresh and new’ – perhaps an 
analogous, if rather vague, description of ‘distinctiveness.320  
The BBC’s own definition is different: ‘The test … should be that every BBC 
programme aspires to be the best in that genre’.321 It adds that distinctiveness should also be 
measured across services rather than just individual programmes and that each BBC service 
should be distinctive from one another (hence BBC director of content Charlotte Moore’s 
comments about the distinctiveness of BBC One as a service322).  Here distinctiveness seems 
to reflect a combination of quality (‘the best’) and public value.  This definition might 
embrace The Voice as well as Strictly, as long as both sought to be markedly superior to their 
commercial competitors.   
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[…] Despite its prominence in the Charter Review debate, it is interesting to note that 
the notion of distinctiveness is relatively new in regulatory terms.  The words ‘distinctive’ or 
‘distinctiveness’ do not appear at all in the 2007 Charter and only once (requiring the BBC to 
enrich ‘the cultural life of the UK through creative excellence in distinctive and original 
content’) in the accompanying Agreement.323 Phil Ramsey notes that ‘distinctive’ became one 
of Ofcom’s ‘PSB purposes and characteristics’ only as recently as 2014.324 It is only in 
relation to Channel 4 that ‘distinctiveness’ has a significant history. The 1980 Broadcasting 
Act required the IBA to ‘to give the Fourth Channel a distinctive character of its own’ and 
Channel 4 is still required to exhibit ‘a distinctive character’,325 but legislation has never 
defined this notion of ‘distinctiveness’ in further detail.  Here, indeed, the implication is that 
the Channel should be distinctive in relation to the remainder of British television.  In view of 
the radical changes undergone by British broadcasting since Channel 4’s foundation, this 
must mean that its distinctiveness is being measured against an ever-changing target, and the 
Channel has repeatedly modified its own interpretation of distinctiveness.326  
Even by this limited range of definitions then, distinctiveness can be taken to mean 
original rather than imitative, foregrounding quality and public value, anti-populist (which, 
note, is not the same as anti-popular), and different from other channels’ programming.  So, 
although these might all be worthy aspirations for a public service broadcaster, it appears that 
distinctiveness is a rather elastic term and at times a contradictory one.  These definitional 
problems show that it would be unwise for ‘distinctiveness’ to be employed too prescriptively 
in any future regulatory settlement.   
 
 
Applying ‘Distinctiveness’  
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When we attempt to apply this loose notion of distinctiveness to the future role of the BBC, 
several potential issues arise.  Most obviously, distinctiveness is subjective, rather like quality 
(with which it is linked in the Charter Review Green Paper327).  Most of us probably believe 
that we can recognise distinctiveness in television when we see it, but how could we prove or 
measure its existence?  Distinctiveness, then, is essentially an ambition rather than a 
determinate quality, although there may be merit in the BBC being held to its ambition to be 
distinctive by Ofcom and any other regulatory body to which it is subject. 
Another key point is to acknowledge that the BBC has much greater potential to 
produce distinctive programming because of its publicly-funded, not-for-profit model.  
Unlike most commercial broadcasters, it has no requirement to produce programming which 
aims for a commercial return, so meritorious programmes and programme types can be 
nursed until they find an audience.  This has largely been the basis for the globally-significant 
innovation in British television which supports the UK’s thriving production sectors and 
Britain’s remarkable position as the second most successful exporter of programmes and 
largest exporter of formats in the world.328 Arguably, many of the BBC’s most celebrated 
programmes of recent years, nationally and internationally, owe their success largely to the 
ability of this not-for profit model to develop distinctive programmes.  For example, Strictly 
and Doctor Who are based on BBC properties originating in the less competitive days of 
black and white television, Top Gear has been grown out of a conventional motoring 
magazine programme to become something unique, while The Great British Bake Off 
originated as a minority interest series with modest ratings.  None represented obvious 
candidates for commercial success, and the audiences for Top Gear and Bake Off were 
generated gradually by the BBC through years of relative invisibility when, presumably, they 
were supported because of their public value rather than any perception of commercial 
potential.  Today, however, these are among the most lucrative television properties in the 
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world due to programme or format sales or, in the case of Top Gear, both.  So, paradoxically, 
the very fact that the BBC represents a different, public service, model for television 
production, founded substantially on public value rather than merely profit, has been a key 
factor in its creation of such distinctive, marketable and popular programmes.  And, crucially 
for Britain, the BBC is creating such programmes whilst maintaining a focus on what Robin 
Foster calls ‘UK stories, topics and faces’.329 
So if the publicly-funded, not-for-profit model itself is a key source for the 
distinctiveness of the BBC’s programmes, what should happen when it generates 
programmes which become hyper-successful?  In Mark Oliver’s terms, Strictly, Doctor Who, 
Top Gear and Bake Off are surely passing from being ‘breakout hits’ to becoming the kinds 
of ‘long running schedule bankers’ which his report criticises.330  In effect, the BBC is being 
praised for its popular success in creating these distinctive ‘breakout hits’, but then lays itself 
open to criticism for a lack of distinctiveness if it continues to commission them.  This is 
where arguments about the BBC’s ‘market impact’ become particularly pernicious.  As noted 
above, one of its key strengths is its ability to create hugely popular and distinctive 
programmes and formats which commercial broadcasters without public service obligations 
would probably never consider commissioning.  Besides the public value that such 
programmes create, this represents a strong example of the BBC combatting market failure.  
But stealing audiences from commercial broadcasters for these same programmes is held by 
the BBC’s critics to be illegitimate in its impact on the profitability of the broadcasting 
market – something which the BBC should be prevented from doing.  This places the BBC in 
a nonsensical position and defies logic – ‘generate popularity from distinctive programming 
but don’t be too popular’. […] Given the success of such programmes, there are also sound 
commercial reasons why the BBC’s competitors may seek to imitate them, but it would be a 
perverse disincentive to innovation and distinctiveness if the fact that the BBC has made 
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them seem familiar is used as a reason to criticise the BBC for retaining such programmes in 
its schedule.   
The overriding issue here is the continuation of the BBC’s commitment to 
universality, serving all audiences including those seeking popular, mainstream 
programming.  The BBC’s ability to create programmes which are distinctive yet popular 
comes from the fact that it is a holistic broadcaster which appeals to all, rather than a minority 
broadcaster like PBS in the USA – often seen as an unpopular alternative.   
But while debates about distinctiveness and market impact arise out of the BBC’s 
competitive behaviour, they also embrace the BBC’s competitive scheduling.  With the rise 
of on-demand viewing, scheduling no longer has the hold on audiences that it once had.331  
Nevertheless, it seems likely that scheduling will remain significant in two important areas 
for the foreseeable future – as a ‘shop window’ for new programming, around which 
marketing activities can be focused, and at times of the week most associated with shared 
family viewing, notably Saturday night.  It is no coincidence that programmes such as Doctor 
Who and Strictly, along with The Voice, are part of the BBC’s Saturday night schedule. […] 
 
 
 
THE BBC: A RADICAL RETHINK 
Justin Schlosberg332 
 
Contrary to widespread expectations and fears, the government’s 2015 white paper on the 
future of the BBC333 preserved the BBC’s license fee for the foreseeable future. That came as 
welcome relief to those who feared a giant sell-off or switch to subscription funding, and an 
end to the BBC’s unique public service mandate as we know it. Though the door remains 
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open to these pathways in the future, public ownership and license fee funding seemed to 
have been temporarily secured. A much more worrying development, however, concerned 
proposed changes to the BBC’s governance and a system of appointments that threatened to 
encroach on the BBC’s editorial autonomy.  
What’s particularly striking about this development is that it pushes in the general 
direction of growing state control of public service media, spearheaded by countries like 
Hungary and Poland. A new media law that came into effect in Poland in 2016, for instance, 
consolidates the executive’s power of appointments in public broadcasters. It was one of the 
first legislative moves of the new government led by the right wing Law and Justice Party. As 
Reporters without Borders declared: ‘This new law, giving the government full powers to 
appoint and dismiss the heads of the public broadcast media, constitutes a flagrant violation 
of media freedom and pluralism’.334 
The BBC white paper for Charter Renewal proposed a new ‘unitary board’ of which 
the majority and most senior members would be appointed by government. For the first time 
in its history, such an approach threatened to give a direct government appointee overall 
editorial responsibility for all of the BBC’s output.  
What’s equally striking about this move, is that it flies in the face of what the 
government has long intimated was at the heart of its charter renewal agenda: to introduce a 
system of contestable funding to effectively break up the BBC and enable more local and 
more commercial providers to take a slice of the license fee. Understandably, that struck fear 
in the minds of those who rightly believe that the BBC must remain entirely in public hands 
and entirely not-for-profit. 
But defensive arguments against top-slicing tend to oppose any possibility of 
decentralisation in the BBC’s structure and governance, and assume that the BBC’s strength 
lies in its scale and unitary composition. This is assumed to provide a robust defence against 
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both government and market pressures, but there is more reason to think that the exact 
opposite is the case. A centralised and concentrated BBC is intrinsically more vulnerable to 
editorial pressures precisely because they can filter down the chain of governors, directors, 
managers and editors. If a government did seek to shape or control the BBC’s agenda, it 
would have a fare more difficult job if it had to contend with a network of editorially 
autonomous outlets than with a single command and control centre. 
Such a network need not involve any degree of privatisation or commercialisation. 
Indeed, a ‘networked’ BBC—provided it was structured in the right way—could also be more 
immune to market pressures that many believe have fostered homogenisation of the BBC’s 
news output and a growing dependency on a commercial-press led agenda.  
So what would such a networked structure look like? As it turns out, we don’t have to 
look much further than our own national doorstep for an example. The Nederlandse Publieke 
Omroep (NPO) in Holland has long been founded on just such a system that distributes 
airtime and resources among a network of affiliate and member-led broadcasting 
organisations. Holland was ranked the second freest media system in the world by Reporters 
without Borders in 2016335 and although it has faced recent cutbacks and consolidation, the 
NPO has proved relatively resilient to the pressures of digitisation. Like the BBC, it continues 
to demonstrate enduring public value, as reflected in the strength of its member-based 
affiliates and the reach of its online services.  
The bulk of channels and airtime assigned to NPO is shared among ten broadcasting 
associations. Eight of these function as audience cooperatives, with membership bases that 
reflect the diversity of interests and groups in Dutch society. The remaining two are ‘task-
based’ broadcasters specialising predominantly in news, current affairs and other factual 
programming. The NPO is charged with administering this network but does not have overall 
editorial responsibility for output.  
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With editorial autonomy thus enshrined into its structure, and accountability to 
audiences cemented by membership-driven governance, the NPO is intrinsically independent 
in a way that the BBC never has been, from its compromised reporting of the General Strike 
in 1926 to its infamous capitulation in the face of government flak over the Iraq War in 2003.   
If such an alternative sounds unthinkably radical, that only reflects how restricted the 
terms of public debate over the BBC’s future have become. Indeed, the very words ‘radical’ 
and ‘reform’ in the context of the BBC have been so co-opted that they seem to automatically 
signal cuts or closure rather than any kind of progressive enhancement of the BBC’s public 
service function.  
Of course there is always the danger that even consideration of a reconfigured BBC 
along networked lines – which could take any number of forms – could open a back door 
route to privatisation or top slicing. But if anything, the white paper on the future of the BBC 
took a step in the opposite direction and revealed its true hand: in spite of the rhetoric, a large 
scale, centralised BBC has always been more consonant with the interests of state-corporate 
power than it is in conflict, notwithstanding periodic headaches and crises engendered by a  
pesky journalist.  
Of course a much more outspoken critique focuses precisely on the BBC’s size 
and scale which is seen as the major threat to media plurality in the UK. From this 
perspective, the decline of newspapers threatens to erode any checks on the near 
monopoly status enjoyed by the BBC. Rather than worrying about the agenda influence 
of mainstream media in general, these arguments336  suggest that we should be 
concerned exclusively with the overarching reach and influence of the BBC. 
But how far does the BBC’s own news agenda reflect or align with that of its 
commercial competitors? When scholars at Cardiff University337 set out to investigate 
this question during the 2015 UK general election, they found that the BBC’s overall 
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issue-agenda appeared to have been consistently led by the predominantly right-wing 
national newspapers. The extent of this alignment was corroborated by other research 
conducted at Loughborough University338 and King’s College, London339 revealing a 
strong correlation between the range and rank order of issues covered by both television 
and the press, and one that did not fully accord with public priorities as demonstrated by 
monthly issue tracking polls. 
The important point this raises for the future of the BBC is twofold. First, if 
commercial press exercise a strong influence over the BBC’s political news coverage, it 
makes little sense to consider it a meaningful counterweight to the BBC’s dominance of news 
consumption. The evidence from the 2015 election suggests that if anything, the BBC 
amplified an agenda that was set largely by the commercial press. Second, and by the same 
token, we ought to be equally sceptical of suggestions that the BBC provides a substantive 
check on the more partisan editorial agenda of the commercial press.  
At a time when many public service broadcasters around the world are facing varying 
degrees of existential crises, public debate is all too often reduced to a choice between 
preservation or market-based reforms; with the latter usually amounting to cutbacks or 
closures. What’s left off the agenda is the possibility of radical democratic reform aimed at 
reconstituting the independence and accountability of public service media. The idea that a 
substantive section of any pluralistic media system needs to be in public hands is one that 
retains a great deal of force, in spite of the digital transition and corresponding end of channel 
scarcity. But the way in which public service broadcasters are structured, regulated and 
governed can have profound implications for independence in relation to both the state and 
market.  
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ENSURING THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF CITIZENS 
Voice of the Listener & Viewer340 
 
[…] The social and cultural purposes of television 
 
Many of the arguments which informed the current BBC Charter were developed in Building 
Public Value, the policy document which the BBC published prior to the last Charter 
renewal. The VLV believes that a vision where the benefits to the citizen are core to the 
mission of public service television is still valid today: 
 
The BBC’s founders believed that broadcasting could make the world a better place. 
Public intervention would ensure that its astonishing creative power – to enrich 
individuals with knowledge, culture and information about their world, to build more 
cohesive communities, to engage the people of the UK and the whole globe in a new 
conversation about who we are and where we are going – would be put to work to the 
sole benefit of the public.341 
 
VLV believes that public service television should be universally available, available to all 
free at the point of use, provide something for everyone, including impartial and accurate 
news and other high quality content for the benefit of the whole of UK society.  
Ofcom was established to ensure that the needs of the citizen and consumer are met. 
These needs may differ but both are equally important. The marketplace will tend to provide 
for the needs of consumers when there is a benefit to the provider. There may be less 
financial return from content which benefits the citizen.  
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The explosion of media platforms in the past decade has led to increased competition 
for viewers. VLV believes increased competition alongside deregulation of broadcasting has 
resulted in an increase in the volume of more popular genres and a reduction in the 
mainstream provision of UK specific content which benefits citizens (for example, UK 
culturally specific children’s content, current affairs, regional and religious content).  
Since the introduction of regulation limiting the type of advertising which can be placed 
around children’s programming, the investment of content for children on the commercial 
PSBs has dropped by 95%.342  
Despite the proliferation of channels since digital switchover, it is clear that the UK 
broadcasting sector faces market failure in some key public service genres. ‘Market failure’ 
refers to the fact that, whatever the number of providers in the market at any given time, the 
market may still fail the citizen if there isn’t a free to air provision of wide range of high 
quality, diverse and informative programming, especially in genres which may not be 
considered commercially attractive.  
The PSB system in the UK has existed up until now as a conscious democratic, social 
and cultural intervention in the market in order to achieve certain public value purposes: to 
enrich our lives with high quality engaging content which broadens our horizons, excites us 
and helps us cohere as a nation.   
VLV believes there is currently a balance provided by the existing UK PSB’s on free to air 
television which in most genres provides the public with such content. We would like this system to 
continue to be supported by a regulatory regime which encourages investment in a range of high 
quality public service content which is provided for the benefit of citizens as well as consumers. We 
do not believe that the viewing habits of individual consumers should drive public policy choices 
which may limit the provision of universal service, and thus the freedom of choice for all viewers. 
[…] 
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THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PURPOSES OF TELEVISION TODAY 
Equity343 
 
Introduction 
 
Television has a number of social and cultural purposes. Some of these are enshrined in 
legislation or regulation such as the remit of Channel 4, the regional production obligations to 
which all public service broadcasters are subject or the public purposes of the BBC, as well 
as the BBC’s overall mission to ‘educate, inform and entertain’. Equity supports these 
principles and duties and has been lobbying for their reform and extension to other 
commercial broadcasters. 
Equity believes that all UK broadcasters should have an obligation to contribute to the 
UK’s cultural diversity through investing in original content production. We have lobbied 
Ofcom to increase quotas for original and regional drama, comedy, entertainment and 
children’s programmes made in and about the UK, particularly with respect to Channel 3 and 
5 licensees. 
One of the social purposes of television should be to promote growth and employment 
opportunities across the creative industries. For some time Equity has been calling on 
broadcasters to produce more content in the Nations and Regions in order to draw on the 
skills and talents in these areas and we have urged Ofcom to reconsider its definition of 
regional/out of London production so as to include on screen talent. 
The creative industries and television and film in particular should provide good jobs 
and training for the UK’s strong base of highly skilled creative workers and performers. 
Equity has been lobbying, through the Charter Renewal process, for specific references to 
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best practice in employment, training and development both for in-house and independent 
producers to be included in the BBC’s public purposes. 
 
Changing Production, Consumption and Distribution Practices  
 
Equity has worked with all of the major UK broadcasters towards developing new platforms 
for content delivery and has consistently sought to ensure that content can be made available 
for use on these platforms when made under Equity collective agreements.   
The BBC led the way in terms of establishing the iplayer and Equity has been party to 
the launch of other such services through the negotiation of agreements with the BBC and 
other broadcasters for rights clearances. These agreements have contributed to the success of 
a multiplicity of digital services including 4od, ITV player and Sky Anytime. Crucially, these 
agreements provide a source of additional remuneration for performers in return for the 
exploitation of their work.  
Most recently Equity has achieved the first agreement with outside of the US for the 
engagement of our members and the reuse of their performances by Netflix. As more new 
delivery mechanisms and platforms emerge, suitable agreements must be concluded that 
recognise the rights of performers whose work is exploited across all channels and platforms.  
 
Funding and Regulation of Public Service Platforms  
 
In terms of funding, Equity continues to support the licence fee as the most appropriate 
funding method for the BBC however we have serious concerns about the most recent 
settlement, which was again concluded hastily with government without any input from 
licence fee payers or consultation with those who work for the BBC. The most pressing 
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concern in terms of future funding of the BBC is the new obligation to provide free licences 
for the over 75s. We believe this is inappropriate as it confers social policy responsibilities on 
to the BBC and is likely to lead to a significant shortfall in BBC funding post 2018, despite 
the government’s commitment to end top slicing for broadband rollout and the potential new 
income arising from the proposed closure of the catch up TV loophole. The projected 
shortfall in funding could be as much as £350m and this will inevitably lead to large scale job 
losses, content budget cuts and service closures.  
The government’s charter renewal consultation during 2015-16 also considered other 
funding options for the BBC including a household levy and introducing subscription based 
services. We believe the latter would undermine the BBC’s ability to provide a range of 
content to all audiences and could lead to the adoption of a much more commercial approach 
by the BBC. It is also likely that under this model niche services such as radio drama could 
become underfunded or unaffordable. 
BBC Worldwide is an important source of revenue which is re-invested in BBC 
production. This helps to keep the licence fee as low as possible. It exists to maximise profits 
for the BBC, but operates under the rules and principles outlined in BBC’s Charter and 
Agreement. This framework is important as it means that BBCW is independent of 
government, but supports the BBC’s public service mission and is accountable to licence fee 
payers. There should be no privatisation of any part of the BBC in the coming period and the 
BBC should instead be free to explore how it can maintain and expand investment in content 
via all income derived from commercial activities into programme-making. 
Equity does not support proposals to divert licence fee funds towards contestable 
budgets for other broadcasters or producers to create drama or children’s content. The BBC’s 
viewers have an expectation that licence fee funding goes predominantly towards the 
production of high quality programmes for the BBC. Currently this is the case and indeed 
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most UK drama production employing professional performers originates with the BBC and 
the independent producers who work with the BBC. […] 
The Electronic Programme Guide remains an important element in the funding of all 
PSBs. Prominence on the EPG remains a key benefit for PSBs and contributes towards their 
ability to invest in skills and content which provide the vast majority of job opportunities in 
the audiovisual sector for performers and other creative workers. 
Our members are very strongly in favour of a regulatory approach to public service 
broadcasting that can facilitate the continuation and an expansion in the production of 
original drama, comedy, entertainment and children’s programmes made in and about the 
UK. 
Without regulation which aims to support UK original content production, we fear 
that certain genres, particularly those for niche audiences, could disappear from our screens at 
an increasing rate. Ofcom’s objective must therefore be to seek to maintain and strengthen 
existing public service broadcasting commitments, so that UK audiences can continue to get 
high-quality original TV from a range of providers. […]   
 
 
 
 
Part Four: Public Service Television in an On-Demand World 
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TAKING THE PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA INTO THE DIGITAL 
ECOLOGY344 
Georgina Born 
 
We suggested in Chapter 3.2 of this book that the normative principles of public service 
media (PSM) have become more rather than less relevant, have expanded, and have gained a 
new urgency in the digital era. Here we set out a series of propositions focused on the ways 
that such principles find new expression in digital conditions. If the proponents of neoliberal 
economic thought argue that the digital economy is best served, and best understood, in terms 
of the dynamics of competition operating within free markets, then the oligopolistic 
tendencies that have become pronounced in the last decade, manifest in the dominance of a 
few key digital intermediaries and the rapid capacity to establish primacy in new digital 
markets, disprove such assumptions. This chapter therefore advances the need for public 
intervention in digital media markets on several levels, each of them important, each founded 
on and drawing legitimacy from the expanded normative principles set out in Chapter 3.2. 
 Given the evidence accruing in support of the wider need for such interventions––for 
example, as has recently been raised on the grounds of national security345––it is remarkable 
how little public debate has occurred about the desirability and the potential significance of 
public service interventions in the digital ecology. It is perhaps indicative that where such 
debates have occurred, it has been less in the global North than in the global South, where the 
severe and deepening economic, social and cultural disadvantages stemming from 
dependence on and lock-in by monopolistic commercial firms based in the North––whether 
with respect to hardware, software or social media––have, on occasion, become focal policy 
and legislative concerns.346  
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 Despite the success of the BBC iPlayer, DAB and Channel 4’s documentary platform 
4docs, then, it is curious how few sustained innovations exploiting the rich potentials of 
digital media have come from the core PSM institutions. In what follows we lay out several 
indicative ways in which new research directions, fuelling a new public debate, are urgently 
needed into the kinds of public service potentials that could be unleashed––in terms of 
animating digital media-supported cultural, informational, educational and artistic activities–
–by PSM interventions in the digital space. Our founding premise is simple: twenty years into 
the heyday of the internet, we have not yet started this debate, let alone conceived of its 
parameters and scope. 
 
Digital PSM, Boosting Diversity: Experimenting with Low-Budget and Niche Content 
 
A first avenue for PSM intervention centres on boosting the creative potential of 
participation, user-generated content, low-budget experimental production, niche markets and 
the ‘long tail’, and platforms designed to host and showcase these activities.347 The absence of 
such an intervention suggests a failure of imagination, of sustained R & D, or of institutional 
commitment – or of all three.  
 New normative thinking can help to combat this state of affairs, framing new 
challenges and imagining vital functions to be delivered by PSM. We therefore propose new 
linked principles: the obligation to animate participation and creative practices, and to curate 
and disseminate the results. In related vein, the BBC’s director general Tony Hall spoke in 
2015 of partnership as a new principle in the digital environment,348 and this was followed 
by a focus in the 2016 DCMS White Paper on the BBC on the imperative for the corporation 
to improve its partnerships with other organisations.349  
  
206 
 While we support partnership as a new principle, it is essential that this commitment 
should not be limited to the opening up of the BBC, and PSM more generally, to partnering 
only with established (and in some cases elite) cultural bodies like the Royal Opera House, 
the British Museum or the British Film Institute. Partnership must extend to local 
engagements with small-scale cultural organisations as well as amateur content producers and 
platform designers: they too must be invited to participate in the PSM ecology, answering 
also to the need for greater decentralisation and diversity in media and cultural production. It 
is this imperative that lies, in part, behind our commitment to creating a new fund for digital 
content providers that we discuss in Chapter 7 of the Puttnam report.  
 The spectrum of PSM-curated production and services should therefore range from 
fully professional to amateur and emerging practices: all matter today, and PSM in the digital 
era is about brokering participation and partnerships across this full spectrum. Emulating the 
long tail model by utilising the curatorial and distributive powers of public digital platforms 
will allow PSM to open out, and one productive effect will be to boost its key function of 
animating the 21st century creative economy. 
 We therefore advocate the synergistic powers of animation, participation, partnership 
and curation. Together, these principles will help to counter the current lack of engagement 
with the niche possibilities of the digital on the part of PSM. They will stimulate the 
production both of low budget and experimental content––film, documentary, reality, 
comedy, ideas- and game-based––and of innovative mainstream output and services, 
expanding the stream that feeds the discovery and throughput of new creative talent and 
enabling the curation of this content on public portals. Such exposure will offer the talent 
behind it higher profile, leveraging their entry into the creative economy as well as into the 
arts, cultural and educational sectors.  
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 In future, the PSM ecology must involve deep reflection about socially and culturally 
enriching digital interventions of this kind which are central to the realisation of PSM’s 
diversity principle – for they have the potential vastly to increase the diversity of voices 
composing the three-way public sphere set out in Chapter 2. At the same time, these 
interventions will encourage the growth of, and consolidate, local, regional and national 
production hubs, with the added potential to nurture new economic growth. These directions 
point to the prospect of opening up the category of public service content beyond PSM to a 
host of partners, including, potentially, to all publicly-funded providers of cultural and 
intellectual content. 
 
What Do We Want? From Commercial to Public Service Recommendation and Search 
Algorithms 
 
If a greatly enhanced content production sector is one result of applying public service 
principles to the digital ecology, a second avenue for PSM intervention concerns the potential 
radically to reshape existing markets in what have become entirely commercial, in some 
cases globally oligopolistic gatekeeping technologies: search engines and recommendation 
algorithms. The stakes are high: search engines amount to an infrastructure that powerfully 
shapes the everyday, incremental and cumulative progression of our information and 
knowledge practices; while recommendation algorithms amount to a hidden infrastructure 
that directs and forms nothing less than our cultural tastes.  
 Under the prevailing market impact discourse, obsessed as it is with short-term 
impacts on competitor revenues and profits, such interventions are almost unthinkable. But 
our argument is that if they derive from PSM’s evolving normative principles—of 
independence, universality, citizenship, quality (now extended to include innovation and risk-
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taking) and diversity—then such interventions in digital markets are justified. Indeed, the 
more pertinent question is why they have been ruled out. In principle, when designing digital 
interventions in the media ecology, PSM should meet the same criteria as PSB did before it: 
they are justified when they complement or raise the game of commercial services. 
 A first example of such an intervention consists in the development of what James 
Bennett has described as public service recommendation algorithms.350 The proposal rests on 
the PSM norms of universality of genre (mixed programming) and diversity. Current 
recommendation engines, including the BBC iPlayer, follow a logic of similarity—‘if you 
liked that, you might also like this’—in this way bringing us more of the same, or only slight 
variants. But is this really what PSM should do? In the broadcast era, the art of scheduling 
took audiences through different genres, exposing them to a mixed diet that opened up new 
experiences and perspectives: from comedy, to news, to drama, to current affairs. In the 
digital age, in contrast, recommendation engines play safe, enclosing audience tastes. Bennett 
asks: ‘What if a public service algorithm made… recommendations from left field, [opening] 
our horizons? If you liked Top Gear, here’s an environmental documentary, or Woman’s 
Hour. If you liked a music documentary, here’s a sitcom. Choice will remain [key]: but it 
should be genuine choice – to watch more of the same or to explore something new’.  
 To enable this alternative recommendation logic, PSM should in future take 
responsibility for researching, designing and hosting algorithms that systematically open up 
encounters with hitherto unknown culturally, socially or intellectually enriching and 
entertaining content. It might additionally be possible to give users the interactive opportunity 
to fine-tune the algorithms guiding the content brought to their attention, potentially 
generating a variable range of settings for individuals, offering them controls over the type 
and range of their encounters. Such recommendation algorithms would mark PSM services 
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out as utterly distinct from the dominant commercial offerings; they would work against the 
commercial enclosure of taste, exposing viewers to a greater breadth of content and diversity 
of voices and viewpoints, taking them beyond what they currently know – a core principle of 
PSB. 
 We would add two further points in support of this proposition: first, that the results 
of viewing, listening and interacting with content guided by commercial taste 
recommendation engines is to encourage an increasing individuation and narrowcasting in 
reception, with the recommendations invariably operating within a commercial ‘walled 
garden’ (e.g. Spotify, Netflix, Amazon). Such narrowcasting works against the 
commonalities of address proffered by PSM in its universalistic mode. Second, the 
commercial algorithms favouring such individuation are also intimately involved in the 
collection, storage and sale of personal data. This represents a grave assault on privacy, 
raising the question of why this dimension of the digital content economy has escaped 
regulatory intervention. The public service recommendation algorithms envisaged here would 
effectively offer citizens the means to avoid, and alternatives to, the burgeoning commercial 
market in personal data. 
 Similar arguments for complementing, reshaping and correcting existing market 
tendencies can be made for search algorithms. Currently, the rankings resulting from 
commercial search engines are guided by commercial principles. From the user’s point of 
view this is often unsatisfactory, because the content sought could be two or three pages in, 
but is trumped by pages that get more traffic. A search engine designed to resist this 
commercial logic and operate according to different, public service and public interest 
principles is likely to prove popular. It would get to the desired content directly and quickly 
regardless of traffic, and it would elevate the online profile of free, non-profit-derived or 
publicly-funded content. The editorial principles at stake, driving the search algorithm, would 
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be transparent and available for ongoing public debate, manifesting the accountability 
essential for such technologies operating at the core of the public knowledge ecology. 
 A complementary intervention would be to regulate commercially dominant search 
engines: adjusting the competition regime so that obligations are triggered by a certain share 
of market; regulating Google so that it presents public service options higher up its rankings; 
or creating ‘must carry’ rules and obligations that give due prominence to public service 
content, akin to the current EPG rules.351 
 These and other PSM interventions to optimise the design of recommendation and 
search algorithms in the public interest would require monitoring and analysis of directions 
being taken by commercial platforms, analysis of society’s changing goals and users’ 
evolving needs and wishes and, as mentioned, the implementation of robust systems of 
accountability. 
 
PSM as Enduring, Accountable Communications Infrastructure: A Digital Public 
Commons 
 
Similar arguments for PSM interventions in the digital media ecology that complement, 
correct and raise the game of commercial services can be made at the level of the very 
foundations of our communicative infrastructure. As Tony Ageh has put it: ‘We used to be 
broadcast beings. We are now internet beings. However with more and higher barriers to 
entry to the digital realm, we must work hard to ensure that nobody is stripped of the ability 
to be a citizen of the future’.352 
 Throughout its history the BBC has been not only a broadcaster and programme 
maker. It has also been a world-leading engineering organisation ‘pushing the boundaries on 
behalf of the population of the UK and the whole of the industry – 
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from manufacturers, to other “competing” broadcasters in both radio and television: sharing 
technologies to enable broadcasting to go further and faster; introducing standards for 
pictures, colour, clearer sound, teletext, and HD’.353 In the digital era, in the face of 
threatened commercial enclosures of the digital commons, the BBC’s historical functions of 
nurturing the next generation of publicly-oriented communications technologies must remain 
undimmed. For in a future media system that is delivered entirely over Internet Protocols 
(IP), we will discover that a series of earlier core guarantees delivered by the allocated public 
broadcasting spectrum––unlimited and secure universal access, free at the point of delivery, 
to a wide range of reliable and high quality content and services––are at serious risk.  
 Currently, there is no allocation of IP bandwidth for public access and discourse free 
of commercial and/or political oversight and imperative, equivalent to the analogue public 
spectrum. Moreover, the present situation is one in which commercial internet service 
providers enjoy almost complete control over the internet access of both individuals and 
public bodies, who are enjoined constantly to invest scarce resources in keeping up to date 
with rapidly obsolete hardware, software and operating systems. In many cases, obsolescence 
is built in as the underlying business model such that consumers, public organisations and 
governments need to pay commercial intermediaries, and keep on paying, simply to maintain 
ordinary ongoing functioning. Commercial IT operators are at liberty to proceed with these 
cyclical and unceasing financial demands on citizens and the public sector without due 
accountability. 
 In this light, three of the original characteristics of broadcasting that were 
fundamental to the vibrant democratic nature of the 20th century analogue media ecology are 
now in question: 
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• Anonymity: the capacity for anyone to watch or listen secure in the knowledge that they 
could not be overseen and the resulting intrusion on their privacy exploited for commercial or 
political ends, or to their disadvantage; 
• Unmetered consumption: there being no limit to the amount of broadcasting that could be 
accessed and enjoyed, or where, without additional charge or fees; 
• Secure and enduring consumption: the confidence to know that broadcast output could not be 
taken away, that access to receive all PSB output was guaranteed.  
 
In future, to support the principles set out here and in previous chapters, PSM should provide 
the foundations for a digital public commons that precludes the repeated creation of barriers 
to entry either by commercial gatekeepers or, potentially, by politicians. In view of the PSM 
principles of independence, universality, citizenship, quality and diversity, we here advance 
arguments for a radically new vision of the IP-based future: one centered on interventions to 
create public internet spaces devoted to universal access to services free at the point of use. 
This is a challenge that, given the engineering prowess of the BBC, is entirely feasible and in 
keeping with its historical role. As argued earlier, in an era of interactive media, of 
participation and partnership, it is not only access in terms of reception and use that are at 
stake, but rights of access to enable and foster dialogue, interactivity, collaboration, learning 
and creativity. 
 In order for PSM to deliver an enduring communications infrastructure equivalent to 
PSB’s analogue public space, it therefore needs to roll out and sustain the architecture of a 
digital public commons. This digital public commons would retain all the elements of its 
analogue precursor, but would also offer additional features and services that were previously 
impossible or unimaginable: 
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1. The digital public commons would guarantee access to a protected allocation of internet 
bandwidth for every citizen, at home and in key public places – just as frequencies within 
the broadcast spectrum were reserved for PSB. 
2. The digital public commons would not require a commercial broadband subscription, but 
would offer unmetered consumption free at the point of use to all, regardless of status or 
ability. It would be available anywhere in the UK, at any time, to anyone. 
3. The digital public commons would offer an ever-growing library of digitised media, 
content and assets owned and provided by our publicly-funded cultural and educational 
organisations: PSM, museums, arts organisations, libraries and archives, universities and 
other educational bodies, and government and public services. 
4. The digital public commons would offer innovative products and services that allow 
people to access, contribute to, interact and communicate with the public cultural, 
educational and government service sectors. 
5. In the digital public commons, citizens would be safe and secure to discover, use, create 
and share content and data without fear of loss or theft of their creative outputs and 
endeavours, or of the unintended exposure of their personal data. 
6. And finally, the digital public commons would not be subject to the threats posed by 
repeated and unaccountable commercial demands for the upgrading of notionally 
obsolete hardware, software and operating systems, and the consequent drain both on 
personal finances and on the public purse. These cycles would be replaced, in the digital 
commons, by justified and well-coordinated evolution of the public digital infrastructure, 
evolving only in the public interest.  
 
If we imagine that such a tally of objectives is foreign to the core purposes of PSB, then that 
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is mistaken, for these combined aims were, in fact, foreseen by and articulated in a 
foundational remit written into earlier versions of the BBC’s charter. The sixth public 
purpose for the BBC set out in the 2006 charter states: ‘(f) In promoting its other purposes, 
helping to deliver to the public the benefit of emerging communications technologies and 
services.’354 It is a matter of concern to us that this purpose has not been included in the 
BBC’s 2016 charter. 
 The proposals advanced in this chapter are designed to contribute to the conceptual 
work that is necessary, and that is lamentably overdue, to develop the capacities of the core 
PSM institutions to promote independence, universality, citizenship, quality and diversity in 
the digital ecology. A set of four additional, synergistic principles at the core of the digital 
media ecology have been identified: animation, participation, partnership and curation. 
Promoting both universality and diversity in PSM’s communicative, informational, cultural 
and educational practices online requires that citizens are enabled to access, participate, 
collaborate and create through their engagements with a digital public commons. These are 
goals that not only resist but roll back the consolidation of ‘private appropriations of a 
“public” space’, as well as the profoundly anti-democratic tendencies immanent in the 
internet’s unimpeded commercialization.355 Together, the proposals set out here materialise 
the transformation of citizens from consumers to ‘actors with heightened capacities for 
[cultural], political and technological activity’, offering new sites of public media, cultural, 
informational and political engagement.356 
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TELEVISION IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD: CONTENT, PLATFORMS 
AND CHANNELS357 
 
The Multichannel Revolution 
 
Perhaps the single most striking change in television over the past generation has been the 
proliferation of channels made possible since the 1980s by the new technologies of cable, 
satellite and digital compression. The four-channel analogue world of the 1980s has given 
way to a new digital landscape of hundreds of channels and the prospect of an online 
environment in which linear channels play a less significant role. This explosion of choice 
was facilitated by governments and regulators but it was consumer-led too; millions of 
households chose to pay for cable and satellite subscriptions, to adopt the free digital services 
Freeview and Freesat and to buy the Smart TV sets that ‘liberate’ them from the tyranny of 
the electronic programme guide. The process of digital switchover was completed by 2012 
without any significant hitches or public resistance.  
As a result of this transformation, the analogue legacy channels’ audience share has 
halved. In 1988, BBC1, BBC2, ITV and Channel 4 still accounted for 100% of viewing. Ten 
years later, with Channel 5 now launched as the fifth analogue channel, their combined 
audience share had fallen to 86%. By 2014, they had just 51% of viewing between them.358 
‘Multichannel’ services therefore now account for around half of all viewing, bringing new 
competition for advertising with them. ITV’s main channel has been perhaps the most 
spectacular casualty, its share down from 44% in 1990 to just 15% in 2014.359  
But the overall impact on the established broadcasters has not been as disastrous as 
sometimes predicted. They have retained their prominence, thanks to regulation that keeps 
them at the top of electronic programme guides. ITV may no longer dominate the landscape 
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in the same way, but it remains the UK’s most watched commercial channel and retains the 
commercial clout that comes with that. The old broadcasters have also adapted to the new 
world by developing new ‘families’ of channels. Taking those channels into account, the 
combined audience share of BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 still represents 72% of the 
total.360 Of the 20 most viewed channels in 2014, 17 belonged to these four broadcasters, with 
the five analogue legacy channels still the five most popular.361 
 
Sky and the Rise of Pay-TV 
 
The only true UK broadcasting powerhouse to arrive on the scene as a result of the 
multichannel revolution has been Sky. The main satellite TV distributor as well as the 
operator of a number of channels and a content producer, Sky is a player of real significance. 
Its reported revenues of £7.8 billion in 2015 were far greater than the BBC’s income of £4.8 
billion.362 
So much of Sky’s scale and success has been built on the back of its acquisition of 
sports rights, most importantly those to English Premier League football. It has been the main 
broadcaster of live Premier League football since the league’s creation in 1992. Live football 
above all else has driven the creation of a pay-TV market in the UK. 
Sky’s original business model relied on people taking up satellite TV subscriptions to 
watch content they could not get elsewhere. It grew faster than the cable industry, which was 
dogged by poor customer service and wasted time and energy on debt-fuelled consolidation 
and internecine competition before finally coalescing under the Virgin Media brand. Between 
them, Sky and Virgin now account for just over half of households with digital TV, a 
proportion that has not changed much in recent years.363  
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As the internet took off, Sky readied itself for the emerging on-demand world, 
developing the pioneering Sky Plus personal video recorder, moving into broadband 
provision, and more recently launching the ‘over-the-top’ service Now TV. Broadband 
technology has allowed telecoms companies such as BT and TalkTalk to enter the pay-TV 
market alongside Sky and Virgin. Despite vigorous competition – particularly from BT, 
which has challenged Sky on the all-important terrain of football rights – Sky remains by far 
the biggest beast in pay-TV. 
Sky’s success has not been entirely down to sport – its movie channels, at least 
initially, helped to drive up subscriber numbers. It has a strong news channel, which is the 
BBC’s main rival, and a well-regarded arts channel. The Sky One entertainment channel has 
invested strongly in production. In total its channels accounted for 8.2% of viewing in 
2014.364 But Sky has not played a part in the formal provision of public service broadcasting 
in the UK – nor has it been asked to. In fact, it has often had an antagonistic relationship with 
the older, more established broadcasters, particularly under the leadership of James Murdoch, 
who has now returned as the company’s chairman. Its relationship with Rupert Murdoch’s 
21st Century Fox media empire, which currently controls 39% of Sky, lies behind this 
somewhat feisty anti-incumbent attitude. 
Subscription revenues amounted to £6bn or 45% of overall TV industry revenues in 
2014.365 But despite the successful growth of pay-TV, the idea of free-to-air television has not 
been abandoned. Free, universal access to content is after all one of the cornerstones of the 
public service television model. Freeview, the terrestrial platform born out of the ashes of the 
failed ITV Digital, became a powerhouse brand that ultimately made the nationwide switch to 
digital possible. The very brand names Freeview and Freesat did much to cement the idea that 
at least some TV should remain free to air.  
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The Internet and the On-Demand Revolution 
 
Alongside the multichannel revolution and the growth of the pay-TV market, the internet has 
become a central feature of everyday life and its potential as a mechanism for the delivery of 
the kind of audiovisual content that has historically been regarded as broadcast material is 
only starting to be realised. Over the past decade, broadband connections have facilitated the 
viewing of video content over the internet, while internet-enabled tablets and smartphones 
have allowed consumers to watch TV ‘on the go’.  
The statistics are striking: broadband take-up increased from just 31% to 80% 
between 2005 and 2015. Some 61% of adults now use the internet on their mobile phones, 
three times as many as in 2009.366 More than half of adults using the internet say they use it to 
watch TV or videos, around two thirds of them doing so in the past week.367  
This rapid adoption of new technology has led to a significant growth in on-demand 
viewing, both in the home and on the go. Broadcasters have both responded to and driven 
demand for such viewing, by streaming content as it is broadcast and by launching catch-up 
services. The most successful of these has been the BBC iPlayer, which has evolved since its 
launch in 2007 as a simple catch-up service to become a more extensive on-demand platform. 
Broadcasters have also started to make online-only content as well as putting some 
programming online first before broadcasting it conventionally at a later date. BBC Three’s 
move online in 2016, while also a money-saving device, was a major step in this direction.  
It is worth noting that the habit of watching TV programmes at the viewer’s 
convenience, rather than when broadcast, predates the arrival of on-demand technology: 
video players have been a part of life for decades and time-shifted viewing through personal 
video recorders (PVRs) is a significant part of the picture today. DVD box-set viewing, 
which became a popular way for people to watch TV programmes at their leisure as vast 
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libraries of content both old and new were made available for the first time, has now been 
superseded by catch-up services and ‘over-the-top’ online subscription services such as 
Netflix that have built on an existing appetite for convenient consumption. 
The extent to which viewing habits have now shifted away from traditional 
broadcasting is hard to capture and leads to some strikingly different views about the pace of 
change. On one measure, only 69% of the total viewing of audiovisual material is through 
live TV.368 On another, such linear viewing still accounted for 85% of long-form audiovisual 
viewing in 2014.369 But even using the latter methodology, on-demand viewing (which 
includes catch-up services but not time-shifted viewing) is growing rapidly – from 2% in 
2010 to 6% in 2014 – with internet-connected ‘smart’ TV sets and tablets driving growth.370 
Similarly, even where the precise figures differ, the trend nevertheless remains the same: 
while Deloitte’s Media Consumer states that live TV viewing declined from 225 minutes a 
day in 2010 to 193 minutes in 2014, Thinkbox—using the same BARB source data—shows a 
slower decline, from 242 minutes to 221 minutes.371 The key point is that both show that 
audiences are turning away not from television per se but from linear viewing and towards 
multi-platform consumption. 
This is a widespread trend. Some 57% of adults surveyed in the second half of 2014 
said they had accessed at least one on-demand service in the past 12 months, up from 27% in 
the first half of 2010.372 The most popular service was the BBC iPlayer, used by 31% of 
people in 2014.373 BBC figures show that requests for television programmes through the 
iPlayer have quadrupled from 722 million in 2009 to 2.87 billion in 2015.374  
Alongside the catch-up services are the ‘over-the-top’ subscription services. 
Dominating this new space are the two US companies Netflix and Amazon, which now have 
significant ambitions in content production as well as distribution. The rapid success that 
Netflix in particular has enjoyed since it launched in the UK in 2012 is remarkable. It had 
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nearly 7 million subscribers – some 30% of households – by the beginning of 2017, up from 
2.8 million three years earlier, while Amazon Prime had 3.64 million.375  
But it is not just Netflix and Amazon driving the growth in on-demand viewing. 
Audiovisual material is now available from myriad sources. Vloggers like PewDiePie with 56 
million subscribers and Zoella with more than 12 million subscribers are evidence of the huge 
appetite for content produced a very long way from the studios of the public service 
television broadcasters. Newspaper websites are now able to produce video, and cultural 
institutions can also use the internet to film plays, events or exhibitions. Universities and 
other institutes of learning make lectures and seminars available online. New entrants in news 
provision are making a mark – the Vice website targeting a youth demographic, for example, 
has a digital audience of more than 5 million in the UK.376 These efforts may not always look 
like high-quality broadcasting output (though that would be hard to argue in the case of 
Vice), but they are competing for the time and attention of TV viewers and, according to 
short-form video specialists Maker Studios, are drastically expanding the very concept of 
‘content’ such that ‘consumption can now range from a 6-second Vine to a 10-season Netflix 
binge marathon.’377 
  These changes appear far more dramatic when the changing consumption patterns of 
younger people are examined in detail. Reported TV viewing of children between 4 and 15 
and adults between 16 and 34 declined by 30% between 2010 and 2015 as compared to the 
10% drop across the whole audience.378 Only 50% of 16-24-year-olds’ total audiovisual 
consumption is through live TV, compared with 69% for all age groups379 while two-thirds of 
their TV viewing is live as compared to 86% of those aged above 55.380  Some 47% of them 
have an on-demand subscription in the home, against 26% for all age groups.381 Only 10% of 
their viewing on Amazon and Netflix services is to BBC or ITV content.382 They are also 
increasingly watching short-form content on sites such as YouTube that accounted for 8% of 
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all their audiovisual viewing in 2014.383 These changing patterns of consumption are not 
confined to under-25s: there is evidence that 25-34-year-olds and even 35-44-year-olds are 
also watching material in different ways.384  
How fast these changes spread remains to be seen, and it is possible that younger 
people will adopt the habits of older generations as they age, perhaps preferring to watch live 
TV more as they go out less. But even if this happens—and there are strong reasons to doubt 
it—it is clear that the formal boundaries between broadcasting and the internet have already 
effectively collapsed. The trend towards on-demand viewing and the prospects of “post-
network television”385 point in one direction; it’s just a question of how fast the change 
occurs. 
This does not, however, presage the imminent decline of television as a form of 
popular communication but rather the gradual supplementing of live television with more 
complex modes of consumption. Indeed, it would be a mistake to equate the appetite for short 
form video amongst younger audiences with a rejection of long form video when, in reality, 
those audiences are enjoying both. The increasing popularity of YouTube, as one source of 
video, ‘no doubt poses a challenge for traditional broadcasters’ argue Enders Analysis. ‘But it 
is one that concerns the delivery of the content rather than the nature of the content itself – 
the production of which [comes]…from a position of experience.’386 Traditional content 
providers may have to up their game if they are to keep up with changing consumer 
preferences but they still retain brand familiarity, access to capital and a track record that 
suggests they are not likely to disappear anytime soon. 
 
The Arrival of the Americans  
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As we have seen, the arrival of Netflix and Amazon is potentially of huge significance in 
disrupting the UK broadcasting sector. They are the biggest names at the moment; others are 
likely to enter the market, and they are most likely to be US companies. The giants of the 
technology sector—Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Apple—are all American. Channel 5 is 
now owned by the US media corporation Viacom, while it is often predicted that ITV will 
ultimately be bought by a US company. Many of the largest ‘independent’ production 
companies in the UK are now US-owned. 
It is not parochialism to point this out. The preservation of a vibrant and dynamic 
British culture and industry, with all its national, regional and local variations, has long been 
one of the goals of public service television. The protection of UK-originated content and 
regional news is built into the quotas that are written into the broadcast licences of ITV, 
Channel 4 and Channel 5, for example. 
At the same time, we have to recognise the appeal of much American content. It is 
many years since the Financial Times’ television critic, Christopher Dunkley, warned of the 
dangers of ‘wall to wall Dallas’.387 Prime-time schedules are no longer reliant on US series 
being bought for transmission by UK networks and instead high-quality long-form television 
drama has been one of the great cultural phenomena of the past 15 years, from The Sopranos 
to Breaking Bad. The availability of DVD box-sets and the new culture of viewing them at 
leisure that has developed over the past 15 years has enabled viewers to sample much more 
adventurous US-originated content.  
The online subscription services of Netflix and Amazon have followed that pattern. 
When Netflix and Amazon’s customers were asked what programmes they watched on these 
services, 49% mentioned US programmes and series, more than the 37% who mentioned UK 
material. Some 31% said they watched the original programming now being produced by the 
distributors such as Netflix’s House of Cards or Amazon’s Transparent.388 British viewers’ 
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exposure to the highest quality US output has, however, arguably undermined the 
distinctiveness and primacy of British content and raised questions about whether Britain’s 
creative industry is really matching the standards reached by the US.  
 
What, Then, Is Television Today? 
 
Given all the changes as described above, it is necessary to consider what we even mean by 
television today. This report is using the term ‘public service television’ rather than the more 
traditional ‘public service broadcasting’. This formulation (which excludes radio from the 
discussion) makes sense in a world of increasing on-demand and time-shifted viewing. 
Broadcast channels remain with us, and account for a larger share of viewing than is often 
appreciated, but the trend is clear: on-demand viewing is growing and represents the future. 
Television does not simply mean broadcast material, or even material that was 
broadcast at some point and can also be accessed on an on-demand basis. For it to have 
relevance in this rapidly evolving marketplace, the idea must also cover content that is not 
necessarily broadcast in the traditional sense but is nevertheless produced for dissemination 
to a wide audience, either for free or for payment. Our definition of television in the UK 
would cover all professionally produced audiovisual content intended for a UK audience of 
significant scale. This means that the services provided by Netflix and Amazon as well as the 
digital channels run by Vice and YouTube need to be part of the discussion.  
Moreover, in a world of mixed media and hybrid audiovisual, text and graphics, we 
must also address the extent to which “television” should be extended to include the wider 
range of online content found across the internet, which might include short form videos and 
also a range of written material. Here we believe that a pragmatic approach should be taken – 
in some genres (news, for example), mixed media of this sort are increasingly an essential 
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part of what we think of as public service television. It would be wrong to curtail the 
expansion of PST into these areas if they are seen by users as the preferred means of 
accessing content. In other, such as drama, more traditional long form audiovisual content is 
likely to remain the primary focus. 
 
The Problem of Defining Public Service Television in an On-Demand Age 
 
While we can arrive at a definition of television, pinning down what public service television 
might mean today is a harder task. In Chapter 1 of the Puttnam report, we looked at how the 
Communications Act, BBC charter, and the broadcast licences for ITV, Channel 4 and 
Channel 5 have given some sort of a definition of public service broadcasting. But it is not a 
clear-cut or sufficient definition, and it predates the recent changes in technology, the 
marketplace and consumption habits that we have outlined. By prioritising broadcasters and 
channels over programmes, it leaves anomalies. How do we define news and arts 
programmes on Sky, for example? What about original, high-quality drama or documentaries 
on Netflix or Amazon? What about video items on the Guardian website, the National 
Theatre or the Tate that we discuss in Chapter 7? Are none of these examples of public 
service television? If they are, do they deserve some form of subsidy too? 
So clearly there is a problem defining public service television. The public are 
likewise not clear about what it is: research commissioned by Ofcom found serious gaps in 
public understanding. According to Ofcom, spontaneous awareness of public service 
broadcasting was low, and the public service broadcasters were losing some of their 
distinctiveness.389 It also found that viewers were more likely to distinguish between good 
and bad programmes rather than public service and non-public service broadcasting.390 
Viewers increasingly think in terms of programmes, not providers, which is a problem given 
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our habit of talking about public service broadcasters rather than public service 
programmes.391 Yet understanding what public service television is (or is not) in a digital 
environment will be key if we are to enhance the possibilities for its survival and expansion. 
In that context, we propose to enlarge the definition of public service television to include all 
those channels, services and programmes that are subject to regulatory commitments to serve 
the public interest. PST, we wish to emphasise once more, is not a matter of pure 
technological or economic compulsion but a purposeful intervention designed to embed 
public service objectives inside a changing television environment. 
  
NEW SOURCES OF PUBLIC SERVICE CONTENT392 
 
Public service content is no longer confined to the traditional public service broadcasting 
system. The conventional definition of public service broadcasting, as set out by the 2003 
Communications Act and understood by Ofcom, is everything produced by the BBC, and the 
programming undertaken by the main channels of ITV, Channel 4, and Channel 5 that fulfils 
the commitments of their broadcast licences.393 
But there is now much audiovisual material being produced outside these 
parameters—either broadcast or made available online—that shares many of the traditional 
features and aims of public service television. Some of this is provided by the many 
commercial operators that broadcast on multichannel platforms, such as Sky or Discovery, as 
well as by Local TV services; some of it is offered by the new on-demand services such as 
Netflix and Amazon; while some of it is being produced online by arts and cultural 
organisations such as the Tate or the National Theatre, and by many other bodies besides. 
Here we suggest how some of these new forms of public service content could be 
strengthened through a specific public intervention. 
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Public Service Content Outside the Television World394 
 
There has been a major shift in recent years in viewing habits, with more and more people 
watching material on-demand, not just through catch-up services such as the BBC iPlayer but 
also online. Greater broadband speeds have facilitated the viewing of audiovisual material 
through an internet connection. At the same time, the technical and financial barriers to 
making such content have fallen. Anyone with a smartphone can make a video. Alongside the 
amateurs, all sorts of professional organisations have embarked on making content. Video 
production and programme making skills are no longer the preserve of professional 
broadcasters or even of large production studios. Every newspaper, advertiser, campaigning 
group, agency, corporation and brand is now in the content creation game. 
So too are the UK’s many and diverse cultural institutions. Ranging from national 
organisations established in statute to diverse local, regional and charitable establishments, 
they could prove to be key contributors to a more plural, diverse and dynamic public service 
media landscape in the future. Many of these institutions, some of which long predate the 
broadcast era, exist to promote the kind of public service objectives that we have associated 
with British broadcasting since its emergence in the 1920s – stimulating knowledge and 
learning, reflecting UK cultural identity, and informing our understanding of the world. Many 
are active in genres that are currently perceived as at risk or failing in delivery on television – 
specialist factual, science, arts, children’s content. We are not just talking about metropolitan 
or national organisations; the network of local and regional museums, art galleries and 
charities is far more widespread, diverse and connected to communities than the outposts of 
our public service broadcasters.395  
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The technological developments of the past decade or so have given these institutions 
new digital tools to reach out to the public, and some of them have done remarkable things 
with audiovisual productions. When Benedict Cumberbatch stepped on to the stage of the 
Barbican as Hamlet in October 2015, there was a global audience of 225,000 people in 25 
countries, courtesy of the National Theatre’s NT Live service.396 Screenings of the play have 
gone on to make nearly £3 million for NT Live.397 The Tate now produces its own films and 
shares them with third parties such as the Guardian and the BBC. Its film series TateShots 
generated 1.9 million views in YouTube in 2014/15. A ‘live tour’ of its 2014 Matisse 
exhibition that was broadcast in cinemas worldwide won a Royal Television Society 
award.398  
In the past the distinction between television—narrative-driven, entertainment-
focused, universally available—and these collection-based institutions, locked into their 
geographically static buildings, may have seemed absolute. But in the past 20 years the 
distinction has become far less clear. Take Tate, perhaps the most sophisticated and confident 
brand in the cultural sphere, with a clear, definable mission: to increase the public’s 
understanding of art. This can be done through galleries and exhibitions, interpretation and 
education – but for 20 years now, core parts of Tate’s intellectual endeavour have been 
delivered through digital media. Tate has developed a knowledge and skills base that 
combines editorial and curatorial excellence and digital knowhow to develop what is 
probably the strongest global cultural brand around contemporary art.  
Our cultural institutions, both local and national, have deep specialist knowledge in 
areas that are core to public service content – whether it be science and technology, ecology 
and the natural world, cultural identity, history, or dramatic excellence. They also have the 
editorial knowledge, the assets, the audiences and the expertise to become significant public 
service content players in the digital world.   
  
228 
What they do not have, by and large, is the money to pursue this destiny. At the 
moment they operate on relatively modest budgets and are expected to generate much of their 
own revenue. Even our largest museums and galleries generally have operating revenues of 
below £100 million. The Tate, for example, had operating revenues of £92 million in 
2014/15, of which only about a third was grant-in-aid.399 As a performance company charging 
for tickets, the National Theatre generates an even higher proportion of its own revenues: out 
of its turnover of £118 million, only 15% (just under £18 million), comes from the Arts 
Council.400  
None of these organisations has dedicated funding to support digital content creation 
or engagement beyond the pursuit of their overall public service mission. Whilst initiatives in 
the 2000s did attempt to support the digitisation of collections and to pilot new services401, the 
galleries, museums and national performing companies have largely had to use their core 
funding, topped up with bids to the likes of the Heritage Lottery Fund, to develop their digital 
offerings.  
It seems highly likely that these organisations could do much more if they were 
released into the networked world with a fraction of the resources that we currently provide 
or safeguard for public service broadcasters. Our cultural institutions have shown they have 
the creative skills but that they are also in this for the long term. They have core missions that 
embody a commitment to specific areas of the public realm, with robust corporate 
governance and detailed statutory frameworks to back them up.402  
One potential way of getting more from these institutions might be to get them to 
partner with public service broadcasters. However, the track record of such partnerships up to 
now has not been good. Cultural institutions talk of projects primarily conducted to 
broadcasters’ priorities and timelines, their resources, knowledge and contacts being 
exploited, and their brand minimised. Contrast that experience to what the National Theatre 
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has achieved by going it alone with NT Live. Instead of partnering with a broadcaster, the 
National Theatre has solved the problems of new video production, distribution, rights and 
business models on its own and is now generating income to return to the core business – £6 
million last year, representing 5% of its revenues.403 Following its own creative and business 
judgement, it has also become a lead partner and platform provider for other organisations – 
the record-breaking Cumberbatch Hamlet was not a National Theatre production, for 
example. It is hard to imagine it would have achieved this level of creative and business 
success if, seven years ago, it had looked to go into partnership for televising plays with the 
BBC or Channel 4.  
Alongside the established cultural institutions, a huge amount of small-scale, 
grassroots content production is now taking place. While there are some initiatives, for 
example by Channel 4, to encourage some of this activity, we feel there needs to be a much 
larger support network and more significant funding to harness the creativity of new or 
marginalised voices who are squeezed out of the mainstream despite deserving wider 
attention.  
 
A New Fund for Public Service Content 
 
We believe that the time is ripe for making more of the public service content being 
developed outside the traditional broadcasting world—both by established institutions and at 
grassroots level—and to bring it more meaningfully within the sphere of television. The 
development of this content should not be regarded as a threat to the television model, 
whether through traditional linear broadcasting or by on-demand platforms, or as giving 
broadcasters an excuse to opt out of making programming in certain fields.  
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To take this step will require the injection of public money so that cultural institutions 
and other bodies from across the UK can bid to use such funds for making television. We 
suggest the updating of what is now a well-established idea: the creation of some kind of 
body that would distribute this public money – what has sometimes been called, perhaps 
unhelpfully, an Arts Council of the Airwaves. Variants of this idea have been proposed 
before404, but it may be that the right moment for it has finally arrived, now that the media 
landscape has been transformed by ubiquitous broadband, smartphones, and digital 
switchover.  
The government’s white paper on the future of the BBC did in fact bring the idea back 
into play. The white paper proposed a ‘public service content fund’ to operate as a three-year 
pilot (with grants first made in 2018/19), using money unallocated from the 2010 licence fee 
settlement. The proposal is somewhat sketchy but it is suggested that the scheme could fund 
children’s programmes or content targeted at underserved audiences such as BAME groups 
or audiences in the nations and regions.405 
We believe elements of this proposal make sense. But we do not believe that licence 
fee income (even if this, for now, is ‘old’ licence fee money rather than the top-slicing of new 
income) should be used to fund it: the licence fee should fund the BBC. We also believe that 
the proposed funding level of £20m a year is inadequate if a new fund is to make a 
meaningful contribution to the public service television landscape.  
We propose a new service for digital innovation: it could be called, for example, the 
DIG (standing for Digital Innovations Grants). This initiative would be financed by a levy on 
the revenues of the largest digital intermediaries (notably Google and Facebook) and 
potentially other sources including the four dominant broadband internet service providers in 
the UK (BT, Sky, Virgin and Talk Talk). All of these companies derive a huge amount of 
value from the distribution of existing public service content and we feel that it would be 
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entirely appropriate for them to make at least a small contribution to its continued existence. 
We estimate that a 1% levy on revenues generated within the UK would raise well in excess 
of £100 million a year, less than the annual budget of Channel 5 but more than that of BBC 
Three and BBC Four combined. 
In the course of our Inquiry, we heard recommendations to consider levies of this 
kind. The National Union of Journalists, for example, argued in its submission to us that there 
was a need to consider new sources of funding including levies and tax breaks to raise 
additional money for public service content.406 There is a long history of the use of levies—
for example, on recording equipment and blank media—in the European communications 
industries.407 More recently, we have seen a £50 million payment by Google to support the 
French culture industries as well as a new rule that forces video-on-demand operators to 
invest a proportion of their revenue in French cinema.408 A report for the thinktank 
ResPublica suggested a levy on the revenue of large digital news intermediaries to support a 
fund aimed at sustaining new forms of public interest journalism.409  
Furthermore, we believe that a levy would be popular with audiences. In a 2015 
YouGov poll, commissioned by the Media Reform Coalition, 51% of respondents said that 
they would support a levy on the revenue of social media and pay TV companies to fund new 
providers of investigative and local journalism, with only 9% disagreeing.410 We think that 
the support would be even higher with a remit to provide a wider array of public service 
content.  
Money awarded by the DIG fund would be disbursed via a new independent public 
media trust with a clear set of funding criteria, transparent procedures and an accountable 
system of appointments, as per our proposals for the BBC unitary board. The trust would also 
recognise the need for meaningful representation from all the nations of the UK.  
  
232 
The DIG would be open to any cultural institutions or bodies that wanted to produce 
public service audiovisual content and could provide evidence of their creative purpose and 
expertise. These applicants should not be wholly commercial operations; rather, they should 
have demonstrable public service objectives and purposes. It should not be for existing 
commercial broadcasters or production companies to subsidise their content production. The 
funding could, however, be used to work with partners of any kind, and these might include 
broadcasters or producers.  
In awarding grants, the fund would be mindful of the kind of programming that is not 
appearing on established channels or is under threat. It could fund local and investigative 
journalism, for instance, or education, science, history and other specialist factual content. It 
should look to innovation in form and content, to adopt a phrase from the original remit of 
Channel 4. In fact, we believe that this intervention could provide something of the 
energising quality that Channel 4’s launch gave the broadcasting world more than 30 years 
ago. This would be a Channel 4 moment geared to digital convergence and the networked 
world of today. 
It is crucial that all of the content created with DIG funding is made widely available 
and easily discoverable on all interfaces. Any organisation applying to the DIG would need to 
provide a distribution and access plan as part of its application for funding, and this would be 
treated with as much importance as the content of the proposal. We do not believe that DIG 
content should be tied to a particular platform, while developing a standalone app and brand 
implies a big overhead in technology and marketing. Applicants for funding may already 
have their own channels (and brands) with significant audience reach and traction, so DIG 
funding should not preclude them from strengthening their own public service objectives. 
We propose, therefore, that the DIG would create partnerships and framework 
agreements with the public service broadcasters and other platform owners to promote and 
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distribute DIG-funded content with appropriate branding and acknowledgement. At the heart 
of this arrangement would be distribution agreements with the BBC and Channel 4 for access 
to and promotion on the BBC iPlayer and All4 platforms, which would detail the appropriate 
editorial presentation and curation of DIG-funded content. The DIG would be expected to 
make other agreements with other partners that would maximise the prominence, findability 
and reach of the content it funded.  
DIG funding would not be limited solely to linear video content and would include 
other digital content, applications and mobile and online experiences that met its 
objectives. Applicants would be expected to use their own digital channels and those of 
partners to maximise prominence and access to this content.  
Qualifying applicants for DIG funding would retain all the intellectual property of 
their output and retain editorial and contextual control of the content once funded. Applicants 
would be expected to hold discussions with distribution and funding partners prior to making 
their application to create both a funding proposal and a distribution and access plan. The 
DIG would not necessarily be the sole funder, nor would distribution partners be limited to 
those with which the DIG has a framework agreement. We believe that the work of such a 
fund would help to transform and revitalize the relevance of public service content for UK 
audiences. 
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DESIGNING A NEW MODEL OF PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION (PST) 
Robin Foster411 
 
[…] I believe that some of the main building blocks of a new model for PST for the future 
can be identified.  
First, although some suggest otherwise, there is still a significant future role for PST. 
A strong case can be made for a substantial, not just a marginal, intervention in the market. 
And that intervention should include content across all the purposes of PST identified in this 
paper: information, knowledge, and culture. Without PST investment, there would be fewer 
UK programmes available, and arguably less editorial innovation and risk taking. Shared 
experiences should continue to be an important part of PST, via the broadcast of major events 
but also through the creation of landmark popular programming. 
However, reaffirmation of the need for a broad range of public service content should 
not be seen as underwriting ever-rising funding or as a licence for PS providers to produce 
just any type of content to attract viewers. While the case for PST’s central role in the 
provision of impartial, independent and in-depth journalism is strong, PST news output will 
only be of value to audiences if it changes to reflect the opportunities presented by new media 
to better serve its users. While knowledge building remains a key role, PST must adapt to 
reflect the new market environment in which it operates, working with the many other expert 
resources available online. While drama, comedy and entertainment should remain part of the 
PST mix, there needs to be a renewed search for ambition and distinctiveness – not just 
across any particular service, but for each piece of content commissioned.  
PST’s future involvement in some types of content should be scrutinised carefully – 
for example, questions could be asked about the justification for PST investment in some of 
the more derivative types of lifestyle and light entertainment programming or online content. 
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And programme volumes in some areas could be reduced, reflecting increased availability of 
high quality content elsewhere. 
 While long-form TV programming will remain at the heart of PST, whether on linear 
channels or (see below) on-demand, the concept of ‘television’ needs to be broadened to 
reflect new opportunities presented by digital media. TV news already benefits from the 
increased convenience and depth offered by online.  Having invested in public service 
newsgathering, it is in the public interest to ensure that audiences can access that resource via 
a range of different electronic media. Likewise, other genres can be enhanced by an extra 
online dimension and, in some cases online will largely replace conventional broadcast TV. 
PST purposes will endure, but the precise format and nature of content should be flexible 
enough to change over time to meet audience expectations. 
 For long-form programming, PST should pro-actively rebalance its portfolio of 
services away from linear broadcasting channels to on-demand, leading audience behaviour 
not just responding to it. The advantages of on-demand will include: 
• A longer shelf life  for programmes  which increases the chances of each piece of 
content being watched 
• Improved reach among those audiences who are turning away from linear channels 
• Potential to unlock access to the rich and varied programme archive 
• Cost-effectiveness as, freed from the demands of a 24 hour schedule, less ”filler” 
content needs to be made. 
Quite soon, the ideal PST portfolio might well consist of one or at most two “premier” 
broadcast channels alongside a widening on-demand proposition. The main channels would 
be the home of live TV and appointment to view programming, while playing a key role in 
promoting other services and launching new programming. 
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In parallel, key PST services should be designed to work well with new devices such as 
smartphones and tablets.  It would be anachronistic to restrict PST to conventional broadcast 
delivery when the audiences who pay for it demand access via new platforms. Universality, 
in this world, should conceptually encompass platforms which are or seem likely to become 
mainstream methods of consumption, although the marginal benefits of extending access to 
such platforms need to be balanced against the costs of so doing. 
 In this new model, should we focus on the BBC, or encourage a new more plural 
system, perhaps through some form of contestable funding? Although contestable funding 
has many attractions, including testing the market for innovation and efficiency, it also faces 
significant practical problems in implementation, well-rehearsed elsewhere. At a time when 
PST funding is under pressure, and the commercial market is volatile, it would be counter-
productive to tear up the current system completely and start again. A better approach would 
be to re-cast the way the BBC operates and is held to account, with more internal plurality of 
commissioning and production, and a greater diversity of programming sources used.  
Over the next decade and beyond one might envisage the BBC as a new type of PST 
institution which is more open, diverse, and devolved in its approach to commissioning, 
production and distribution, and one which engages more actively and openly with content 
producers whoever they are – individuals, other institutions or commercial suppliers. Rather 
than simply commissioning individual programmes or series from external suppliers, this 
BBC might contract a completely new service from an external provider. Instead of one 
centralised editorial function for news, a number of independent and diverse news centres 
might be established to introduce more internal plurality. Local online services could be 
tendered from other local news sources, rather than set up inside the BBC – and so on. 
 In parallel with this development, the BBC would be asked to place more emphasis on 
expert curation of diverse content sources.  Audiences increasingly need help to find and 
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navigate their way to interesting content.  This is particularly the case for on-demand 
programming and content on the internet. It is a non-trivial task to do this well, especially in a 
world where search and sharing are dominated by major US corporations like Google and 
Facebook, backed by huge investment and R&D budgets. If it is to be of value, this almost 
certainly requires special executive commitment and substantial new investment to make it 
happen. Government can help, too, by ensuring that the regulatory framework is updated to 
secure continuing prominence for PST content on major on-demand gateways (not just the 
main broadcast EPGs).  
 Given the risk that audiences increasingly lose touch with PST, another key building 
block should be to increase the connection between licence payers and the BBC, with the aim 
of enhancing a sense of real public ownership of PST and its accountability to audiences. At 
present, the licence fee is in effect a tax paid by anyone owning a TV receiver.  In future, it 
would make more sense to link the payment explicitly to the provision of BBC services, and 
use the licence fee contract to build a mutually reinforcing relationship between the BBC and 
its users.  Many commercial companies now encourage their customers to join loyalty 
schemes which provide benefits to users in return for frequent purchases and information 
given to the company.  Likewise, many charities operate like membership clubs, in which 
donors are made to feel part of the organisation and have a say in its operations (through 
annual meetings, voting rights etc.).  
There is huge potential for the BBC to borrow the best of these ideas and create a 
membership or even shareholding scheme for all licence payers, which would ideally help 
create a closer relationship between the institution and its beneficiaries. Rather than inventing 
another version of the BBC Trust to “represent” the licence payer, this would have the effect 
of directly involving licence payers without an intermediary appointed from among the ranks 
of the great and the good. 
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Based on the admittedly impressionistic analysis of the previous section, there seems 
little evidence that PST in the UK is significantly under-funded at present. In any event, 
whatever the real funding needs for PST, given the likely economic outlook for the next 
decade, uncertainties about public support for the licence fee, and the arguments over 
decriminalisation, it seems unlikely that there will be much potential in future for any 
significant real increase in the amount of public funding available for PST beyond the current 
settlement. 
For this reason, and also because it is in many ways unhealthy for an institution to 
rely solely on guaranteed public funding, there is a good case for introducing some elements 
of voluntary funding into the mix over the next decade. Alongside the core licence fee, users 
of some of the BBC’s peripheral services could be expected to pay for access to those 
services.  For example, it would be possible for access to the iPlayer via mobile devices and 
PCs to be encrypted, and made available only on payment of a small annual charge.  All BBC 
content would remain universally available, free to air, on the broadcast channels, but added 
convenience would be available for a modest fee.  Alternatively, any BBC membership 
scheme could have different levels attached to it – again with a comprehensive basic level, 
but some higher levels for enhanced services. 
The trade-off obviously is between creating some financial upside for the BBC, and 
retaining absolute universality for all. It does not seem unrealistic for such choices to be made 
in the interest of enhancing overall investment in content while retaining an affordable core 
fee. 
 Last but not least, the importance of a competitive UK commercial sector must be 
recognised. The focus of my submission has been on PST provision, and largely on publicly 
funded provision. However, UK PST has only been so effective to date because it has 
operated successfully in a wider commercial market (part of which was also regulated). The 
  
239 
obligations imposed on the commercial PST sector are now more limited, than before.  
Existing commercial PSBs like ITV and Five now have a key role to play in helping drive 
commercial market developments rather than in the delivery of narrowly defined public 
service goals, although their significance as alternative news providers should not be ignored. 
More widely, open markets, with their decentralised decision-making, free exchange, scope 
for trial and error, and speedy ability to exploit technological change, will in future have a 
key role to play in delivering high quality programming to audiences and in doing so 
supplementing the effects of PST investment. […]   
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PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING AS A DIGITAL COMMONS 
Graham Murdock412 
 
A swelling chorus of commentary claiming that because in the age of the smart phone and the 
tablet anyone can access whatever they want, whenever they want, there is no longer any 
need for publicly funded institutions that offer a comprehensive service. The version of this 
argument put by Martin le Jeune, former head of public affairs at Sky, is typical. 
 
Judged from the point of view of the consumer… broadcasting is in a very healthy 
state. There is a good deal more choice for people; they have more ways to access 
good content…If the market is providing more, the state (through direct and indirect 
intervention) could and should do less.413 [italics in the original] 
 
In common with a number of critics he sees public service organisations continuing to 
have a role but a much more restricted one:  
 
tightly focused on delivering what the market cannot do, or does only to  a limited 
extent. That might indicate a smaller but rather more intellectually distinguished 
corporation: impartial news and current affairs, factual and documentary 
programming, children’s television, classical music, speech radio – and little more.414  
 
This projected future enjoys continuing currency. It features prominently in the 
consultative green paper issued by the British government in July 2015 inviting responses to 
a series of questions over the BBC’s future role and organisation, in the lead up to the 
renewal of its governing Charter. Among the key questions put is whether ‘[g]iven the vast 
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choice that audiences now have there is an argument that the BBC might become more 
focused on a narrower, core set of services.’415  
There is no matching question asking for comments on possible directions for further 
expansion. In a communications environment increasingly organised around digital networks 
however, there is a compelling case for extending the BBC’s public service remit. There are 
three reasons for this. 
Firstly, successive cuts to public expenditure have seen a major contraction in the 
public information and cultural facilities previously available in local communities. Public 
recreational spaces have been sold. Libraries and museums have closed, reduced their 
opening hours, or have only been kept open by volunteers. These cuts render the maintenance 
of PSB as a comprehensive cultural and informational resource open to all and free at the 
point of use more essential than ever. 
Secondly, this is particularly true of households on low incomes. Despite repeated 
claims that smart phones and tablets have brought the internet within the reach of ‘everyone’ 
research reveals persistent patterns of exclusion by age and class. Recent British figures, 
show that the elderly and the poor are least likely own a tablet or smart phone. In 2015, 90% 
of young people aged 16-24 owned a smart phone compared to only 18% of those aged 65 
and over.416 At a time of widening income gaps and cuts in welfare budgets they are also the 
group most likely to have difficulty meeting the subscription costs for commercial cable and 
satellite services. For them, PSB is likely to remain their major, and for some, their only, 
point of access to a diverse range of cultural and information resources which suggests that 
maintaining a comprehensive publicly funded service, free at the point of use, remains a 
policy priority.  
Thirdly, users accessing commercially provided ‘free’ digital facilities now encounter 
a system where the most popular on-line activities are dominated by a handful of mega 
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corporations—Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Apple—all based outside the UK and 
generating profits by harvesting and selling users’ personal data. In a speech in 2016, the 
former president of the European parliament, Martin Schulz, characterised the power of these 
digital giants as totalitarian, arguing that the decisions now being taken behind closed doors 
were constructing a future without public consultation in which corporate priorities take 
primacy over the public interest.  
 
Facebook, Google, Alibaba Amazon: these companies must not be allowed to shape 
the new world order. They have no mandate to do so! It is and must remain the proper 
task of the democratically elected representatives of the people to agree on rules and 
enshrime them in laws.417   
 
In the UK the BBC offers the only effective institutional base for a comprehensive alternative 
to this corporate annexation of the internet. It currently operates one of the UK’s most 
popular web sites, with a unique audience of 40 million, placing it third behind Google (with 
46 million) and Facebook (with 41 million). Sky, the only other UK broadcaster to make the 
top ten, attracted only 28 million.418   
I have previously argued that PSB institutions should take full advantage of the 
internet’s networking and participatory potentials to become pivotal hubs in the public 
provision of on line resources.419 In the decade since then, this idea has steadily gained 
momentum. […] A variant of this idea has now been incorporated into the Corporation’s 
formal policy proposals outlined into its 2015 manifesto for change, British, Bold and 
Creative. This imagines an ‘Ideas Service’ with the BBC providing a platform for 
collaboration that  
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would bring together what the BBC does across arts, culture, science, history and 
ideas and add to it work done by many of this country’s most respected arts, culture 
and intellectual institutions... for curious audiences around the world, the BBC would 
create and manage an online platform that, working with partners, would provide the 
gold standard in accuracy, breadth, depth, debate and revelation. It would offer 
audiences the thrill of discovery and the reassurance of reliability.420  
 
This initiative would aggregate content from multiple sources, working across broadcast and 
on line, providing audiences with content to share, curate and mutate, and encourage 
participation in citizen science and other collective projects. As the document concedes 
however, implementing this vision remains a work in progress, an ambition rather than an 
accomplishment. 
The labels may be different—‘digital commons’, ‘public space’, ‘ideas service’—but 
they are informed by the same basic ambition of deploying the centrality of broadcasting in 
everyday life to construct and coordinate a public digital network that reinvents the cultural 
commons for contemporary conditions, grounded in the core commons values of shared 
access and collaborative activity.  
This aim has animated a range of recent BBC initiatives, from the Listening Project, 
in partnership with the British Library, to the collaboration with the LSE on a major survey of 
contemporary social class and the recent Global Philosopher exercise in generating 
transnational debate on public issues. But a comprehensive effort to build a digital commons 
that utilizes the full range of platforms—broadcast, podcast, website—needs to tackle a series 
of issues that have not so far been given the attention they require. 
 
Infrastructures  
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Given the escalating climate crisis it is imperative that any plan to utilize digital systems 
more extensively addresses the ecological impact of the infrastructures and machineries 
involved. Cloud storage for example consumes very significant amounts of energy. 
Proposal: The BBC’s purchasing polices for operating equipment and infrastructure 
should impose stringent requirements on suppliers to meet specified environmental thresholds 
on the procurement of raw materials and the ecological impact of production practices. 
Subsequent use should also be subject to strict rules on energy consumption and disposal. 
Proposal: suppliers should also be subject to strict requirements on conditions of 
work and minimum levels of pay at every stage of the production and distribution process. 
 
Software  
 
Proposal: The BBC should support the open source movement by using non- 
commercial operating systems and software wherever possible.  
Proposal: The Corporation should take the lead in developing a public search engine 
as an alternative to commercial search engines, allowing users to locate material according to 
its veracity and social value rather than its popularity. 
 
Participation 
 
A properly inclusive digital commons needs to mobilise participation from the widest 
possible range of sources. It reaches beyond the major public cultural institutions-libraries, 
museums, theatres, archives, universities, concert halls-to include the dense networks of 
voluntary community and freelance initiatives.  
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Proposal: That the commercial internet companies be charged a fee for their 
proprietary use of users’ personal data and that the money raised be placed in a fund for the 
production of new digital cultural resources to be added to and accessed through the 
broadcast commons. These might include: subsidies to local associations wanting to digitalise 
their archives; grants to teachers developing new educational materials; support for 
investigative research on key public issues; support for crowdsourced proposals in areas of 
citizen science. 
 
Internationalization 
 
Public cultural institutions across the world are now in the process of digitalizing their 
holdings offering an unprecedented opportunity to construct a global on-line resource. The 
Europeana project, although still in its early stages, demonstrates the immense gains from 
transnational co-operation. At a time of exacerbated divisions and animosities facilitating 
access to materials that illuminate events and situations from within contrasted experiences 
and perspectives is a priority.   
Proposal: The BBC should take the leading role in developing networking 
arrangements with cultural institutions outside the UK and in enabling users to search for and 
find relevant material across the full range of available international sources through the 
public search engine. 
 
[…] For reasons I have outlined, the BBC is the institution best placed to coordinate and 
build on this ambition, incorporating the ‘public’ as active contributors as well as consumers.  
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‘PUBLIC SERVICE’ IN A GLOBALIZED DIGITAL LANDSCAPE 
Ingrid Volkmer421 
 
National public service media in Britain as well as in other European countries are in the 
process of transformation. Current industry debates and scholarly approaches are 
focusing on the complex practicalities of the convergence, from the ‘logic’ of 
broadcasting to the ‘logic’ of the dynamics of the advanced digital ecology. Of course 
there are nuances within both discussions, however, overall, it can be argued that both see 
the transformation as mainly associated with new strategic imperatives such as the 
production of multi-screen content formats, the embeddedness of interactive content 
components, the creation of sites for non linear ‘catch up’ content archives (keyword: 
‘iPlayer’) and linkages with shared platforms of social mediascapes.  
It is also argued that in order to maintain a national centrality of public service 
media, innovative combinations of ‘linear’ and ‘online only’ content genres are required 
to target the emerging divide of generational specific communication practices. While 
these are important issues in the lens of public service broadcasters, we need to begin the 
debate of ‘bigger’ questions to identify the requirements of national public service media 
in the new discursive scopes of public ‘civic’ communication. In other words, it is 
necessary to begin to assess public service as no longer being only in the normative 
national parameter of territorial ‘boundedness’, but as a much needed civic space within 
today’s sphere of globalized public communication.  
The term ‘public service’ originates from the time of terrestrial national 
broadcasting of the early radio days in the 1920’s. The national boundedness is to a large 
extent related to the limitations of antenna reach in the early broadcasting era. In addition, 
the notion of ‘public’ service is also rooted in the Habermasian public sphere model of 
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deliberation among citizens as the key component of national public spheres. However, 
both paradigms  are—strictly speaking—no longer sufficient for assessing the public 
‘service’ in today’s non-national, non-territorial connected publics. We live in the age of 
multi-directional discourse spheres of globalized ‘threads’ that are dis-embedded from 
territorial ‘boundedness’. Furthermore, our communicative world is no longer divided 
into ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ communication, or a sphere of inter- or even trans-national 
communicative ‘extensions’. […] Although nation-states will not disappear, national 
public communicative space is—whether we like it or not—already increasingly 
disembedded from national territory, seamlessly streamed between servers and screens, 
shared by peer-to-peer networks, especially among young generations. They understand 
communicative spheres no longer as territorial but rather as subjective spatial 
configurations, as their personalized micro-network. We also need to realize that this 
communication sphere seamlessly amalgamates modern nation states as well as other 
society types, involving so called ‘failed’ states and authoritarian states. Debates about 
public service media have to acknowledge these fundamentally shifting axes of 
communication flows - where national public service is only one ‘node’ among many - to 
identify a new role for public service communication in such a sphere 
However, it is surprising that the severe paradigmatic consequences of these 
spheres of civic communication are rarely surfacing in debates of public service media. In 
fact, globalized public spheres have rarely been addressed in debates of the public remit. 
For example, even satellite communication which can be considered as a first important 
phase of the emerging globalized communication landscape which targeted specifically 
European countries in the early nineties has – also in scholarly debates - not been 
incorporated into the paradigmatic debate of public service media in the 1990s. Instead, 
debates of satellite communication have mainly centered upon the launch of public 
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service satellite channels, such as Euronews and ARTE (a bilateral German/French 
channel). However, the enlarged communication sphere, enabled by satellite footprints 
has not led to a revision of public service terrains. It is interesting to note that satellite 
communication remained on the periphery in the assessment of national public spheres 
despite the fact that thousands of radio and television channels in multiple languages, 
ranging from Ukrainian, Russian, Portuguese, French, Arabic, to Chinese, Albanian, 
Croatian, Korean and to English, simultaneously accessible in Europe as well as North 
Africa and the Middle East and have created a shared communication universe across 
these regions. Despite the reality of multi-cultural societies in European countries, and 
despite such a new dynamic of civic communication, public service media remained to a 
large degree embedded in a normatively defined national public sphere.  
The need to at least question the normative alignment to national imperatives is 
now even more important. At a time where commercial corporations, such as Google and 
Facebook constitute worldwide monopolies as new types of content provider and 
producer of new civic communication landscapes, we need to more fundamentally debate 
new terrains of ‘public service’. These multilevel networks no longer operate in the realm 
of content and ‘information’ but—one could argue—provide ‘public service’ knowledge 
in completely new areas - from ‘web search’, to virtual libraries to new areas of public 
service, such as navigation. 
In addition, today’s transnational terrain public ‘reasoning’ is situated within, and 
magnified through, a transnationally available spectrum of choices, loyalties and political 
alliances. Not only is it possible to engage with digital activism from almost anywhere 
with Internet access but this spectrum has become more ‘horizontally’ subtle: I can live in 
Australia, vote in Germany, follow by the minute on news resources from the US, watch 
streaming television from Kenya and engage in ‘live’ debates about saving the Amazon 
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rain forest with NGO’s in South America. These are the new geographies of public 
‘horizons’ which are—and this is important to realize—no longer central to the 
democratic nation-state and also no longer central to other societies! It is a shift towards a 
subjective axis determining and selecting engagement in a globalized interdependent 
public debate of chosen networked formations which has implications for deliberation 
and legitimacy—again—in a geographically ‘horizontal’ spectrum. In a way it is the new 
calibration of ‘polis’ and ‘demos’; my vote contributes to the election outcome in 
Germany, I take on roles in climate change communities in Australia which are no longer 
informed by local knowledge or the climate change agenda of national media or but 
rather by subjective public horizons. […]  
  Based on this discussion, it is not surprising that the BBC’s public remit is still 
embedded in a bounded conception of the nation. For example one aim of the BBC’s 
remit is to sustain citizenship and civil society. However, given today’s networked 
structures of communication, citizenship is also perceived as global citizenship, for 
example, vis-a-vis worldwide risks and conflicts and—in consequence—relates not only 
to national responsibilities rather to new responsibilities in a global civil society. The 
remit’s aim to represent ‘the UK, its nations, regions and communities’ is also challenged 
as communication no longer relates to ‘bounded’ content but is embedded in individually 
produced networks which are no longer ‘bounded’ but ‘fluid’. Collective identity is no 
longer understood as a ‘representation’ but is ‘shared’ within subjectively chosen 
communities. […]  
 In contexts of public service media, we might also have to move away from the 
media/broadcasting, online/offline duality towards a centrality of civic discourse spheres. 
[…] Within such a model, public service could provide a civic topography in the larger 
digital ecology, provide public agency, such as spaces for ‘actors’, spaces as critical 
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‘reflector’ of discourse or of linking debates as ‘interlocutor.’422 Although this might 
seem to be a glimpse into the future, it is important to begin the debate.  
  
  
251 
VIDEO-ON-DEMAND AS PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION 
Catherine Johnson423 
 
Public service broadcasters (PSBs) are operating in a media landscape in which the increased 
convergence of the internet and television has blurred the distinctions between broadcast and 
on-demand TV.424 In this environment, people can switch easily between live/linear and on-
demand viewing within the same interface and access television content through a range of 
online and internet-connected services. In the UK market there are a number of suppliers 
providing video-on-demand (VOD) services operating with different financial models (Table 
1). These services are typically offered across a range of platforms, including PCs and 
laptops, tablets, smartphones, games consoles, set-top boxes and connected televisions. With 
increased uptake of connected televisions, tablets, smartphones and superfast broadband, on-
demand services are set to become a dominant means for accessing television. 
Free Part of a television 
subscription package 
Direct subscription Pay-per-view 
BBC iPlayer Sky Go Netflix iTunes 
ITV Player Virgin TV Anywhere Amazon Prime Google Play 
All 4  Now TV Sky Store 
Demand 5   TalkTalk TV Store 
UKTV Play    
Table 1: Based on top online VOD services listed in Decipher mediabug – Wave 4 report on claimed use of 
selected online VOD services in the UK for 2013-14.425  
 
There is a strong argument that as traditional broadcast and internet services merge 
the case for PSB becomes stronger. In a fully commercial media landscape, economically 
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disadvantaged audiences are under-served because they are less able to pay for services and 
less attractive to advertisers. By providing free-to-air content that is not determined by ability 
to pay or attractiveness to advertisers, PSBs ensure that VOD serves all of the UK public with 
high quality programming that entertains, educates and informs. In particular, UK public 
service broadcasters provide access to a mixed diet of programming online that includes news 
and current affairs, genres that are largely absent on subscription VOD services, such as 
Netflix and Amazon. Despite the increased choice of media providers and services, the UK 
public increasingly value and trust PSBs, in part because they are mandated by regulation to 
serve the public’s needs over other interests.426  
Increased choice and fragmentation has enabled VOD providers to serve the needs of 
a wide range of niche audiences, often with large catalogues of content. However, this does 
not mean that new commercial VODs serve the needs of all audiences equally. For example, 
in the US Netflix has been criticised for a lack of black TV shows and potential racial bias in 
its recommendation algorithm.427 Research indicates that rather than broadening people’s diet 
of opinions, ideas and debate about society, politics and culture, online platforms tends to 
limit that diet by acting as an ‘echo chamber’ where individuals find their ideas supported 
and reinforced.428 By contrast, PSBs can provide media spaces that encourage encounters 
with a broad range of ideas, opinions and cultures that are vital for a healthy society and 
democracy. 
PSB has often been criticised for restricting market competition. However, the US 
case demonstrates that deregulated commercial media markets tend towards conglomeration 
and there is no evidence to suggest that the internet changes this.429 New large global 
corporations have emerged (such as Google, Apple and Amazon) that increasingly control the 
flow of global digital content and information and seek to limit market competition. These 
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companies not only dominate online search and retail, but also are major players in the 
provision of VOD. 
The new businesses entering the VOD market in the UK and beyond have invested in 
original content. However, the business model for global providers, such as Netflix, is to 
produce programming that can be exploited across a range of international markets and there 
is no guarantee that the global players within the VOD market will invest in UK 
production.430 The UK PSBs, on the other hand, remain the primary investors in programming 
for UK audiences. Beyond programming, UK PSBs can also catalyse technological 
innovations, develop markets and stimulate demand in new areas where business models are 
unclear, with Channel 4’s and the BBC’s lead in the development of VOD a case in point. 
This PSB investment maintains a world-leading television industry and significantly 
contributes to the UK’s creative industry sector.431 
 If there remains a case for PSB, how might it be funded? VOD makes it possible to 
pay for PSB via subscriptions. However, introducing a subscription-based model for all 
public service broadcasting would damage the fundamental principle that PSB should be 
universally accessible regardless of ability to pay. The option of funding VOD services (such 
as BBC iPlayer) through subscription (while retaining a publicly funded linear broadcast 
service for the BBC) places undue costs on the young who make most use of VOD services 
for accessing television.432 Indeed, VOD is a crucial tool in delivering public service 
outcomes to young people. 
 Since the 1980s there has been increasing competition for advertising revenue which 
has led to concerns that commercial PSBs will be unable to fulfill their public service remits 
and remain financially viable. However, there are a number of reasons to suggest that funding 
through advertising remains a viable option for PSB. First, television content (broadcast and 
online) remains attractive to advertisers because of the large audiences that it can reach.433 
  
254 
Second, advertisers and broadcasters are developing technological solutions to prevent ad-
skipping and ad-blocking online.434 Third, the internet enables greater opportunities for 
viewer data collection which allows targeted, interactive and personalized advertising around 
on-demand content. Fourth, new relationships are emerging between advertisers and 
broadcasters to co-create content for broadcast and online with, for example, the rise of 
programmes funded wholly by single advertisers (currently referred to in the industry as 
‘advertiser-funded programming’). 
However, these new developments give rise to a number of concerns. Viewer 
intolerance of advertising and anxieties about the use of data online might drive them to other 
media channels for accessing content. In addition, the rise of advertiser-funded programming 
could erode audience trust in PSBs by undermining (or being perceived to undermine) their 
creative and editorial integrity. An increase of advertiser-funded programming would also 
diminish the spaces within which television programmes (both factual and fiction) might 
engage in useful and necessary critique of the practices and values of advertisers and their 
clients. In this context, regulation remains important to maintain a balance between ensuring 
commercial viability and protecting editorial/creative integrity and public service values. 
 The problems with advertiser and subscription funding demonstrate that there remain 
strong arguments for publicly funded public service broadcasting. Universal public funding 
ensures that the benefits of television are available to all and that PSBs are accountable 
directly to the public they serve. Public funding also spreads the costs of PSB and ensures 
significant value for money and affordability compared with pay-TV services.435 Public 
support for the licence fee has increased and the majority of UK households are willing to 
pay.436 Public funding needs to cover all of the services provided by PSBs given the 
convergence of broadcast and on-demand television. The media landscape in which PSBs are 
now operating is one in which the boundaries between linear broadcasting and online are 
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continuing to diminish. Public service television for the internet era needs to be understood as 
a component of a larger networked and connected online infrastructure. In order to be able to 
provide television programming that serves the public, PSBs have to operate across broadcast 
television and the internet and need to have the flexibility to respond to new technological 
developments as they emerge. […] 
 In an on-demand environment the organization and design of interfaces to ‘curate’ 
content replaces linear scheduling as the means by which broadcasters shape viewing 
choices. Ofcom notes that we are witnessing a shift away from the EPG towards advanced 
search and recommendation through online interfaces provided by a widening number of 
firms.437 VOD has the potential to broaden the diversity of content that viewers watch through 
curation and recommendation. Research suggests that by 2014 42% of people came to BBC 
iPlayer without a specific programme in mind.438 While new online providers, such as 
Netflix, use algorithms to produce recommendations based on existing viewer behavior 
(encouraging viewing of more of the same), the BBC has developed online curation focused 
on enhancing serendipitous discovery of a diverse range of content. Curation can also be used 
to offer increased access to the rich history of PSB and British culture. All 4 offers free 
access to box sets of archived programmes, while the BBC has integrated iPlayer into its web 
pages to create journeys from audiovisual content to curated online articles and third party 
content. In this way, VOD can be used as the starting point to connect viewers to online 
content within and beyond PSBs in ways that fulfil the public service remit of informing, 
educating and entertaining. In this sense, PSBs can act as trusted online hubs to connect 
audiences to a diversity of content with public service value produced by other organisations, 
such as galleries, libraries, archives and museums (GLAMS). Within this connected 
environment, PSBs should be working towards making their online content more shareable 
and interactive, enabling audiences to freely engage with and spread public service content 
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across the internet. At present, however, the ability for UK PSBs to provide online access to 
archival content can be limited by copyright legislation and could be enhanced if the public 
interest function of extended collective licensing was more clearly articulated.439  
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[…]DO WE STILL NEED PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION? 
Luke Hyams440 
  
We still, unquestionably, need public service television. There’s a role the public service 
broadcasters fulfil that neither the independent young creators that we work with at Maker 
Studios441, nor the big media corporations can really fill. There is a sweet spot there in the 
middle that is so important. We are now is at a time when young people really need to get 
behind the BBC, get behind Channel 4 and re-appropriate young people’s vision of public 
service broadcasting. 
 In advance of coming here and talking with you today, I spoke to a lot of young 
people about what public service broadcasting meant to them.  And on a lot of occasions, the 
response I got was: is YouTube a public service broadcaster?  Is Instagram or Periscope a 
public service broadcaster?  Because these are platforms that the public have access to, that 
young people can broadcast through, and where they can share their opinions from in varying 
levels of creative ways. 
There are so many ways in which public service broadcasters do well for under-25  
year olds: from incredibly high production values, well thought out dramas and 
documentaries on Channel 4 to the BBC 6 Music, 1Xtra, the World Service, Radio 4. You 
know, these are really the things that come up: sports, Match of the Day, they come up over 
and again. And of course, the objective news perspective. But I think that news is one of the 
things where there has been a big change for a lot of the young people that I spoke to. They 
could actually pinpoint it to one night—a Sunday—back in 2011. 
 When the London riots happened, it was an amazing night. I sat in front of the TV 
with my laptop open. On the BBC, it was just regular Sunday night news coverage. But on 
the Twitter feed, there were little videos and photos of Dixons and Foot Locker in Brixton on 
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fire. And it was this constant chat. It was just this incredible disparity. Obviously the 
Metropolitan Police didn’t want to stoke the fire and get more people to come to the riots and 
we completely understand that. But the BBC on that night chose to side itself with authority 
in a way that I think is a bit worrying. For someone who is 18 right now, the BBC offers so 
many incredible things, so many choices in terms of content, but at the same time, we are 
living in an age where young people are very sceptical of authority. And for the last five or 
ten years, the headlines we see are either attacking the BBC or bringing up institutional issues 
from the BBC’s past and I think that that could give a young person quite a clouded image of 
what the BBC is. 
 Beyond that, there are serious challenges regarding respecting authority, whether it is 
with the Tories who make endless cuts or Labour who took us to war or the Murdoch press 
who had very, very unscrupulous means to get their stories. So I think that what public 
service broadcasters need to do is to step aside from that. They need to keep the objectivity 
but really reassess what it actually means to be a public service broadcaster. What can they 
provide that either the big corporations, or the incredibly authentic young creators who are 
making stuff themselves, cannot provide?   
 And I think we need to get this provision now. I want to get straight in to the heart of 
the matter: we need to reappraise who the licence fee is perceived to be for. We are people 
who have an incredible amount of nostalgia …you know, our careers have started at the 
BBC.  I remember as a child going past Television Centre and like Charlie looking at the 
Wonka factory and just dreaming to get inside.  My whole career started because I sat at 
home one Saturday night and Challenge Anneka442 built a TV studio training facility for kids 
a mile away from my house. I’m the luckiest so-and-so who ever lived. So I think that for us, 
there are lots of reasons why the BBC should continue and we just need to work hard for that 
next generation, for them to value it in the same way we do. […]  
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Part Five: Representing Britain on TV 
  
  
260 
TELEVISION AND DIVERSITY443 
 
‘We’re just trying to redesign the face of British TV’ (Idris Elba’s speech to Parliament, 18 
January 2016) 
 
Television is a crucial means through which we come to know ourselves and to learn about 
the lives of others and that public service television, in particular, should provide ample 
opportunities for dialogue between and within all social groups in the UK. Success for a 
commercial broadcaster is predicated on reaching the most desirable demographics or on 
attaining sufficiently high ratings; to the extent that commercial television does facilitate this 
dialogue and does address all social groups, it is more of a happy accident. For public service 
television, on the other hand, adequately communicating with and representing all citizens is 
not a luxury but an essential part of its remit. 
Issues of diversity—based on the recognition that the population consists of multiple 
and overlapping sets of minorities—are therefore central to the continuing relevance (or 
impending irrelevance) of any public service media system. 
This is far from a new proposition in relation to broadcasting. More than 50 years ago, 
the Pilkington report insisted that catering for minorities was not an optional add-on or indeed 
a capitulation to special interests but a vital part of broadcasting’s responsibility to serve all 
citizens. ‘Some of our tastes and needs we share with virtually everybody; but most—and 
they are often those which engage us most intensely—we share with different minorities. A 
service which caters only for majorities can never satisfy all, or even most, of the needs of 
any individual.’444 Some 15 years later, the Annan Committee also agreed that broadcasting 
could no longer conceive of its audiences as in any way homogeneous; contemporary culture, 
it argued, ‘is now multi-racial and pluralist: that is to say, people adhere to different views of 
  
261 
the nature and purpose of life and expect their own views to be exposed in some form or 
other. The structure of broadcasting must reflect this variety.’445 Broadcasting, it famously 
asserted, should be ‘opened up’446 in order both to promote the most diverse range of 
experiences and perspectives and to more effectively communicate with a changing 
population.  
If television in the 21st century is to retain legitimacy and relevance, then it has little 
option but to recognise the desire of all social groups to be listened to and to be properly 
represented. This is especially the case when, for example, devolution, inequality, 
immigration and the establishment in law of ‘protected characteristics’—such as age, 
disability, gender, race, sex, sexual orientation and religion—have further weakened the idea 
of the UK as a ‘singular’ space in which we all face the same challenges and share the same 
dreams. Public service television has somehow simultaneously to recognise our common 
interests and to serve the needs of different minority and under-represented groups. 
 This means that diversity, as it applies to television, needs to take on board issues of 
voice, representation and opportunity. It needs, in other words, to provide a means by which 
all social groups are able to speak, to be portrayed respectfully and accurately, to have equal 
employment prospects and, finally, to have access to a wide range of content.  
The US academic Phil Napoli has identified three dimensions of broadcast diversity 
that connect to these capacities: source, content and exposure diversity.447 We dealt with one 
element of source diversity in the previous part of this book where we examined the 
prospects for new suppliers of public service content in a digital age; we will consider 
another crucial area of source diversity later in this chapter where we confront the fact that 
television continues to be an industry dominated by white middle-class men. We discuss 
content diversity both in relation to the need to support the broadest range of television genres 
(in the next part) and, later in this chapter, in relation to how minority groups are represented 
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on television as well as how they themselves perceive this representation. Exposure 
diversity—in other words, ‘the degree to which audiences are actually exposing themselves to 
a diversity of information products and sources’448—is particularly difficult to measure and to 
mandate but our belief is that if audiences are presented with a television environment that is 
more open and receptive to the labour, lifestyles and languages of minority groups, then they 
are far more likely to seek out this material and to cultivate more promiscuous consumption 
habits. Public service television, we believe, has a crucial role in delivering both surprises 
and certainties to a curious (and diverse) population. 
 
Are You Being Served? 
 
Many viewers appear to be content with the quality of television in general. Ofcom reports 
that audience satisfaction with the delivery of public service broadcasting has risen from 69% 
of respondents in 2008 to 79% in 2014449 and, while half of all adults believe that programme 
quality has stayed the same in the last year, the gap between those who think it has improved 
(17%) in relation to those who believe that things have got worse (30%) has more than halved 
in the last ten years450. Research carried out for the BBC Trust found that the public’s ‘overall 
impression’ of the BBC has increased since 2008 earning an average score of 7.4 on a scale 
of 1-10 with 60% of respondents claiming that the BBC offers them ‘quite a bit’, ‘a lot’ or 
‘everything I need’451. 
The problem is that satisfaction levels are not shared equally by all the population and 
that some groups—notably ethnic, regional, national and faith-based minorities—have 
expressed significant dissatisfaction with how they are represented or with the range of 
programmes relevant to their interests. So, for example, the wealthiest audiences are more 
than 50% more likely to praise the BBC’s performance than those in the poorest households 
  
263 
while English viewers are significantly more positive than Scottish ones.452 Just 44% of 
Christian and 47% of non-Christian audiences agree that the BBC adequately represents their 
faith while only 41% of non-white audiences and a mere 32% of black audiences are happy 
with how the BBC represents them.453 Just consider the implications for the BBC that less 
than one-third of black audiences report that they are satisfied with Britain’s main public 
service broadcaster. In fact while public service television channels (including their portfolio 
channels) account for some 73% of the viewing of white audiences, the figure drops to a 
mere 53% for black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) audiences.454 Overall satisfaction 
levels may look impressive but there are serious fissures behind the glossy headline figures. 
This unevenness in satisfaction levels spills over into Ofcom’s figures for audience 
perceptions of both visibility and portrayal of a range of social and geographical communities 
across all public service television channels. For example, while 42% of viewers in Northern 
Ireland think that there are too few people from Northern Ireland on TV, a mere 4% of 
Londoners think there are too few Londoners on TV; while only 6% of Londoners think they 
are shown in a bad light, some 20% of those from the North of England think they are 
represented negatively; similarly, while a mere 8% of men aged 55 and above think there are 
too few of them on TV, the number rises to 27% of women who think that there should be 
more older women on our screens. Finally, while there is a broad consensus among both the 
general viewing population and those viewers with disabilities that there are too few disabled 
people on TV there is no such agreement about the representation of black ethnic groups 
where 16% of all PSB viewers feel they are portrayed negatively in contrast with the 51% of 
black respondents who felt they were shown either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ negatively.455  
It is true that all minority groups are naturally more likely to want both to increase 
their visibility and to draw attention to the frequency and scale of negative representations. 
Who, after all, wants to feel either marginalised or caricatured? The more important point, 
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however, is that if sections of a viewing public that is meant to be at the heart of public 
service broadcasting do not see themselves on screen or do not recognise the representations 
that do exist as valid, then broadcasters have a credibility problem they need to address. As 
the equality campaign Creative Access put it to us, the media ‘cannot reflect society if society 
is not reflected in the media’ and they warned of the consequences for broadcasting if it does 
not ‘represent visually the society that pays its bills’.456 The slogan ‘No Taxation without 
Representation’ may have originated in the run-up to the American Revolution in the 18th 
century but 21st century broadcasters have much to fear if they neglect its message. This is all 
the more crucial in a situation in which there are more platforms and channels to choose from 
and where, as the actor Idris Elba put it in his call for broadcasters to embrace diversity, ‘if 
young people don’t see themselves on TV, they just switch off the TV, and log on. End 
of…’457 
We are not at all suggesting that public service television is a monocultural space or 
that broadcasters have totally failed to recognise the identity claims as well as the 
demographic and social shifts that are changing the face of the UK. Channel 4’s heavy 
investment in and promotion of the Paralympics and the BBC’s commissioning of a range of 
programmes concerning transgender issues is evidence of such recognition. What we are 
arguing is that ‘opening up’ television—to a full range of voices, cultures, narratives and 
identities—is an ongoing process and that public service television needs constantly to renew 
itself. If it fails to keep pace with changing tastes and attitudes, then it will undermine both its 
popularity and its legitimacy.  
Indeed, as long as different social groups are not adequately addressed and as long as 
they are ignored, stereotyped or patronised, then struggles over visibility and representation 
will continue. One topic that has generated a significant amount of debate in recent years is 
the representation of working class lives in reality television,458 a genre that has, formally 
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speaking, allowed ‘ordinary people’ to enter a television world in which their presence, until 
then, had been largely confined to soap operas, ‘kitchen sink dramas’ and Alan Clarke 
productions from the 1970s. Factual entertainment is relatively cheap to produce, popular 
with audiences and has the added attraction of dramatising the experiences of ordinary 
viewers for ordinary viewers. It has won hearts and minds with programmes like The Great 
British Bake-Off but it has also antagonised whole sections of the population with, for 
example, what has been described as ‘poverty porn’459 – programmes (usually with the word 
‘benefits’ in the title) which explore the ‘reality’ of life for some of the poorest in society. In 
his lecture to the Royal Television Society, the writer Owen Jones condemned the ‘malignant 
programming’ that ‘either consciously or unwittingly, suggest that now – in 2013 – on British 
television, it’s open season on millions of working-class people...’460 Professor Bev Skeggs, a 
sociologist who has studied reality television, put it to us that this is ‘social work television, 
the moral television that tells people how to behave as better mothers (though very rarely 
better fathers interestingly) and how to look after children.’461 
Of course, broadcasters themselves insist that television programmes that can help to 
stimulate a discussion about, for example, how to cope with poverty in ‘austerity Britain’ are 
invaluable and responsible. This was precisely the argument provided by the producers of 
Channel 4’s Benefit Street in 2014 where the claim by the channel’s head of documentaries 
that there is no more ‘important job for programme makers than to record what life is like on 
the receiving end of the latest tranche of benefit cuts’462 was countered by accusations that 
programme simply ‘demonised the poor and unemployed.’463 The fact that death threats were 
issued to local residents, that Ofcom received nearly 1,000 complaints and that a petition 
condemning the programme gathered more than 50,000 signatures suggests that the perceived 
dangers of misrepresentation remain very real.  
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Yet while we have plenty of data on what audiences think of television content, 
regulators are not required to collect data on the actual on-screen representation of different 
social groups. Instead we have occasional pieces of industry and academic research that 
attempt to monitor specific areas of content. For example, the Cultural Diversity Network 
carried out research in 2009 and 2014 that found that women, disabled people, lesbian, gay 
and bisexual and BAME individuals were all significantly under-represented on television in 
relation to their proportion of the UK population.464 Professor Lis Howell’s annual ‘Expert 
Women’ project examines the representation of women experts on television news bulletins. 
Its most recent findings in November 2015465 showed that there were five men to every 
woman on ITV’s News at Ten, a ratio of three to one on Sky News with Channel 5 News 
coming out on top with a ratio of 1.6 men to every woman.  
A similar study in 2014 led by Professor Howell in association with Broadcast 
magazine about the ratio of white to black, Asian and visible ethnic minority (BAVEM) 
contributors revealed a far more mixed picture: while the ratio of white people to ethnic 
minorities in the UK is approximately six to one, researchers found that ITV performed worst 
with a ratio of over seven to one in its programmes while both Channel 4 and the BBC had 
ratios of 4.3 to one with Sky, a non-PSB channel, performing especially well with a ratio of 
three to one. The study, however, also identified a ‘diversity gap’ in relation to specific 
genres like topical, factual and entertainment leading Howell to conclude that a major 
problem lies in drama (apart from soaps) and ‘in factual entertainment programming where 
BAVEM’s are almost invisible’.466 Unfortunately, the research was not followed up and, 
without a commitment from either broadcasters or regulators to commission such research, 
detailed data on representation—both quantitative and qualitative—is likely to remain scarce 
and impressionistic.467 
Of course better data about representation and even increased visibility of minority 
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groups will not, by itself, necessarily lead to more favourable representations. However, 
without a comprehensive record of who is being portrayed and in what circumstances, it will 
be even more difficult to attain a more diverse on-screen television landscape.  
 
Diversity Strategies 
 
UK television, therefore, does not yet look like the audience it is supposed to serve. This is 
also true in terms of the composition of the television workforce that remains, some 15 years 
after the former director-general Greg Dyke’s comment that the BBC was ‘hideously 
white’468: it is disproportionately white, male, over-35, London-based and privately educated. 
This is accentuated at top levels where women occupy 39% of management positions while 
BAME individuals occupy a mere 4% of executive positions, well below their respective 
proportion of the population (of 13%).469 This is not quite as bad as the situation in the UK 
film industry where Directors UK found that women directed a mere 13.6% of films made 
between 2005 and 2014 leading them to conclude that ‘there has not been any meaningful 
improvement in the representation of female directors’.470 There is, however, no room for 
complacency in relation to television and a real need for concrete measures to address the 
situation.  
Lenny Henry certainly touched a nerve in his celebrated BAFTA lecture in 2014 
where he argued for action to address the fact that BAME individuals make up only 5.4% of 
the creative industries (precisely the same figure as in 2000) and that, while the sector has 
grown overall, fewer BAME people are working in it.471 Data from Directors UK suggested 
that 1.5% of television programmes were made by BAME directors while, of the 6000 
directors on its database, a mere 214 (3.5%) were from BAME backgrounds.472  
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In response to this deficit, diversity has become a key buzzword inside the television 
industry with all broadcasters publishing ‘diversity strategies’ that relate to their plans to 
develop more ‘inclusive’ hiring and representational practices. For example, the BBC has 
recently published its latest Diversity and Inclusion Strategy, Channel 4 introduced its 360° 
Diversity Charter in 2015 while ITV has a Social Partnership strategy that it aims to embed 
throughout its programming.473 While all these initiatives are to be welcomed as a sign that 
broadcasters have accepted that they have to improve their performance in relation to 
diversity, they are not without their own problems. 
First, there is the definitional issue. We have already argued that diversity in 
television needs to be understood with reference to voice, representation and opportunity and 
that, therefore, it cannot be restricted to the portrayal of a specific social group. However, 
there is a danger that diversity becomes a ‘catch-all’ phrase that refers to a blissful state of 
‘inclusion’ rather than a commitment to tackle previous patterns of ‘exclusion’. When the 
cover of the BBC’s strategy document insists that ‘Diversity includes everyone’—with a 
photograph of Bake-Off winner Nadiya Hussain along with Paul Hollywood and Mary 
Berry—the implication is that diversity is all about the creation of a ‘happy family’ as 
opposed to the commitment to challenge the structures and ideas that have undermined 
prospects for inclusion and equality.  
Even Channel 4, which, was launched with a remit to target minority audiences and 
which regularly attracts high levels of BAME viewers to its news bulletins, is keen to shift 
diversity onto less contentious ground.  
 
Diversity is not about the colour of someone’s skin; it goes way beyond that. 
Diversity is about being all-inclusive, regardless of culture, nationality, religious 
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persuasion, physical and mental ability, sexual orientation, race, age, background and 
addressing social mobility.474 
 
The problem is, however, that diversity is about skin colour, gender, sexual orientation, class 
and other characteristics, and therefore about how specific marginalised groups have not been 
sufficiently well integrated into the television workforce and television programming. So, for 
example, when Idris Elba stood up in front of parliamentarians in 2016 to insist—quite 
rightly we believe—that diversity is ‘more than just skin colour’ and is mainly about 
‘diversity of thought’,475 the fact remains that he was asked to deliver the speech precisely 
because of a growing concern that opportunities for BAME participation in the TV industry 
remain very limited. Race, as well as other forms of ‘difference’, cannot be so easily ‘erased’ 
from diversity talk.  
Indeed, Sara Ahmed, who has written widely on diversity and public policy, argues 
that there remains a ‘sticky’ association between race and diversity. While, in reality, it is not 
so easy to move ‘beyond’ race, the language of diversity is ‘often used as a shorthand for 
inclusion’476 – a way of recognising difference but freeing it from negative associations 
concerning actual forms of discrimination. Diversity, she insists, can then be used to avoid 
confrontation and simply to highlight the contributions and achievements of different groups 
without asking more fundamental questions of why these achievements were marginalised in 
first place. 
Television historians like Sarita Malik remind us that diversity policy was not always 
like this. When Channel 4 first started, it operated as a ‘multicultural public sphere’ with a 
series of programmes that engaged directly with ‘questions of representation and racial 
stereotyping’.477 Malik identifies a change in programme strategy after the closure of its 
Multicultural Programmes Department in 2002 as part of a more general shift in broadcasting 
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from a ‘politicised’ policy of multiculturalism to a more consumerist emphasis on cultural, 
and now creative, diversity. What we are now left with is the possibility of a ‘depoliticized, 
raceless ‘diversity’ consensus’.478 
The implication here is that broadcasters are using justified complaints about a lack of 
representation to pursue commercial strategies to appeal to diverse audiences without 
fundamentally changing commissioning and funding structures. The cultural theorist Anamik 
Saha describes this as the ‘mainstreaming’ of cultural diversity which ‘while no doubt 
increasing the visibility of blacks and Asians on prime-time television, had actually has little 
impact on the quality of representations.’479 So while BAME individuals may be increasingly 
visible on TV, the quality of their representations has not have fundamentally changed and 
we are still stuck, all too often, with a repertoire limited to ‘terrorism, violence, conflict and 
carnival’ or, in terms of how Muslims are portrayed, to ‘beards, scarves, halal meat, terrorists, 
forced marriage’.480 
This connects to the second potential problem with broadcasters’ diversity strategies, 
especially with regard to employment: the reliance on targets, the provision of small pockets 
of funding and training and what the Campaign for Broadcasting Equality described to us as 
‘Flash-in-the-Pan initiatives which are announced with a great flourish but which fail to 
deliver structural change.’481 Let us be clear: additional money for diversity is a positive sign 
but the BBC’s £3.5 million spend in 2014 that was dedicated to increasing diverse 
employment constituted less than 0.1% of the BBC’s overall budget. Similarly, targets are 
entirely welcome and a very useful focus for organisations seeking to highlight the need for 
change but they are rarely successful by themselves, can be easily manipulated and are 
painfully slow in their realisation. The fact that there have been, according to Lenny Henry, 
some 29 target-led diversity initiatives adopted by the BBC in the last 15 years, bears witness 
to this.482 
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The BBC has now launched its 30th such initiative promising to ensure that, by 2020, 
half of its workforce and its screen time will be composed of women, 8% of disabled and 
LGBT people and 15% of BAME individuals.483 Channel 4 have announced similar targets 
(actually more ambitious in terms of BAME figures) and have announced ‘commissioning 
diversity guidelines’ which require independent production companies to demonstrate their 
commitment to diversity both on- and off-screen.484 
It is not clear to us, however, how these targets, no matter how necessary they are, 
will overcome the structural barriers that have undermined diverse employment in television 
up to this point: the employment networks that favour friends and contacts, the reliance on 
unpaid interns and the reluctance of commissioners to take risks. Small steps in the right 
direction will do little to counter the pressures pushing in an opposite direction. So, for 
example, while there are a number of training schemes aimed at entry level positions, this can 
simply reinforce the notion that it’s the talent that is the problem and not the institutions 
themselves. ‘Training schemes and initiatives’, argues Simone Pennant of diversity 
campaigners the TV Collective, ‘inadvertently create the perception that the reason why 
Black, Asian and ethnic minority talent are leaving the industry or not striving in their careers 
is because they are ‘not good enough’ for existing roles.’485 According to Lenny Henry: 
‘When there aren’t enough programmes from Scotland we don’t give the Scots more training. 
We place more commissioners up there to find good Scottish programme makers to make 
decent programmes. Let’s do the same to ensure BAME representation.’486  
We believe that Lenny Henry is right to argue that ‘systemic failures’ have led to a 
lack of diversity in the industry and we believe, therefore, that ‘systemic’ solutions are 
required alongside the provision of targets and training schemes. 
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This takes us back to the importance of the principle of quality that we discussed 
earlier in this book: that high quality minority representations require conditions that support 
innovation, experiment, risk-taking and the right to fail, conditions that arguably 
undersupplied in the current PSM ecology. 
So firstly, we need to tackle the blockages at commissioning level. Idris Elba, for 
example, warned in his speech to Parliament that, all too often,  
 
Commissioners look at diverse talent, and all they see is risk. Black actors are seen as 
a commercial risk. Women directors are seen as a commercial risk. Disabled directors 
aren’t even seen at all. In general, if broadcasters want to stay in the game, their 
commissioners must take more risk with diverse talent.  
 
We need to change the culture of commissioning and to provide incentives for commissioners 
to take risks. This might be enhanced if the Equality Act 2010 were to be amended so that 
commissioning and editorial policy would then be covered by public service equality 
duties.487 There is also a need to create new and more diverse commissioning structures at the 
same time as placing new obligations on existing commissioners to break from a ‘risk-averse’ 
mindset by working with a broader base of talent. As one BAFTA member warned us: 
‘There’s so little risk taking…that we risk stifling a whole new generation of makers and 
audiences’.488    
Secondly, public service broadcasters who after all have a specific remit to serve 
multiple audiences, should be required to use a range of instruments to improve minority 
employment and representation. As the founder of the Campaign for Broadcasting Equality 
told us, ‘there need be no conflict between ring fenced funds, quotas, targets and other 
measures to promote diversity. They are complementary.’489 In particular, given the 
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worryingly high levels of dissatisfaction of BAME viewers, together with the under-
representation of BAME talent in the industry itself, we believe that public service 
broadcasters should be required to increase their investment in BAME productions through 
significantly enhanced—and ideally ringfenced—‘diversity funds’ along the lines that Lenny 
Henry has called for490 in order to secure conditions for a more representative workforce (at 
all levels) and prospects for more representative content. 
We recognise that television alone cannot be expected to solve issues of 
underrepresentation given the inequality we see in relation to access to other services like 
health, education, employment and housing. But television certainly has a role to play both in 
addressing these issues and in involving minority audiences in the dialogue that will be 
necessary if we are to live together and to act collectively to overcome all forms of 
discrimination. For that to happen, appropriate targets and quotas need to be complemented 
by sufficient resources if aspiration is to turn into reality. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION IN THE NATIONS AND REGIONS491 
 
Public service broadcasting has previously been described as ‘social cement’492 in relation to 
the role it plays in bringing together and solidifying the various communities of the UK. At a 
time when the UK’s constitutional shape is changing and when devolutionary pressures are 
increasing, what kind of role should television play both in maintaining the cohesiveness of 
the UK and in reflecting and giving voice to these hugely important shifts? 
This is not, of course, an entirely new question. Back in 1951, in the very early days 
of television, Lord Beveridge chaired a committee on the future of broadcasting in which he 
spoke of the need for ‘greater broadcasting autonomy’ for the constituent countries of the 
UK. This was rejected by the government of the day that nevertheless acknowledged their 
‘distinctive national characteristics, which are not only valuable for their own sake, but are 
essential elements in the pattern of British life and culture. It applies in only lesser degree to 
the English regions which also have a rich and diversified contribution to make and should be 
given full opportunities for making it.’493 
Some 65 years later, with the emergence of devolved governments and assembles as 
well as ‘city-regional machinery’ in places like Manchester, Leeds and Birmingham, there 
has been a clear shift to what Tony Travers at the London School of Economics calls a 
‘quasi-federal UK’.494 Significant powers have been devolved to the administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and some additional powers transferred to 
municipalities in England. According to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, with the ‘passage of 
the Cities and Local Government Bill in 2016 some 55% of the population will be 
experiencing a form of decentralised decision-making’.495  
Yet Whitehall and Westminster continue to exert a decisive influence on major areas 
of everyday life. For example, the UK remains one of the most fiscally centralised of all 
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major western countries with only a tiny proportion of tax raised locally. So while there has 
been devolution of power and resources in some policy areas, there has not been a similar 
shift in relation to fiscal policy, defence, pensions, competition law and foreign policy that 
are matters ‘reserved’ for the Westminster parliament. 
Furthermore, England continues to dominate the UK not just politically but also in 
terms of population and wealth. It has 84% of the population and 86% of GDP although these 
headlines figures gloss over some significant differences. While the South East’s share of 
GDP has risen from 38.6% to over 45% of the total in the last 50 years, the share held by the 
North West and North East has declined by a quarter: from 16.8% to 12.7% of GDP. 
According to Travers, ‘despite the substantial redistribution of resources from place to place, 
significant territorial inequality has persisted.’496  
This chapter will explore the extent to which these ‘territorial inequalities’ are 
relevant to the UK television system and discuss the kinds of action that broadcasters have 
taken to address the situation. Given that television policy remains a ‘reserved’ matter for the 
Westminster parliament, with devolved administrations having little control over the shape 
and content of television, the chapter also seeks to consider whether the present arrangements 
are fit for purpose or whether, in the light of changing constitutional arrangements, they need 
to be updated and a new approach developed that more adequately serves all the population 
of the UK. 
 
Television’s Role Across the UK 
 
Unlike their multichannel counterparts, public service broadcasters are required to cater to all 
the geographical constituencies of the UK and, according to Ofcom497, they do this in several 
ways. 
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First, they make programmes either produced or set in different parts of the UK to 
transmit to all UK audiences. Recent ‘network’ programmes have included The Fall, 
produced in Northern Ireland, Doctor Who, which is made in Wales, Broadchurch made in 
Dorset and Happy Valley and Last Tango in Halifax produced by the Manchester-based RED 
production company. The intention here is both to represent parts of the UK to the whole of 
the UK as well as to redistribute TV budgets outside of a London base that has long 
performed the same role for British television as Hollywood studios have for US television. 
PSBs also produce news and current affairs programmes in and for Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland and the English regions as well as a small range of non-news 
programmes. This refers to the crucial ‘intracultural’ form of address in which a community 
speaks to itself in order to get to grips with shared experiences and problems. The BBC and 
Channel 3 licence holders are required to produce a specific amount of each genre broken 
down into news, current affairs and non-news (although ITV is no longer required to produce 
standalone non-news programmes in its regional English output). 
Finally, there are services aimed at minority language speakers: for example, S4C 
provides Welsh-language television for the more than half a million people who speak Welsh 
while BBC Alba provides programming for Gaelic speakers in Scotland.  
Research carried out for Ofcom as well as the BBC Trust498 shows that that there is 
especially strong demand for material produced in and for ‘the nations’—as Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland are referred to—and the English regions. Although there are very 
different political and cultural contexts that pertain to the ‘nations’, as distinct from the 
‘regions’, they are key spaces in which communities are able to find out about issues that 
directly pertain to their lives and their identities. As the managing director of UTV told us, 
audiences for its Live at 6 news bulletin are often bigger than those for Coronation Street 
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while Ofcom research suggests that ‘the importance people place on their Nation or region 
being portrayed fairly to the rest of the UK has increased across the UK since 2008.’499 
The concern that we wish to highlight is the growing gap between expectations and 
performance. This gap is likely to grow given the increased demands of audiences together 
with current pressures on public service broadcasters to cut budgets and to secure ‘value for 
money’ which, if narrowly interpreted, could lead to a further reduction in ‘minority’ 
services. 
For example, despite the fact that we have had a Scottish parliament and assemblies in 
Wales and Northern Ireland since 1999 and despite the increased infrastructural investment 
linked to the creation of both a ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and a ‘Midlands Engine’, investment 
in television for the ‘nations and regions’ does has not kept pace with these developments. 
Non-network output in 1999 reached 17,891 hours (that is first-run original output produced 
for the ‘nations and regions’ by the BBC, ITV and S4C; by 2014, 15 years after devolution, it 
had fallen to 13,814 hours (and that includes programming by BBC Alba), a decline of nearly 
23%.500 The main reason for this is the reduced obligation for Channel 3 licence holders to 
provide such programming though there have also been significant declines in BBC output – 
in Wales, for example, the BBC’s English language television output has dropped by 27% 
since 2006/7.501 
If we focus only on the period between 2009 and 2014, the picture appears to be more 
stable with an overall 7% increase in hours. However this headline figure disguises a 9% fall 
in Wales, a 3% decline in Northern Ireland and a small fall in the English regions. The 
picture is affected by the very welcome 57% increase in hours in Scotland but, even here, 
there were very specific explanatory factors notably the increase in resources provided to 
cover the 2014 Commonwealth Games and the independence referendum as well as the 
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distorting impact of STV’s low-budget, overnight programme, The Nightshift, that ran from 
2010 to 2015.502 
Spending on programmes produced for the ‘nations and regions’ has also declined 
markedly in the past few years: from £404 million in 1998 to £277 million in 2014, a drop of 
just under one-third in real terms. This is due to the significant decrease in Channel 3 spend 
which has overshadowed a small increase in BBC investment.503  
The most worrying declines have been in the English regions and in Wales with 
spending down by 11% and 16% respectively. It could be argued that the situation in Wales 
has been improved by the contribution of S4C to the Welsh cultural economy although its 
own creative capacity has been squeezed by a highly uncertain economic picture. It suffered a 
24% cut to its core funding in 2010 when the bulk of its source of income was transferred 
from the government to the BBC, while BBC Wales’ contribution to the channel is also set to 
decline. According to the Institute of Welsh Affairs, these reductions threaten the ability of 
Welsh broadcasters to tell the full range of stories in the widest possible range of forms: 
‘pluralism needs to be viewed not just in terms of the number of providers, but also in terms 
of the range, form, purpose and tone of programmes and the voices they carry.’504 Rhys Evans 
of BBC Wales told us at our event in Cardiff that ‘a fully developed national television 
service should go beyond news and sport and should help create and define a wider culture. 
We need to be entertained as well as informed.’505   
A similar picture affects the prospects for BBC Alba where small pockets of funding 
from the Scottish government and the BBC allow for a mere 1.7 hours of original material 
per day with a 73% repeat rate overall. Despite its popularity with Gaelic viewers, its director 
of development and partnership, Iseabail Mactaggart, told us that insufficient funding ‘creates 
really serious audience deficits’ that need urgently to be addressed.506 
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Years of declining output and spend have, therefore, hindered the ability of 
broadcasters to more effectively cater to national and regional audiences and, in the case of 
some communities, have done little to dispel the idea that a centralised UK television system 
could ever adequately recognise their distinct needs and identities. The TV producer Tony 
Garnett, who has a distinguished record with the BBC, now talks of a ‘Central London 
Broadcasting Corporation’ that ‘steals from the rest of the country by taking its money and 
spending it on itself.’ Instead of truly reflecting the diverse lives of its population, the BBC—
the main, but not the sole, target of his criticism—‘reflects distorted slivers of privileged life, 
for the international market; then it goes downmarket to caricature everyone else in soaps.’507 
At a time when more viewers are associating themselves with a ‘sub-national’ UK 
identity, how should policymakers and television executives react and what steps should be 
taken to best meet the needs of viewers from across the UK? We first examine the emergence 
and impact of the ‘nations and regions’ strategy and then consider some alternatives. 
 
Going ‘Beyond the M25’: The Emergence of a ‘Nations and Regions’ Strategy 
 
Simply put, fundamental shifts in the UK’s political tectonic plates, and an indefensible 
imbalance in investment in the UK creative economy provided the key motivations for 
developing a ‘nations and regions’ strategy especially for the BBC and Channel 4, 
organisations without the regional structure that ITV at least used to have. The licence fee is 
collected in every corner of the UK yet for most of its history, the vast majority of spending 
took place where only a minority lived. In 1992, 80% of BBC network television 
programmes were made in London and the South East which then had 25% of the UK 
population508 and which are areas that are not culturally, politically and socially 
representative of the entire UK.  
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Demands for a more decentralised service also reflect the realities of everyday lives, 
many of which continue to be lived locally despite increasing patterns of mobility and 
migration. According to research carried out for TSB in late 2015, people live on average 60 
miles away from their childhood home with some 60% of people continuing to live in the 
same area where they were born. ‘Even in an age of easy, cheap travel, instant global 
communication and the chance to experience life across the world, a significant proportion of 
Brits remain firmly connected to their origins.’509 As people grow older, have children, buy 
homes and plan their recreational time, so their appetite for local information and expression 
grows. The celebrated phrase, ‘think global, act local’ reflects the significance of supra- and 
sub-national spheres of interest and the idea that, paraphrasing Daniel Bell, the nation-state is 
too small for the big problems in life and too big for the small problems.  
So there was real pressure in the late 1990s on the BBC—as the ‘national’ 
broadcaster—to address its deep-seated metropolitan bias and to shift some production from 
London to other parts of the UK. The generous licence fee settlement granted in 2000, shortly 
following John Birt’s term in office as director general, had very clear ‘out of London’ 
requirements which were then supported by the new DG, Greg Dyke. Once the argument had 
been accepted inside the BBC, Channel 4, which already had a strong pedigree in culturally 
representative programmming, was left exposed and immediately followed suit.  
There had already been a BBC ‘regional directorate’ throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Scotland had lobbied especially hard against being seen as a ‘region’ and so in 1999, Mark 
Thompson was appointed as director of national and regional broadcasting followed in 2000 
by a new director of nations and regions. Stuart Cosgrove was given the same title at Channel 
4 not long afterwards. 
The 2004 Building Public Value initiative and subsequent charter review process 
emphasized the BBC’s commitment to meet the needs of an increasingly diverse and 
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fragmented UK. The BBC promised to strengthen its programming for the devolved nations, 
to step up its local services, both in the nations and in the English regions and to develop its 
network of ‘Open Centres’ and ‘digital buses’ where less well-off people could access online 
technologies for no additional cost, seven days a week.510 Whole departments and channels 
were to leave the London base with Salford announced as the main destination. 
However, the main focus of this strategy was on increasing network output in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland with only a very limited expansion of local services in 
the English regions including the launch of a local television pilot that was subsequently 
refused permission by the BBC Trust following heavy lobbying by the newspaper industry. In 
2008, Jana Bennett, the director of BBC Vision, unveiled proposals that she described as a 
‘radical shift in the whole set up of broadcasting’511: a promise that spend on network 
programming in the nations would go up from 6% of total spend in 2007 to 17% by 2016, 
representing their share of the overall UK population, and that ‘out of London’ spend overall 
would rise to 50% by 2016 (still significantly below its share of the population). For the first 
time in many years, the gravitational field in British broadcasting was due to change – a 
situation that would be further cemented by the requirement imposed on Channel 4 in 2014 to 
allocate 9% of its budget to ‘out of London’ productions by 2020.    
This strategy, it could be argued, had an inescapable logic and an underlying sense of 
fairness. ‘Sustainability’ was seen as a key objective of the BBC’s approach in which just 
four new or enhanced centres of network production, one in each nation and the new Media 
City in Salford, would be established. Thus real concentrations of craft and talent could be 
created and developed. 
   There have been undoubted successes. The targets for 2016 have been met and indeed 
have been exceeded: as of 2014, the ‘out of London’ spend was over 53% while Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland accounted for over 18% of total spend.512 Cardiff Bay has built 
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quite an industry around Dr Who, Torchwood and Sherlock; in Northern Ireland, strengthened 
BBC foundations (along with a significant contribution from Northern Ireland Screen and the 
Northern Ireland government) have enabled the creation of Game of Thrones (albeit for 
HBO) and much more including the network series The Fall; Question Time is now produced 
out of Scotland which has also excelled at Saturday night National Lottery programmes like 
In It to Win It and Break the Safe. 
And therein lies a major problem with the existing nations and regions strategy for 
network programming: that it may have shifted elements of production out of the capital but 
there is little guarantee that this will lead to rich and complex representations of the nations 
themselves. ‘While drama production has been a beacon of success in Wales’, argue Cardiff 
University’s Sian Powell and Catriona Noonan, ‘this drama rarely reflects life in Wales and 
Wales is solely a location for filming rather than part of the narrative setting.’513 Angela 
Graham of the Institute of Welsh Affairs told us that ‘it’s ironic that BBC Cymru Wales is 
enjoying such great and welcome success when its domestic output is tragically low.’514 It has 
made War and Peace, Casualty and Dr Who but it lacks the resources to dramatise 
experiences that more directly speak to people from Cardiff to Caenarfon. Dr Who may be 
about many things but it is not, at least overtly, about the people of Wales. 
There is also the problem, as with Scotland in particular, that a ‘tick box’ approach to 
‘out of London’ programming may not necessarily lead to the emergence of a sustainable 
production infrastructure. Production has indeed been shifted but often by temporarily 
transferring labour and resources during the programme run: the so-called ‘lift and shift’ 
strategy. Additionally, commissioning, finance and most national channels remain within the 
magic circle that surrounds W1A – a pattern that is replicated by the vast majority of big, 
successful, independent production companies.  
So despite the positive impact of increased network spend across the UK, it can be 
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argued that the balance of power has not fundamentally shifted. Key positions—including 
those of director general, director of television, director of England and director of BBC 
Studios—are all still based in London; network production in the nations is now under the 
creative leadership of genre heads based in London while the main conurbations of England, 
with their massive populations, are not directly represented at the BBC’s most senior 
management table in London. Meanwhile, funding pressures remain intense both on the 
nations as well on the BBC’s output across the English regions. Given all these 
developments, one could make the argument that power is now actually more centralised 
inside the capital than it was previously. 
At least some of this has been acknowledged by the broadcasters themselves which 
explains why many are stepping up their commitments, particularly with regard to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. Tony Hall, the BBC’s director general, for example, accepts that 
not enough has been done to provide programming and governance structures that adequately 
reflect the demand for a ‘louder’ voice from the nations. ‘Audiences have told us…that they 
think we need to do more to capture distinctive stories from across the UK and share them 
across the country, as well as doing more to reflect the changing nature of the UK and 
support democracy and culture.’515 He now promises to complement the quotas for network 
content with, for example, new drama commissioning editors in each nation, dedicated 
‘splash’ pages for its news websites and the iPlayer, and increased support for English-
language programming in the nations. In February 2017, Tony Hall announced the creation of 
a new channel, BBC Scotland, backed up by a £20 million investment into Scottish 
content.516 
We welcome these commitments but we note that they do not signify a meaningful 
shift in power away from W1A: decisions about the nations will continue to be taken in 
London while the new drama commissioners will still report to the overall controller of 
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commissioning in London. We believe that a new approach is now needed: one that accepts 
both that a centralised structure and culture can never adequately represent all citizens and 
that a changing political settlement will require a robust response from broadcasters. 
In reality, despite some who thought that any significant shift of production out of 
London might weaken the BBC as a whole, the ‘nations and regions’ strategy was developed 
not to undermine the BBC’s role as a ‘national broadcaster’ but precisely to rescue it. As 
Greg Dyke forcefully argued back in 2005, such changes were necessary ‘if the BBC really 
wants to be the national broadcaster and not what it is today, a broadcaster aimed 
disproportionately at the South of England middle classes. This bias will only change if more 
broadcasters live away from the South-east and more BBC programming commissioning is 
done away from London.’517 For some critics, however, the existing ‘nations and regions’ 
strategy was only ever ‘a response from institutions reluctant to devolve real power, which 
construct this offering as a means to retain control in London.’518 At a time when, as we have 
already argued, more and more decisions are being taken by directly elected assemblies and 
parliaments as well as by mayors, local crime commissioners and unitary authorities in the 
English regions, we feel that a more full-blooded engagement with decentralisation is not 
simply advisable but necessary if the BBC in particular is to retain loyalty from viewers 
across the UK. 
 
A ‘Devolved’ Approach to UK Television 
 
At its most basic level, a devolved television system would simply allow distinct 
communities to decide what stories to tell and how to tell them. The present arrangements, 
based on centralised budgetary, commissioning and editorial control, all too often prevent 
them from doing this. This lack of autonomy has stirred up some lively debates on the 
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possible devolution of television policy. The Institute of Welsh Affairs, for example, argues 
that responsibility for broadcasting ‘should be shared between the UK government and the 
devolved administrations’519 while the academic Robert Beveridge put it to us that Scotland 
should have full control over its media policy.520 In a high-profile speech at the Edinburgh 
International Television Festival in August 2015, the Scottish first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, 
called for a ‘federal’ BBC521, a demand that was rebuffed in the UK government’s 2016 white 
paper but one that we think is likely to resurface in any future referendum debate and that 
merits very serious discussion. While there is little point in this Inquiry pre-empting 
constitutional change, there is also little point in refusing to acknowledge significant shifts in 
the public’s appetite for increased autonomy. 
In the meantime, as Robert Beveridge told us, ‘we need to establish new and better 
ways of working within which to secure the Scottish public interest within the evolving 
constitutional settlement.’522 Following this logic, devolved administrations are energetically 
making the case for further decentralisation. The Scottish government, for example, has 
asked for the ability to spend the £323 million raised by Scottish licence fee payers on 
content and services of its own choosing including, of course, content produced centrally.523 
This form of ‘budgetary control over commissioning’, it argues, could even be achieved 
within the terms of the existing charter and ought to be seen as a fairly basic democratic 
principle. The Welsh assembly is recommending that commissioners for the nations and 
regions should be based in those areas and provided with greater control of network funding, 
‘as a means of increasing the range and diversity of output, both locally and for the 
network’.524 
There appears, however, to be few spaces in UK-wide policy circles in which to argue 
for these sorts of policies without being dismissed as either ‘nationalist’ or ‘parochial’. This 
is particularly the case in Scotland where, as we have already noted, the BBC already 
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receives the lowest performance ratings in the UK. We ought to recognise the strength of the 
Scottish’s government’s mandate to secure more control over the country’s future but we also 
need to disentangle what are sometimes still seen as ‘partisan’ nationalist politics from the 
wider opinions of the Scottish public – not every demand for more autonomy is necessarily a 
full endorsement of Scottish National Party policy.  
So while we welcome the quotas for network spend for and the creation of new 
commissioners in the nations, we believe that real commissioning power should follow shifts 
in production. Too many decision makers continue to walk the same metropolitan (and 
sometimes suburban) streets and eat in the same restaurants to truly appreciate, and hence 
reflect, a fast changing UK. For this to happen, commissioners need to be in charge of 
budgets that should be devolved with them. There is no particular reason why drama 
commissioning could not be based in Cardiff, comedy commissioning in Glasgow and 
children’s commissioning in Belfast. If, as it is mooted, Tony Hall is set to restructure the 
BBC around new divisions focused on education, information and entertainment,525 then a 
new opportunity arises to devolve power via commissioning budgets.  
We also welcome the government’s commitment in its 2015 BBC white paper to main 
minority language television services. Indeed, such programming may be more important 
than ever in a multichannel age and it can hardly be accused of lacking ‘distinctiveness’. The 
arguments for S4C were originally made in 1982 when the UK had just three channels. ‘How 
much stronger’, asked S4C’s Huw Jones at our meeting in Cardiff, ‘are those arguments 
today when the English language offering for the viewer consists of more than 500 channels, 
while in Welsh we still only have the one?’526 We note the fact that the government intends to 
review S4C in 2017 but we are mindful that the government’s commitment to language 
programming has to be backed up with secure, long-term funding. Given the particular 
purposes they serve in relation to national heritage, cultural diversity and education, we feel 
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that they should be at least partially funded by ringfenced money – either from central 
government or another source – and not left to survive on whatever the BBC can find from its 
(declining) budgets.527 
A devolved strategy would also recognize what is possible in other countries. The 
significant success of Danish drama is the result of imaginative government intervention and 
the support of the industry – soft power achieved in subtle ways in ‘smaller’ states. As the 
former controller of BBC Scotland John McCormick told us, devolved structures are 
common in other European countries. ‘While comparable audiences in Ireland and Catalonia 
are each served by half a dozen or more TV channels located in their territory, the German 
länder have one by right under federal law and the Dutch provinces have one. In Scotland, 
apart from BBC Alba we still have the twin TV channel opt out model established in the 
earlier part of the premiership of Harold Macmillan.’528 
As well as a new and more vigorous strategy for the devolved nations, we also need a 
far stronger remit for the English regions with specific responsibility for diverse ethnic and 
faith-based representation. English regions—with the notable exception of the North West—
have failed to benefit from the existing ‘nations and regions’ strategy and, indeed, Bristol has 
had its drama base ‘lifted and shifted’ to Cardiff. Ethnically and socially diverse areas like the 
East and West Midlands and Yorkshire, which are home to far more license payers than those 
in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, enjoy little or no network television production and 
are underrepresented in most genres. The announcement by the BBC to locate several 
departments in Birmingham, including its centre of excellence for skills, recruitment and 
talent development, Diversity Unit and HR functions is very welcome and, in part, a response 
to the energetic campaign run in the city to secure improved broadcast representation. The 
BBC’s agreement to move its online channel, BBC Three, to Birmingham by 2018 is more 
evidence of a willingness to reflect demands for greater investment in infrastructure outside 
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of London.  
We are not arguing that these devolutionary changes should be at the expense of core 
PSB services for the UK where demand remains strong across the nations and regions. 
Indeed, some of the highest viewing figures for network content are in Wales; that fact does 
not preclude the need, at the same time, for more Welsh content. As John McCormick of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh put it in relation to Scotland, ‘it’s important to find a way of 
articulating the need for adequate Scottish public service broadcasting without losing sight of 
the value of existing provision from London, from which we all benefit enormously. And the 
desirability of not harming it.’529 Our point is that public service television—and this is not 
restricted to the BBC alone—will be strengthened if it is restructured on a more democratic 
and accountable basis that recognises both the demand for UK-wide content as well as a 
growing appetite for output that fits the changing political configuration of the UK in the 21st 
century. 
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ARE YOU BEING HEARD?  
Lenny Henry530 
 
 
I made a speech at BAFTA recently, where I spoke about my shock at a Skillset census that 
revealed that between 2006 and 2012, the number of BAME’s (Black, Asian and minority 
ethnic people) working in the UK TV Industry has declined by 30.9%.531 Skillset’s figures 
clearly showed that BAME representation in the Creative industries in 2012 stood at 5.4% – 
its lowest point since they began taking the census. This is an appalling figure, especially 
when you consider that London, arguably the UK’s biggest creative hub, is 40% BAME. 
Interestingly, figures from Directors UK in 2015 show that 98.5% of directors in the industry 
are white.532 
Back then everybody said something needed to be done. Government ministers said 
something needed to be done, the BBC said something needed to be done, Channel 4 said 
something needed to be done and Sky announced their 20% BAME targets. I was invited to 
talk at a Parliamentary Select Committee. Diversity was going to be addressed. Life was 
great. 
But this is where I differed from many of the big TV companies and broadcasters. 
They seemed to think more training initiatives were the easy fix—not training courses for 
those in positions of power on how they could be more diverse and inclusive in 
their employment practices and commissioning—but instead further training for the BAME 
talent base! 
  
290 
They set up tons of BAME training schemes, management training, youth training, 
even trainee commissioners. Now, I am not arguing against training, far from it. Nor am I 
suggesting that these initiatives lack merit or the best of intentions. 
My concern is this: that when the only tangible solution on the table to create 
significant and sustainable change is training, it can be argued that inadvertently the 
perception being perpetuated of the BAME creative community—the reason why BAME 
people are leaving the industry, the reason why our numbers are at their lowest in years—is 
because we’re not good enough. 
Please don’t misunderstand, I am not arguing against training; training initiatives are 
what ensure a strong, capable workforce. What I am saying is by all means create training to 
improve the skill base in the creative industry, but what good is training as a tool to improve 
inclusion and diversity in the industry if the very systems that have inadvertently created the 
problem fail to address their systemic failure? 
So here’s my revolutionary thought; why don’t we change the system? 
[…] I think everyone in the television industry today would agree that ensuring that 
diversity in front of the camera, diversity behind the camera and a diversity of programmes 
and voices that speak to all the nations, regions and communities must be our ultimate goal if 
we are going to truly serve our viewing audiences now and most importantly in the future!  
I think making sure programmes of all different genres being made by a diverse 
production team is just as important as making sure programmes are made by Scottish and 
Welsh production teams.  
If there weren’t enough news and current affairs programmes being made, we 
wouldn’t blame the journalists and give them more training to make better programmes. We 
give a current affairs commissioner a budget and a number of hours on TV and she or he has 
find programme makers to make those programmes. 
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When there aren’t enough programmes from Scotland we don’t give the Scots more 
training. We place more commissioners up there to find good Scottish programme makers to 
make good programmes. 
Let’s do the same to ensure BAME representation. 
Let’s create a number of commissioners and give them real power (and that means 
money) to find productions made by diverse teams to make great programmes. 
And let’s not ghettoise these diverse programme makers by saying they can only 
make programmes about black or Asian issues. Just like Scotland can make Eggheads and 
it’s a Scottish programme, I want BAME professionals to have access to make programmes 
across the TV landscape, from high end period dramas to Panorama. 
[…] We have a once in a decade chance to change history, to make diversity a celebration 
of our nation rather than a problem! 
Let’s make history and let’s all make sure we change the face of the television industry 
forever. 
  
  
SKILLS AND TRAINING INVESTMENT VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE BROADCASTING 
Creative Skillsetdxxxiii 
 
[…] The UK has one of the most vibrant TV production sectors in the world, with an enviable track 
record of producing innovative and high quality content across genres. Our PSB system has been a 
driving force: the PSBs, between them, are responsible for some 80% of total investment in UK 
original non-news content.dxxxiv Independent producers are responsible for around 60% of total 
commissioned hours on the five main PSB channels.dxxxv This has been bolstered by the recent 
introduction of tax credits in PSB related industries.dxxxvi According to the report by Olsberg and and 
Nordicity, the High End TV Tax relief created some 16,800 jobs in the UK and generated some 
£852m for the UK economy.dxxxvii  
Given the rapid pace of change around technology, audience behaviour and business 
models, the demands placed on those working in production are constantly evolving. The 
creation of content and its distribution on multiplatform devices is integral to delivering PSB 
– and this relies on relevant talent and skills.  PSB needs to serve both the media consumer 
and the citizen. A healthy and sustainable media market needs high quality, home-grown, 
innovative content, effective distribution and plurality. Future PSB models need to support 
and invest in our industries’ workforce in order to keep content relevant and our creative 
industries competitive.    
As new platforms and formats emerge, old divides are blurred. A holistic and collaborative 
approach across not just PSBs but all screen-based industries is increasingly vital to ensure that the 
Creative Industries’ talent base can compete globally. This requires upskilling and re-skilling with an 
integrated view and a systematic approach to tackling barriers to entry and enabling progression 
within an ever more casualised workforce.  
 
  
Skills Challenges in the Creative Industries 
Barriers to entry—and the ability to attract, maintain and sustain a highly skilled, creative and 
productive workforce—are critical factors affecting the growth of the PSB workforce. There 
is currently a high proportion of graduates entering the Creative Industries, but a workforce 
from a wide range of backgrounds, with a rich mix of skills is vital to creativity and 
employability. Factors that might influence industry entrants’ social and educational 
backgrounds include the systemic culture of those wishing to gain industry skills having to 
undertake unpaid ‘work experience’: in a 2014 survey of the creative media workforce, 82% 
of those surveyed who undertook work experience did so unpaid.dxxxviii Similarly, there is still 
a lack of open recruitment practices: 71% of the creative media workforce in the same survey 
reported that they heard about their current job through informal routes.   
This arguably affects the current state of diversity in the PSB workforce. Positive 
progress has been made: currently, overall representation of those from BAME groups in the 
TV industry currently stands at 9%dxxxix – which, if compared to BAME representation in the 
overall UK workforce (10%dxl), and compared with similar exercises, shows improvement. 
There is still more to be done, however, and we believe an ideal starting point includes better 
monitoring at a more granular level to help PSBs. There is broad commitment across the 
Television sector to ‘Diamond’, the diversity monitoring system that will provide detailed 
and consistent reporting in a way that has not been possible before and is co-ordinated by the 
Creative Diversity Network.  
 The government’s apprenticeships levydxli could, if implemented effectively, provide a 
timely opportunity for industry to help diversify and supply a cohort of new entrants to PSB. 
As both a graduate and non-graduate route, new apprenticeships could—with industry 
backing—be a powerful driver for greater creative industry workforce diversity via paid, job-
ready entrants. 
  
Creative Skillset has worked with employer groups and training providers UK-wide to 
deliver ‘trailblazer’ Apprenticeship standards. We have developed content for roles including 
broadcast production junior, content producer and props technician – and, at a more advanced 
level, an apprenticeship in outside broadcast. We know from our work with partners 
including Channel 4 and the BBC that the appetite for apprenticeships is growing, and we see 
a positive opportunity for PSB and its supply chain to benefit by working with us to create 
the right content and conditions to ensure that investment delivers the best value for levy-
paying employers. 
Within the current workforce, skills demands have been driven by growth in PSB ‘tax 
relief’ sectors (children’s, TV, High-end TV, film, animation), spurring a demand for rapid 
access to the latest skills and talent. However, in a 2015 survey some 22 out of 24 High-end 
TV companies reported difficulties in crewing for their latest production.dxlii These sectors 
share similar skills requirements, so there is a greater need to sustain a more flexible 
workforce that can move as demand requires between sectors – sharing know-how, injecting 
energy and stimulating innovation and transformation. 
Coupled with this, PSB industries, and TV in particular, comprise a high proportion of 
SMEs, with freelancers forming around 40% of the workforce. Many freelancers work in 
production-related roles: for example, 67% of camera staff and 60% of post-production staff 
are freelance.dxliii Perhaps unsurprisingly, freelancers are more likely to report a training need 
(57%) compared with permanent employees (45%); and 74% claim to experience barriers to 
training and professional development compared with permanent employees (55%).dxliv There 
is a risk of market failure in skills provision since our casualised workforce will, on the 
whole, not have employers investing in their training. The shift toward ‘portfolio’ careers is 
also likely to increase the proportion of freelancers in the PSB industries.  
  
PSB broadcasters are investing in upskilling their workforce through measures such 
as the High-end TV levy, contributing over £4million to training and skills for their 
workforce since 2013. This has resulted in several successful schemes delivered in 
collaboration with Creative Skillset. An example includes the ‘Stepping Up’ Programme, 
which aims to facilitate high end producers’ progression into the role of TV Drama Producer 
across scripted, factual and other broadcast media. This initiative supports ten production 
placements, ultimately supporting talent progression in a critical PSB genre while, at the 
same time, increasing the wider PSB talent pool. Despite this progress, a stronger and more 
coherent industry-wide approach is needed to tackle investment in upskilling and mobilising 
the PSB workforce. […] 
  
  
SKILLS AND TRAINING INVESTMENT VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF 
PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 
Creative Skillset545 
 
[…] The UK has one of the most vibrant TV production sectors in the world, with an enviable 
track record of producing innovative and high quality content across genres. Our PSB system 
has been a driving force: the PSBs, between them, are responsible for some 80% of total 
investment in UK original non-news content.546 Independent producers are responsible for 
around 60% of total commissioned hours on the five main PSB channels.547 This has been 
bolstered by the recent introduction of tax credits in PSB related industries.548 According to 
the report by Olsberg and and Nordicity, the High End TV Tax relief created some 16,800 
jobs in the UK and generated some £852m for the UK economy.549  
Given the rapid pace of change around technology, audience behaviour and 
business models, the demands placed on those working in production are constantly 
evolving. The creation of content and its distribution on multiplatform devices is 
integral to delivering PSB – and this relies on relevant talent and skills.  PSB needs to 
serve both the media consumer and the citizen. A healthy and sustainable media 
market needs high quality, home-grown, innovative content, effective distribution and 
plurality. Future PSB models need to support and invest in our industries’ workforce 
in order to keep content relevant and our creative industries competitive.    
As new platforms and formats emerge, old divides are blurred. A holistic and 
collaborative approach across not just PSBs but all screen-based industries is increasingly 
vital to ensure that the Creative Industries’ talent base can compete globally. This requires 
upskilling and re-skilling with an integrated view and a systematic approach to tackling 
barriers to entry and enabling progression within an ever more casualised workforce.  
 
  
Skills Challenges in the Creative Industries 
 
Barriers to entry—and the ability to attract, maintain and sustain a highly skilled, 
creative and productive workforce—are critical factors affecting the growth of the 
PSB workforce. There is currently a high proportion of graduates entering the 
Creative Industries, but a workforce from a wide range of backgrounds, with a rich 
mix of skills is vital to creativity and employability. Factors that might influence 
industry entrants’ social and educational backgrounds include the systemic culture of 
those wishing to gain industry skills having to undertake unpaid ‘work experience’: in 
a 2014 survey of the creative media workforce, 82% of those surveyed who undertook 
work experience did so unpaid.550 Similarly, there is still a lack of open recruitment 
practices: 71% of the creative media workforce in the same survey reported that they 
heard about their current job through informal routes.   
This arguably affects the current state of diversity in the PSB workforce. 
Positive progress has been made: currently, overall representation of those from 
BAME groups in the TV industry currently stands at 9%551 – which, if compared to 
BAME representation in the overall UK workforce (10%552), and compared with 
similar exercises, shows improvement. There is still more to be done, however, and 
we believe an ideal starting point includes better monitoring at a more granular level 
to help PSBs. There is broad commitment across the Television sector to ‘Diamond’, 
the diversity monitoring system that will provide detailed and consistent reporting in a 
way that has not been possible before and is co-ordinated by the Creative Diversity 
Network.  
 The government’s apprenticeships levy553 could, if implemented effectively, 
provide a timely opportunity for industry to help diversify and supply a cohort of new 
  
entrants to PSB. As both a graduate and non-graduate route, new apprenticeships 
could—with industry backing—be a powerful driver for greater creative industry 
workforce diversity via paid, job-ready entrants. 
Creative Skillset has worked with employer groups and training providers 
UK-wide to deliver ‘trailblazer’ Apprenticeship standards. We have developed 
content for roles including broadcast production junior, content producer and props 
technician – and, at a more advanced level, an apprenticeship in outside broadcast. 
We know from our work with partners including Channel 4 and the BBC that the 
appetite for apprenticeships is growing, and we see a positive opportunity for PSB 
and its supply chain to benefit by working with us to create the right content and 
conditions to ensure that investment delivers the best value for levy-paying 
employers. 
Within the current workforce, skills demands have been driven by growth in 
PSB ‘tax relief’ sectors (children’s, TV, High-end TV, film, animation), spurring a 
demand for rapid access to the latest skills and talent. However, in a 2015 survey 
some 22 out of 24 High-end TV companies reported difficulties in crewing for their 
latest production.554 These sectors share similar skills requirements, so there is a 
greater need to sustain a more flexible workforce that can move as demand requires 
between sectors – sharing know-how, injecting energy and stimulating innovation and 
transformation. 
Coupled with this, PSB industries, and TV in particular, comprise a high 
proportion of SMEs, with freelancers forming around 40% of the workforce. Many 
freelancers work in production-related roles: for example, 67% of camera staff and 
60% of post-production staff are freelance.555 Perhaps unsurprisingly, freelancers are 
more likely to report a training need (57%) compared with permanent employees 
  
(45%); and 74% claim to experience barriers to training and professional development 
compared with permanent employees (55%).556 There is a risk of market failure in 
skills provision since our casualised workforce will, on the whole, not have employers 
investing in their training. The shift toward ‘portfolio’ careers is also likely to 
increase the proportion of freelancers in the PSB industries.  
PSB broadcasters are investing in upskilling their workforce through measures 
such as the High-end TV levy, contributing over £4million to training and skills for 
their workforce since 2013. This has resulted in several successful schemes delivered 
in collaboration with Creative Skillset. An example includes the ‘Stepping Up’ 
Programme, which aims to facilitate high end producers’ progression into the role 
of TV Drama Producer across scripted, factual and other broadcast media. This 
initiative supports ten production placements, ultimately supporting talent progression 
in a critical PSB genre while, at the same time, increasing the wider PSB talent pool. 
Despite this progress, a stronger and more coherent industry-wide approach is needed 
to tackle investment in upskilling and mobilising the PSB workforce. […] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
THE MEDIA CANNOT REFLECT SOCIETY IF SOCIETY IS NOT 
REFLECTED IN THE MEDIA 
Creative Access557 
 
[…] Our evidence is focused specifically on the question of skills and the pool of 
talent from which our creative sector currently recruits. There is a marked lack of 
ethnic diversity in the creative sector’s recruitment processes, which remains a 
significant problem throughout the media and creative industries.  
 
The Scale of the Problem 
 
Media does not represent visually the society that pays its bills. There is a significant 
under-representation of people from black, Asian and other minority ethnic 
backgrounds (BAME) working in the media and creative industries.  
 
• 60% of media workforce is graduate level;558 
• 23% of UK undergraduates are BAME;559  
• Yet 6% of creative sector workforce is BAME;560 
• In television, the figure ranges from 9.5% in terrestrial broadcast to 5% in 
independent production; 
• At senior levels the figures are much lower, circa 3%; 
• Almost one third of all UK creative sector jobs are in London561, where 30% 
of the working population is BAME. 
  
 
UK media is missing out on an enormous pool of talent. This is despite many 
years of efforts by individuals and organisations designed to improve ethnic diversity 
within the industry.  
 
Diversity is Economically Important for the Creative Industries  
 
If this problem is not tackled, in the long run it is the creative sector that will lose out: 
in not recruiting black and Asian workers, it is limiting its labour resource and it will 
be unable to understand and sell back to significant proportion of the of the UK 
population that is non white. There is a vast pool of talent out there and the creative 
sector is currently failing to tap into it.   
It is widely recognised that diversity enhances the creativity within an 
organization.562  From a creative company or organisation’s perspective it makes both 
commercial and ethical sense: if you want your production to link to your audiences 
then your audiences have to be part of the production.   
 
Why the Problem Persists 
 
From Creative Access’ research among media companies, colleges and universities 
and among hundreds of applicants looking to find ways into creative positions, it is 
clear that there are many reasons why access to the creative industries for young 
people from ethnic minority backgrounds is poor.  
These include:  
 
  
• Lack of awareness among BAME young of the opportunities available, 
especially those with no friends or family working in the sector (lacking the necessary 
social capital); 
• The appearance of a closed shop based on networks of personal contacts, 
mentors and role models; 
• A history of ’expenses only’ internship placements for extended periods; 
• Closed recruitment networks within the media; 
• Limited knowledge on the part of school and college career services of the 
opportunities available in the creative sector.  
 
What is particularly clear is that there is no single place for BAME young 
people to look for training and employment opportunities in the creative industries 
and that is where Creative Access comes in. In just over three years, Creative Access 
has placed over 500 BAME interns with 214 media partners across 13 creative 
industry sub-sectors. […] 
 
What More Can Be Done  
 
Those holding the purse strings should use their leverage to promote greater diversity 
and to extend schemes such as the BFI and Channel 4 diversity charters to all 
broadcasters and to secure public funding for creative endeavour. This would 
ensure that companies applying for funding or commissions would be required to take 
practical steps on diversity in order to succeed in business. […] 
 
  
 
DOES TELEVISION REPRESENT US? 
Ken Loach563 
 
[…] Does television represent us? No, absolutely not. Does it do justice to the 
nuances and the subtleties and the intricacies of people’s lives and their concerns and 
their worries? No, absolutely not. It never has. It has marginally done better at some 
times than others. But I want to say that really broadcasting is about control. 
Broadcasting is about ensuring that the main tendency of the state stay in place. Tony 
Benn said once: ‘Britain doesn’t need the KGB, it’s got the BBC.’ And there’s a lot of 
truth in that. It’s about control. 
 Back in the day, there were investigative programmes, there were dramas, 
there was the voice of the individual writer, which did give some variety, which did 
give some acknowledgement of the diversity of the life that we should reflect. The 
voice of the individual writer is very rare now. You have one in Liverpool, Jimmy 
McGovern, who’s a terrific writer, fine writer, he writes brilliantly. But most writing 
in drama now is formulaic. The talent is there, but people are put into a situation 
where the formula transcends the writer because television is about making 
commodities, it’s not about making communications. And in the making of 
commodities you have to shape it and fix it so that it will sell. And then you refine it 
so it has a shelf life, and you sell it for as long as you can, and then you drop it. 
Writing individual communication is much more subtle, much more personal, much 
more driven by what people have to say. Broadcasting is now driven by commodities, 
not communication. It is rarely driven by unearthing something you should know 
  
about, which we do want to know about, it’s driven by questions that the powers that 
be are happy for you to deal with. 
 There’s one story that reveals the role of the BBC when it was at its 
foundation in the early 1920s. Soon after it had been established there was a general 
strike in 1926, and it was a major event. Churchill, who was in the government, 
wanted to deal with the BBC as an agent of government. He wanted to control it. He 
wanted to use it as a propaganda machine. Baldwin, who was Prime Minister, said, 
‘no, no, no, you’re very crude. What is much more convincing is if people believe the 
BBC is independent they will take what it says as important. If they see it as a 
government propaganda sheet they will ignore it.’  
 So what happened was, Lord Reith, who was the man in charge at the 
time, moved into a government office. He wrote the news the government wanted the 
people to hear. He even considered banning the Archbishop of Canterbury from 
speaking because it was thought he might be too sympathetic to the strikers. He put 
out government propaganda, but the people believed it because they believed the BBC 
was independent. The BBC has never been independent from that day to this, and 
that’s why it doesn’t represent us, because the people have interests that the BBC will 
not represent.  
  Because you have to think: who writes the news? Someone goes 
through all the things that come in on the teleprompter or whatever, and somebody 
says ‘well, that’s important, we’ll put that in, and we’ll adjoin it to that, and this is 
how we’ll frame it.’ And then you’ll have the current affairs programmes. Somebody 
decides the editorial line. Somebody says ‘we’ll ask this question, we won’t ask that 
one, that’s the language we’ll use, that’s the subtext of our questioning.’ And the BBC 
is the master of this because the BBC, like the British ruling classes, is urbane, 
  
sophisticated, nuanced, very subtle and knows how to appear to be fair minded while 
actually getting you by the goolies. And that’s the subtlety of the BBC, and they tell 
you what to think without you realising it, and that’s why it doesn’t represent us. And 
it goes to the heart of who they are. 
  They’ve always had political pressure from the 1920s onwards, but of 
course it’s been more intense. When I joined the BBC in the 1960s it was very class 
conscious, but there was a space for a few ruffians from the Midlands in our case, and 
from other parts of the country to come in and do stuff. That is largely closed up now. 
Broadcasting deals with people at the lower end of society. Benefit scroungers, 
poverty porn, fascist TV really. Setting people up to be diminished, demeaned, 
loathed, derided. You could make a list of what the BBC believes in. The BBC 
believes in monarchy. And how they believe in monarchy. They believe in organised 
religion. Most of the people in the country are probably not religious at all. When was 
the last time you heard a Humanist or Secularist on Thought for the Day? Don’t exist. 
No other thoughts. No other view of what you might call one’s spiritual imagination. 
Only organised religion gets a hearing.  
  Most of all they believe in the market. That is the political correctness 
that the BBC espouses. Don’t challenge the market. Politicians are testing them, are 
you business friendly? That’s the test. If you’re not business friendly then obviously 
you’re unspeakable. The free market equals freedom in the eyes of the establishment 
and has reflected through television and broadcasting. Because the BBC represents 
the state, not the government, so the BBC will be dismissive of the far right but give it 
huge coverage because they’re fascinated by it. So you’ll see Farage on and you’ll see 
Trump on wall to wall. They’re fascinated by the far right. Did you see Bernie 
  
Sanders as much as you saw Donald Trump? No, of course not. They hate Corbyn and 
the Labour party now. Absolutely hate it. […]    
  The BBC’s political programmes are a joke. Who thinks watching 
Andrew Neil with that curious haircut is ever going to be about politics? About how 
we live together, about how we teach our children, about how we look after each 
other when we’re ill, how we get work. Is that about politics? Andrew Neil and a few 
deadbeats from Westminster. Is it hell! It’s nothing to do with it. And even if they 
patronise us and put it in a studio somewhere outside London you’ll have the same 
bunch of deadbeats boring us to death again. That’s not about politics. Politics is 
about how we live, it’s how we survive, it’s how we treat each other.  
  I just want to say a couple of other things really quickly. One thing is 
about the huge exploitation in the broadcasting industry. It’s run on people trying to 
get their CVs and working for nothing. It’s run on trainees being forced to do 
overtime without payment. There’s huge exploitation. Any inquiry into broadcasting 
must take that into account, and the BBC must stop commissioning programmes on 
budgets that they know will require them to exploit their workforce. [...] 
  The micromanagement is something else that’s never mentioned when 
they talk about their business. When I began [my career on television], […] there 
were one or two people at the top and a lot of people making programmes. Now 
there’s lots of people telling other people what to do and the person making it. We’ve 
just done an interview for Sky. The cameraman was the recordist, he was the spark, 
he was driving the van, he was working the communication on top of the van. The 
director was holding the mic and was also the sound recordist. That is rubbish. It’s not 
professional. We need to stop the micromanagement from the top and give proper 
budgets for people to make proper programmes. 
  
  Finally, there’s a huge fear of privatisation, but we have to defend 
public broadcasting, we have to make it genuinely accountable. It has to be based in 
the regions with proper budgets, and then those programmes can be broadcast 
nationally so that we speak to each other. We want competition in ideas, we want no 
government control, no appointees from the government telling people what they 
should be organising and making. It happened under all parties, whether it was 
Alastair Campbell or Bernard Ingham564, and it’s certainly happening now. It must be 
independent and it must be democratic, but we must defend public service 
broadcasting, and my god, we’ve got to make it better. 
  
  
 
PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION IN WALES 
Caitriona Noonan and Sian Powell565  
 
[…] Our research and our engagement with the local television sector tells us there is 
certainly evidence of success and a well-placed sense of optimism in Wales. The 
international visibility of the Welsh-language drama Y Gwyll/Hinterland (S4C 2013 -) 
and investments in the new BBC drama studios in Roath Lock and by Pinewood 
Studios are testament to the growing confidence and capacity of the television 
production sector, much of which began with the reimagining of Dr Who in 2005.   
However, mixed with that renewed confidence is an awareness that further 
interventions, resources and accountability are needed if these successes are to be 
fully leveraged by local industry and audiences. […] 
 
The Crucial Role of Public Service Broadcasting and its Broadcasters in Wales 
 
Public service broadcasting plays a crucial role in enhancing citizens’ understanding 
of their culture, history and political system. The process of political devolution in the 
UK has made this event more important but also more complex. […] In Wales 
particularly, there is a limited range of news sources about devolved politics. So, for 
example, a 2016 survey in Wales found that many readers relied on news produced in 
England, or UK-wide news, which has limited information about Welsh affairs.566 
Following the 2014 Scottish Referendum, further power transfer to the National 
Assembly for Wales is being discussed and so consideration should be made to the 
way in which our media portrays the differences between the nations of the UK.567 
  
Therefore, while the provision of an effective PSB service is crucial throughout the 
UK, we believe that it is central to the future of a well-informed citizenry and publicly 
accountable government in Wales.   
One of the biggest changes in television provision in Wales relates to English-
language programming. There has been a significant decrease within both the BBC 
and ITV in terms of both output and spend.568 The consequence of this has been a 
narrowing of programmes and genres in Wales. For instance, there is little content 
produced specifically for Welsh audiences in the genres of arts, children’s, and 
comedy.   
While drama production has been a beacon of success in Wales, this drama 
rarely reflects life in Wales and Wales is solely a location for filming rather than part 
of the narrative setting. This is a major disappointment to both audiences and local 
industry who believe that Wales and Welsh life deserves/needs to be represented both 
to itself in its opt-out service and to the wider UK audience on network television.569 
Without such representation it is difficult to see how the BBC can fulfill at least one 
of its public purposes ‘to reflect the many communities that exist in the UK’ (BBC 
2016).  Successful content like Happy Valley (BBC 2014 - ) and Last Tango in 
Halifax (BBC 2013 - ) demonstrate that there is an appetite amongst audiences for 
content which is specific to a locale and based outside of London.   
In order to achieve the kind of content which represents local communities, we 
would like to see a sustainable change within the BBC which encourages network 
commissioners to engage more proactively with the nations, along with a commitment 
to Welsh-specific content especially on network news and drama. Research by 
Noonan570 suggests that in order for decentralisation of broadcasting services to be 
successful, three ingredients are necessary: financial resources, local decision-making 
  
and cultural commitment to change. We are confident that the provision of each of 
these in Wales will enhance the creative resources of the BBC going forward. 
 
The Future of S4C and Welsh-language Provision 
 
S4C’s contribution to the continuation and survival of the Welsh language has been 
well documented. With so much choice in terms of English language television 
channels, the importance of the one and only Welsh language television channel, S4C, 
should be highlighted at every possible opportunity. The role of broadcasting is to 
reflect audiences and their communities, and in Wales this means both in Welsh and 
English. Therefore it is vitally important that the Welsh language is a visible and 
vibrant part of the television system in the UK. Welsh language broadcasting offers 
Welsh speakers and learners the opportunity to hear Welsh being spoken both 
formally and informally within a range of contexts and on a day to day basis.  
Any efficiency savings regarding PSB should acknowledge the wider significance of 
broadcasting in Wales.  
The ongoing cultural and social impact of S4C is often overlooked when 
metrics concentrate exclusively on economic value. That is not to say that S4C does 
not offer value for money or economic support to the Welsh creative economy. 
Indeed its economic significance is evidenced by the diverse and highly skilled jobs it 
supports directly571 and through the independent television companies and external 
partners it works with closely. It is impossible to compare the funding of S4C with 
other media organizations: S4C doesn’t exist within a multi- channel context, it is the 
only Welsh language channel and, therefore, its unique contribution to the UK’s 
creative and social identity must be taken into account. […]  
  
 
PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING: A VIEW FROM SCOTLAND 
Robert Beveridge572 
 
[…] Scotland has given much to the values, structures and content of public service 
broadcasting. One need only think of the four Johns: John Logie Baird (1888-1946), 
inventor; John Reith (1889-1971), founding Director General of BBC; John Grierson 
(1898-1972), GPO Film Unit and Documentary Theorist; and John Gray (1918-2006), 
producer and Director of ‘West Highland’ the last of the lyrical documentaries and co-
founder of Edinburgh TV Festival. 
 However, the relationship between broadcasting in Scotland and broadcasting 
on a UK basis is analogous to that between the UK film industry and Hollywood. In 
Lord Puttnam’s apposite and acute analysis of the latter, it could be said to be an 
‘Undeclared War’.573  
 At the very least, it can be defined as neglect: sometimes benign; sometimes 
malign but in many cases, and over many decades, a refusal to enable the culture(s) 
and identities of the nation of Scotland to find full expression. 
Media and broadcasting policy is an articulation of the balance of powers in a 
given State. They generally reflect specific historical and political circumstances and 
are always, even by default, an expression of a settlement between various interest 
groups and stakeholders in the context of the prevailing zeitgeist. It was no surprise 
therefore when the Scotland Act 1999 ensured that powers over broadcasting 
remained reserved to Westminster. 
 It was no surprise therefore that when OFCOM was established, there was no 
place at the top table for the voice of the nations, including Scotland. This policy 
  
decision—to have partners on the main board of OFCOM rather than 
representatives—struck at the heart of democratic accountability, however imperfect 
and threw away decades of representation for Scotland, via named members, on the 
regulators who had been merged into OFCOM. 
 It was no surprise therefore that when the Controller of BBC Scotland, John 
McCormick, proposed changes to the BBC Scotland news offer that this was rejected 
by the then BBC Governors, following what can only be described as a conspiracy 
between the then Director General John Birt and the New Labour government, thus 
compromising the independence of the BBC in the interests of the British state. 
 BBC Scotland had proposed, in preparation for devolution, that the news 
offering from BBC Scotland be enhanced by the introduction of what became known 
as the ‘Scottish Six’ i.e. the national (Scottish), national (UK) and international news 
edited and broadcast from Glasgow. 
This was a step too far for the British state but was clearly not in the interests 
of licence fee payers in Scotland nor of the BBC which has continued throughout this 
charter to exhibit worrying and low levels of audience approval in Scotland.574  
 It is not a surprise therefore that the concerns of citizens and consumers in 
Scotland extend beyond the BBC into Channel 3 and Channels 4 and 5. In November 
2014, I enquired into the steps that have been taken by Ofcom to ensure that its 
licensees take full  account of the evidence on problems in reporting—with due 
impartiality, accuracy and balance in news and current affairs—coverage of the four 
nations. In particular, I asked how were the lessons of the King report addressed by 
Ofcom  and what steps have been taken to monitor and report upon these issues?575 
 Ofcom’s reply was far from satisfactory and basically stated that they already 
had guidelines and would continue to monitor their licensees and judge complaints on 
  
a case by case basis. They apparently chose not to draw the attention of their 
licensees—affecting for example ITN and Channel 4 News—to research which was 
and remains relevant in terms of the balance, impartiality and accuracy of reporting 
stories in the complex context of a changing UK. […] 
 The examples provided are but a few of the ways in which Scotland’s 
broadcast structures, cultures and operations have had a mixed experience in the field 
of broadcasting regulation and policy. […] However, it would be churlish to state that 
there has been no progress and it is important to draw attention to the establishment of 
BBC Alba and the enormous success, evident in many indicators, of the quality and 
appreciation for broadcasting in the Gaelic language. 
Indeed, MG Alba and BBC Alba provides a salutary lesson as to what can be 
achieved from minimal investment and one can only hope that further investment and 
statutory or charter security for this indigenous language broadcasting can be secured. 
Further investment over even a few million pounds would reap substantial economic, 
cultural and democratic benefits. […] 
 
Recommendations 
 
The Scottish Parliament should be fully responsible for media policy and media 
regulation in and for Scotland, including BBC Scotland. This would require an 
amendment to the Scotland Act so that powers over broadcasting are no longer 
designated as reserved. […] 
 The scale and scope of BBC Alba should be increased The BBC must increase 
its programme contribution to BBC ALBA from the current 230 hours per annum to 
520 hours to match that of S4C.  
  
 Having the headquarters of a channel with funds and commissioning power 
based in Scotland would transform the Scottish broadcasting and creative industry 
sectors. Incidentally, it might also help the creative industries in the North of England 
and Northern Ireland. At a stroke, this would increase production and thus economic 
impact and investment.  
BBC Scotland needs to have control of its own scheduling and to adopt an 
opt-in rather than an opt-out policy towards programming, thus taking account of the 
distinct and distinctive nature of the Scottish television and media market and patterns 
of consumption. There is no reason why BBC Scotland cannot have some of the same 
independence as STV in relation to London centre. Should in-house production 
quotas and terms of trade allow greater competition and what impact could this have 
on the Scottish broadcasting industry? […] 
The BBC should be required to achieve approval of at least 60% in terms of 
licence fee payer satisfaction with performance in Purpose 4 in each of the nations of 
the UK. […] Failure to meet this target should result in reductions in performance 
related pay for both the Director General and the Director, Scotland as a minimum. 
This recommendation comes after a decade, if not decades, of under performance In 
Scotland and failures to devise and implement policies which enable the BBC to have 
reduced the purpose gap – despite substantial evidence of the problem and 
exhortations from the Audience Council of Scotland and others to do so.  
The real issue is what levers exist to ensure that there is appropriate executive 
action when the purposes are not fully achieved. The evidence has been clear for 
decades. The licence fee payer in Scotland deserves better.  
The BBC tries to support distinctive Scottish content but—to take one 
example which is also a value for money issue—River City is not shown on the BBC 
  
network across the UK. Given the substantial investment in this series—over many 
years—one has to wonder quite why it has not been shown in peak time or even at 
another time. It is not necessarily my choice of programming but that is neither here 
nor there. Why is River City not on the BBC One UK network and what are the 
implications of this?  
This is not a new problem: and it affects how much can be spent on distinctive 
Scottish content. In Scotland we are exposed to numerous adaptions of Jane Austen 
but have yet to make a television series of the renowned, popular and high quality 
Scotland Street novels by Alexander McCall Smith although the BBC in London 
managed the Number One Ladies Detective Agency. […] 
The BBC can also enhance support and development of talent and skills in 
Scotland. The BBC is the UK’s best training operation in television and radio but the 
proposal above to establish a federal BBC would bring about enhanced support and 
development on talent and skills in and for Scotland.  
There needs to be more investment and more programming in Edinburgh, the 
capital of Scotland. At present, Edinburgh must be the only capital city of its stature 
and status in the world to have such a poor broadcasting infrastructure. At a 
minimum, BBC Scotland needs to establish a multimedia studio to do more than radio 
phone-ins and Parliamentary reporting. The BBC’s proposal for the creation of an 
interactive digital service for each of the Nations of the UK could provide an 
opportunity for Edinburgh to be better served. At present the commercial broadcaster 
STV does a better job than the BBC of reporting Edinburgh. […] 
  
 
 
  
Part Six: Public Service Content and Genres 
  
  
CONTENT DIVERSITY576 
 
One of the key ways to ensure a healthy public service ecology is to maintain a rich 
and heterogeneous provision of programming. British television, thanks to its public 
service tradition, is well known for the wide variety of genres that have helped to 
provide a diversity of cultural expression. These genres enable public service 
broadcasters to engage with a range of subject matters, both familiar and new, and to 
entertain, challenge and expose audiences to different experiences. Some of those 
genres - such as big entertainment, quiz shows, reality and comedy - fulfil 
entertainment values and are in good health577, while others are in crisis, due to rising 
costs, a highly competitive pay TV market and the scaling down of commitments 
following changes to the quota regime in the 2003 Communications Act.  
Genres that have been traditionally associated with public service 
broadcasting— 
such as education, natural history, science, arts, current affairs, children’s and 
religion—have now been in steady decline for over a decade. Public service channels 
produce by far the highest levels of original content in these genres and, despite the 
introduction of tax relief for certain areas including high-end drama, live-action 
children’s programming and animation,578 spending across all genres on first-run 
original programmes fell by 15% between 2008 and 2014.579 
A shift to on-demand viewing in recent years has further segmented our 
viewing habits. Although the vast majority of our viewing continues to be live, some 
genres are increasingly viewed on catch-up services. Big entertainment shows and 
sports events often account for the highest proportion of live viewing, compared to 
drama series, which have the highest proportion of on-demand viewing.580 These 
  
trends are significant as they point to the increasing complexity of maintaining public 
service mixed genre provision given an increasing reliance on ‘big data’, consumer 
preferences and taste algorithms that may serve to limit the diversity and visibility of 
a broad range of genres. 
In particular, creating a programme in a more fragmented television landscape 
that reaches a ‘mass’ audience and that contributes to a shared cultural life represents 
a considerable challenge. Today, that responsibility increasingly lies with the ‘big 
entertainment’ shows that have traditionally occupied primetime weekend evening 
slots, and, together with drama, are the most popular genre with the highest audience 
share at 17%. These shows are costly – a 14 week run of BBC One’s Strictly Come 
Dancing or ITV’s X Factor costs in excess of £20 million, as they often involve a 
long production cycle.581 Nonetheless as talent shows generate several hours of 
programming each week, their cost per hour remains lower than that of drama. But 
they are hugely important to public service channels, who are the most successful 
innovators of entertainment genres and biggest producers of television entertainment 
formats, with the ability to commission ‘more new titles every year than any other TV 
system in the world,’582 because of the ratings and profile they generate. Other genres, 
such as children’s, arts and current affairs for example, are in a far more fragile 
condition for a variety of reasons. 
 
News and Current Affairs 
 
Television news has for over half a century been one of the most valued and popular 
public service genres. It remains the key platform through which ordinary citizens 
access news with two-third of adults turning to television compared to 41% who go 
  
online.583 The traditional narrative is that through the provision of impartial and 
accurate information across a range of domestic and international topics, television 
news has sought to develop informed citizenship and to promote active participation 
in democratic processes. Current affairs complements these noble objectives and, 
through research and in depth analysis, aims to investigate events of interest to the 
public and to monitor the affairs of powerful elites. Yet, both genres are now in crisis 
albeit in different ways. 
The crisis is not one of falling levels of output. Buoyed by the growth of a 
multichannel environment, total news and current affairs output has actually increased 
across the PSB networks since 2009. The picture is uneven of course: while hours 
have increased on BBC One and Channel 5, they have fallen on BBC Two, ITV and 
Channel 4.584 It is partly a crisis of investment – spending declined by 14% between 
2008-2014585 while at the same time newsrooms are producing more hours of material 
with fewer staff. 
In terms of television news, however, the crucial development is that 
audiences are simply starting to switch off. While the average viewer watched 119 
hours a year in 2010, this had fallen to 108 hours by the end of 2014, a decline of 
some 10% in four years.586 The change is particularly intense on the public service 
channels:  Thinkbox, using BARB figures, reports an 18% decline since 2003 in 
audiences for TV news bulletins on the public service channels in contrast to only a 
7% decline across the whole multichannel environment.587 Some broadcasters are 
feeling the effect more than others – viewing figures for the ITV Evening News, for 
example, had dropped from 3.4 million viewers on weekday evenings in 2010 to 2.5 
million by late 2015588 while the BBC’s share of a declining field has actually 
increased in recent years.  
  
The crisis is particularly acute when it comes to younger audiences who are 
far more developed in their consumption of online news. Thinkbox reports that 16-34 
year olds now watch an average of six minutes a day of TV news on the main 
channels, down from 13 minutes a day in 2003. 16-24 year olds watch even less TV 
news with their annual consumption down 29% since 2008 with the average young 
adult watching only just over two minutes a day.589 This reflects an attitudinal as well 
as a technological shift. As Luke Hyams formerly of short-form video specialists 
Maker Studios told us at our launch event: 
 
Generation Z are growing up in a time when these ever present social media 
platforms are free, unfiltered and enable anyone with a smartphone to become 
a broadcaster. The voices and opinions that they interact with on these services 
are devoid of perceived journalistic bias or an agenda and tell it like it is with 
a raw, unedited delivery that most young people have come to accept as the 
norm.  
 
Where does this leave public service broadcasters like the BBC? The 
independent position and distinct voice of the corporation seems to be lost 
upon swathes of this generation, who look upon the BBC as just another voice 
of authority in an increasingly crowded media landscape.590 
 
We therefore agree with the authors of a recent report on the future of 
television news that the crisis needs to be immediately addressed. ‘Television news is 
still a widely used and important source of news, and will remain so for many people 
  
for years to come, but if television news providers do not react to the decline in 
traditional viewing and the rise of online video…they risk irrelevance.’591  
 None of this means that television bulletins have lost their influence as a 
source of news and television is still, according to Ofcom, ‘by far the most-used 
platform for news.’592 Jeremy Tunstall argues that the BBC remains the UK’s news 
agenda setter593 and, while social media and online video are central to any future 
vision of the news, the role of existing PSB news providers is still crucial in shaping 
how we talk about matters of public interest. For example, in Northern Ireland, the 
media academic Ken Griffin told us that the BBC and UTV remain ‘the main source 
of objective news and current affairs coverage’ and are able to offer an alternative to 
the country’s print media which, he argues, ‘consistently exhibit political bias.’594 
Similarly, in Wales, Sian Powell and Caitriona Noonan of Cardiff University argue 
that there is only a limited range of news sources about devolved politics in Wales 
and so the need for effective public service broadcasting is ‘central to the future of a 
well-informed citizenry and a publicly accountable government in Wales.’595  
Indeed, social media have not replaced the ability of the major news bulletins 
to set the tone for ongoing national debates around major political issues like elections 
and economic matters. It is, we believe, a sign of the increasing politicization of the 
whole media landscape (and therefore a reminder of the need for the BBC and other 
broadcast organizations to be meaningfully independent in editorial matters) that 
serious complaints were made, for example, about the BBC’s coverage of the 
independence referendum in Scotland in 2014 and about its approach to austerity 
where, as one researcher concluded, its bulletins were ‘almost completely dominated 
by stockbrokers, investment bankers, hedge fund managers and other City voices.’596 
  
Impartiality is a worthwhile objective as long as it is not used to police the divisions 
that burst to the surface at times of major political conflict. 
Public service news media must meet especially demanding standards of 
impartiality when dealing with topics where there are significant differences of 
opinion (although, of course, they should not seek to avoid topics that are deemed to 
be ‘controversial’). Impartiality is not secured merely by allocating similar amounts 
of time to ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ voices. Many issues that matter for the public, or for 
specific sections of the public, are complex and there should be no expectation either 
that there are only two positions to be covered or that the ‘Westminster consensus’ is 
necessarily the most appropriate starting place. On the other hand, neither does 
impartiality refer to the affordance of equal airtime to ‘sense’ and ‘nonsense’. 
According to Professor Steve Jones, the BBC’s coverage of climate change, for 
example, has at times given unwarranted attention to a small number of climate 
change ‘deniers’: ‘Attempts to give a place to anyone, however unqualified, who 
claims interest can make for false balance: to free publicity to marginal opinions and 
not to impartiality but its opposite.’597 Impartial coverage requires both an 
engagement with a range of informed positions and a commitment to drawing on 
credible evidence as opposed to unsubstantiated claims. 
The nature of the ‘crisis’ in current affairs is rather different. There was a 
steep decline in current affairs provision in the 1980s and 1990s598 followed by a 35% 
fall in output between 1992 and 2002.599 Yet, in recent years, far from falling off a 
cliff, the average consumption of current affairs appears to be increasing with a 52% 
rise in viewing time since 2003 across all channels (albeit with a slightly smaller rise 
of 23% on the main PSB channels).600 Ofcom figures also show a 10% rise in hours 
produced across the schedule between 2009-2014 with BBC Two and Channel 5 
  
showing increases of nearly 60%. The situation is not quite so rosy when it comes to 
peak-time current affairs where a majority of the overall increase is accounted for by 
the BBC’s digital news channel and where both BBC One and ITV show less than 
one hour a week of current affairs.601 
The problem, therefore, is not about the total number of hours transmitted but 
with the very delicate position that current affairs occupies in a ratings-driven 
environment. Despite the public’s appetite for high quality investigations and 
analysis, current affairs programmes remain expensive to produce and do not attract 
the largest audiences. That they still continue to feature in prime-time schedules is 
largely to do with the obligations placed on public service broadcasters by regulators. 
According to one anonymous producer quoted in a 2013 report on the future of 
current affairs, ‘if there were no regulation, current affairs would disappear overnight. 
It would legitimise the race for ratings’; another argued that ‘broadcasters’ 
commitment to current affairs is dubious and is slipping fast. They are doing our stuff, 
but grudgingly, because they have to. There is relentless pressure to soften what we 
do.’602  
There appears to be a quite different atmosphere—and of course a very 
different financial landscape—from the 1970s when programmes such as ITV’s 
World in Action, This Week and Weekend World reached collectively 20 million 
viewers a week and had huge resources thrown at them.603 The small increase in peak-
time current affairs output since 2009 has been matched by a 14% fall in spending and 
there is anecdotal evidence, according to Steven Barnett, ‘that there is now more 
emphasis on the personal, the human interest and on celebrity issues than in the late 
1990s.’604 ‘Infotainment’ is gradually replacing output that used to focus on 
international stories and costly investigations. Channel 4’s Dispatches and the BBC’s 
  
Panorama remain the cornerstones of this latter genre but they are becoming 
increasingly reliant on ‘safer’ topics such as consumer or lifestyle stories.605 In the 
light of these shifts, we want to reiterate our commitment to in the democratic 
importance of ‘accountability journalism’606. We believe that not only should the 
quotas remain (and in the case of ITV, as we have already argued, increased) but that 
there needs to be a revival, monitored by Ofcom, of the ‘hard-hitting’ investigative 
strands that have produced some of the most celebrated output of British television 
like World in Action’s programmes on thalidomide in the 1970s. 
We believe that the lives and concerns of all citizens, but especially young 
people and ethnic and other minorities, are too often underserved by the journalism of 
existing public service providers. Young people, for example, often don’t see their 
world and their concerns covered in a comprehensive and relevant manner. This 
alienates them and pushes them towards more energetic newcomers such as Vice 
Media who operate outside of the formal public service compact. The dominant 
culture of journalism fails to reach these and other minorities and too often seeks to 
manufacture an unsatisfactory consensus by over-representing the centre ground. At a 
time of growing disillusionment with traditional parliamentary politics and, especially 
in the light of increased devolutionary pressures, we believe that news providers need 
to adopt not simply a more technologically sophisticated grasp of digital media but a 
model of journalism that is less wedded to the production of consensus politics and 
more concerned with articulating differences. Television, as Richard Hoggart reminds 
us in relation to the Pilkington Inquiry, ‘should not hesitate to reflect ‘The quarrel of 
this society with itself’, even though politicians may not like the result.’607 We believe 
that this is the case today just as much as it was in 1962.  
 
  
Drama 
 
Drama, including soaps, is one of the most popular genres associated with the remit of 
public service. The genre’s popularity, with an average audience share of 17% in 
2015, is matched by its high costs. As one of the most expensive genres, a typical, 
prime-time homegrown drama costs between £500,000 and £1 million per hour.608 
While public service channels continue to be highest investors in the genre, Ofcom’s 
2015 review of public service broadcasting reported a 31% fall in investment in 
original drama since 2008.609 Although audience satisfaction with drama is stable,610 
BARB figures show that the average time spent watching drama series and soaps on 
the main channels fell by 50% between 2003 and 2015.611 
This does not appear to signal a lack of interest in drama itself as falling levels 
of investment by PSBs has been, at least in part, offset by a huge increase in co-
productions and pay TV platforms offering globally appealing US content. Streaming 
services such as Netflix and Amazon appeal to younger demographics, and the 
subscription take-up has been exponential, with almost a quarter of UK households 
subscribed to Netflix by the end of 2015.612 They are changing our viewing habits too, 
with ‘binge viewing’ becoming an increasingly popular way of engaging with quality, 
complex drama. The domination of US content is also clear with a doubling of 
American scripted shows, from 200 to an estimated 409, with content produced for 
streaming media experiencing the largest jump.613 Netflix has recently promised to 
spend $5 billion on programming and to produce 600 hours of new content in 2016 
alone.614 
While this increase is not directly linked to the fall in drama spending in the 
UK, it clearly makes the market more competitive, a situation welcomed by the 
  
BBC’s head of drama, Polly Hill, who points to the need for PSBs to take risks in 
developing fresh ideas and engaging scripted content.615 Yet, while this might be an 
extra push to increase the already high standards of UK drama, not all public service 
channels are able or willing to take up this challenge, with ITV, a channel 
traditionally associated with high-end dramas such as Downton Abbey or Mr 
Selfridge, recording an alarming 65% drop in drama investment since 2008.616  
The pressure to produce popular, high-budget drama has also led to an 
increasing dependence on US investment – reflected in a growing reliance on UK-US 
co-productions. The BBC’s recent adaptation of John Le Carre’s novel The Night 
Manager was coproduced with US TV channel AMC while Andrew Davies’ 
adaptation of Tolstoy’s War and Peace for BBC One was coproduced with the 
Weinstein Company. Netflix has also invested in UK specific content, namely the 
British drama The Crown, filmed at Elstree Studios, but also the third season of 
Charlie Brooker’s Black Mirror, with Channel 4 losing the right to show the season’s 
first run as a result.617 This is not limited only to high-end drama and the US market 
alone. Michael Winterbottom’s quirky The Trip moved from the BBC to Sky Atlantic 
for its third season reflecting the BBC’s inability to ‘compete with the financial 
resources which Sky Atlantic was able to commit.’618  
While there are clear advantages and benefits to such collaborations, 
notwithstanding increased investment opportunities and increased international 
recognition for British talent and content, US/UK co-productions tend to cultivate a 
specific subgenre of ‘period and fantasy world dramas’619 or novel adaptations, which 
do not necessarily lead either to risk-taking or, for that matter, making ‘British stories 
for British audiences’ but to content with a broadly international appeal. This is an 
issue that has been repeatedly addressed in relation to the need for television to reflect 
  
the full diversity of life in the UK as we discussed in the previous chapter and that 
was raised at several of our events.620 Furthermore, much like sports, commercial 
pressures have, in the past, resulted in audiences losing out, with quality scripted 
shows like Mad Men, The Wire and The Sopranos migrating behind paywalls, out of 
reach of their loyal viewers who had previously watched them on public service 
channels. 
  
  
CHILDREN AND PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 
Sonia Livingstone and Claire Local621 
 
[…] Children are defined as persons aged from 0-17 years old in the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, ratified by the UK.622 Children represent one fifth of the 
UK population (and the entirety of the future population), yet in discussions about 
broadcasting, they are often overlooked as a group with specific needs and are easily 
lost under umbrella terms (‘audience,’ ‘public,’ ‘viewers,’ ‘households,’ 
‘population’). Given broadcasters’ practical struggle to appeal to teenagers, they 
appear tempted to define ‘children’ as under 12. Problematically, the BBC and other 
public service broadcasters (PSBs) have substantially cut provision for teenagers and, 
increasingly, for younger groups.623 But children’s needs from infancy through to 
adolescence should be recognised and provided for, as children develop intellectually, 
emotionally and socially. 
Much has been said on the future of public service content, the growth of 
multiple platforms, new market and regulatory pressures, and changing audience 
preferences and practices, among other widely debated topics.624 However, little 
attention has been paid to the role that public service television plays in educating, 
entertaining and broadening the horizons of children in the UK. This paper focuses on 
how public service television625 can better serve a child audience that spends on 
average at least 35 hours per week consuming broadcast, on demand and online 
content626. 
We divide the domain of children’s content by defining ‘broadcasting’, 
‘television’ and ‘public service’ as shown in the table that follows. While our focus is 
on the two cells that encompass ‘public service television’, we argue that it is crucial 
  
to grasp the relationships between public service television and commercial content 
on the one hand, and between public service television and other public service 
content on the other. 
 
 
 
CHILDREN’S  
CONTENT 
Public service content Commercial 
content 
Television Television on a TV 
set 
Live and recorded 
viewing on a TV set 
e.g. CBBC programmes e.g. CITV or the 
Disney Channel 
Television not on a 
TV set 
Live viewing 
on  network connect 
device, such as a 
laptop, tablet, 
smartphone, games 
console etc. 
e.g. CBBC programmes 
via iPlayer live 
e.g. CITV online 
live 
Other television 
On demand viewing 
on a network 
connected TV or other 
e.g. CBBC programmes 
viewed via iPlayer or 
YouTube 
e.g. CITV or 
Disney 
programmes 
viewed via CITV 
  
device, such as 
laptop, tablet, 
smartphone, games 
console etc. 
online or 
YouTube 
Other 
content 
Other content 
Includes audiovisual 
(e.g. games, film) and 
print, web, music and 
other content 
e.g. information and 
games on 
www.bbc.co.uk/cbbc, 
NASA Kids’ Club site, 
Wiki_for_Kids, 
KidzSearch 
e.g. CITV or 
Disney web 
content, Miniclip, 
MovieStarPlanet 
 
Children Still View Public Service Television on a Television Set 
 
Care is needed regarding popular claims about children’s changing media practices as 
they are easily overstated and often under-evidenced627. Despite pessimistic 
predictions about children and TV, children are not deserting broadcast television in 
general, or public service television in particular. According to Ofcom’s 2015 
Children and parents: media use and attitudes report, ‘the amount of time 8-11s and 
12-15s spend online has more than doubled since 2005, with 12-15s now spending 
more time online than watching TV’ – where ‘watching TV’ is defined as watching 
TV exclusively on a TV set.628 But for children aged 3-11, viewing on a TV set 
exceeds internet use. For 12-15 year olds, although internet use now exceeds 
television viewing on a TV set, they nonetheless watch as much or more television on 
a TV set as do 3-11 year old children.629 Indeed, 96% of children aged 5-15 use a TV 
  
set to watch television and the majority (87%) of viewing of broadcast TV among 4-
15 year olds is of live television630. This matters because of the social situation that 
such viewing is typically associated with.631 […] It also matters because of issues of 
social and digital inequality and inclusion. The assumption that all children are able to 
access content via the internet neglects the minority who lack internet connectivity at 
home: Ofcom estimates one in ten 8-11 year olds and one in twenty 12-15 year olds 
are without internet at home at around632. In short, children’s public service 
broadcasting on television continues to serve a valuable and valued function in UK 
society. 
 
Is Children’s Television Viewing Really In Decline?  
 
The above data are insufficient for claims and predictions about children’s changing 
media practices. While it may seem obvious that children are increasingly watching 
television on devices other than a TV set—usually a tablet or laptop—to the best of 
our knowledge this trend has not been measured. We know 96% of children aged 5-15 
view television content on a TV set, and 45% of the same age range view television 
on other devices.633 We do not know how much time children spend watching TV on 
devices other than a TV set, nor how many of the hours spent ‘using the internet’ 
include viewing television content. Thus we do not know the balance between time 
spent watching TV on a TV set and on an internet-enabled device, nor the balance 
between time spent on TV content and other online content.634 
 […] Discussion of PSB in the current media landscape must distinguish 
television content from television viewing devices and measure both, by age group. 
Are children moving away from live TV to on demand services? Are they are 
  
replacing TV content with other activities such as (non-TV content on) YouTube or 
online games? Without answers to such questions, we cannot say how much time in 
total children spend consuming PSB services offline or online, or evaluate how 
valuable (or not) PSB provision may be to children. It would be premature to 
determine future provision of public service television viewed by children without 
clear answers. 
Yet this has already happened. BBC Three, the BBC’s ‘youth’ channel whose 
target audience includes 16 and 17 year olds, now exists only as an online service635 
and no PSB in the UK offers systematic programming across the full age range of 
children (0-17).636 This contravenes Article 17 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, ratified by the UK, which stipulates that, concerning media, children should 
have access to a variety of information and material.637 This lack of provision is often 
framed as broadcasters responding to children’s preferences for accessing content, but 
it cannot be distinguished from the alternative, that children are responding to 
broadcasters’ reduction in provision for them. 
 
The Case for Online Provision of Children’s Public Service Television 
 
[…] The BBC is the only PSB to have an online platform dedicated to children’s 
content that neither collects their personal data nor carries commercial sponsorship or 
advertising.638 ITV and Channel Five have online platforms targeted at children 
(CITV and Milkshake TV) but both include adverts.639 Channel 4 does not have an 
online platform dedicated to children nor a dedicated space on its online website, 4od. 
For children, therefore, options for viewing non-commercial public service television 
content are limited.640 This matters both because of the adverse effects of exposure to 
  
advertising641 and because commercial broadcasters tend to omit a range of content of 
value to children.642 
Meanwhile commercial services increasingly target the child audience (or 
‘market’). Either providers of children’s online content collect and exploit children’s 
personal data or the boundary between advertising and programming is increasingly 
blurred.643 Paid advertising on digital platforms is subject to guidelines, but 
‘commercial content is not. This is problematic insofar as Youtube becomes 
increasingly popular with children, where they can watch vloggers, ‘unboxing’ videos 
(where presenters discuss new products they have bought), and other ‘endorsement’ 
videos644. […] 
 In addition to legitimate concerns surrounding children’s increasing exposure 
to commercial content, any decline in public service provision risks the loss of 
positive opportunities for children to engage with quality content that informs, 
inspires, and entertains them. 
 
The Case for Online Provision for Children of Other Public Service Content 
 
It is increasingly difficult (and inadvisable, in terms of children’s experiences of 
content) to evaluate the contribution of television content separately from the 
proliferation of other forms of online content and services available to children online 
– think of web content, games, quizzes, parental guidance, links to further content 
options (both television and other), online communities, and so forth.  
It seems obvious that online content of all kinds can, and do, enhance the 
experience of television content, including public service content.645 It also seems 
obvious that the choice to spend time on television content—broadcast or not, public 
  
service or not—along with the benefits to be gained will be shaped significantly by 
the wider online environment in which television content is positioned and viewed. 
PSBs and other providers have long been working on exactly this assumption. Our 
point here is that a range of other public service content must be considered when 
evaluating the situation for public service television. But here we face a further 
evidence gap that impedes effective decision-making. We know remarkably little 
about what content children engage with on the internet. The main systematic 
measurement of online content use relies on Ofcom’s646 reporting of comScore data 
of the ‘top 50 web entities accessed by children aged 6-14 from desktop and laptop 
computers.’ This is problematic for our present purposes as it excludes tablets, 
smartphones and other devices. The use of the concept ‘web entity’ is also 
problematic, as this includes entities which are not updated with content such as 
Microsoft, or websites for downloading apps. Still, it shows that children’s top twenty 
web entities accessed in 2015 were, in rank order: 1. Google; 2. MSN; 3. BBC; 4. 
YouTube.com; 5. Facebook and Messenger; 6. Yahoo; 7. Amazon; 8. Wikipedia.org; 
9. Windows Live; 10. Roblox.com; 11. Mode Tend Parenting; 12. O.UK; 13. eBay 
Sites; 14. Disney Entertainment; 15. Microsoft; 16. Steam (App); 17. Safesearch.net; 
18. Origin; 19. Animaljam.com; 20. Adobe.com. 
Even if one considers all 50 sites, it is immediately apparent that children are 
accessing considerable amounts of commercial content, much of it designed for a 
general (adult) audience. It is also clear that these data tell us little about children’s 
choices of television or other content, public service or commercial content, child-
appropriate content or other. Nor is it clear where such data are to come from. 
Children’s online activities constitute a major part of their media experiences, but 
there is little information about the content involved or the consequences of engaging 
  
with it available in the public domain to inform policy. Such data as are collected 
rarely evaluate content and use against child-specific criteria of value or benefit.647 
[…] 
 
The Case for Enhancing the ‘Discoverability’ of Children’s Public Service 
Content 
 
Insofar as there is good quality content—television and other—available for children 
online, how are children (or their parents) to discover it? Discoverability poses a new 
and pressing challenge for public service content providers – and for the children and 
their families who could benefit from such content. […] 
 This in turn poses a major challenge to the scalability and sustainability of 
public service providers, especially those that are small, niche or catering to minority 
groups. 
PSBs have traditionally played a valuable role in exposing their audience to 
mixed diet schedules, thereby encouraging viewers to watch programmes on subject 
matter that they may not seek out unprompted but may yet enjoy. A concern with 
children locating content through search engines or YouTube is that these 
‘mainstream’ as many people as possible towards highly ranked sites (or to other sites 
like those the child has already visited648).  
Safety considerations also lead parents to restrict their children’s freedom to 
search the internet widely,649 as well as favouring the ‘walled gardens’ built for 
children online by both public and, especially, commercial providers. Our risk-averse 
society worries about— 
  
rather than welcomes—support for children’s freedom to search in creative ways 
online, discovering new and surprising content and exploring at will according to 
interest. 
What can be done? We are intrigued at the investment of the German 
government in Ein Netz für Kinder, a search engine designed for children to increase 
the discoverability of high quality content for children online.650 We also note the 
efforts of Google to produce KidzSearch, and possibly other initiatives exist. We are 
not aware of independent evaluations that show how many children these reach, 
whether they are effective, or whether they help in the discoverability of public 
service content by children. […] 
  
  
PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION AND SPORTS RIGHTS 
Paul Smith and Tom Evens651 
 
Sport has long been a vital part of the range of different programme genres provided 
by UK public service broadcasters (PSBs). In fact, the very existence of the UK’s 
sporting calendar owes much to the growth of public service broadcasting during the 
twentieth century.  As described by the broadcasting historian, Paddy Scannell:   
 
Consider the FA Cup Final, the Grand National or Wimbledon. All these 
existed before broadcasting, but whereas previously they existed only for their 
particular sporting publics they became, through radio and television, 
something more. Millions now heard or saw them who had little direct interest 
in the sports themselves. The events became, and have remained, punctual 
moments in a shared national life. Broadcasting created, in effect, a new 
national calendar of public events.652 
 
If anything, the ability of PSBs to bring the nation together with live coverage 
of major sporting events is even more valuable today. In an era of multi-channel 
digital television and increasingly fragmented audiences, live television coverage of 
major sporting events remains one of the few forms of programming able to bring the 
nation together for a shared viewing experience. In 2013, for instance, when Andy 
Murray became the first British winner of the men’s singles title at Wimbledon for 77 
years, he was watched by a (BBC) television audience of over 17 million. Perhaps 
even more impressively, over 90 per cent of the UK’s population watched (at least 
some of) the BBC’s coverage of the 2012 London Olympic Games, with audiences 
for the opening and closing ceremony each exceeding 25 million. However, the 
access of viewers to live television coverage of events like these in such huge 
  
numbers is dependent on their continued availability via the BBC, and/or other 
commercially funded PSBs. 
 
The Twin Threat to PSB Sports Coverage 
 
A combination of the escalating costs of sports rights and a squeeze on its own 
finances means that there is a very real danger that sport (and particularly live sport) 
will become an increasingly marginal feature of the BBC’s (and other PSBs) output.  
Driven largely by the growth of pay-TV since the 1990s, the increased value 
of the rights to popular sports and competitions, such as Premier League football (see 
Table 1), means that without regulatory intervention (see below) live coverage (or 
even highlights coverage) is increasingly beyond the budget of PSBs. Since its 
inception in 1992, not a single live Premier League football match has been broadcast 
live by a UK PSB. Instead, PSB coverage has been restricted to highlights coverage, 
and even here there has been a significant increase in the value of the rights, from 
£104 million paid by the BBC (seasons 2004-5 until 2006-7) to £204 million agreed 
by the Corporation in 2015 (seasons 2016-17 to 2018-19).     
 
Years Value (£ millions)  
1992-97 191 
1997-2001 670 
2001-2004 1,200 
2004-2007 1,024 
2007-2010 1,706 
  
2010-2013 1,773 
2013-2016 3,018 
2016-2019 5,136 
Table 1: The value of (UK) live Premier League football rights. Source: BBC 
(2015)   
 
While most extreme in the case of Premier League football, other sports have 
also seen significant increases in the value of their rights over the last couple of 
decades, perhaps most notably the Olympic Games (see Table 2) and English cricket, 
which saw a trebling of the value of its rights—from £15million to £50 million—
when it moved from free-to-air PSB coverage to pay-TV.653  
 
Years Value (US$ millions)  
1998-2000 422.1 
2002-2004 514.0 
2006-2008 578.4 
2010-2012 848 
Table 2: The value of Europe-wide Olympic Games TV rights (summer and 
winter). Source: IOC (2015) 
 
Alongside rights inflation, the BBC’s capacity to secure sports rights has also 
been undermined by recent cuts to its own funding. Following the 2010 licence fee 
settlement, the BBC cut its sports rights budget by 15 per cent and committed itself to 
limit spending on sports rights to an average of 9p in every licence fee pound.654 
Furthermore, the announcement in the 2015 Budget that the BBC is to take on from 
  
the government the £600 million-plus annual cost of providing free TV licences for 
people aged over 75, has resulted in further reductions in spending on sports rights, 
with an additional annual saving of £35 million targeted by the Corporation.655 
The impact of the BBC’s shrinking sports rights budget is already evident. In 
February 2015, it was announced that the BBC had lost the live rights to the Open 
Golf Championship to Sky, bringing to an end sixty one years of live coverage of the 
event on free-to-air television. In a similar vein, in December 2015, the Corporation 
announced that it had decided to terminate ahead of schedule its contract with 
Formula One (originally due to end in 2018). To avoid a similar fate with other sports, 
the BBC has looked to share the cost of rights with other PSBs where once it was able 
to command exclusive coverage. Most notably, in July 2015, the BBC and ITV 
announced a joint six year deal to offer live coverage of Six Nations Rugby, with ITV 
offering all England, Ireland and Italy home matches and the BBC covering Wales 
and Scotland home matches. This strategy may well enable live coverage of at least 
some key sporting events to remain on free-to-air television, but it cannot disguise a 
significant dilution in the capacity of the BBC to achieve its key public service 
objectives.     
 
The Public Value of BBC Sport   
 
For the BBC, sports coverage provides an important means to achieve some of its key 
‘public purposes’. Specifically, the BBC has emphasised the importance it attaches to 
continuing to offer a broad mix of UK and international sports coverage that includes: 
major events that bring communities and nations together; minority sports that bring 
communities of interest together and broaden cultural horizons; and sports serving 
  
audiences that are otherwise under-served by the BBC, such as young men, lower-
income and ethnic minority audiences.656  
Alongside its already pragmatic attempts at alliances with other PSBs, the 
BBC also should look to maximise the public value of its sports coverage by 
continuing to provide extensive coverage of minority and or growing sports, which 
are often available at a relatively affordable cost. For example, the BBC has recently 
agreed deals: to provide live coverage of snooker’s three biggest tournaments until 
2019; to launch innovative new coverage of the increasingly popular, particularly 
amongst younger sports fans, mixed martial arts competition, Ultimate Fighting 
Championship (UFC), via BBC Three; and, continues to build on its popular coverage 
of women’s international football.   
The BBC and other PSBs should also highlight the benefits of the universally 
available free-to-air coverage they can provide.  Some major sports organisations, 
such as the AELTC (Wimbledon tennis) have long appreciated the value of such 
coverage for the long- term popularity of (and commercial sponsorship opportunities 
available for) their sport and have opted to remain available via PSBs. Other sporting 
organisations, such as the ECB (English cricket) have experienced the disadvantages 
of moving to pay-TV. In 2005, Channel Four’s coverage of Ashes cricket reached a 
peak audience of 8.2 million. Four years later, following the sale of the exclusive TV 
rights to Sky, the audience peaked at 1.9m and, in 2013, just 1.3 million. Last 
summer, when England clinched victory in the First Test Match of the series, the TV 
audience was just 474,000, only marginally more than a repeat of Columbo being 
aired at the same time on ITV3! Cricket may well be earning far more from the sale of 
its rights to pay-TV, but it is less and less part of the national consciousness.  
 
  
Regulation: Protecting the ‘Crown Jewels’ of Sport and PSB   
 
Against the background of escalating rights costs and reduced funding for PSBs, the 
position of the BBC (and, albeit to a slightly lesser extent, other PSBs) in the UK 
sports rights market is more dependent than ever on the continued existence (and 
effective enforcement) of listed events legislation, which effectively guarantees that 
certain key national sporting events (the so-called ‘crown jewels’ of sport) remain 
available on free-to-air television. […] 
 The listed events policy remains a vital safeguard for the preservation of major 
sporting events and competitions on public service television. For example, in June 
2015, the IOC announced that it had agreed a Pan-European deal with Discovery, the 
owner of the pay-TV broadcaster, Eurosport, for the exclusive rights to the Olympic 
Games, between 2018 and 2024 (although only for 2022 onwards in the UK). This 
meant that the BBC had lost control of the rights to broadcast the Olympic Games. 
However, listed events legislation has ensured the sub-licensing of rights for free-to-
air coverage in the UK, which was agreed between Discovery and the BBC in 2016, 
as part of an exchange deal, which also included the sub-licensing (from the BBC to 
Discovery) of pay-TV rights for 2018 and 2020.  
Just as, if not more significantly, Sky agreed an exclusive deal for live 
coverage of Formula One racing between 2019 and 2025. As part of the deal, Sky has 
proposed to broadcast the British Grand Prix (as well as two other races) free-to-air 
via its planned new channel, Sky Sports Mix, intended to showcase Sky Sports 
programming to potential new subscribers. While the British Grand Prix is not a listed 
event, as the law stands (the Broadcasting Act 1996, as amended by the Television 
Broadcasting Regulations 2000 and the Communications Act 2003) it may be possible 
  
for a pay-TV broadcaster, such as Sky or BT, to broadcast a listed event by adopting a 
similar approach. This is because the existing legislation only requires an event be 
available via a ‘qualified service’, which is defined as available free-to-air to 95 per 
cent of the population. In such a scenario, the letter of the law would not be breached, 
but the spirit of legislation intended to ensure easily accessible coverage of national 
sporting events and a shared viewing experience almost certainly would be. For 
example, BT recently employed this type of approach as part of its exclusive live UK 
coverage of UEFA Champions League football. According to reports, BT’s 
commitment to offer a number of high profile matches, including some of those 
involving English teams, on a free-to-air basis, via its BT Showcase channel, was an 
important factor in convincing UEFA to agree to an exclusive pay-TV deal. However, 
the matches broadcast via BT Showcase have, to the frustration of UEFA’s sponsors, 
attracted far fewer viewers than the free-to-air coverage previously offered via PSB 
(ITV). Taken together, these developments highlight the need for the tightening of the 
listed events legislation so as to restrict live coverage of listed events to designated 
PSB channels, either by making this requirement a clearer part of the legislation 
and/or by amending the existing regulation to include a more detailed audience 
requirement (e.g. a minimum average peak time audience rating).   
The growth of pay-TV has provided benefits for both viewers and sports 
organisations, but this does not lessen the case for listed events legislation. The 
argument for such legislation is based on its potential to promote (and/or preserve) 
‘cultural citizenship’ in two key ways. First, listed events legislation may be justified 
on grounds of equity. For instance, Ofcom has highlighted the rising cost of pay-TV 
subscriptions for UK viewers657 and, given the spiralling cost of recent rights deals, 
these costs are only set to increase. For example, in 2016, Sky announced that the 
  
price of its Sky Sports package was to increase by £2.75 a month to £27.50, meaning 
that a the cost of a year’s subscription to Sky Sports will be more than double the cost 
of an annual television licence. The continued (and growing) exclusion of low income 
groups from access to sporting events broadcast exclusively on pay-TV is exacerbated 
by the UK government’s reluctance to fully implement changes to listed legislation as 
recommended by the Davies Review.658  
Secondly, one of the main benefits of ensuring that major sporting events are 
broadcast on free-to-air television is the generation of what economists refer to as 
‘positive network externalities’. In simple terms, an individual not only enjoys the 
event and the ‘conversational network’ through viewing, their participation also adds 
value to the network for everyone. This concept is highly significant to the debate on 
the future of PSB, and listed events legislation in particular, because it can be seen to 
apply to the difficult to quantify, but no less real, shared benefits that can result from 
the coverage of major sporting events on universally available free-to-air television – 
think London 2012 and the ‘feel good factor’.   
The opposition of many sports organisations to the listing of their sports is 
based on the belief that they are best placed to judge how to further the interests of 
their own sport, and in particular how to balance the potentially increased revenue to 
be gained via pay-TV with the benefits (not least commercial via increased 
sponsorship revenue) of greater exposure through free-to-air broadcasting. Even 
though the example of English cricket suggests that this may not always be the case, 
the key argument in support of listed events legislation is not that policy makers and 
regulators know better than individual sports organisations how to promote the best 
interests of a particular sport. Rather, it is, as noted above, that the wider public 
interest in the form of cultural citizenship is served by the availability of particular 
  
sporting events on free-to-air PSB television. For sports organisations whose events 
are protected for free-to-air coverage, the existence of listed events legislation may 
well be a source of frustration, but it is not particularly unusual in democratic 
societies for certain property rights to be subject to state regulation in the public 
interest. Planning laws mean that those who live in heritage properties cannot do with 
them exactly what they want. To promote cultural citizenship and to preserve public 
service broadcasting, the same is true for sports organisations and listed events. 
  
  
SECURING THE FUTURE FOR ARTS BROADCASTING  
Caitriona Noonan and Amy Genders659 
 
[…] In 2014 Tony Hall, director general of the BBC, announced that the Corporation 
would place the arts centre-stage across all BBC platforms. 660 While this offers some 
good news for both those working in that area of programming and audiences with an 
interest in the subject of arts, the wider trend is one of decline. 
Research commissioned by Ofcom categorises arts television as a genre ‘at 
risk’ of disappearing as relatively small audiences are unable to offset increased 
production costs.661 A decline is also evident in Ofcom’s own research which finds 
that in the five years to 2011 spending on arts programming by the five main 
terrestrial broadcasters fell by 39%.662 Regular strands, which arguably are the 
lifeblood of any genre, have been cancelled, for example, The Review Show (BBC 
1994-2014), or moved to niche subscription channels, for example South Bank Show 
(ITV 1978- 2010; Sky Arts 2012 – ). Meanwhile, ITV and Channel 5 broadcast little 
regular arts content, and Channel 4’s peak-time arts output fell from 30 hours in 2009 
to just 19 hours in 2014.663 There is a clear downward trend in the visibility of arts 
content within the schedules, particularly during peak-time.   
This decline is the confluence of a number of factors. Decreases in 
commissioning and production budgets mean fewer resources for producers. Within 
specialist factual genres such as arts, this can have a limiting effect on the coverage of 
the subject, access to expertise, and the aesthetics of the final programme.  
Furthermore, our research directly highlights that even within the PSB’s traditionally 
aligned to serving niche audiences, in a more competitive, multi-channel environment 
the commercial necessity of appealing to a mass audience has become the norm. This 
  
has had a direct impact on the tone, subject-choice and scheduling of arts leading to 
accusations of marginalisation and ‘dumbing down’.  
Two further unique elements underscore the need for intervention within the 
arts genre specifically. Unlike UK-originated children’s content, which has had some 
success in accessing international markets, arts television has historically been a 
national construct and rarely sells beyond national markets. It often struggles to find 
an international audience at a time when many PSBs and independent producers are 
looking to expand their revenue streams through overseas content and format sales. 
Furthermore, the genre’s decline in peak-time makes arts content less attractive to 
independent production companies and over the past decade there has been a marked 
decline in the number of production companies specialising in this content. Given the 
structural and commercial changes in the television sector, both of these limitations 
suggest that the downward trajectory of arts content on British public service 
broadcasting is unlikely to be reversed without a deliberate strategy to save it. 
 
Why is Arts Broadcasting Vital? 
 
One of the founding principles of PSB is that broadcasters should engage with the 
totality of life in Britain including its cultural life and artistic community. For a large 
portion of the population, television is their primary way to engage with the arts 
across the UK. If this genre disappears from free to air channels it denies access to the 
whole population to the range of arts and culture available. It also renders a whole 
area of society effectively invisible at a time when the Warwick Commission argues 
that ‘too few of the population have access to as rich a culturally expressive life as 
  
might otherwise be open to them.’664 Therefore, marginalizing art and culture on 
television further marginalizes these spheres in everyday life. 
British arts and culture is a globally successful sector communicating British 
creativity and ideas worldwide. It is a significant employer, with cultural and creative 
sectors constituting ‘the fastest growing industry in the UK.’665 However, it also 
contributes to local wellbeing and features in a variety of national policy agendas 
including health, education, urban regeneration and social inequality. Television 
offers it further reach and visibility that has both economic and cultural value.  
Content which is critical and engages with debates on the sustainability of the arts 
contributes to a more vibrant sector. In return the arts sector makes important 
contributions to the television sector and the wider creative industries in terms of 
creative innovation and talent. This is a delicate ecosystem and so the health of the 
creative industries depends on the health of the arts and cultural sectors and vice 
versa. 
Despite claims that we have moved into a ‘post-broadcast age’, the findings of 
reports such as that by the Warwick Commission suggest that ‘TV remains a key 
feature of most people’s everyday cultural life.’666 In order for broadcasters to fulfill 
their remit for public service a mixed ecology of programmes is needed ranging from 
drama to sports, news to comedy. Arts, of course, needs to be part of this mix. A 
strong arts proposition will serve to offer audiences high quality, informative 
programmes which speak to the diversity of creativity in the UK and beyond. 
Everyone should have access to the arts regardless of economic or social background 
and a healthy public broadcasting system will reflect these values. […]  
We believe there are both economic and cultural rationales for greater provision of 
content for and with young people.  Undoubtedly, young people have different 
  
consumption habits (e.g. preference for online consumption rather than linear 
schedules). Yet arts programming has the potential to offer novel forms of engagement 
and opportunities for creative expression and further investment should be made into 
developing innovative content creation and distribution strategies that reflect this. 
Engaging with young people in this way will also encourages them to see the arts as a 
viable career aspiration thereby strengthen the sectors. 
We also believe there is a need for greater diversity in arts broadcasting in terms of 
subject matter and form, and in the diversity of those working in this genre behind and 
in front of the camera. Our research found that many within the field regard current arts 
provision as too narrow in its focus and often reluctant to take creative risks. The arts 
are one of the most vibrant and diverse areas of public life and it is important to have 
programming which reflects this. Public service broadcasters must provide space to 
take creative risks and should strengthen their distinctiveness through investment in 
programming that is creative in both style and content. We also advocate an ongoing 
commitment within all PSBs to diversity through paid training opportunities extending 
access to this professional space beyond those from more privileged backgrounds. […] 
  
  
PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
Daniel Jackson667 
 
 
In most appraisals of democracy today the news media figures prominently. This is 
for good reason: it is the main channel of communication between elected 
representatives and citizens; and (self-appointed) watchdog of the powerful. The 
performance of the news media with respect to civic engagement is thus much 
debated and often maligned. […] 
While news organizations are sometimes reluctant to accept the responsibility 
that comes with such power, it is implicit in the core principles of journalistic 
philosophy, whereby attempts to constrain or censor the news media are seen as 
threats to democracy itself.668 But these normative roles also are surrounded by many 
tensions that surround the ability of our news media to perform their democratic 
functions. Borrowing from Bennett and Entman,669 I’ll discuss four of these tensions. 
 
Tension 1: Diversity versus commonality.  
 
The media landscape continues to expand rapidly. Media fragmentation and 
segmentation have expanded the genres of what can be termed ‘political’. There is 
also undoubtedly more news and journalism circulating in the public sphere than ever 
before, which should be considered a good thing. 
However, segmentation and fragmentation do bring potential dangers as well. 
Firstly, in a commercially dominated system that is driven by the demands of 
advertisers, audiences can be segmented by technological access and spending power, 
  
not cultural or civic needs.670 The resulting risk is that the market disregards some 
citizens who are less desirable to advertisers. As Gandy671 explains, the targeting of 
ever more specialised and smaller groups serves to undercut a common public culture. 
In this sense, segmentation can be implicitly anti-civic and anti-collectivist.  
Secondly, changes in the way we engage with media (increasingly mobile, 
networked, web-based), together with the affordances of these devices and platforms 
(e.g. algorithms, data-driven, user-led ‘pull mediums’) are all pointing in the direction 
of increased personalisation of our media consumption, including news. This has 
numerous consequences. Two that I would like to highlight here are that for the 
interested citizen, there has never been more information available to learn about 
political issues, but conversely, at the same time it has never been easier to avoid 
political fare either. Secondly, as research in online news consumption is beginning to 
show, increasing personalisation in media consumption can lead to ideological 
homogeneity (also knows as a ‘filter bubble’), where we consume news that fits 
within our ideological biases, and can filter out that which doesn’t.672 
The challenge for PSBs is to maintain a sense of shared identity in their 
offerings, so as to foster a culture that still values civic life. It should also offer 
moments where audiences can (inadvertently or through choice) be challenged by 
political views that may contrast with their own. This means that PSBs must offer a 
range of ideological viewpoints from across the political spectrum.  
 
Tension 2: The information necessary for citizens to participate effectively in 
democratic life, versus the entertainment-driven focus of an increasingly 
commercial-oriented media.  
 
  
Here, I will spare readers from the somewhat staid arguments about dumbing down673, 
but instead warn of some other dangers of the increasing corporate and commercial 
bias of our news media, which emanate from the organisation and structure of the 
media itself. As profit-seeking entities, commercial media organisations are reliant on 
advertising as the primary source of their income. As political economists have noted, 
this dependence can come at the expense of editorial independence.674 
Whilst many journalists and editors might scoff at such suggestions of advertiser 
influence, there is growing evidence of other subtle ways in which the relationship 
between journalism and promotional industries (advertising, marketing and PR) are 
changing. For instance, a number of recent studies have documented the growing 
influence of public relations material in the news, raising questions of editorial 
independence.675 Similarly, news organisations—in the search for new income 
streams—are increasingly working collaboratively with brands through ‘branded 
content’ and ‘native advertising’ initiatives, which blur the lines between news and 
advertising. 
Whilst the response of news organisations to such accusations is often one of 
defiance, there is no doubt they are still very real threats – to editorial independence, 
to the normative concept of a fourth estate and in my view, to democracy. I will 
explain why, with respect to the next tension. 
 
Tension 3: The need of the media to treat people as citizens on the one hand and 
as consumer publics on the other.  
 
If we consider the media environment as a whole, there can be little doubt that we are 
overwhelmingly addressed as consumers rather than citizens. The circulation of 
  
goods, the material and symbolic meanings of commodities, and the dominant 
position of advertising in its many forms make civic culture look diminutive in 
comparison to consumer culture. 
News and journalism are not immune from this process. The consumer model 
of news is now well established in the UK.676 It is precisely because of news 
organisations’ treatment of the audience as consumer and not citizen that some of the 
processes described above are able to take place.  
According to McChesney, the consequences for democracy of a consumer-
centric news media system are serious, as they carry a huge implicit political bias: 
‘Consumerism, class inequality and individualism tend to be taken as natural and even 
benevolent, whereas political activity, civic values and anti-market activities are 
marginalised.’677 The news media are thus central in the definition of culture in terms 
of consumerism and not citizenship. For him, the combination of neoliberal media 
policies and corporate media culture tends to promote a deep and profound de-
politicisation of society, evidence of which can be seen across the western world, and 
the USA in particular. In the UK—to the extent that it is not with us already—we 
should not think we are immune to such developments, especially given recent 
developments in media policy.  
 
Tension 4: Broadcasters’ relationship with the press  
 
UK news broadcasters are mandated to be impartial, accurate and fair. As such, they 
provide a counterbalance to a highly partisan press. But this is a delicate balance.  
Studies consistently show that UK broadcasters are susceptible to following the news 
agendas of the press. This might not be so problematic if our press were a) not so 
  
overwhelmingly right wing and b) concentrated in so few hands. In the 2015 UK 
general election, we saw a super-charged Tory press, aligned with the agenda of the 
Conservative Party, that was remarkably successful at setting the news agenda of the 
terrestrial broadcasters.678 Just as worrying was the 2014 survey679 that found that the 
UK public holds a number of (quite grave) misapprehensions about many key public 
policy issues, such as immigration, welfare and crime. Such a collective failure is 
something our news media, including PSBs, should be ashamed of.  
We know what to expect now from the UK press. Therefore it is imperative 
that public service broadcasters offer us news that is distinctive, independent, and as 
free as possible from the biases implicit in commercial news and broadcasting.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Underwriting all of these tensions are the market forces of a largely commercial 
media landscape. Compared to the US system, British broadcasting has traditionally 
remained relatively protected from the worst excesses of the market, but this is not 
inevitable or permanent, especially given the current political landscape.  
The BBC is also not immune from these tensions. Whilst its news operations 
have seen relatively fewer newsroom cuts compared to the commercial sector, the 
BBC arguably acts too much like a commercial broadcaster at times, and news output 
is not always as distinctive or independent as it could or should be. But the question 
here is whether the BBC’s funding model is driving this type of news, or whether 
there are other factors, such as journalistic culture and corporation strategy. I would 
argue the latter. […] 
  
  
TUNNEL VISION: THE TENDENCY FOR BBC ECONOMIC AND 
BUSINESS NEWS TO FOLLOW ELITE OPINION AND EXCLUDE OTHER 
CREDIBLE PERSPECTIVES 
Gary James Merrill680 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on a very specific element of television’s role in promoting a more 
creative and robust public culture, namely the economic and business journalism 
produced by the BBC. Despite increased competition from online news organisations, 
BBC News holds three of the top five positions in the overall rankings681. The BBC is 
also rated as a highly trustworthy source of economic and business news682 and since 
the financial crisis, there has been a substantial increase in audience interest683. 
Economic and business news equips the public with essential knowledge and 
understanding to make informed decisions—as consumers, workers, tax payers and 
citizens—and is a vital element of the BBC’s journalistic output. Unfortunately, only 
around a fifth of viewers believe that the Corporation gives a ‘fair and balanced 
picture’ of the economic environment684. For these reasons, it is important to take a 
critical look at the impartiality of the BBC’s journalism in this sphere.   
 
The Left-Wing Problem 
 
The central role that public service broadcasting plays in British democracy was 
clearly demonstrated during the 2015 UK general election campaign. Among the 
countless interviews, numerous speeches and the endless analysis, one quote from 
  
BBC TV’s coverage stands out because it exemplifies a formidable challenge facing 
the Corporation. It came from then Ukip leader Nigel Farage who, during a heated 
interaction on BBC 1’s Question Time, said:  
 
There just seems to be a total lack of comprehension on this panel and, 
indeed, amongst this audience, which is a remarkable audience even by 
the left-wing standards of the BBC.685 (emphasis added)  
 
Farage’s contention that BBC habitually tilts left is not unique. Indeed, this 
belief is oft-repeated686 with columnists in the Conservative-supporting press 
particularly strident in their views. The Daily Mail’s Richard Littlejohn, for example, 
even saw evidence of this tendency in the BBC’s 2014 ‘austerity-laden’ Christmas 
TV schedule687. Public opinion also sways in the same direction: according to an 
Opinium/Observer poll in 2013, 41 percent of respondents said the BBC displays 
some bias, and of these twice as many people thought it favours the left rather than 
the right.688 Overall, only 37 percent placed the BBC as neutral which, for an 
organisation that has a statutory duty to impartiality, should be a concern for 
regulators, journalists, programme makers, and the general public alike. The 
challenge is even greater in the context of economic and business news: the 
Corporation’s own research689 has revealed that audiences do not fully understand the 
coverage; they would like it to ‘relate more to their own circumstances’; and ‘only 22 
percent believe it gives a fair and balanced picture.’  
 
The ‘Anti-Business’ Fallacy  
  
Impartiality is a legal requirement of the BBC Charter and a core editorial value690 
and applies equally to all output. It is impossible to be perfectly impartial in every 
news item, of course, and so BBC journalists are obliged to show ‘due impartiality,’ 
which 
 
… requires us to be fair and open minded when examining the evidence 
and weighing all the material facts, as well as being objective and even 
handed in our approach to a subject. It does not require the 
representation of every argument or facet of every argument on every 
occasion or an equal division of time for each view.691 (emphasis added).  
 
Achieving due impartiality clearly requires high-level editorial decisions that take into 
account the reporting of an issue over time. The BBC has a devolved editorial 
structure by which authority is given to programme and unit editors who follow the 
principles of the Corporation’s code of conduct but take responsibility for their team’s 
output692. Hence, although the BBC has clear guidelines on impartiality at an 
institutional level, how these are implemented is largely the decision of editors.  
 The BBC did not have a business editor until 2001 when it appointed Jeff 
Randall to the role. In his five-year tenure, Randall remodelled the Corporation’s 
business coverage on the premise that the BBC he had joined: ‘was culturally and 
structurally biased against business.’ 693 This tendency was so pronounced, said 
Randall in another interview, that: ‘on the whole, they [the BBC] treated business as 
if it was a criminal activity.’ 694 Randall’s perception that the Corporation was fiercely 
‘anti-business’ added fuel to the perennial belief that the BBC was ‘left wing.’ In 
  
2007, such views contributed to the commissioning of a major study by the BBC 
Trust into the impartiality of the Corporation’s business reporting.  
If the BBC’s journalism were ‘anti-business’, as Randall et al maintain, one 
would expect BBC news to generally favour organisations and viewpoints 
traditionally associated with the left. However, the author of a 2007 study, Alan Budd, 
found no ‘evidence of systemic (anti-business) bias’ 695 but he did discover a neglect 
of news from the perspectives of investors and workers. Indeed, the author noted 
indifference to the coverage of labour issues: 
  
Around 29 million people work for a living in the UK and spend a large 
proportion of their waking hours in the workplace. However, little of 
this important part of UK life is reflected in the BBC’s business 
coverage. 696  
 
The belief that the BBC is ‘anti-business’ or indeed, ‘left-wing’ in general, is often 
informed by naked opinion and prejudice. However, as suggested by the Budd Report, 
the systematic and methodical analysis of news points to economic and business 
journalism of quite a different hue.  
 Whereas Budd noted an underrepresentation of organised labour, a study of 
BBC Radio 4’s Today programme’s coverage of the UK government’s bank rescue 
plan in 2008 revealed the exclusion of other arguments from the left697. The author 
assessed the extent to which competing solutions to the banking crisis were given 
exposure and credence. If the BBC had been true to the accusations of left-wing 
tendencies, then nationalisation, a flagship of left-wing thought, would have 
dominated. However, the option that took centre stage in the programme’s coverage, 
  
injecting public money or the ‘bank bailout’, was supported by virtually all key 
sources, mostly from the City of London. In contrast, nationalisation was barely 
mentioned or quickly dismissed. 
 
Opinion Beyond Westminster and the City 
 
It is important to note that Budd’s assessments were made against a definition of 
impartiality from a previous BBC publication, the Neil Report, which requires the 
Corporation’s journalism to be ‘fair and open minded in reflecting all significant 
strands of opinion, and exploring the range and conflict of views.’698  
 What constitutes: ‘significant strands of opinion’ is clearly open to debate. 
The leading political parties’ viewpoints are naturally included, but because no party, 
at the time of writing, currently offers a coherent and comprehensive alternative 
economic narrative, one could argue that views from beyond the broad parliamentary 
consensus are insignificant by definition. However, in the light of capitalism’s evident 
fragility—the financial crisis and the subsequent global recession—one might expect 
the BBC, as a public service broadcaster, to give greater exposure and credence to 
alternative discourses. 
 Alternative economic discourses undoubtedly exist, and high-profile critics 
include Nobel Prize winners Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, and the international 
financier, George Soros699.  Numerous writers, journalists and academics have also 
questioned core neoliberal assumptions and asked whether markets serve the public 
interest well. Other authors have focussed on the brutality of an economic system that 
prioritises unfettered profit maximisation over social concerns.700 In addition, there 
are countless NGOs, trade unions, grassroots pressure groups, and other organisations 
  
that have their own specific issue with the modern market economy. Indeed, despite 
the major political parties’ convergence in policy, there is evidence that the world’s 
publics are not convinced. In 2009, a major international survey701 found widespread 
disillusionment with capitalism. In only two countries did more than 20 percent of 
people think it was working well, and a higher proportion thought it ‘fatally flawed.’ 
Globally, there was also significant support for more government regulation of 
business and a fairer distribution of wealth702. 
 Despite this widespread—and often very credible—scepticism toward 
capitalism, academic research suggests that BBC journalists focus their attentions on 
opinions from Westminster and the City of London. The inevitable consequence of 
this tunnel vision is that viewpoints from outside a narrow corridor of power are 
largely excluded. In the case of the ‘bank bailout’, nationalisation was advocated by 
some leading economists but it had little support among the British financial and 
political elite. As a result, BBC journalists felt no obligation to include this option in 
debates.703 The same phenomenon was also evident in a comparative analysis of the 
reporting of economics and business by four British news providers704. In total, the 
author analysed some 1,625 articles published by the BBC News website, the 
Guardian/Observer, the Telegraph Group, and the Times/Sunday Times. For each of 
three issues—economic globalisation, private finance in public services, and 
supermarket power—all four news organisations tended to gravitate to the business 
and political elite for information and opinion and, with the possible exception of the 
Guardian/Observer, generally excluded the views of individuals and organisations 
critical of neoliberalism and big business. Most significantly, the analysis revealed 
that the political content of the BBC’s reporting had far more in common with 
newspapers traditionally associated with the right than the left.705 […] 
  
 
Toward a More Inclusive Journalism 
 
Despite the studies outlined above, the economic and business news of the BBC has 
received relatively little interest from researchers. Consequently, the belief that the 
BBC is ‘left-wing’ in this context has never been robustly tested, and so it persists. 
There is scant evidence to suggest that this perception might be well-founded and 
research to date suggests that the converse is more likely. Indeed, the case for the 
antithesis was strengthened by a candid admission from the former economics (and 
business) editor of the BBC, Robert Peston, who said the Corporation tends to follow 
the agenda of the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail. ‘If I’m honest,’ he said, ‘…the 
BBC’s routinely so anxious about being accused of being left-wing, it quite often 
veers in what you might call a very pro-establishment, [a] rather right-wing direction, 
so that it’s not accused of that.’ 706  
 Given the importance of impartiality in BBC economic and business 
journalism to public debate, more research is clearly needed. The Budd Report was a 
useful start but it was published before a period of deep introspection for many 
practitioners that was prompted by the financial crisis.707 Furthermore, there was no 
comparative element and so Budd could not benchmark the BBC’s output against 
other news providers that have distinct political positions. Hence, this paper 
recommends the commissioning of a post-crisis study which assesses the extent to 
which the BBC and other news organisations award exposure and credence to ideas 
from outside of the Westminster-City of London axis. It is vital that such an inquiry is 
carried out with the support of BBC journalists and other editorial staff, and it is 
  
hoped that the findings of the subsequent report would inform the evolution of the 
BBC’s economic and business output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Part Seven: Recommendations and Afterword 
  
  
HOW TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION 
Chris Tryhorn708 
 
Recommendation 1: The UK’s broadcasting ecology must be maintained 
 
The word ‘ecology’ is often used to describe the mix of broadcasting provision in the 
UK, and it seems an apt term. It conjures up the way in which different broadcasters 
and producers feed off each other, in terms of ideas and nurturing talent, and how a 
number of idiosyncratic entities live alongside each other, competing and co-existing. 
These organisations play a role in supporting the wider creative industries and 
encourage grassroots creativity too. The notion of an ecology has for some time been 
gaining ground in the arts world, where there are increasing attempts to map the 
subtle interdependencies and overlaps of interest between the commercial, publicly 
subsidised and amateur spheres.709   
The point about most ecologies is that they permit delicate balances to be 
maintained; pull on one thread and things can unravel. We should be very careful 
about upsetting those balances in the television world. It is not unimaginative or 
somehow reactionary to argue for the preservation in broad terms of the status quo 
when the status quo has a proven track record of working. 
In such a context, and given the lack of clarity from the government, it is 
important to make the case that public funding for the BBC should be maintained and 
Channel 4 must not be privatised. Such radical upheaval at either broadcaster could 
have untold consequences, and the uncertainty needs to be cleared up. 
BBC and Channel 4 have a virtuous effect on the rest of the TV market, by 
setting standards and thereby improving the overall quality of output. ITV’s aspiration 
  
to make high quality UK-originated drama is bolstered by creative competition with 
the publicly funded BBC, for example. Would Sky be as committed to arts 
programming were it not for the existence of the BBC? 
The quality of the BBC and Channel 4’s output, and their ability to be freed, at 
least to some extent, of commercial constraints stems directly from the way they are 
set up as organisations: their public ownership and, in the BBC’s case, the direct 
relationship with viewers that public funding entails. Commercial ownership – or in 
the BBC’s case, commercial funding – would inevitably dilute their commitments to 
public service output, whatever regulatory constraints were formally imposed.  
Thinking about the BBC and Channel 4 together can help to define their 
respective purposes. It makes sense to treat the two questions in conjunction for a 
more holistic sense of the broadcasting ecology and the role of public service 
television within it. 
 
Recommendation 2: The BBC needs to have its funding futureproofed 
 
The BBC should remain publicly funded, as argued above. Crucially, though, this 
funding needs to be futureproofed to take account of changes in technology and 
consumption. It needs to be funded honestly and not continually raided by 
opportunistic governments using it to pay for media infrastructure projects or 
politically motivated schemes. 
The TV licence fee is a peculiar throwback to a bygone era of broadcast 
monopoly and spectrum scarcity. But as a means of funding today’s BBC it seems 
preferable to the alternatives, including the most suggested option, voluntary 
subscription, which would probably lead to the BBC becoming a premium service for 
  
more affluent citizens.710 The universality of the fee guarantees the BBC scale and 
allows it to aspire to reach everyone in the UK. The government has narrowed the 
options down to a reformed licence fee, a media levy, or a hybrid licence fee and 
subscription model.711 The first two options are preferable.712 
It is time to ditch the anachronism of a ‘TV licence fee’ and adopt the 
platform-neutral term ‘BBC licence fee’, creating at the same time an opportunity to 
make the funding more honest. The BBC should no longer have to bear the costs of 
projects that the government ought to be funding.713 The level of its funding should be 
set sustainably to bring an end to continual cost-cutting and debilitating uncertainty.  
 
Recommendation 3: Channel 4’s status as a publicly owned publisher 
broadcaster needs to be set in stone 
 
Channel 4 has enormously enriched British television since it was launched in 1982. 
Viewed now, in the multichannel age, when ITV is arguably no longer the public 
service broadcaster it was, its importance seems greater than ever. It is vital that the 
UK retains at least two broadcasting organisations that are unambiguously committed 
to public service, as the BBC and Channel 4 are. If it were left just to one, ie the BBC, 
the competition in terms of quality that exists across the television marketplace would 
be diminished. 
Channel 4’s business model—publicly owned, commercially funded, a 
‘publisher-broadcaster’ that produces none of its programmes—is idiosyncratic, but 
none the worse for that. It takes its public remit seriously, but privatisation would 
threaten that remit. Even if a sale tied the buyer to certain regulatory requirements, it 
  
would necessarily change Channel 4. No one is likely to buy it without wanting to 
make a profit; and regulatory requirements can always be gamed. 
 Such an existential threat will always lurk in the background, without more 
fundamental backing for the Channel 4 model. The government should set out 
unambiguously that Channel 4 will remain in public hands and that it sees it as a 
critical part of the UK’s broadcasting ecology.  
Action may also be needed to support Channel 4’s ability to make public 
service programmes. Ofcom has put forward interesting suggestions about changing 
the regulatory model as the advantage of EPG prominence diminishes.714 
 
Recommendation 4: We need to decide whether we really want ITV and Channel 
5 to do public service television – and get a fair deal from that 
 
One could be forgiven for not realising that ITV and Channel 5 are public service 
broadcasters.715 It is not something either broadcaster makes much of.716 Programmes 
outside news that are obvious examples of public service television do not always 
spring readily to mind. 
In the past, when ITV was the UK’s only commercial broadcaster, the viewers 
switched on and the advertising revenues rolled in, so public service output was no 
threat to the business model, and in fact was a crucial part of the licence award 
process. Now, amid vast competition, getting ‘eyeballs’ is ITV’s priority, and the 
main ITV channel’s position at channel 3 on the EPG has been a key advantage. 
The question for the public here is: who is getting the better deal, the 
broadcasters or the public? Are ITV and Channel 5 doing sufficiently good public 
service programmes to deserve their high EPG slots? The problem is that the 
  
regulatory requirements are made in vague terms: a better audit needs to be made. We 
need to decide whether they really are fulfilling their remit as public service 
broadcasters, and whether they should up their game as such.  
This is an important question as the next generation of TV interfaces is likely 
to see the traditional EPG model transformed beyond recognition. It would definitely 
be in ITV’s interests to gain prominence on future interfaces as their business model 
depends on being the UK’s biggest commercial broadcaster, with the advertising 
benefits such scale brings. In such a scenario, should they be asked to do more to 
justify that prominence – and should we hold them to account more for the quality of 
their output? Without regulation, they would have to rely on the status and appeal of 
their shows to justify such prominence.  
 
Recommendation 5: Public service television must be defined better, sold better 
– and be better 
 
Outside broadcasting and political circles, how many people really know what public 
service television is? Ofcom’s research found serious gaps in public understanding. If 
we view it as such a public good, should it not be sold to the public better? 
First, of course, we must be clear about what it is. We should perhaps start by 
defining public service television less generally; should we be calling ITV and 
Channel 5 ‘public service broadcasters’ when this is far from a sufficient description 
of them? Maybe we need to think more in terms of public service programmes, as the 
public increasingly does.717 […] The task of ‘selling’ public service television need 
not be overwhelmingly difficult. All organisations that lie somewhere between the 
purely profit-seeking and the state have to justify receiving any kind of public 
  
subsidy.718 There are ways of explaining why not everything worthwhile need be 
popular. For example, there is a value in something that you do not currently watch 
but might choose to watch one day, and a value in something you have no intention of 
ever watching but are glad that other people can watch. These kinds of ideas are not 
complicated and can bolster the validity of content that appears to have limited 
appeal.719 
But nothing will boost the case for public service television like the 
programmes themselves. A notable finding of Ofcom’s research was the public’s 
tendency to be more concerned with whether content was good or bad rather than 
designated public service or not.720 There are definitely areas where broadcasters 
could do better: a personal wish list would include more investigative journalism, 
more challenging documentaries, a revival of regional (not local) programming, and 
better long-form drama to emulate the heights reached by recent American shows. 
This kind of programming is not cheap and it may be necessary for more ‘popular’ 
programmes to lose out as a result. Real quality of output, however, will provide the 
best argument in favour of public service television in the 21st century. 
  
  
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUTTNAM REPORT721 
 
General 
 
The UK’s public service television system is a vital political, economic and cultural 
resource and should be viewed as an ecology that needs careful protection and 
coordination. Public service media should not be viewed as synonymous with market 
failure and therefore should not be regulated simply in relation to the impact of their 
content and services on the wider media market. Principles of independence, 
universality, citizenship, quality and diversity need to be embedded into the regulation 
and funding of an emerging digital media landscape. 
 
1. In return for public service broadcasters meeting the obligations of their 
licences, their content should be guaranteed prominence on electronic 
programme guides, smart TVs and on the interfaces of on-demand players as 
they emerge. 
 
2. Retransmission fees should be paid by pay-TV platforms to public service 
television operators to address the current undervaluation of public service 
content by these distributors. 
 
3. Ofcom should supplement its occasional reviews of public service 
broadcasting with a regular qualitative audit of public service content in order 
to ensure that audiences are being served with high-quality and diverse 
programming. This should include detailed data on the representation and 
  
employment of minority groups and a comprehensive account of the changing 
consumption patterns of younger audiences. 
 
4. Ofcom should continue to monitor the independent production sector and 
take action, where necessary, if consolidation continues to increase and if 
diversity of supply is affected. 
 
The BBC 
 
We support the inclusion of diversity as a specific public purpose for the BBC but 
strongly reject the abolition of the purpose focusing on the delivery of emerging 
communications technologies and services to the public. We believe the BBC should 
be encouraged to pursue networked innovation, to embrace the internet and to develop 
a range of content and services for the online world. 
 
The BBC should continue to provide mixed programming and cater to all audiences 
as well as competing with other broadcasters to produce high quality programmes. 
The BBC needs to demonstrate further commitments to creative ambition and to 
address shortfalls in specific areas, for examples its services to BAME audiences, its 
relationships with audiences in the devolved nations, its institutional commitment to 
impartiality and its willingness to embrace new types of collaborative partnerships. 
 
5. The government should replace the licence fee as soon as is practically 
possible with a more progressive funding mechanism such as a tiered 
platform-neutral household fee, a supplement to Council Tax or funding via 
  
general taxation with appropriate parliamentary safeguards. We do not believe 
that advertising or subscription are appropriate to the aspiration that BBC 
content and services should be free at the point of use. 
 
6. The government should hand over decision-making concerning the funding 
of the BBC to an independent advisory body that works on fixed settlement 
periods. 
 
7. The BBC should be reconstituted as a statutory body, as with Channel 4, 
thus abolishing its royal charter or – at the very minimum – providing 
statutory underpinning to a continuing royal charter. 
 
8. Appointments to the BBC’s new unitary board should be entirely 
independent from government. We recommend that the process should be 
overseen by a new independent appointments body and based on a series of 
tests drawn up by the former commissioner for public appointments, Sir David 
Normington. There should be an opportunity for BBC staff to take part in the 
selection of at least some board members while representative voices from the 
devolved nations must be involved in selecting the members for Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 
9. If Ofcom is handed the responsibility of regulating the BBC, it must be 
given the resources and the structures to regulate the BBC independently of 
both government and its commercial rivals. 
 
  
Channel 4 
 
Channel 4 occupies a critical place in the public service ecology – supporting the 
independent production sector and producing content aimed specifically at diverse 
audiences. 
 
10. Channel 4 should not be privatised – neither in full or in part – and we 
believe that the government should clarify its view on Channel 4’s future as 
soon as possible. 
 
11. Channel 4 should significantly increase its provision for older children and 
young adults and restore some of the arts programming that has been in 
decline in recent years. 
 
12. Channel 4 should continue to innovate and experiment across different 
platforms and it should aim to arrest the fall in the number of independent 
suppliers that it works with. 
 
ITV and Channel 5 
 
We believe both ITV and Channel 5 should remain part of the public service 
television ecology but that they have been contributing less to it than they might have. 
 
  
13. We recommend that ITV and Channel 5 continue to receive the privileges 
afforded to other public service broadcasters but we believe that their 
commitment to public service needs to be strengthened. 
 
14. Ofcom should be asked to conduct a major review of how best ITV can 
contribute to the PSM ecology for the next decade and beyond, including 
explicit commitments for programming and investment, alongside a fresh look 
at the range of regulatory support that can be offered. 
 
15. ITV should be asked to take on a more ambitious role in regional TV and 
in current affairs. Measures to be considered might include increasing the 
minimum amount of regional current affairs from 15 to 30 minutes a week and 
an increase in network current affairs output to the equivalent of 90 minutes a 
week.  
 
16. Channel 5’s voluntary commitment to children’s programing should from 
now on be embedded in its licence, with specific commitments to UK-
originated children’s content, in return for the channel continuing to receive 
the benefits of its public service status. 
 
A new fund for public service content 
 
We recognise that there are important new sources of public service content coming 
from commercial operators such as Sky and Discovery as well as subscription video-
on-demand services like Netflix and Amazon. We note, however, that this output is 
  
dependent on the extent to which it serves a larger commercial purpose and it not part 
of any regulatory obligation. We also note the importance of traditional public service 
television providers in creating an environment in which commercial operators are 
able to thrive through their investment in training and high quality content, which 
boosts the ‘brand’ of television in the UK. 
 
We wish to highlight the growing contribution to a digital media ecology of a broad 
range of cultural institutions – including museums, performing arts institutions and 
community organisations – who are producing video content in areas such as science 
and the arts.  
 
17. In order to increase the levels, quality and security of this provision, we 
propose to set up a new fund for public service content. This would consist of 
a series of digital innovation grants – the DIG – that would be open to cultural 
institutions and small organisations that are not already engaged in 
commercial operations. 
 
18. DIG funding would not be limited to linear video content but to other 
forms of digital content that have demonstrable public service objectives and 
purposes. We would expect applicants to partner with existing public service 
broadcasters and platform owners in order to promote their content. 
 
19. The DIG would be funded by the proceeds of a levy on the revenues of the 
largest digital intermediaries and internet service providers and would be 
disbursed by a new independent public media trust. 
  
 
Diversity 
 
There is clear evidence of dissatisfaction with the performance of public service 
television from ethnic, regional, national and faith-based minorities and it is vital that 
PST operators address these issues if they are to retain any legitimacy with these 
audiences.  
 
There is also evidence that the television workforce is not representative of the wider 
UK population and that there is a systematic under-representation of, for example, 
ethnic minorities and those from poorer backgrounds at top levels of the industry.  
 
We welcome the various ‘diversity strategies’ adopted by all broadcasters, but these 
have not achieved the desired change either in representation or employment. We 
believe that there are systemic failures that account for an enduring lack of diversity 
on- and off-screen and therefore that more systemic solutions are required alongside 
the setting of targets and provision of training schemes. 
 
20. The 2010 Equality Act should be amended so that public service television 
commissioning and editorial policy would be covered by public service 
equality duties. 
 
21. A renewed commitment to diversity must be accompanied by sufficient 
funds. We agree with the proposal by Lenny Henry that the BBC (and in our 
view other public service broadcasters) should ringfence funding – taking its 
  
cue from the BBC’s funding of its nations and regions output – that is 
specifically aimed at BAME productions (though this could apply to other 
minority groups in the future). 
 
Nations and regions 
 
The public service television system has failed to reflect the changing constitutional 
shape of the UK such that audiences in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the 
English regions are being under-served. We believe that the English regions have 
failed to benefit from the existing ‘nations and regions’ strategies of the main public 
service broadcasters and that the broadcasters have a responsibility to shift both 
production and infrastructure to areas that are currently marginalised. 
 
We welcome the increase in ‘out of London’ production as well as recent 
commitments from public service broadcasters to step up their investment in the 
devolved nations. We are concerned, however, that their proposals will fail to 
challenge the underlying centralisation of the UK television ecology.  
 
We propose a ‘devolved’ approach to public service television that ultimately aims at 
sharing responsibility for broadcasting matters between the UK parliament and the 
devolved nations. 
 
22. Commissioning structures and funding need to better reflect devolutionary 
pressures and budgets for spending in the devolved nations should be wholly 
controlled by commissioners in those nations. 
  
 
23. We firmly believe that it is time for a ‘Scottish Six’ – and indeed a ‘Welsh 
Six’ and a ‘Northern Irish Six’. 
 
24. The government (or governments in the future) should both protect and 
enhance funding aimed at minority language services that play such a crucial 
role in maintaining cultural diversity and identity. The government needs to 
identify stable sources of funding for S4C other than the BBC in its review of 
the channel in 2017. 
 
25. The BBC should be allowed to revisit its local television proposal and 
strike up meaningful partnerships with a range of commercial and not-for-
profit news organisations in order to galvanise television at the local level. 
 
Genres and content diversity 
 
We note that there has been a decline in investment in some of the genres traditionally 
associated with public service television: arts, current affairs and children’s 
programming. Other genres, for example drama and sports, have been negatively 
affected by rising costs and competition from heavily capitalised commercial rivals.  
 
Regulators and broadcasters need to work together to consider how best to address 
these pressures in order to maintain a diverse public service ecology. There should be 
no automatic assumption that a particular genre is no longer ‘affordable’. 
 
  
We believe that the creation of the Digital Innovation Grants (DIG) fund will create 
significant opportunities for a broader range of public service organisations to 
contribute to reversing the decline in, for example, arts, history, science, religious and 
children’s programming. 
 
We note the decline in viewing of television news across the main public service 
broadcasters, especially among younger audiences. We believe that this is partly due 
to wider changes in consumption patterns but also that new sources of news are 
providing an energetic and robust challenge to television bulletins that are sometimes 
seen as ‘staid’ and unrepresentative. 
 
We note that there has been a steady migration of live sports from free to air channels 
to pay TV and that the vast majority of sports coverage is now to be found on pay TV 
channels. Public service broadcasters are increasingly unable to compete with 
companies like Sky and BT in rights to the most popular sports. While some 46% of 
all investment in first-run original programming in the UK is devoted to sports, only a 
small proportion of the audience is able fully to benefit from this. 
 
26. At a time of increasing disengagement with mainstream political parties, 
public service news content ought to adopt a model of journalism that is less 
wedded to the production of consensus politics and more concerned with 
articulating differences. 
 
27. We have earlier recommended that Channel 4 significantly increases its 
provision for older children and young adults, while Channel 5 should have its 
  
commitment to children’s programming embedded in its licence. The BBC 
must also be required to maintain its engagement with younger audiences and 
to reverse its recent cuts in this area.  
 
28. We support the efforts of the European Broadcasting Union to protect 
audiences’ access to major sporting events and believe that the government 
needs to protect the number of ‘listed events’ available to UK audiences on a 
free-to-air basis. 
 
Talent development and training 
 
Employment in the television industry is growing but it is a sector that, due to some 
significant barriers to entry, does not yet reflect the demographic make-up of the UK. 
There is an urgent need for a more consolidated approach to maximising entry-level 
opportunities and increasing investment in training and professional development at 
all levels of the industry.  
 
29. Creative Skillset, as the key industry body that is charged with developing 
skills and talent, should coordinate a sector-wide response to challenges 
concerning entrance into and training within the television industry.   
 
30. The government should meet urgently with industry bodies and 
broadcasters to consider how best to make the forthcoming apprenticeship 
levy work effectively for the television industry. 
  
  
AFTERWORD 
Vana Goblot and Natasha Cox722 
 
The Inquiry into the Future of Public Service Television examined the role and 
purpose of public service television during what were (and remain) turbulent times for 
the industry. From new players and platforms settling in and expanding our television 
experience in the UK, to genuine government threats to the historical continuum of 
public service institutions, the current period is one in which upholding and 
strengthening PSB’s key principles—such as universality, quality and diversity—
seems to us to be more important than ever before.  
In the course of a short but intense period in 2015-2016, our focus as members 
of the core team of the Inquiry was to bring together television industry professionals, 
civil society groups, academics and campaigners in order to facilitate discussions and 
findings about the best way forward to ensure a robust and diverse public service 
ecology. We gathered together more than 50 submissions (and even penned one of 
them723), organised fourteen events,724 and held regular meetings in order to consider 
the much-needed guidance by our two advisory bodies.725 Across the Inquiry’s own 
social media platforms—Twitter, Facebook and a YouTube channel—conversations 
ranged from audience representation and diversity to what a future Communications 
Act might look like. All of this proved essential in formulating ideas for the final 
report as our task was to consider how best to embed public service principles in a 
diverging and unsettling digital world. Judging by the response we have received to 
the report, we would like to think that, by and large, we met this brief. However, 
while were busy working through a broad and dissonant range of positions and 
arguments, we were also aware that we were only skirting around some bigger 
  
questions facing the television industry. While we hope that this volume goes a step 
further in updating research originally produced for the Inquiry with important 
contributions by industry professionals and international scholars, we believe there 
are two issues that remain underdeveloped: the significance of the independent 
production sector and the contribution of non-traditional sources of public service 
content.  
  
Public Service Values, Freelancers and the Independent Sector 
 
Public service television indisputably offers a range of qualities and values that 
remain essential for a healthy democracy. It has also been at the forefront of 
technological innovations like internet-distributed television: take, for example, the 
BBC’s online news, red-button technology and the iPlayer. But if the PSBs are to 
continue being media pioneers, they might want to reconfigure and reimagine what 
the independent sector can offer to an evolving public service media environment. 
We believe that PSBs play a central part in supporting the independent 
television production sector. But more needs to be done in an environment of 
increased competition, especially one fueled by the consolidation and dominance of 
‘super-indies’ and their focus on international sales, both of which are, according to 
Natasha Cox, ‘stunting creative freedoms’.726 The launch of BBC Studios in 2016 
could be seen as an important step to readjust this market imbalance. However, we are 
yet to witness how BBC Studios’ newfound ability to directly compete with the 
independent sector will contribute either to the strengthening of the BBC’s public 
service mission or to satisfying the government’s appetite for more competition in the 
media market. Indeed, it is too early to be sure whether BBC Studios will offer more 
  
creative freedom to independent producers or simply maintain the power of 
commissioners inside the Corporation.  
Furthermore, for a healthy PSB ecology, it is important to carefully consider 
the impact of this big brand’s entry into the market on smaller independent production 
companies. In order for the future of public service television to be more open and 
pluralistic, we may need to develop new relationships between broadcasters and all 
levels of the independent sector—not just the BBC and ‘super-indies’ but crucially, 
smaller units that are more organically tied to communities and interest groups—in 
the interest of delivering a broader range of public service content.   
While our Inquiry attended to some of these concerns, the desired focus may 
have been overshadowed by other more pressing issues facing public service 
organisations. Threats to diminish the BBC’s scope and serious deliberations to 
privatise the publicly owned Channel 4 required robust and focused responses. As 
Lord Puttnam observed at the Inquiry’s launch event727, the BBC has been ‘a 
permanently endangered, permanently threatened organisation’ and public service 
organisations can only prosper ‘in an atmosphere of confidence.’728 Indeed, 
independent television production can only thrive if it is supported by confident, 
‘healthy 21st century broadcasters.’729 
With these threats seemingly averted for the time being, British television 
continues to demonstrate why it continues to be one of the leading creative industries: 
producing multi-award winning programmes – from Channel 4’s Educating Yorkshire 
and Gogglebox to the BBC’s Storyville strand with Nick Fraser at the helm as 
commissioning editor. At the heart of this success is an independent production sector 
that attracts programme makers from different backgrounds and that brings in a 
greater diversity of perspectives, services and choice. If we want television to provide 
  
a more honest and accurate portrayal of life outside what many see as the privileged 
bubbles that dominate UK society, the BBC needs to nurture relationships as a curator 
across its platforms, to see the value and variety in working with freelancers in order 
to breathe fresh air into the Corporation. 
 
Hidden in Plain Sight? New Sources of Public Service Content 
 
The Puttnam report revealed the resilience of the viewing figures of public service 
channels. Despite the exponential rise of online streaming services, the five main PSB 
channels still account for over half of total TV viewing.730 While there is a steadily 
widening gap between old and young viewers, even the latter are reported to watch 
over two hours of TV content daily.731 With UK subscription to VOD services such as 
Netflix and Amazon Prime on the rise,732 traditional PSB broadcasters are responding 
to the connected world in order to keep pace with audiences’ changing consumption 
habits. For example, BBC Three—now exclusively online—commissions something 
‘that has public service value in the short form space’, according to its controller, 
Damian Kavanagh, and values how audiences respond on Twitter and Facebook as 
much as ratings.  
Yet Vice, a media giant, synonymous with cutting-edge, provocative content 
that originally eschewed traditional platforms went the other way and, in October 
2016, launched a UK TV channel, Viceland. Undeterred by gloomy reports of how 
the new initiative was progressing,733 it soon began discussing plans to launch a TV 
studio in order to develop scripted programmes.734 At the time of writing, Vice 
remains a pioneering and somewhat isolated example of this reverse move. Yet, even 
so, it highlights how important it is to keep a fresh view of the dynamics between 
  
platforms and content and the importance that partnerships play in the mix, as attested 
by Vice and the Guardian joining forces in December 2016 in order to develop new 
media formats across different genres and platforms.735  
Indeed, our report sought to highlight that public service is an ecology situated 
in a multiplatform, connected world, and that its content therefore can no longer be 
seen as limited to the traditional public service broadcasting providers.736 We were 
also frequently presented with arguments that some of the content produced by non-
public service broadcasters is made to engage with viewers who feel they are 
underserved by traditional PSBs. According to Shane Smith, the CEO of Vice, 
‘elusive’ young, diverse audiences do have an appetite for intellectually stimulating 
content. In his 2106 MacTaggart Lecture, he argued that challenging topics such as 
climate change and LGBTQ issues are all of interest to 16 – 24 year olds, yet they are 
very rarely covered by established television companies.737 Similarly, short-form 
expert Luke Hyams, sections of whose talk at the Inquiry’s launch is reproduced in 
this volume, insists that it is not only the choice of topics but also the tone and 
positioning of content that is crucial. He spoke powerfully of what he saw as the 
failure of ‘due impartiality’ in the BBC’s coverage of the 2011 London Riots to 
address issues of particular relevance to younger audiences and identified the broader 
issue of institutional political bias as one of the key reasons why sections of 
Generation Z have started to abandon traditional broadcasters.  
Our inquiry made several attempts to further probe this perceived gap in 
provision and to engage with the online platforms and social media that extend and 
enrich public service provision, but we faced some difficult issues. These were less 
about the reluctance of traditional public service providers to engage with these 
questions or the result of a clichéd ‘commercial’ versus ‘publicly owned’ binary. 
  
Instead, they involved rather more abstract and intangible problems: how do we 
involve non-PSB content providers when ‘they’ are not defining their own work as 
‘public service content’? And how do we persuade this highly individualised, 
unsystematised and unregulated sector of YouTubers and multiplatform independent 
companies even to begin to consider potential continuities between their socially 
engaged content and more traditional public service approaches? As much as social 
media can deliver the experience of communality and conversation, involving this 
disparate community in a dialogue about the future was by no means straightforward 
while the formal response from self-styled ‘technology platforms’ such as Facebook 
and Google was that of political neutrality and polite distance from the topic.  
If we learnt anything in the time between the launch of our report and the 
publication of this volume, it is that this experience of detachment has become 
increasingly problematic with the emergence of ‘fake news’ on the one hand and the 
enormous influence of these companies on the other. We are yet to witness the 
ideological transformation of these technology giants into responsible and fully-
fledged media organisations, let alone institutions with formal public service 
responsibilities. What we know for sure is that we urgently need an open debate on 
the importance of public service principles beyond established platforms and 
institutions. Perhaps this is a topic for a future independent Inquiry. 
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